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ABSTRACT 
 
This interpretive study explores the effect of employee share ownership (ESO) plans 
(SIP, EMI and SAYE) on employee attitudes and behaviours at work by taking into 
account the role of Psychological Ownership (PO), characterised by feelings of "mine" 
and "ours". The key concepts and relationships specified in positivist causal models of 
ESO and PO were translated into a set of interview questions and were used to explore 
with 37 ESO plan participants and 9 ESO plan managers whether the causal models fit 
with the way they explain for themselves their experiences of and reactions to employee 
share ownership. In doing this, the study has responded to suggestions made in the 
research literature to compare the attitudinal effects of different types of employee 
ownership, avoid the manipulation of large, readily available data sets, and to provide 
insights into the causal processes surrounding ESO.  
 
Overall, three main themes can be identified from employees’ responses, which 
appeared to have some influence on whether or not the share plan was felt to have an 
impact. First, employees’ interest in making money, and expectations of whether they 
would, played a large part in their explanations of ESO’s impact. A number of 
employees felt the share plan helped retain them in the organisation. However, this did 
not appear to be because the plan was making then more committed, in the sense that 
they would feel more emotionally attached, or a greater sense of identification with the 
company. Instead, the plan was retaining employees by causing them to make an 
assessment of the costs associated with leaving (continuance commitment). Second, 
many of the ESO outcomes featured in the academic literature were already felt to be 
experienced by employees at work and ESO was felt to only be able to add in a small 
way to what was already being experienced. Finally, in some situations ESO 
represented something quite meaningful to employees. ESO was sometimes interpreted 
as being a sign that the company valued employees, wanted them to feel part of the 
company, or that the employees were important to the company. The offer to participate 
in ESO was interpreted in some cases as being an acknowledgement of hard work, and 
an indication of how the company wanted employees to feel. This was found to enhance 
ESO’s capacity to impact how employees felt at work.  
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However, with regards to most outcomes explored in this study, employees reported 
little or no impact from ESO. Findings suggested that the ESO plans, even when they 
were felt to lead to feelings of PO, provided little incentive to work harder. PO was also 
found to play little or no part in employees’ explanations of how share plans had an 
impact – or why they did not. Employees felt they had a long wait before making a 
financial return and no tangible day to day benefits of ESO. This led the plans, and the 
potential gains that could be made, to be perceived as very long term, and easily 
forgotten.  
 
Finally, this study highlights a mismatch between the causal models of ESO and PO, the 
conventional wisdom of ESO, the views of the ESO managers, and the interpretations of 
the employees who were interviewed –and raises the question of whether ESO achieves 
what it is intended (and often believed) to achieve.  
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
ESO is a form of employee financial participation designed to encourage employees to 
acquire shares (sometimes referred to as stock) in the company in which they work 
(Pendleton, 2010), and to give employees the right to share in the wealth of that 
company (Landau et al. 2007).  
 
According to Sengupta et al. (2007: 1507), “recent years have seen the advent of a wide 
range of worker-focused holistic approaches by firms in search of improved competitive 
performance in their product markets, and ESO has been accorded a pivotal role in this 
process”. The use of ESO plans (of various different forms) has grown over the past two 
decades, across Europe (McCarthy et al. 2010), and the US (Bryson and Freeman, 
2010), and has been “widely adopted in Eastern countries” (Liu et al. 2009: 148). 
 
In the UK, Pendleton (2010: 158) states that ESO plans have been strongly supported by 
governments for many years “on the grounds that share ownership will create an 
identity of interests between companies and their employees, leading to enhanced 
company performance”.  
 
Given that ESO plans can give employees a stake in the company they work for, and an 
opportunity to share in the wealth that is created, there are some fairly convincing 
theoretical and common sense reasons to think that ESO should bring benefits. These 
might include increased incentives to work hard; better alignment of interests of 
employees and employers; a workforce that likes performance related reward; 
incentives to stay in the company; and a willingness to share information for the sake of 
the common good.  
 
1.2 Employee Share Ownership (ESO) Theory and Research 
 
As will be shown in chapter 2, the consensus among those involved in promoting and 
managing ESO plans seems to be that ESO is a good thing; that it positively influences 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours, and that ESO has a positive influence on company 
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performance. UK Governments continue to support ESO, and are vocal about its 
benefits. For example, in a 2006 speech UK Conservative Prime Minister David 
Cameron (then leader of the opposition) stated “I believe that employee share 
ownership is good for companies and good for society. It creates a common bond 
between employees and aligns them with the interests of the company” (Rt Hon David 
Cameron, 2006).  
 
In contrast, (as will be shown in chapter 3) the academic literature overall does not 
provide the same overwhelmingly positive signs that ESO is, without doubt, a positive 
impact on the way employees think, feel and behave. There does not appear to be a 
general consensus in the academic research literature whether ESO does or does not 
have positive or significant influences on the way employees think, feel and behave at 
work.  
 
This study takes into consideration a number of the suggestions made in the academic 
research literature which may help lead to a better understanding of the mixed findings. 
A number of studies support the need to consider attitudinal effects of different types of 
employee ownership (e.g. Kaarsemaker et al. 2010; Sengupta et al. 2010;  Poutsma et al. 
2006) and to avoid “the manipulation of large, readily available data sets, which have 
dominated previous studies” (Knyght et al. 2010: 1316). In addition, it has also been 
suggested that future research should concentrate more on detailed studies of individual 
firms that have adopted ESO (Knyght et al. 2010) and that in future research qualitative 
data could add value by providing insights into the causal processes (Sengupta et al. 
2010).  
 
The core of this study draws on the work of Pierce et al. (1991) who suggested that 
ownership was unlikely to have a direct or independent impact on employee attitudes 
and behaviours. It was observed by Pierce et al. (1991) that research literature had 
provided neither consistent empirical observations nor a well-developed theoretical 
explication of the process through which ESO may have an impact. Pierce et al. (1991) 
therefore developed a model of ESO effects and proposed a number of intervening 
stages and moderating effects that serve to delineate the process through which ESO 
operates. Pierce et al. (1991) produced an elaborate network of relationships articulating 
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a set of conditions through which ownership may produce some of its social-
psychological and behavioural effects.   
 
The ownership literature suggested to Pierce et al. (1991) that ownership can be 
commonly defined in terms of three basic and fundamental rights, each of which may be 
more or less present in certain ESO contexts. The rights identified by Pierce et al. 
(1991: 125) included:  
 
(1) The right to possession of some share of the owned objects physical being 
and/or financial value (equity).   
(2) The right to exercise influence (control) over the owned object (influence).  
(3) The right to information about the status of that which is owned 
(information).  
 
The operationalisation of ESO, an objectively defined state, through equity possession, 
information sharing, and influence was proposed to be positively and causally related to 
Psychological Ownership (PO).  
 
Later work by Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) went on to explore a number of experiences 
proposed to lead to feelings of PO, known as the routes to PO. These routes were used 
to explain how PO emerges. Pierce et al. (2001) proposed that feelings of PO arise from 
certain processes of association of the individual with that which PO is felt over (the 
target of ownership). The three routes (i.e., paths or mechanisms) through which PO 
was proposed to emerge included: (a) the amount of control an employee has over a 
particular organisational factor (control), (b) the extent to which an employee intimately 
knows a particular organisational factor (intimate knowledge), and (c) the extent to 
which an individual employee invests himself or herself into the potential target of 
ownership (investment of the self).  
 
Studies have since recognised comparisons that can be made between the rights of 
ownership (identified by Pierce et al. 1991), and the routes to PO. For example, Pierce 
et al. (2004a) observed that an ESO arrangement constructed around equity, 
information, and influence (ownership rights) more or less parallels the three routes to 
PO. A potential connection between ESO and the way in which PO may emerge (where 
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ESO is able to satisfy the PO routes) can therefore be observed. This connection has 
been recognised in few ESO studies, and has not been explored in any great depth.  
 
1.3 Positioning the study: Establishing Research Objectives 
 
In the Literature Review (chapters 2 and 3) the key concepts and relationships specified 
in positivist causal models of ESO and PO are presented in graphical form, and were 
translated into a set of interview questions. The questions were designed to explore 
whether the causal models (specified in the research literature) fit with the way 
employees explain for themselves their experiences of and reactions to employee share 
ownership.  
 
Taking an interpretive approach, this study explores ESO participants’ interpretations of 
the effect of ESO plans, by taking into account the role of PO, characterised by feelings 
of “mine” and “ours” (e.g. as applied in Van Dyne et al. 2004). This study explores 
different employees’ perceptions, and tries to explain what is happening in different 
cases when employee share plans are felt to have an impact, but also when they are not 
felt to have an impact. The qualitative design of this research centres on employees 
participating in an ESO plan in the UK, and aims to generate comprehensive and 
contextual information to address the following four research questions:  
 
1. What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO 
plans (SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over 
a target, coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
2. To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. 
their job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
3. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an 
important part of how UK ESO has an impact on their attitudes?  
4. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an 
important part of how UK ESO has an impact on their behaviours?  
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The study aimed to intensively examine the individual employee’s experience and focus 
on unique features of one setting (the company and the ESO plan participation). 
Furthermore, it aims to see, to what extent, the causal mechanisms specified in the 
research literature (which may or may not be true in an absolute sense) are authentic to 
the experience of those participating in ESO plans. To achieve these aims, the semi-
structured interviews were chosen as the data collection method (this decision is 
elaborated on in chapter 4).  
 
Following pilot interviews, 37 Interviews with ESO participants of the SIP, SAYE and 
EMI plans took place in 9 different companies in the UK, between November 2009 and 
September 2010. In addition, 1 interview was conducted with 1 ESO plan manager in 
each company, resulting in 46 interviews in total. Companies were located in different 
areas of the UK, as far north as Edinburgh, and as far south as London. The interviews 
ranged in length from twenty five minutes to over one hour, and all interviews were 
audio recorded with permission from both the contacts within the company (in most 
cases the manager of the ESO plan) and the interviewees. Data were analysed following 
a process of thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006: 78) – “a 
flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet 
complex, account of data”. Findings were then presented and discussed in the context of 
existing knowledge.   
 
1.4 Summary and Outline Structure  
 
This introductory chapter has briefly outlined the rationale for and objectives of this 
study. The content and structure of the proceeding seven chapters is as follows. Chapter 
2 will introduce employee share ownership (ESO) and the plans being explored in this 
study, presenting some of the differences between different forms of ESO and, 
specifically, plans in the UK. Following this the number and types of companies 
adopting tax advantaged ESO plans in the UK will be presented. Finally this chapter 
will consider the perception of ESO outside academia, among consultants and 
politicians, before providing a review of the academic research literature in chapter 3.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the impact ESO is often believed to have on employee attitudes 
and behaviours. This chapter explores PO as a possible explanation for how ESO may 
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influence the way employees think, feel and behave at work, incorporating the findings 
of ESO and PO studies. The review will conclude with a number of research questions 
to be explored.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological philosophy adopted for this study, before 
presenting the research design, and the decisions made relating to data collection and 
analysis. The credibility of the findings, with regards to reliability and validity, ethical 
considerations, and the methodological limitations of this study, will be addressed in the 
final part of this chapter. 
 
Chapters 5 through to 7 are data chapters. Research findings will be presented for each 
of the nine companies and will be organised into three main chapters, one chapter for 
each share plan (this will include: 3 companies with the SIP, 3 companies with the 
SAYE, and 3 companies with EMI schemes).  
 
Finally, chapter 8 draws together the findings of the study in relation to its objectives 
and assesses their theoretical and practical implications. The role PO is found to play in 
employees’ experiences and interpretations of ESO will be concluded in this chapter.    
 
In summary, this research focuses on providing an in-depth account of the differences 
employees participating in an ESO plan in the UK, believe the plan makes to the ways 
they think, feel and behave, particularly regarding their relationship with their 
employer. A small number of studies in the research literature have theorised that ESO 
can enhance employees’ sense of Psychological Ownership (PO) and lead to changes in 
behaviour and attitudes, however, these connections have not yet been tested 
thoroughly. The study pays specific attention to the role of PO and explores the extent 
to which PO, and theories associated with it in the research literature, are reflected in 
employee explanations. The study adopts a loose conceptual framework, drawn from 
the literature review findings and the identification of key concepts and relationships, to 
explore with employees how they explain for themselves their experiences of ESO.  
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CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will introduce employee share ownership (ESO) and the plans being 
explored in this study, presenting some of the differences between different forms of 
ESO and, specifically, plans in the UK. Following this the number and types of 
companies adopting tax advantaged ESO plans in the UK will be presented. Finally this 
chapter will consider the perception of ESO outside academia, among consultants and 
politicians, before providing a review of the academic research literature in chapter 3.   
 
2.2 What is Employee Share Ownership (ESO)?    
 
According to Sengupta et al. (2007: 1507), “recent years have seen the advent of a wide 
range of worker-focused holistic approaches by firms in search of improved competitive 
performance in their product markets, and ESO has been accorded a pivotal role in this 
process”. Although there are many different types of ESO plans across the world, most 
can be described as being a form of employee financial participation designed to 
encourage employees to acquire stock (shares) in the company in which they work 
(Pendleton, 2010), and to give employees the right to share in the wealth of that 
company (Landau et al. 2007).  
 
Pendleton (2010) states that ESO plans have been strongly supported by UK 
governments for many years “on the grounds that share ownership will create an 
identity of interests between companies and their employees, leading to enhanced 
company performance”. In the UK, the Finance Act 2000 (Schedule 8, Section 47, Part 
1, 2000) defines an ESO plan, as follows:  
 
1. An employee share ownership plan means a plan established by a company 
providing  
a. for shares (free shares) to be appropriated to employees without 
payment, or 
b. for shares (partnership shares) to be acquired on behalf of employees 
out of sums deducted from their salary. 
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2. A plan that provides for partnership shares may also provide for shares 
(matching shares) to be appropriated without payment to employees in 
proportion to the partnership shares acquired by them. 
3. Where a plan contains provision for all, or more than one, of the kinds of 
shares mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), it may leave it for the 
company to decide when the provisions relating to each kind of share are to 
have effect. 
4. In this Schedule, in relation to an employee share ownership plan “the 
company” means the company which established the plan. 
 
The Finance Act 2000 also defines the purpose of an employee share ownership plan, 
stating:  
 
1. The purpose of the plan must be to provide benefits to employees in the nature 
of shares in a company which give them a continuing stake in that company. 
2. The plan must not contain, and the operation of the plan must not involve, 
features which are neither essential nor reasonably incidental to that purpose.  
 
2.2.1 ESO Plans in this Study   
 
In the UK, currently, there are 4 different types of HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs) approved (tax-advantaged) share plans (ifs Proshare, 2011a). Two of these 
plans are known as all-employee plans, and two are discretionary. In contrast to an all-
employee plan, discretionary plans allow companies to choose which employees they 
would like to participate. In an all-employee plan, all eligible employees and directors 
must be invited to participate in the plan. The four plans are listed below:  
 
All-Employee Schemes  
1. Save as you Earn (SAYE)  
2. The Share Incentive plan (SIP)  
 
Discretionary Schemes  
3. Company Share Option plan (CSOP)  
4. Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) 
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Of the four tax-advantaged share plans in the UK, three are share option plans. The SIP 
however, provides shares in a variety of ways (ifs Proshare, 2011a). A share option is 
defined as follows:  
 
“A share option is a right to buy a share at a future date at a fixed price. This 
price will frequently be the same as the market value of the share at the date the 
option is granted, but sometimes it might be more or less” (ifs Proshare, 2011a). 
 
Of the four HMRC approved (tax-advantaged) share plans in the UK, the sponsors of 
this study (ifs Proshare) expressed their interest in understanding more about the impact 
of the SAYE, SIP and EMI plans on employee attitudes and behaviours at work. The 
SAYE and SIP are the two most frequently used, government approved, all employee 
share schemes in the UK and the sponsors were therefore keen to understand more 
about their impact. Of the discretionary schemes, the EMI scheme (an ESO plan 
specifically designed for small businesses and does not have to be offered to all 
employees) is more frequently adopted by companies than the CSOP and was chosen to 
contrast the SIP and SAYE – both of which are all employee plans that can be operated 
in large companies.  
 
2.3 Mainstream and Majority Employee Share Ownership 
 
ESO is not only a UK phenomenon. It has been reported that the use of ESO plans (of 
various different forms) has grown over the past two decades, across Europe (McCarthy 
et al. 2010: 383), and the US (Bryson and Freeman, 2010: 2), and it is also stated that 
ESO has been “widely adopted in Eastern countries” (Liu et al. 2009: 148). However, 
around the world “ESO can take several different forms” (Kaarsemaker et al. 2010: 
317) and can give employees an opportunity to become shareholders, and share in the 
company’s wealth, in different ways. In some forms of ESO, employees (collectively) 
own a substantial proportion, or the majority of company shares; in others, employees 
own a small minority of company shares.  
 
Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 317) provides a very clear distinction between different types 
of ESO plans, differentiating between majority ESO and mainstream ESO. Employee 
ownership in a majority employee owned firm sometimes occurs following an employee 
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buyout or when an existing owner wants to pass on the business to employees. 
Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 317) state that in the USA and UK, majority ESO has often 
been achieved via an ESOP, where, on behalf of employees, shares are acquired by a 
trust. In most cases, according to Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 317), “the shares will be 
distributed over time to individual employees, but in some cases the shares are held in 
trust in perpetuity so that there is collective ownership”. John Lewis is an example of 
majority ESO (a majority employee owned firm) in the UK.   
 
In mainstream ESO, as stated by Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 317), ESO may be “one of 
several components of the company’s reward package, and employees may have little 
expectation or interest in participating in governance and management”. Kaarsemaker et 
al. (2010: 317) suggests that in this situation, employees may be more financially 
orientated. This (mainstream ESO) is in contrast to majority employee owned firms, 
where Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 317) states “employees have a strong sense of 
ownership, and may expect to be deeply involved in the governance and management of 
the firm”.  
 
Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 318) identifies three different ways in which employees 
typically acquire shares in mainstream ESO. These are listed below with some added 
examples of ESO plans in the UK and USA (two countries where a large proportion of 
ESO research has been carried out) that share these characteristics:   
 
1. “Donation of shares by the company to employees or the purchase of shares 
on employees’ behalf by the company”   
a. (E.g. The Share Incentive plan (SIP) in the UK; Employee Stock 
Ownership plans (ESOPs) in the US).  
2. “Purchase of shares by employees, typically on favourable terms”.  
a. (E.g. The Share Incentive plan (SIP) in the UK; The 401 (k) Pension 
plan; The Employee Stock Purchase plan (ESPP) in the US).  
3. “Share options. Employees take out options to purchase shares at some point 
in the future”. 
a. (E.g. Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI); Save as You Earn 
(SAYE); Company Share Option Scheme (CSOP) in the UK; The 
Incentive Stock Option Plan in the US).  
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2.4 Employee Share Ownership: SAYE, SIP and EMI  
 
The focus of this study is on three different forms of mainstream ESO in the UK. This 
includes two all-employee ESO plans (SAYE, SIP) and one discretionary ESO plan 
(EMI).  
 
HMRC outline detailed information relating to ESO in the UK, to inform and help 
companies wishing to set up and run an ESO plan (HMRC, 2011a; 2011b). There are 
also a number of companies administering and/or providing information about ESO in 
the UK, such as Postlethwaite, (an employee share scheme specialist law firm) 
(Postlethwaite, 2011a), and a number of share plan administrators, including Rm2, 
(Rm2, 2011), and The Yorkshire Building Society (YBS, 2011). Drawing on 
information from these sources, key characteristics of the three plans are presented 
below.   
 
2.4.1 Save as You Earn (SAYE)  
 
The SAYE plan (sometimes referred to as Sharesave) is an all-employee scheme, 
meaning all eligible employees and directors must be invited to participate in the plan. 
However, participation in the scheme is not open to people who own more than 25% of 
the company. The scheme allows a company to give employees the right (option) to buy 
shares in the company at an exercise price that is fixed (discount of up to 20%) when 
the option is granted. Participating employees save between £5 and £250 per month 
under a SAYE savings contract lasting for three, five or seven years. The lump sum 
resulting from the SAYE contract (i.e. the employee’s savings) can be used to buy the 
shares if the employee chooses to exercise their options. Employees do not have to 
exercise their options and may not want to do so if the current share price is less than 
the exercise price set when the option was granted. If the option is not exercised, the 
employee receives the proceeds of the SAYE contract (savings). For the employee, the 
SAYE is therefore considered to be a low risk ESO plan.  
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2.4.2 Share Incentive Plan (SIP) 
 
In contrast to the SAYE, the SIP creates immediate employee shareholders. These 
employees, as shareholders, may therefore have the same voting rights and rights to 
dividends as other shareholders (more immediately than SAYE participants). The SIP 
has three key elements:  
 
 Free shares: employers can give employees up to £3,000 worth of shares 
each year; these shares can be allocated by the company at any time (within 
the annual limits).  
 Partnership shares: employees can buy up to £1,500 of shares out of pre-tax 
and National Insurance earnings; or up to 10 per cent of gross salary 
(whichever is less). These shares can be allocated by the company once, 
once a year, or every month. The company is also able to allow employees to 
have Partnership Share money deducted from their pay once a month for up 
to twelve months (known as an Accumulation Period). This money can then 
be used to buy Partnership Shares (Postlethwaite, 2011b). 
 Matching shares: employers can give up to 2 free shares for each partnership 
share bought by the employee. These shares are allocated at the same time as 
the Partnership Shares.  
 
Additionally any dividends paid out on shares acquired under this plan can be re-
invested in the plan (Dividend Shares). Any shares allocated to employees must be held 
on their behalf in a special SIP trust, normally for five years to ensure the income tax 
reliefs (Postlethwaite, 2011b). Dividend shares must normally be held for three years.  
 
The SIP can also have performance conditions attached to the award of shares. HMRC 
state: “Performance allowances are awards of free shares which are made only if a 
performance target is met or where the number or value of shares awarded depends on 
performance” (HMRC, 2011c). The HMRC also state that a SIP which provides for 
performance allowances must use performance measures which are: “based on business 
results or other objective criteria” and “fair and objective measures of the units to which 
they apply”. The performance criteria can vary between business units and can apply to 
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the performance of the whole company, sections, departments or units, or individual 
employees.  
 
2.4.3 Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) 
 
EMI offers tax-advantaged share options to help small, higher risk independent trading 
companies. EMI is open to qualifying companies or groups with gross assets not 
exceeding £30million (increased from £15million on 1 January 2002). In the EMI plan, 
selected employees can be granted options (at a fixed exercise price) over shares worth 
up to £120,000 at date of grant. Once an employee has been granted EMI options (or 
EMI and CSOP options) up to the £120,000 (£100,000 prior to 6 April 2008) limit, the 
employee must wait until three years after the last of these options was granted before 
he or she can be granted any more EMI qualifying options, even if some of the options 
have been exercised or released (HMRC, 2011a).   
 
Options can be granted at any exercise price, with no minimum period of exercise. The 
company may choose to grant EMI options over non-voting shares (as can be done with 
the SIP) or allow exercise of EMI options only on sale of the company. The option 
holder does not have to exercise the options, and may have the right to choose not to 
exercise the option and acquire shares, and instead receive a cash payment for the 
difference between exercise price and the market value of the shares. This type of 
arrangement is often known as a ‘cash cancellation payment’. Companies can have up 
to £3million of shares under EMI option at any one time; the maximum size of 
qualifying companies is 250 full-time equivalent employees.  
 
A comparison of some of the features of the three plans can be seen in the table below.  
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Table 1. A Comparison of Features: The SAYE, SIP and EMI Plans  
 
 SAYE (Introduced in 1980 in the UK) SIP (Introduced in 2000 in the UK) EMI (Introduced in 2000 in the UK) 
Minimum savings £5 per month. £10 per month. Can be granted options over shares worth up to £120,000. 
Maximum savings £250 per month. £125 per month - no more than 10% of gross salary. - 
Holding period No holding period, but there is a 3, 5 or 7 year 
option period. 
Companies can require employees to hold free and matching 
shares in the Share Incentive plan trust for up to five years. 
Dividend shares - three years.  
Companies can require employees to hold shares for a period of 
time; there is no minimum period of exercise. It must be possible 
for the option to be exercised within ten years from grant.  
Saving term 3 or 5 years. The company can allow participants to buy either monthly or at 
any period up to a maximum of 1 year.  
- 
Exercise Price Guaranteed. Not guaranteed. Options can be granted at any exercise price.  
Flexibility: Savings  No change can be made to amount saved.  Partnership shares: usually once in an accumulation period. - 
Ownership  After option is exercised shares are owned.  Immediate ownership (held in Trust). After option is exercised shares are owned. 
Tax relief Under an approved SAYE share option scheme, the 
employee does not pay income tax or National 
Insurance on the grant of options, the bonus or 
interest received under the SAYE contract, the 
benefit from being able to buy shares at a discounted 
price, or any increase in the market value of 
underlying shares between the dates on which the 
option was granted and exercised.  
Employees do not pay income tax or National Insurance on the 
value of the free or matching shares given to them provided they 
keep them in the plan for at least 5 years.  
No income tax or National Insurance is chargeable on either the 
grant or exercise of EMI options if: the options are exercised 
within 10 years of grant; the exercise price is the market value of 
the shares at the date the option is granted; and the company and 
employee qualifies for EMI throughout the period from the grant 
to exercise. If the option is granted at a discount, the amount of 
the discount is normally taxed on exercise and National Insurance 
may be payable.  
 Discount The exercise price can be discounted by up to 20%. Partnership Shares can be matched on a maximum of 2:1 basis.  Options can be granted at any exercise price.  
Capital gains tax 
(CGT) 
CGT is paid on the difference between the sale 
proceeds and exercise price of share option (subject 
to annual exemption limit). 
NO CGT if the shares are held in trust at the time of sale. If 
withdrawn from the Trust when the shares are sold, the cost for 
calculating capital gains tax liability (if any) is the market value 
of the shares on exit from the plan and not the market value at 
acquisition.  
If shares are sold for more than they cost, Capital Gains Tax may 
be payable on the gain.  
If Employee leaves 
Company  
The employee may be able to exercise options they 
already hold, but this depends on the reason why 
they left the company.  
If an employee leaves through dismissal or voluntary 
resignation, Free Shares or Matching Shares can be forfeit.  
A company can set up the plan so that if an employee leaves the 
employment, the share option will lapse and the employee will 
lose all their associated rights.  
Voting Rights Non-voting shares can be used, but this is unusual.  The company can put certain conditions on the shares: e.g. the 
shares may have limited or no voting rights.  
It is possible to limit voting rights. EMI options can be granted 
over non-voting shares.  
(Table adapted and modified from YBS, 2011)
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2.5 Company Adoption of Employee Share Ownership  
 
This section of chapter 2 will provide an overview of the number of companies in the UK 
operating approved ESO plans. This section will also consider why a company might wish 
to operate an ESO plan.  
 
2.5.1 Number of Companies Operating Tax-Advantaged Employee Share Plans 
 
According to Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 320), “certain kinds of firms are more likely to use 
ESO plans than others”. Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 321) asserts that (Mainstream) ESO 
plans “are mainly found in larger, stock market listed firms” and also “tend to be especially 
prevalent in the financial services sector”. Pendleton (2001) and Knyght et al. (2010: 1313) 
agree that this is due to employees having higher knowledge (than firms outside the 
financial sector) of the characteristics of the plans and greater familiarity with the use and 
concept of stock savings. Furthermore, Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 320) state, “Share 
ownership plans are most prevalent in the Anglo-American economies...because 
governments in these economies have passed legislation and offered tax concessions to 
promote these plans”.  
 
Bryson and Freeman (2010: 2) observed that by 2004, “one-fifth of British workplaces had 
share ownership plans covering one-third of private sector employees”. Recent HMRC 
figures of tax-advantaged ESO adoption in the UK, would suggest that the adoption of 
some ESO plans has continued to rise. Table 2 shows how the number of companies 
operating tax-advantaged employee share ownership schemes (by year scheme is in 
operation) increased from 5,180 in 2000-01, to 12,140 in 2008-09. However, Table 2 also 
shows that the number of companies operating tax-advantaged ESO schemes has not been 
increasing each year for every type of ESO plan. Whilst the EMI scheme figures have been 
increasing each year, SAYE figures have decreased from 1,110 in 2000-01 to 670 in 2008-
09. The number of companies operating the SIP increased each year from 2000 – 2007, 
however, by 2008-09 SIP numbers had fallen back to 2005-06 levels. As with the SAYE, 
CSOP figures also fell during 2000-2009. Since 2000, increased levels of tax-advantaged 
ESO plan adoption can therefore be attributed in most part to the growing use of the EMI 
and SIP.  
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Table 2. Companies with Tax-Advantaged Employee Share Schemes (Number of Companies Operating Tax-
Advantaged Employee Share Plans by Year Plan is in Operation) 
 
(HMRC, 2011a).  
 
2.5.2 Why do Companies Operate Employee Share Ownership Plans?  
 
Pendleton (2010: 157) states that over the last thirty years, UK governments have 
encouraged employees to acquire shares in their employer. The primary justification, 
according to Pendleton (2010: 157) has been the “promotion of an identity of interests 
between employees and their employer, so as to improve corporate performance”. Bryson 
and Freeman (2010: 2) infer that managers/owners within companies share this motivation, 
stating “firms introduce share ownership plans in the hope that ownership will align 
employee and employer objectives to increase productivity and profits”. Furthermore, 
Bryson and Freeman (2010: 2) suggest employers may be operating ESO plans because 
they satisfy employees’ desires for ownership, stating “many employees desire some form 
of ownership in the firm at which they work, so providing this benefit ought to increase 
their loyalty and willingness to work hard for the firm”.  
 
In addition to the impact ESO may have on the way employees think, feel and behave at 
work, there may be other motivations, related specifically to tax-advantaged ESO plans. 
For example, a company operating the SIP plan does not have to pay employer National 
Insurance on any pay used by employees to buy Partnership Shares (if the shares are left in 
trust for the full five years), which could, according to Postlethwaite (2011b), save a 
company up to £128 for every £1,000 invested by employees. Furthermore, the cost to the 
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company of awarding Free Shares or Matching Shares is deductible against corporation tax 
(Postlethwaite, 2011b).  
 
Other ESO plans also provide the company with tax/financial incentives. In the SAYE 
plan, “any gains enjoyed by employees may be treated as an expense of the employer 
company for corporation tax purposes” (Postlethwaite, 2011c), which again may act as a 
motivation. Likewise, in the EMI scheme, the company can “claim a deduction against 
corporation tax for the full amount of financial gain provided to employees who exercise 
their EMI options” (Postlethwaite, 2011a).  
 
2.6 ESO Rhetoric?  
 
Given that ESO plans can give employees a stake in the company they work for, and an 
opportunity to share in the wealth that is created, there are some fairly convincing 
theoretical and common sense reasons to think that ESO should bring benefits. For 
example, increased incentives to work hard; better alignment of interests of employees and 
employers; a workforce that likes performance related reward; incentives to stay in the 
company; and a willingness to share information for the sake of the common good.  
 
Outside academia, at least publically, the consensus among those involved in promoting 
and managing ESO plans seems to be that ESO is a good thing; that it positively influences 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours, and that ESO has a positive influence on company 
performance. Whilst it may be that those involved in managing ESO in companies believe 
they experience and witness the benefits of ESO in their day to day lives at work, this 
positive outlook on ESO may also be influenced by the many commercial consultancy 
reports, press releases and websites (most often aimed at industry professionals) which 
readily provide positive assessments of ESO. For example, David Craddock Consultancy 
Services (David Craddock Consultancy Services, 2010) (specialising in ESO) provide 10 
reasons on their website why companies and their advisers should consider the introduction 
of an employee share scheme arrangement. Reasons include:  
 
 To provide a basis for employee motivation and incentive. 
 To enable the company to meet its recruitment requirements. 
 To act as a retention tool for quality employees. 
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 To encourage consensus between shareholders, management and employees. 
 To enable employees to think like shareholders. 
 To encourage interest in the business from within the workforce. 
 
Similarly, The Employee Ownership Association (ESOA, 2010) provides a positive 
assessment of ESO, stating on their website that “a range of factors combine to make 
employee owned businesses an asset to the UK economy”. The ESOA state:   
 
 Independent research suggests that a combination of shared ownership and 
employee participation delivers superior business performance.  
 Because they’re co-owners, staff in employee owned businesses tend to be more 
entrepreneurial and committed to the company and its success.  
 Employee owned companies are good at innovation because managers go out of 
their way to consult, share information about the company, and give staff 
responsibility.  
 
Research reports outside academia, in the vast majority of known cases, conclude that ESO 
has a positive impact. In a Report for the HMRC in 2007, an independent consultancy 
(Oxera, 2007: 1) concluded that “employee share schemes can be used to incentivise 
employees to align their efforts with those of company owners, and thereby encourage 
them to work more productively”. It is not uncommon to read great claims of ESO’s 
powerful impact. Oxera (2007: 4) for example, stated that having any type of share scheme 
“increases (company) productivity by around 6.1% in the long run”.  
 
In 2008 Ipsos MORI (a UK market research company) also prepared a report for the 
HMRC, investigating employers’ perceptions of the EMI scheme. The report concluded 
that, “according to employers, EMI had been most successful in helping their companies 
retain key or skilled employees and improve staff motivation (79 per cent agreed with 
each), and the majority felt that EMI had improved their overall company performance (71 
per cent)” (Ipsos MORI, 2008: 5).  
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A press release in 2009 showed the results of a study commissioned by Computershare 
(share plan registrars) into its own employee share plans. In this study share plan 
participants and non-participants in the UK, Ireland, South Africa, Australia and the United 
States were surveyed with regards to their attitudes to ESO, their employer, general 
investment, plan design and the effects of the share plan. The press release concluded:  
 
 An employee who is a member of a company share plan works harder than one 
who is not;  
 Members (ESO participants) take less sick leave;   
 Members will stay longer with your company.   
 
Following the report, Stuart Crosby (CEO of Computershare) stated in the press release 
“...it’s great to finally be able to prove the difference that a share plan makes to a 
company”. A year later Equiniti (a UK based share registrar) also issued positive news in a 
press release of their survey of over 1,350 employees in the UK, stating that the results 
showed “a general increase in employee loyalty as a result of providing staff with shares in 
the companies they work” (Equiniti, 2010). Collectively, this ESO publicity sends strong 
messages to those in industry that ESO has the potential to benefit the organisation.  
 
This support for ESO extends further – to positions of authority. UK Governments for 
example, continue to support ESO, and are vocal in about the benefits of ESO. In a 2006 
speech UK Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron (then leader of the opposition) 
stated:  
 
“I believe that employee share ownership is good for companies and good for 
society. It creates a common bond between employees and aligns them with the 
interests of the company...And yet, despite all its clear benefits, businesses tell me 
that employee share ownership is becoming less, not more attractive. That is a 
position we must reverse” (Rt Hon David Cameron, 2006).  
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In 2003 Labour MP Dawn Primarolo (currently Labour MP for Bristol South, and Deputy 
Speaker of the House of Commons), whilst working as Paymaster General and Treasury 
Minister (with responsibility for employee share ownership), stated:  
 
“Employee share schemes provide a valuable way for companies to reward the 
commitment of their staff, and enable employees to gain a sense of the wider 
business and how the company as a whole is performing. Evidence shows that 
share schemes help companies achieve better results” (Rt Hon Dawn Primarolo, 
2003).   
 
More recently, in 2010 at a celebratory event at the House of Commons (held by ifs 
Proshare) to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the SAYE and the tenth anniversary of the 
SIP and EMI, Lord Newby, the Liberal Democrats’ Treasury spokesman in the House of 
Lords from 1999–2010, stated:  
 
“The government does a lot to incentivise programmes and they don’t always work. 
The great thing about share schemes is that they do work” (Lord Newby, 2010).   
 
Despite any theoretical disputes, or doubts regarding the significance of ESO’s impact that 
may exist in the academic research literature (see chapter 3), there are a number of 
organisations operating around the world promoting ESO, and many advocates of ESO that 
speak highly of its impact. In the UK for example, there are organisations that aim to 
“support employee share ownership, represent the (ESO) industry to policymakers, and the 
media” (ifs Proshare), “promote the spread of employee ownership in the UK economy” 
(The Employee Ownership Association, 2010), and “inform, lobby and research in the 
interest of developing all forms of broad-based ESO plans in the UK and Europe” (The 
Employee Share Ownership Centre, 2011). Governments around the world add weight to 
this, as they continue to support ESO, provide tax advantages to companies adopting them, 
and speak publicly in favour of the positive impact they have on employee attitudes and 
company performance.  
 
In contrast to the view often heard in industry/politics, as will be shown in chapter 3, the 
academic literature, overall, does not provide the same overwhelmingly positive signs that 
ESO is, without doubt, a positive impact on the way employees think, feel and behave. It 
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could therefore be argued that there is a mismatch between what has so far been found, 
overall, in academic studies (research evidence) and what is often communicated (ESO 
rhetoric) to the general population and industry professionals by commercial consultants, 
ESO advocates and politicians.  
 
2.7 Summary  
 
This chapter has introduced ESO and the plans being explored in this study, focusing 
specifically on ESO in the UK. The view of ESO outside of academia has been considered, 
drawing on commercial reports and public statements made by high profile politicians.  
 
Chapter 3 will present a review of the academic research literature that has attempted to 
understand if and how ESO has an impact on employee attitudes and behaviours at work. 
The research questions to be explored in this study will also be presented in chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3: EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS: THE IMPACT OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP 
 
3.1 The Academic Research Literature  
 
This chapter will present a review of the academic research literature, focusing on the 
impact ESO is often believed to have on employee attitudes and behaviours. The review 
will begin by presenting findings from the early literature (1970s and 1980s) – upon which 
a number of models and explanations have since been built. Following this review of early 
findings, the chapter will then focus on an under researched and inconsistently defined 
concept known as Psychological Ownership (PO), which began to attract some attention in 
the early 1990s.  
 
Building on ESO research findings from the 1970s and 1980s, a small number of studies 
proposed that both formal ownership (e.g. ESO) and PO must be independently recognised 
to achieve an understanding of the effects of ESO on corporate performance and related 
processes. A number of models and theories depicting a relationship between ESO and PO 
were put forward in the literature, of which some aspects of these models have since been 
tested. Empirical evidence began to emerge which suggested that PO may play a role in 
how ESO, in some circumstances, might impact work attitudes such as organisational 
commitment and job satisfaction.  
 
This review explores PO as a possible explanation for how ESO may influence the way 
employees think, feel and behave at work, incorporating the findings of ESO and PO 
studies. The review will conclude with a number of research questions to be explored.  
 
3.1.1 Research Literature in the 1970s and 1980s  
 
Since the 1970s a number of academic studies have focused on the capacity of ESO (of 
various different types) to lead to improved employee attitudes and levels of commitment. 
By the end of the 1980s the research literature had provided a range of contrasting 
findings, relating to different forms of ESO. These studies focused predominantly on the 
impact of the ESOP and majority ESO in the USA and Canada. With some exceptions (e.g. 
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Dewe et al. 1988; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988; and Baddon et al. 1989), few studies in 
the 1970s and 1980s explored the impact of ESO in the UK. 
 
The literature has not always clearly differentiated between ESO plans, or specific plan 
features – and has sometimes referred to shared capitalism, financial participation or 
employee participation. This can sometimes lead to a mixture of different forms of ESO 
and profit sharing plans being studied together, without much consideration given to their 
specific features, e.g. the different ways employees can become shareholders (as presented 
in chapter 2). It can be a difficult task dissecting these studies in order to identify the 
relevance they have in developing our understanding of specific features of, for example, 
the SAYE, where at very low risk employees save money each month with an option to 
take their savings (and interest) or use their savings to buy shares at a predetermined price, 
or an EMI scheme where employees can be selected (by the company) and given free 
shares. Furthermore, when looking at the research findings for individual forms of 
financial participation or shared capitalism, it is clear that the impact of some forms, e.g. 
profit sharing, are relatively more positive overall, compared to ESO findings. Considering 
these models of financial participation collectively does not always help those interested in 
specific features or specific types of ESO plan. Whilst most of the plans in the literature 
share some similarities (e.g. they can ultimately result in employee ownership of company 
shares), the research literature can appear messy, as Knyght et al. (2010: 1305) observe, 
“ESO terminology usage in the literature is not always clear and, at times, is confusing”.   
 
3.1.2 Early Research Findings  
 
A common method of exploring the impact of ESO in the 1970s - 1980s was to study both 
participants (owners) and non-participants (non-owners). In studies which took this 
approach, major changes in employee attitudes at work were rare. Other studies looked at 
the impact over time, some at different stages after ownership conversion or after the 
introduction of a share plan (e.g. Long 1982; Tucker et al. 1989; Kruse 1984), and some 
before and after (e.g. Dunn et al. 1991; Keef 1998). The results of these studies also 
suggested significant changes from ESO were unlikely (e.g. Long, 1982; Kruse, 1984; 
Dunne at al. 1991). In contrast, the more positive findings in the early research literature, 
(as pointed out by Pendleton, 2001: 156) tended to come from the studies that asked 
“respondents to assess the impact of ownership on their own attitudes or on the state of 
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attitudes in the company as a whole”. These mixed findings when considered together 
might suggest that employees find it difficult to identify and report the impact of ESO over 
time. Alternatively, it may be that employees’ positive assessments of ESO were a result of 
other factors – and employees were mistakenly attributing the changes in the way they felt 
at work to their involvement in ESO.  
 
By the early 1980s, there was some evidence that positive outcomes on employee attitudes 
and behaviour (and firm performance) may have occurred as a result of ESO. For example, 
Long (1978a, 1978b) found in a study of owners and non-owners in a Canadian trucking 
firm, higher levels of satisfaction for all employees following the installation of ESO. In 
this firm, owners experienced greater increases than non-owners and felt more integrated, 
involved, and organisationally committed, compared with employees who did not own 
stock. Summarising early studies of ESO and performance, Buchko (1992) stated that, 
“overall, the data seem to suggest that ESO may be a useful mechanism for improving 
organisation performance and increasing competitiveness”.  
 
However, the factors which may have been moderating the relationships between ESO and 
the predicted outcomes were not clear. In 1982, based on themes that were emerging in the 
literature, Long (1982: 196) attempted to explain ESO’s impact further, proposing two 
factors that moderate the relationship. The first factor was based on the suggestion that 
without changes increasing employees’ participation in decision making (PDM), ESO 
would not have the desired effects (e.g. See Hammer and Stern, 1980; Long, 1978a; 1978b; 
1979). The growing consensus in the early literature was that when ESO provides 
opportunities for worker participation in decision making, ESO is more likely to impact 
attitudes and behaviours positively. The second of Long’s (1982) factors related to the 
amount of company stock possessed by individual employees. Although this had been 
studied with ESO less frequently than PDM, some early research findings had suggested 
that the impact of ESO is greater for employees acquiring relatively more shares than for 
those acquiring fewer (e.g. Conte and Tannenbaum, 1978; Long 1980).  
 
3.1.3 Two Emerging Trends: PDM and the Quantity of Shares Held 
 
Long (1982) proceeded to conduct a study exploring the role of PDM as a possible 
moderator variable, and the extent to which the quantity of shares held by individual 
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employees affects outcomes. Long’s (1982) two year study at an electronics firm (before 
and after the introduction of an ESO plan) represented an important point in the 
development of the research literature – addressing the two dominant themes that were 
emerging.  
 
Long’s (1982) study differed from many studies prior to it, in that in a number of previous 
studies the decision to implement ESO had been motivated by a risk to the company’s 
survival. In contrast, in Long’s (1982) study the prime reason for purchase appeared to be 
the employees’ desire for greater involvement in decision making. Due to the growth of the 
company, “the close-knit organisation in which employees had frequent informal inputs 
into decisions had started to disappear” (Long, 1982: 212). Employee-ownership and the 
accompanying participation mechanisms were being used in the company as a way of 
reversing this trend. Long’s (1982: 212) findings revealed that, “as it became apparent to 
virtually all non-managers that these heightened expectations for worker influence were 
not being realized, a negative reaction occurred”. Long (1982: 208) found that not only 
were job attitudes not improving, “some deterioration seemed to be taking place”. 
Although greater levels of PDM were introduced (some employees believed that increases 
had occurred, and a significant increase in personal participation in organisational 
decisions was perceived by shareholders), the increases did not meet employees’ 
expectations (there was a feeling that gaps existed between desirable and actual amounts of 
employee influence prior to employee purchase). In this case, greater levels of PDM 
combined with the introduction of ESO did not produce the anticipated effects.  
 
Long (1982: 209) concluded that the lack of change in PDM violated employees’ 
expectations “that ESO would enhance their input into organisational decisions”. This was 
found to cause a “backlash against management and negative attitudes toward the 
organisation” (Long, 1982: 209). Long (1982: 209) found that there was a “drop in trust of 
the organisation, which initially occurred among those who believed no changes in PDM 
had occurred, and then spread when it became evident to most employees that worker 
PDM had not, in fact, increased and was not likely to do so” (Long, 1982: 209). 
Interestingly, based on these findings Long (1982) suggested that employee PDM may be a 
key factor in realizing positive effects from ESO and preventing negative consequences 
from arising. However, rather than PDM being a key factor (as Long put it), the key factor 
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in determining ESO’s impact might have been whether or not employees’ expectations 
were met (whatever they may have been).  
 
Another interesting finding in this study related to the quantity of stock owned per 
employee (Long’s 1982, second factor), which appeared to have little effect on attitudes. 
Long (1982: 214) found that large shareholders had more favourable job attitudes than 
smaller shareholders, but also found that these differences existed prior to purchase of 
shares. Long’s (1982: 214) response to this was to suggest that these findings “may 
indicate that the major psychological effects of ESO occur when the decision to purchase 
shares is made, and the actual amount of stock is of lesser importance”.  
 
3.1.4 Employee Expectations  
 
Perhaps more explicitly than Long (1982), French and Rosenstein’s (1984) findings cast 
more doubt on PDM’s importance in explaining ESO’s impact – and by reiterating this, the 
study arguably marked another significant point in the research literature. In contrast to 
earlier studies (e.g. Long 1980), French and Rosenstein (1984) found little support for the 
notion that the effects of shareholding on attitudes and behaviour are more pronounced 
among employees with more authority, influence, and status in the firm.  
 
In attempting to explain this contrast with the common assertion in the literature that PDM 
was an important accompanying factor
1
, French and Rosenstein (1984: 862) observed that 
a lot of prior research had been confined to small firms in which “employee owners 
enjoyed considerable access to mechanisms of control in producer co-operatives and 
directly-owned firms purchased by employees from the parent company to save jobs”. 
Weaker forms of ESO (e.g. initiated by management for financial reasons, or to motivate 
employees) were less common. French and Rosenstein (1984: 862) stated that “in these 
often large and complex firms (with weaker forms of ESO), the bulk of the employee 
shareholders are non-managerial personnel, and rarely exercise significant influence 
because of the small portion of stock held, the lack of stock voting rights and 
representation on the board of directors”. French and Rosenstein (1984: 863) went on to 
                                                     
1 This assertion continues to be made. For example, point 4 of a memorandum relating to the Postal Services Bill submitted by 
Andrew Pendleton in 2010 to the Public Bill Committee stated: “The evidence on employee attitudes is clear: to be effective 
share plans need to deliver financial benefits to employees and be associated with participation in decisions. The balance of the 
evidence is that share plans have a positive effect on productivity, because of the favourable impacts on employee attitudes and 
behaviour”. (Postal Services Bill, Memorandum submitted by Andrew Pendleton, 2010).  
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state that “the lack of control by most employee shareholders under conventional (weaker) 
forms of ESO may be less likely to weaken the relationships of shareholding with 
identification and satisfaction then is often supposed”. Again, as could be concluded from 
Long (1982), these findings reflect the possibility that employees may not always expect to 
gain more influence under certain types of ESO. In these cases (where it is not expected) 
the lack of additional PDM opportunities may not necessarily limit any 
attitudinal/behavioural impact. It may be that these employees expect other rights or 
benefits as a result of participating in ESO.  
 
French and Rosenstein’s (1984) findings added to doubts expressed in earlier literature that 
greater influence and opportunities for PDM were not expectations employees necessarily 
had when participating in ESO. Three quarters of respondents in this study indicated that 
they viewed shareholding as an investment rather than the chance to become an owner 
where they worked, and were highly satisfied with the ownership plan. These findings 
reflected Kruse’s (1981) earlier suggestions that employee shareholders may resemble 
most non-employee shareholders and define ownership solely in terms of rights to the 
profits generated by the invested capital. French (1987: 427) elaborated, stating “employee 
owners may view themselves as investors who, by coincidence, own shares in the company 
they work for. Their expectations may be limited to a return on the investment, rather than 
greater control”.  
 
A number of studies following French and Rosenstein (1984) began to consider 
employees’ desires and expectations when participating in ESO, with similar conclusions. 
Sockell (1985) for example, found no influence of stock ownership on employees’ desires 
for influence in company decision-making. In 1986, Rosen et al. analysed over 50 cases of 
ESO and found that workers were more interested in financial gain than in participation in 
decisions and that the strongest predictor of satisfaction and motivation was the 
contribution of stock each firm made to the plan. It could therefore be inferred that, based 
on the early literature, if employee expectations are important in explaining ESO’s impact, 
and if PDM is not often expected or desired when ESO is introduced (perhaps with the 
exception of majority ESO where PDM might be more likely to be expected), then 
increasing employees’ participation in decision making (PDM) may not be required in 
order for ESO to have the desired effects.  
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3.1.5 Klein’s (1987) Three Theoretical Perspectives: A Landmark Study 
 
Klein’s (1987) study built on previous literature findings further, clarifying different ideas 
and findings in previous studies and presenting clear alternatives of how ESO’s impact 
might be explained. The study has since been credited as being a landmark study 
(Kaarsemaker et al. 2010: 325), “influential on both the subsequent US and the UK 
literature” (Landau et al. 2007: 11) and a clear example of how “contingent features of 
share ownership have a greater effect on employee attitudes than share ownership itself” 
(Pendleton, 2001: 157). Consequently, this work has played an important role in helping to 
explain how ownership translates into improved employee attitudes, and has received a lot 
of attention in the ESO research literature.  
 
Klein (1987: 320) summarised past literature, stating that, overall, it had suggested “three 
alternative, but not mutually exclusive, models of the psychological effects of ESO”. Klein 
(1987: 320) explained that each model predicts that different ESO conditions are 
associated with high employee satisfaction with stock ownership, high organisational 
commitment, and low turnover intentions. The models, according to Klein (1987), 
provided an appropriate starting point for ESOP theory building and research. The models 
are presented below, along with Klein’s findings and other key studies published during 
the 1980s that help contribute to the discussion of these models.  
 
3.1.5.1 The Intrinsic Satisfaction Model 
 
The first model, known as the intrinsic satisfaction model, suggests that the simple fact of 
ownership increases employees’ commitment to and satisfaction with the company. This 
model reflects previous studies such as Tannenbaum (1983) and Long (1978a, 1978b) that 
suggest ownership is attractive and that it creates a common interest. In order for this 
model to be supported, the impact of ESO would have to derive from the ESO plan. This 
model had previously been tested where the number of shares owned by the employee had 
been taken into account (French and Rosenstein, 1984; Hammer and Stern, 1980); where 
attitudes of owners and non-owners had been compared (Long, 1978a), and where 
comparisons had been made between employee owned and conventionally owned firms 
(Greenberg, 1980; Rhodes and Steers, 1981).  
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Klein (1987) observed that previous research testing this model had produced inconsistent 
and inconclusive findings and had often featured small samples of different types of ESO 
that required employees to purchase stock (e.g. worker co-operatives, direct purchase 
buyouts and employee stock purchase plans). Klein (1987: 320) therefore (given the 
different ways in which shares are allocated) felt they had little in common with the ESOP, 
and felt that other types of ESO (particularly where stock was purchased or where the plan 
was designed to save a failing firm) reflected different dynamics and expectations from 
“the receipt of stock as an ESOP benefit”. However, although this may differ from the 
ESOP, purchasing stock (shares) is consistent with UK plans such as the SAYE and SIP.  
 
With regards to this model, it could be argued that to say the impact is, or to be able to test 
whether the impact is, a result of ESO per se, is very difficult. For example, in studies 
which claim support for this model, such as Rosen et al. (1986), which found (analysing 
over 50 cases of ESO) that the strongest predictor of satisfaction and motivation was the 
contribution of stock made to the plan – this impact may in fact reflect other factors. For 
example, it may reflect employees’ hopes of making a financial return, employees’ 
perceptions of management’s commitment to ESO or the various different psychological 
feelings caused, for example, as a result of knowing the company has contributed X 
amount of stock to the plan.  
 
Klein’s (1987) study however, did not support the intrinsic satisfaction model. In contrast 
to Rosen et al. (1986), the study found that the percentage of company stock owned by the 
ESOP was not significantly related to employee outcomes. The results suggested that the 
ESOP in the study was not intrinsically rewarding, and supported the possibility that an 
intervening variable may be needed for there to be an association with employee 
satisfaction and commitment. Klein (1987: 329) suggested this may be “financial gain, 
participative management, or both”.  
 
3.1.5.2 The Instrumental Satisfaction Model  
 
The second model is the instrumental satisfaction model. Despite doubts that had been 
expressed (Long, 1982; French and Rosenstein, 1984), this model proposed that ESO 
increases employee influence in company decision making, which then impacts employee 
commitment. As previously mentioned, some earlier studies (although not all) had 
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suggested a positive impact. Kruse (1984) for example, concluded that ownership alone 
has little influence on employees’ perceptions of work or company, and made strong 
assertions relating to the role of employee influence. Kruse (1984) determined, after 
studying two ESOP firms (a durable goods manufacturer and a retail store chain), that 
“ownership must accompany changes in other work-related variables, including 
participation, if the ESOP is to be effective in changing attitudes” (Tucker et al. 1989: 30).  
 
Reiterating French and Rosenstein, (1984) concerns about previous studies of ESO and 
PDM, Klein (1987) observed that in most previous research, instrumental models (i.e. ESO 
and increases in PDM) had been based, mostly, on non-ESOP firms (instead many 
researched the impact in firms owned by employees, e.g. where companies have been 
purchased by employees). The assumption that ESO causes an increase in worker 
participation was felt, by Klein (1987), to be inappropriate when studying an ESOP firm, 
despite publicly held firms having to offer voting rights to participants. Klein (1987) noted 
(as did French and Rosenstein, 1984: 862) that in these firms (unlike the firms in some of 
the earlier studies which had suggested the importance of PDM with ESO), ESOP 
participants are often a small minority among a larger body of public shareholders. 
Furthermore, Klein (1987) did not see any evidence that ESOP firms were significantly 
more participative than non-ESOP firms, or that ESOP firms in which employees held 
larger proportions of stock were more participative than ESOP firms in which employees 
held a small percentage of stock.  
 
Nevertheless, Klein (1987) tested this model, and took into account the possibility that any 
ESOP characteristic that increases or is associated with employee influence and 
participation may influence employees’ feelings towards the ESOP or the company. Klein 
(1987) also recognised the possibility that even if firms don’t give employees much 
influence, companies offering ESOPs may be more participative overall, in other ways, 
than those that do not. Klein (1987) therefore, after making moderations, hypothesised that 
“the instrumental satisfaction model predicts that voting rights, managements reason for 
having an ESOP, and ESOP communications are all significantly related to the employee 
outcomes and that the level of worker influence in the company mediates these relations”.  
 
Klein’s (1987) findings generally, were supportive of the instrumental satisfaction model. 
Stock voting rights, however, were not significantly related to employee outcomes, or to 
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employee perceived worker influence, which contradicted the instrumental satisfaction 
model. Klein (1987: 329) stated that this may be because ESOP voting rights often provide 
employees with relatively little power to influence company policies.   
 
Although the instrumental model was supported in Klein’s findings (at least in part) studies 
such as Tucker et al. (1989) continued to bring into question the role of employee PDM. 
Tucker et al.’s (1989) study, published shortly after Klein (1987) conducted surveys in a 
small company, before and after the introduction of an ESOP. This study stands out in the 
research literature for two reasons. First, the study found that employees’ commitment to 
the organisation and job satisfaction were higher after ESOP implementation, yet, 
perceived worker influence levels did not change – thereby suggesting the possibility that 
ownership can change employees’ evaluations of their jobs and companies without 
changing employees’ influence over them.   
 
Second, Tucker et al.’s (1989) research indicated that the ESOP had an effect on attitudes 
irrespective of whether employees were aware of the amount of stock allocated to their 
ESOP accounts. Employees viewed the ESOP as “an aspect of their workplace about 
which they care a great deal”, yet when queried about the specifics of the plan, few were 
knowledgeable (Tucker et al. 1989: 38). Despite this, changes in attitudes after ESOP 
implementation were found. This study offered further support to the possibility that ESO 
(or, as in this case, an ESOP) may affect employees independent of their degree of 
influence over company matters or familiarity with the plan.  
 
However, Tucker et al.’s (1989) study found only minor differences between participants 
and non-participants in the ESOP for all dependant variables (job satisfaction, 
organisational commitment, perceived worker influence on company decision making). 
Consequently, Tucker et al. (1989) concluded (similarly to Kruse, 1984; Rosen et al., 
1986) that the “ESOP presence alone does not necessarily alter employee attitudes 
significantly – and that the sizable economic growth in the company between the two 
survey periods may also explain the positive shifts in attitudes” (Tucker et al. 1989: 37). 
Tucker et al. (1989) suggested that the climate associated with the ESOP is, perhaps, as 
important as actual participation in it. 
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3.1.5.3 The Extrinsic Satisfaction Model 
 
The third of Klein’s (1987) models is the extrinsic satisfaction model, and depends on ESO 
being financially rewarding. This had previously received little attention in the literature. 
The results in Klein’s (1987: 327) study suggested the size of the company contribution to 
the ESOP is significantly positively related to employee ESOP satisfaction and 
organisational commitment, and significantly negatively related to turnover intention. 
Klein (1987), making the case that these results were robust, dismissed the possibility that 
positive employee attitudes could have led the company to make large company 
contributions (i.e. positive attitudes preceded the large company contributions) – rather 
than ESO causing attitudinal change. Klein (1987: 327) dismissed this as unlikely because 
management is “typically guided by financial, legal and practical considerations” – 
however, this still remains a possibility. Other studies in the 1980s also offered support for 
this model. For example, Dewe et al. (1988: 19) concluded (in support of the extrinsic 
model) that if the scheme turns out to be financially rewarding, these conditions seem to 
offer a greater potential for more widespread attitudinal change to follow.  
 
3.1.6 Employee Ownership: A Financial Investment or a Mechanism of Control?  
 
Around the same time as Klein (1987) and Dewe et al. (1988), French’s (1987) theoretical 
paper explored the possibility that ESO is viewed as a financial investment, rather than a 
mechanism of control – continuing to question the two key themes identified by Long 
(1982). The study considered the relationship between ESO, satisfaction and desired 
control and paid specific attention to the implications of employee owners viewing 
themselves as investors seeking profits, but not any more active (than a non-shareholder) in 
decision making. This study followed on from previous evidence that had questioned 
whether shareholding increases satisfaction (e.g. Long, 1978b), and studies that had cast 
doubt on the relationship between shareholding and the desire to participate in decision 
making (e.g. Long, 1979; Hammer and Stern, 1980; Long, 1981). French’s (1987) study 
also built on previous work, such as French and Rosenstein (1984), Sockell (1985) and 
Rosen et al. (1986), by considering in greater depth the nature of the expectations and 
orientations that employees bring to their shareholder roles (which was less evident in 
Klein, 1987).  
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The lack of support for control expectations on the part of employee owners (in previous 
studies), according to French (1987: 429), questioned the idea that owners’ dissatisfaction 
(with ESO) is due to constraints on their ability to influence decision making. Whilst Klein 
(1987) was concerned with predicting different ESO conditions associated with different 
employee attitudes, French (1987) was concerned with examining another view in more 
detail, employee expectations. Specifically, French (1987) was concerned with the idea 
that employees expect profits (as reflected in the extrinsic model), rather than control from 
ownership (as reflected in the instrumental model).  
 
French (1987) theorised that employees’ satisfaction with their jobs and firms depends on 
their evaluation of their present circumstances. French (1987) argued that two perspectives 
could be taken. One was a control perspective (sometimes assumed in previous literature), 
where the critical issue for employee owners is their ability to exercise their perceived 
rights to greater influence in the organisation. French (1987: 431) second perspective, 
suggested that “when employees view ownership solely as a financial investment and 
concentrate on rights to profits rather than control, other issues (e.g. stock price, dividend 
levels and trends in sales and profits) may be regarded as critical by employee owners”. 
Following a discussion of these perspectives, French (1987) stated: “assuming a financial 
rather than control orientation among employee shareholders, it can be argued that the 
effects of ownership on satisfaction with jobs and firms depends on employees’ 
perceptions of the firm’s performance”.  
 
French (1987: 432) concluded that “when ownership is treated by employee share-holders 
as an investment, it makes little sense to assume that shareholding invariably increases 
employees’ desires for influence”. Therefore, employee owners may remain content with 
traditional (existing) patterns of decision making (or may not seek changes because of ESO 
status) “as long as the returns on their investments are satisfactory” (French, 1987: 432).  
French (1987) stated “as long as”, because if financial returns are not adequate (when 
ownership is treated an investment) French (1987) believed that dissatisfaction may 
increase employees desire to participate in the decision-making process. The reasoning for 
this was that employees would seek to ensure that appropriate solutions are sought to 
address the inadequate financial returns (French, 1987: 432).  
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Research after the 1980s continued to explore the mechanisms of ESO’s impact in greater 
depth, and featured more on what can be defined as mainstream ESO: where typically, 
employees collectively own lower proportions of ESO (than in majority ESO) – which in 
the UK, is more frequently found in companies where plans such as the SIP, SAYE or EMI 
are in place.  
 
3.2 The Emerging Concept of Psychological Ownership 
 
3.2.1 Pierce et al. (1991): A Model of Employee Ownership  
 
In 1991, with reference to key studies such as Klein (1987) and Long (1982), Pierce et al. 
stated that a conceptual and empirically based literature had emerged that could help 
researchers better understand the relationship between ESO and employee attitudes and 
behaviours. However, Pierce et al. (1991) believed that this literature provided neither 
consistent empirical observations nor a well-developed theoretical explication of the 
process through which ESO may have an impact. In summary, findings prior to Pierce et 
al. (1991) suggested that ownership was unlikely to have a direct or independent impact on 
employee attitudes and behaviours. Pierce et al. (1991: 122) felt that there was a need to 
build on the existing literature and to develop a model that both “describes ESO and 
illustrates the process through which ownership operates”.  
 
Building on previous studies, Pierce et al. (1991) developed a model of ESO effects and 
proposed a number of intervening stages and moderating effects that serve to delineate the 
process through which ESO operates. Models and empirical tests of indirect effects, which 
portrayed the role of mediating and intervening conditions, were, in Pierce et al.’s (1991) 
view, essential to advance understanding of ownership and the consequences it produces. 
Pierce et al.’s (1991) model incorporated existing theories of ESO, and in Buchko’s (1992: 
715) view, represented an advance over previous efforts.  
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Pierce et al.’s (1991: 123) model of ESO can be seen below:  
 
 
Figure 1. Pierce et al.’s (1991) model of Employee Ownership  
 
The model, described by Pierce et al. (1991) as being exploratory in nature, integrated 
research on cooperatives, direct and social ownership, and employee stock ownership 
plans. The result was an elaborate network of relationships articulating “one set of 
conditions through which ownership may produce some of its social-psychological and 
behavioural effects” (Pierce et al. 1991: 122). The primary focus of the model was the 
(US) ESOP, defined as “an organisational arrangement in which there remains a clear 
separation between managers and workers; where shares of ownership are not necessarily 
distributed equally, and where a significant proportion (though not necessarily all) of the 
people who work in the firm, regardless of hierarchical level, or whether compensated by 
salary or hourly pay, possesses ownership in the employing organisation”. However, Pierce 
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et al. (1991) believed that there were many parts of the model (especially the core) which 
were applicable to a variety of ESO situations. Different types or forms of ownership, 
according to Pierce et al. (1991) may moderate the relationship between ESO and the 
degree to which the employee owner identifies with and internalizes the organisation. 
However, as the remainder of this review will show, little is known about how UK plans 
such as the SAYE, SIP or EMI may fit into this theoretical model – or to what extent they 
can.  
 
At the core of the model, Pierce et al. (1991: 122) suggested that under certain moderating 
conditions ESO leads to PO and an integration of the employee-owner into the ownership 
experience. Regardless of the type of ownership, PO was proposed to lead to the 
integration of the employee into the organisation and the ownership experience, and as 
ESO participants become integrated, the social-psychological and behavioural 
consequences increase. By incorporating moderating conditions such as PO, this model 
differed from many previous studies, most of which reflected simplistic relationships 
linking ownership with a set of employee reactions.  
 
The model presented a range of conditions and relationships leading to PO. However, as 
Pendleton et al. (1998) observed, Pierce et al. (1991) said little about the nature of PO –
which, given the level of detail elsewhere in the model, is a frustrating aspect of their 
study. However, it can be inferred from Pierce et al.’s (1991) references to PO that, 
generally, this was a psychological recognition by individuals, of ESO arrangements. 
Pierce et al. (1991: 126) stated that “research evidence to date has not established the 
dimensionality of PO, nor have there been conscious attempts to empirically establish a 
link between the two ownership constructs (i.e., formal ownership (ESO) and PO)”. This 
perhaps helps explain why PO was so loosely defined by Pierce et al. (1991) at this time.  
 
Many studies since have referred to Pierce et al.’s (1991) model, and in particular, the 
processes through which employees are proposed to develop feelings of PO – although this 
has not be studied in depth (later sections of this chapter will elaborate on these processes 
and research findings) and PO has rarely been empirically tested for in these studies. This 
chapter will next discuss the concept of PO and how this concept, at the core of Pierce et 
al.’s (1991) model, has since been conceptually developed and defined. The chapter will 
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then discuss this model, and the factors proposed to lead to and from PO in an ESO 
arrangement, drawing on studies of ESO and PO.  
 
3.2.2 The Core of the Model: Psychological Ownership  
 
A small number of ESO studies have investigated PO, building on some of Pierce et al.’s 
(1991) propositions of how PO can develop in the minds of employees participating in 
ESO, and in turn, have an impact on the way they think, feel and behave at work. In 
addition, a small number of studies have explored antecedents and outcomes of PO in an 
organisational setting, but with no mention of ESO. The focus in these studies has been 
primarily on what causes PO and the impact it can have at work.   
 
It is clear that the construct PO, at the core of Pierce et al.’s (1991) model, has since been 
given more than one conceptual definition in the research literature– some measures appear 
quite different, yet all use the term PO. In comparison to the ESO studies that incorporate 
PO, studies that have explored PO in an organisational setting (without ESO) have defined 
PO with much more consistency. In these studies, typically, a definition based around 
feelings of possession has been used to define PO (e.g. See VandeWalle et al. 1995; Van 
Dyne et al., 2004; Pierce et al., 2004b; O’Driscoll et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007; Pierce 
et al. 2001; 2003).  
 
Since 1991, Jon Pierce has continued to elaborate on the concept of PO in a number of his 
studies. Pierce et al.’s later work (e.g. Pierce et al. 2001; 2003; 2004a; 2004b) featured 
more in-depth explanations of PO, and focused on explaining the relationships between a 
possession based definition of PO and other organisational factors. Although less focus 
was given to ESO, later work remained consistent with Figure 1, with regards to 
explanations of how ESO could impact feelings of PO and how this may have an impact on 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours. Taking these studies into account, it can be observed 
that little work has been done in the research literature to date to consider the ways in 
which ESO can have an impact (e.g. as described in Pierce et al. 1991; Pierce et al. 2001; 
2003) via a possession based definition of PO.  
 
Following the Model of ESO in 1991 (Figure 1), a possession based measurement focusing 
on feelings of MINE and OURS was developed by Jon Pierce at the University of 
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Minnesota, drawing extensively on the possession literature (e.g. Furby, 1978; Rudmin and 
Berry, 1987). This measure of PO was used in Pierce et al. (1992) and theoretically 
justified in Pierce et al. (1995). VandeWalle et al. (1995: 215) and Van Dyne et al. (2004: 
449) later used very similar measures in their studies of PO at work. Van Dyne et al.’s 
(2004: 449) measure of PO (which differed slightly from that used in VandeWalle et al. 
1995 – although very similar), has since been adopted in almost all studies using a 
possession definition of PO – including those by Jon Pierce. More recently, a theoretical 
study by Pierce and Iiro (2010) added a new perspective of PO to the research literature, 
proposing that PO can also exist as a group-level phenomenon (i.e., a collectively held 
single mind-set), which could lead to its own set of outcomes (e.g. collective identification, 
and cohesion and team chemistry). Pierce and Iiro (2010) explained that this can be 
identified at a group level as a collectively held notion of an "us", and a collective sense 
that the target of ownership (e.g., workspace, project, idea, product created) is collectively 
ours. As this is a recent addition to the research literature, very little work has been done to 
develop knowledge of specific groups of employees collectively feeling PO – almost all 
studies to date have considered PO at the individual level.  
 
Respondents in Van Dyne et al.’s (2004: 449) study were asked to think about the “home, 
boat or cabin that they own or co-own with someone”, and the experiences and feelings 
associated with the statement THIS IS MY (OUR) HOUSE. Survey questions then dealt 
with the sense of ownership respondents may have felt for the organisation that they work 
for. Van Dyne et al. (2004: 449) included the following items in their questionnaire, 
emphasising possession and using possessive vocabulary as reflected in everyday 
associations with property and possessions.  
 
 This is MY organisation  
 I sense that this organisation is OUR company  
 I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organisation  
 I sense that this is MY company  
 This is OUR company  
Most of the people which work for this organisation feel as though they own the 
company  
 It is hard for me to think about this organisation as MINE (reversed).  
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3.2.3 The Target of Ownership  
 
Pierce et al. (2001), in their theoretical study of PO, added more meaning to this concept – 
focusing on aspects of the employees’ life at work, over which feelings of PO are felt 
(referred to as the target of PO). Analysing past literature on possession, Pierce et al. 
(2001) stated that there is empirical evidence that individuals express feelings of ownership 
over a number of different targets. These targets included: their work (Beaglehole, 1932), 
their organisation (Dirks, Cummings, and Pierce, 1996), the products they create (Das, 
1993), their jobs (Peters and Austin, 1985), the practices employed by their organisations 
(Kostova, 1998), and specific issues in their organisations. Pierce et al.’s (2003: 94) study 
two years later built on this discussion of PO targets, and provided greater clarification of 
how and why a particular target might become the subject of PO (a target).  It was noted, 
with regards to the development of feelings of possession that:    
 
 Culture and personal values shape what can and cannot be owned (Furby, 1976);  
 The nature and character of one’s most valued possessions change throughout one’s 
life span (Kamptner, 1991);  
 Males tend to identify with objects that involve physical interaction and activity, 
whereas females are more inclined to associate with more contemplative, 
expressive, and symbolic objects (Kamptner 1991; Rochberg-Halton, 1980);  
 Those items that are controlled, are known intimately, or flow from the self are 
likely to be items for which a psychology of mine emerges. 
 
Pierce et al.’s (2001 and 2003) discussion regarding the target of ownership influenced the 
research literature and opened up the possibility that employees might feel PO over 
anything at work, not only the organisation as a whole. Mayhew et al. (2007) for example, 
acknowledged that it can be expected that individuals may develop feelings of PO toward 
any number of different organisational targets, such as organisations themselves, jobs, 
work tasks, work space, work tools or equipment, ideas or suggestions, and team members. 
A number of studies began to empirically test feelings of PO towards both the job and the 
organisation (e.g. Pierce et al. 2004b; O’Driscoll et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007), as 
opposed to prior studies which had considered only PO towards the organisation (Pierce et 
al. 2004a; Chi and Han, 2008).  
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In the PO literature, organisation based PO has been defined as being the individual 
members’ feelings of possession and psychological connection to an organisation as a 
whole. Mayhew et al. (2007) stated that several characteristics may influence this state, 
including organisational culture and climate, attitudes of senior management, corporate 
goals and vision, reputation of the organisation, and corporate policies. Job based PO has 
been defined as the individuals’ feelings of possession toward their particular jobs. 
Mayhew et al. (2007) observed that researchers consider both types of PO as attitudinal 
rather than enduring personality traits. Furthermore, Mayhew et al. (2007) stated that PO is 
context specific and reflects the individuals’ current position in regard to both the present 
organisation and the existing job. If this is true, and feelings of PO are context specific, 
then given that the UK and its ESO schemes remain unexplored in the PO literature 
(defined by possession), little is known about the impact of PO in those contexts.  
 
Although it has been acknowledged that the target of ownership may develop for a wide 
range of things, both intangible and tangible, Pierce et al. (2003) stated that whilst “there 
have been many attempts to identify the targets to which individuals become 
psychologically tied” (see Kamptner, 1991; Rochberg-Halton, 1980; Rudmin and Berry, 
1987), there does not appear to be a theory of ownership targets. Currently, there is no 
known acceptance of any kind regarding a classification scheme regarding what employees 
feel possession over.    
 
As mentioned, Pierce et al. (1991) focus heavily on PO antecedents and outcomes, and say 
little about what PO actually is. In most cases the inconsistencies with regards to the 
conceptual definition of PO are not acknowledged in the literature and many studies that 
do refer to PO, talk of PO as a general psychological recognition of ownership. For 
example, in Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 326) it is stated that “several empirical studies have 
shown the important role played by PO in ESO plans”, yet the studies Kaarsemaker et al. 
(2010: 326) refer to, including Kaarsemaker (2006), Pendleton et al. (1998); Wagner et al. 
(2003), measure PO very differently. Caramelli and Briole (2007: 293) also state that, 
“results suggest that PO plays a moderator role in the relationship between ESO and some 
work attitudes such as organisational commitment or job satisfaction”. Again, despite 
themselves defining PO with a possession based definition (as found in Van Dyne et al. 
2004), to support their claims about PO, studies such as Pendleton et al. (1998), 
VandeWalle et al. (1995) and Wagner et al. (2003) are referenced, with no mention that PO 
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means something different in each of these studies. The following section will present 
alternative measures of PO that have been used in the literature.   
 
3.2.4 Measures of PO  
 
Different definitions of PO in the ESO research literature are not difficult to find. For 
example, Pendleton et al. (1998) attempted to operationalise Pierce et al.’s (1991), vague 
definition of PO by measuring the extent to which individuals felt like owners, and their 
orientation to and evaluation of ownership. Questions originally developed by Klein (1987) 
were used, which Pendleton et al. (1998) believed expressed some degree of PO. In a 
similar way in his book, Pendleton (2001) used five items from Rosen et al.’s (1986) ESOP 
satisfaction measures to measure PO, because they explicitly referred to feelings and 
salience of ownership.  
 
The measurements used by Pendleton et al. (1998) which were referred to as “expressing 
some degree of PO”, can be seen below:   
 
 Because of ESO my work is more satisfying  
 I feel like I own part of the company  
 It is very important to me that the company has a share scheme  
 I am proud to own shares in the company  
 I don’t care for ESO at this company.   
 
When comparing these measurements against those used in the possession definition, it 
could be argued that only one of the above, “I feel like I own part of the company”, reflects 
a feeling of possession. In contrast to PO in Van Dyne et al. (2004: 449), the emphasis of 
MINE and OURS is missing from many of the items used by Pendleton et al. (1998).  
 
Wagner et al. (2003) too proposed a very different PO definition from Van Dyne et al.’s 
(2004) ‘possession’ definition, Pendleton et al. (1998), and other PO studies. It was 
proposed that PO is a shared sense of possession of the organisation, manifested in 
ownership beliefs and ownership behaviours (this measure was also used in Nien-Chi et al. 
2009: 155). In addition, in Wagner et al.’s (2003: 857) study the definition of PO referred 
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to behaviours and beliefs in work groups, rather than the individual. The items used can be 
seen below:  
 
Ownership beliefs:  
 Making [name of organisation] a good investment for stockholders is important to 
me;  
 My job performance has an impact on the profitability of [name of organisation];  
 I should share in the benefits of [name of organisation]’s financial successes;  
 I should share in the consequences of [name of organisation]’s financial setbacks.  
 
Ownership behaviours:  
 I seek out information on the financial performance of [name of organisation];  
 I work at improving my performance on the job in order to make [name of 
organisation] more profitable;  
 I try to find ways to cut costs associated with my job and save money for [name of 
organisation];   
 I make suggestions about new, innovative ways of doing my job that will make 
money for [name of organisation] in the long term.  
 
Given the contrast in measurements, it is possible that an employee could strongly agree 
with all of the items set out by Pendleton et al. (1998) and Wagner et al. (2003), yet still 
not feel possession over the organisation (or their job) - as seen in the items used by Van 
Dyne et al. (2004). It could also be argued that Wagner et al.’s (2003) measure, when 
compared with the possession measure of PO, reflects possible outcomes of PO, rather 
than PO itself. This measure says little about whether employees feel possession over the 
company, their stocks/shares, or anything else at work.  
 
Another definition of PO, used by Chiu et al. (2007: 310), again differed from the other 
studies. In this study, PO was operationalised with three items – measuring whether or not 
the respondents understood the business operations of their firms, showed concern for the 
firm’s business conditions, and explored opportunities to monitor the operation of their 
firms. Here, Chiu et al. (2007: 310) incorporated a sense of shared responsibility into the 
PO definition – as opposed to viewing it separately as most other studies did. Avey et al. 
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(2009) also stayed away from the possession based explanation of PO, devising a new 
definition of PO, using four theory-driven domains determined to best constitute the 
dimensions of promotion-oriented PO. These included self-efficacy, accountability, sense 
of belonging, and self-identity with the target.        
 
In the ESO literature, Pierce et al.’s (2004a) theoretical study, and Chi and Han (2008) 
empirical study, are the only known studies to have tried to explain ESO’s impact using a 
possession based definition of PO. These studies, unlike those mentioned above (e.g. 
Pendleton et al., 1998; Pendleton, 2001; Wagner et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2009; Chiu et al. 
2007), have built on Pierce et al.’s (1991) model (or at least parts of it) and used the 
definition of PO (as seen in Van Dyne et al. 2004) that Pierce went on to adopt and justify 
in later studies of PO (e.g. Pierce et al. 2004b; Pierce et al., 2001; Pierce et al., 2003).  
 
3.2.5 Conceptual Distinctiveness of Psychological Ownership 
 
In addition to the potential problem of PO being defined differently in different studies, it 
is also possible that PO may be compared with or mistaken for other concepts, such as 
commitment. Pierce et al. (2001) felt the issue of the conceptual distinctiveness of PO from 
other organisational behaviour constructs, was critical for the establishment of the 
construct of PO in the organisational literature (this is also important in the ESO literature). 
Three concepts were identified by Pierce et al. (2001) as being closely related to PO - 
organisational commitment (feelings and/or beliefs concerning the reason an individual 
wants to maintain his or her membership in a particular organisation; Meyer and Allen, 
1991), organisational identification (the social classification or categorization of the self in 
terms of what one believes are distinctive and admired attributes of the organisation; Mael 
and Tetrick, 1992), and internalization (the adoption of the values and goals of the 
organisation; Mael and Tetrick, 1992).  
 
Pierce et al. (2001: 305) described these constructs as “different types of psychological 
relationships with organisations”. It was suggested that commitment, identification, and 
internalization may coexist with PO, especially when the ownership target is the whole 
organisation or a central component of the organisation. Furthermore, although these 
constructs are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for PO, Pierce et al. (2001) 
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believed they are likely to have a reciprocal relationship with the state of PO. However, 
Pierce et al. (2001) believed that PO is distinct from these other constructs in a number of 
ways; further details of these differences can be seen in Appendix 1.  In summary, Pierce et 
al. (2001: 305) stated that:  
  
“…the feeling of possession that one has for an organisation is different in meaning 
from the desire to stay employed in a particular organisation (organisational 
commitment), the use of characteristics of the organisation to define oneself 
(organisational identification), and the adoption of the values of an organisation 
(internalization)”.  
 
It was also reasoned that all these states differ in their theoretical anchoring; that 
identification is anchored in social identity theory and commitment is in part anchored in 
reasons for social membership, while PO is primarily grounded in psychological theories 
of possession (Pierce et al. 2001: 305). Providing a way of differentiating between these 
concepts, Pierce et al. (2001: 305) explained:   
 
 PO answers the question, what do I feel is mine?  
 Commitment answers the question, should I maintain my membership in this 
organisation and why, because I ought to, I need to, and/or because I want to?  
 Organisational identification is suggested to address the question, who am I? 
 Internalization addresses the question, what do I believe? 
 
In contrast to these other constructs, Pierce et al. (2001: 305) stated that “PO serves a 
unique set of motives, develops through a set of unique processes, reflects a specific type 
of psychological state, and has unique outcomes”. Pierce et al. (2001) believed that none of 
the other states leads to the same set of presumed rights and responsibilities as PO. Pierce 
et al. (2001: 305) therefore felt it reasonable to suggest that PO may predict (1) certain 
effects unaccounted for in the existing theoretical models of the other constructs and (2) 
criterion variance currently unaccounted for by each of the other constructs.     
 
This chapter has so far discussed the concept of PO and how this concept, at the core of 
Pierce et al.’s (1991) model, has since been conceptually developed and defined. The 
following section of this chapter will discuss the routes to PO (as mentioned by Pierce et 
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al. 2003) as well as a number of ownership rights, as featured in Pierce et al. (1991) - all of 
which are proposed to help lead to feelings of PO. Before discussing findings relating to 
the causes of PO, and the possible role PO could play in explaining ESO’s impact, 
parallels will be drawn between the rights of employees in a an ESO arrangement (put 
forward by Pierce et al. 1991) and the routes proposed to lead to PO.  
 
3.2.6 Employee Ownership Rights  
 
After reviewing the ESO literature, Pierce et al. (1991: 124) believed that the ownership 
construct was “multidimensional in nature”, and that it should be “pulled apart and its 
dimensions be identified”. The ownership literature suggested to Pierce et al. (1991) that 
ownership can be commonly defined in terms of three basic and fundamental rights, each 
of which may be more or less present in certain ESO contexts. Pierce et al. (1991) came to 
this conclusion following such works as Hespe and Wall (1976); Rhodes and Steers (1981) 
and Conte and Tannenbaum (1978), where it had been suggested that ownership carries 
with it a legal right to influence decisions, including the right to attend shareholder 
meetings and vote. Pierce et al. (1991) also acknowledged the work of Rhodes and Steers 
(1981), which had previously observed that there was more PDM in co-operatives than 
conventionally owned firms. Other studies such as Bernstein (1979); Klein (1987); Long 
(1977) and Rosen et al. (1987) helped add weight to the inclusion of other rights relating to 
information and equity.  
 
The rights identified by Pierce et al. (1991: 125) included:  
 
(1) The right to possession of some share of the owned objects physical being 
and/or financial value (equity).   
(2) The right to exercise influence (control) over the owned object (influence).  
(3) The right to information about the status of that which is owned (information).  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that the operationalisation of ESO, an objectively defined 
state, through equity possession, information sharing, and influence is positively and 
causally related to PO. Furthermore, the operationalised state of ownership is, according to 
Pierce et al. (1991: 127), likely to influence the degree to which the psychological state of 
ownership is created. It could be inferred from this that the extent to which ownership is 
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designed around equity, influence and information may influence the degree to which the 
psychological state of ownership is created.   
 
One potential drawback with this assessment of ownership rights is that these dimensions 
were not developed based on UK schemes such as the SAYE or more recent schemes such 
as the SIP or EMI – and may not even be rights employees expect to have when 
participating. Unlike in firms with majority ESO (featured in many earlier studies) the 
extent to which UK firms adopting schemes allow, for example, the employee to have 
greater influence at work or greater access to information is questionable. Although UK 
ESO plans often provide employees with a voting right at the company AGM, little is 
known as to whether employees with this vote feel as though they actually have an 
influence, or whether this vote alone is enough to allow the model proposed by Pierce et al. 
(1991) to apply to UK ESO. Whilst it might seem logical to argue that more participative 
firms may be more likely to have ESO plans, what constitutes participative and whether or 
not employees feel they are able to participate, is very subjective. The extent to which the 
plan needs to provide these rights in order to cause, or contribute to PO, is also unclear.  
 
As seen in Pierce et al.’s (1991: 123) Model of ESO (Figure 1), a number of factors which 
will be discussed in later sections of this chapter (e.g. managements’ philosophical 
commitment to ESO; employees’ sense of legitimacy to share in the equity of the 
organisation etc.) leading up to the models core (PO), relate to the ownership rights, and 
the employees’ experience of them. It may mean, that the way the model works in practice 
depends on the rights employees have, or expect to have, when participating in ESO. 
Alternatively, previous research on majority ownership (and early studies such as 
Bernstein, 1979; Klein, 1987; Long, 1977; and Rosen et al. 1987), may have led Pierce et 
al. (1991) to put forward a set of rights that, irrespective of the type of ownership, are 
required in order for PO to emerge and have an impact.  
 
Furthermore, empirical studies in the organisational literature have found that PO can 
emerge without ESO, suggesting that the rights might be provided by other sources 
elsewhere in the organisation (e.g. Chi and Han, 2008; O’Driscoll et al. 2006). This raises 
the question of whether ESO needs to provide all of these rights, in order for it to influence 
employees’ feelings of PO and lead to a change in attitudes and behaviours at work.  
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Before discussing the antecedents of PO in Pierce et al.’s (1991) model, and other literature 
findings relating to PO’s development, Pierce’s later work elaborating on how PO 
develops will be discussed (e.g. Pierce et al. 2001; 2003).  
 
3.2.7 The Roots of and Routes to Psychological Ownership 
 
With regards to how PO emerges (the roots of PO), it was proposed by Pierce et al. (2001) 
that organisational members may experience feelings of ownership for the organisation or 
various organisational factors (i.e. targets of PO), because PO is rooted in motives that are 
operative and can be satisfied in the organisational context. It was proposed that feelings of 
ownership (PO) allow individuals to fulfil three basic human motives, and that these 
motives are therefore the reason for feelings of PO – each motive facilitating the 
development of PO, rather than directly causing this state to occur (Pierce et al. 2001).  
 
It was suggested that the motives, efficacy and effectance, self-identity and having a place 
can be satisfied in organisations. To explain efficacy and effectance Pierce et al. (2001, 
2003) referred to the possession literature, suggesting that ownership and the rights that 
come with it allow individuals to explore and alter their environment, thus satisfying their 
innate need to be efficacious (Beggan, 1991; Furby, 1978a, b, 1980; White, 1959). A 
diagram of these roots can be seen below:  
 
 
 
Figure 2. An Interpretation of Pierce et al. (2003) 
 
According to Pierce et al. (2001), possessions also serve as symbolic expressions of the 
self since they are closely connected with self-identity and individuality, and it is through 
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our interaction with possessions, coupled with a reflection upon their meaning, that “our 
sense of identity, our self-definitions, are established, maintained, reproduced and 
transformed” (Dittmar, 1992: 86). Furthermore, Pierce et al. (2001) believed that 
ownership and the associated psychological states can be explained in part by the 
individual’s motive to possess a certain territory or space - to have a home in which to 
dwell (Ardrey, 1966; Darling, 1937, 1939; Duncan, 1981; Porteous, 1976).  
 
In addition to the roots of PO, Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) also proposed experiences that 
lead to feelings of PO, known as the routes to PO. In doing this they attempted to answer 
the question of how PO emerges. Pierce et al. (2001) proposed that feelings of PO arise 
from certain processes of association of the individual with the target (of ownership). 
Through these processes it is suggested that individuals become psychologically tied to the 
target, and the target becomes part of their extended self. The three routes (i.e., paths or 
mechanisms) through which PO was proposed to emerge included: (a) the amount of 
control an employee has over a particular organisational factor (control), (b) the extent to 
which an employee intimately knows a particular organisational factor (intimate 
knowledge), and (c) the extent to which an individual employee invests himself or herself 
into the potential target of ownership (investment of the self).  
 
Pierce et al. (2001) suggested that there is a positive and causal relationship between the 
amount of control an employee has over a particular organisational factor and the degree of 
ownership the employee feels toward that factor. Pierce et al. (2001) also observed that 
control of an object appears to be a key characteristic of the phenomenon of ownership, 
and that based on past literature, control exercised over an object may eventually give rise 
to feelings of ownership toward that object.  
 
The second route to PO, the extent to which an employee intimately knows a particular 
organisation, is proposed to have a positive and causal relationship with the degree of 
ownership the employee feels toward that factor. It is therefore suggested by Pierce et al. 
(2001) that the more information and the better the knowledge an individual has about an 
object, the deeper the relationship between the self and the object and, hence, the stronger 
the feeling of ownership toward it.  
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Finally, it is proposed by Pierce et al. (2001) that there is a positive and causal relationship 
between the extent to which an individual employee invests himself or herself into the 
potential target of ownership and the degree of ownership the employee feels toward that 
target. Pierce et al. (2001) draws on the work of Marx (1976), who reasons that through 
our labour we invest our psychic energy into the products that we create. As a result, these 
products become representations of the self, much like our words, thoughts, and emotions. 
The investment of an individual’s energy, time, effort, and attention into objects is 
suggested (following references to the work of Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 
1981) to cause the self to become one with the object and to develop feelings of ownership 
toward that object  
 
3.2.7.1 The Need to Satisfy all the Routes to PO  
 
Pierce et al. (2003: 95) stated that “the three roots of psychological ownership are 
complementary and additive in nature.....Thus, ownership may emerge as the result of any 
one or any subset, of these needs”. Pierce et al. (2003: 95) also suggested that “the three 
routes to PO are distinct, complementary, and additive in nature...any single route can 
result in feelings of ownership independent of the others”. However, as with the roots, it 
was theorised that “feelings of ownership for a particular target will be stronger when an 
individual arrives at this state as a result of travelling multiple routes (e.g., intimate 
knowing and controlling) rather than just one route” (Pierce et al., 2003: 95). Pierce et al. 
(2003: 95) explained that the routes, as they saw them, do not have a multiplicative 
relationship, which would imply that if any one of the routes does not occur, ownership 
will not emerge.  
 
When considering whether ESO can impact employee attitudes and behaviours by 
operating through a possession based form of PO, it may be that not all the routes need to 
be satisfied, or at least, not all by ESO. Therefore, it may be for example, that a plan 
providing no additional control or influence in the organisation could result in, or enhance 
existing, feelings of PO. Pierce et al. (2003: 96) acknowledged that it was not clear 
whether some routes are more effective at generating PO than others, but speculated that 
“the routes of control and the investment of the self in the target have the potential to be 
most effective”. However, this problem remains; the research literature has not provided 
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answers regarding the most effective routes, or the routes that are best satisfied by ESO, or 
most important.  
 
3.2.8 Parallels Between the Rights of Ownership and the Routes to PO 
 
Although there are no theoretical propositions made by Pierce et al. (2001, 2003) as to how 
the roots of or routes to PO may relate to employee participation in ESO, some studies 
have since recognised comparisons that can be made between the rights of ownership 
(identified by Pierce et al. 1991), and the routes to PO proposed by Pierce et al. (2001, 
2003).  For example, Pierce et al. (2004a) observe that an ESO arrangement constructed 
around equity, information, and influence (ownership rights) more or less parallels the 
three routes to PO. Similarly, Chi and Han (2008: 2) argue that the three rights are identical 
to the three routes. Pierce et al. (2004a) recognised that in an ESOP arrangement the 
individual’s financial ownership stake in the organisation, in part, derives from 
investments of the self (e.g. tenure, hours worked, and performance) into the organisation. 
The influence and information dimensions contribute to experiences of control over the 
target and intimate knowing of the target. A potential connection between ESO and the 
way in which psychological ownership may emerge (through the PO routes) can therefore 
be observed. This connection has been recognised in very few ESO studies, since most 
studies using a possession definition of PO (which is what the connections are based upon) 
have explored PO routes without ESO.    
 
Interestingly, despite their study being about PO rather than ESO, Pierce et al. (2003) made 
comparisons between the ESO rights and routes, stating that although the routes can be 
satisfied without legal ownership, legal ownership (e.g. ESO) may facilitate and speed up 
the emergence of PO. 
 
To support this, Pierce et al. (2003: 96) suggested that:  
 
 Legal ownership allows the individual to explore the three routes leading to this 
state.  
 Legal ownership provides the right to control or change the target more or less at 
one’s own will, the right to explore and to come to intimately know the target, and 
the right to invest the self in the target.  
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 Lack of legal ownership may in some cases provide a more precarious form of 
ownership, in that an individual has to avoid violation of the law (e.g., physical 
barriers, customs, and social practices) to exercise one or more of the three routes 
to psychological ownership.  
 In the absence of legal ownership, one may also have to contend with a greater fear 
of separation, claim of ownership by the legal owner, and loss of the object.  
 
Conversely, Pierce et al. (2001 and 2003) also suggest that an individual may legally own 
some object but not feel a sense of ownership for it. It is suggested that this condition may 
exist when the object is not a source of effectance and efficacy, is not associated with one’s 
self-identity, or is not a place within which to dwell (the roots of PO), even though it might 
have been purchased with money they have earned and is controlled and known. This is a 
possibility in ESO organisations, but given the lack of research in the UK that has 
combined ESO and PO, it is also possible that ESO satisfies the roots of and routes to PO 
in different ways to those proposed in existing studies. If ownership rights are different in 
the UK to those suggested by Pierce et al. (1991), then maybe the ways in which ESO 
needs to satisfy the routes to PO are different to those suggested in the literature (which 
seems influenced by majority share ownership and US schemes).  For example, in a similar 
way to how O’Driscoll et al. (2006) suggested low levels of work environment structure 
satisfy the control route, which, in turn, leads to the other two routes being satisfied, the 
saving arrangement in a SAYE, or the partnership shares awarded in the SIP may satisfy 
all conditions required for PO without influence or control being a right of ownership. 
Employees’ interpretations of how they perceive the routes and rights to emerge may also 
be an important contribution when exploring the propositions in a UK context.  
 
However, as not all the routes to PO have been tested in relation to ESO (as seen later in 
this chapter); there is little evidence to say that legal (employee) ownership (which 
includes UK plans such as the SAYE, SIP and EMI) allows the individual to explore the 
three routes. The following section of this review will discuss the only known studies since 
Pierce et al. (1991) to explore the impact of ESO and a possession based definition of PO. 
Following this, antecedents explored in the PO literature (in an organisational context) will 
be presented.  
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3.3 Employee Ownership and Antecedents of Psychological Ownership 
 
As this review will show, it is not clear from the literature what impact ESO may have with 
regards to the development of PO, or the roots and/ or routes it may be able to satisfy. 
Whether ESO may enhance the feelings of PO roots, or in some way satisfy the intimate 
knowledge or control routes is unknown, and is made more complex by the possibility that 
the target could be a range of different organisational factors, tangible or intangible.        
 
Pierce et al. (2004a) and Chi and Han (2008) are the only known studies to explore the 
impact of ESO and a possession based definition of PO. Pierce et al. (2004a) paid very 
little attention to the antecedents of a possession based form of PO. Instead Pierce et al. 
(2004a) focused primarily on developing theoretical propositions relating to the impact of 
PO on employee performance. Chi and Han (2008) on the other hand, simultaneously 
examined the relationships between employee participation in profit sharing, participation 
in decision making and access to business information (which, together were proposed to 
satisfy the three PO routes) with PO for the organisation. The study also explored the 
mediating roles of distributive and procedural justice.   
 
Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed a positive and causal main effect relationship between 
objective ownership and (a) organisation based PO and (b) organisation based self-esteem. 
Consistent with Pierce et al.’s (1991) ownership rights, objective ownership here referred 
to an ESO system designed, implemented, and operated as equity based, information 
based, and influence based system. An interpretation of this theoretical study can be seen 
below:  
 
Figure 3. An Interpretation of Pierce et al. (2004a) 
 
As suggested in Pierce al. (1991), Pierce et al.’s (2004) proposed model was based on the 
premise that ownership exists as both an objective and psychological state (i.e. ownership 
is part real and part in the mind). These two states were assumed to be separate, 
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distinguishable one from the other, and it was suggested that both must be independently 
recognised to achieve an understanding of the effects of ESO on corporate performance 
and related processes.  
 
Pierce et al. (2004a) acknowledged that the effects of ownership may not be realised when 
management creates an equity based ownership arrangement without also addressing the 
information and influence dimensions of ownership
2
. It was not specifically suggested here 
that they had to be part of ESO, just addressed by management – which perhaps leaves 
room for them to be provided in the organisation by factors other than ESO. Drawing on 
the possession literature, Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed, having recognised the similarities 
between ownership rights and routes to PO, that the psychological state of ownership will 
be positively influenced by each of the three dimensions of objective ownership (i.e., 
equity possession, information sharing, and influence/control) – as earlier proposed by 
Pierce et al. (1991).  
 
Chi and Han (2008) proposed a different process of ESO’s impact. Chi and Han (2008: 
697) stated in their empirical study that “profit-sharing plans provide employees with the 
right to share organisational economic returns and enable them to own company stock”. 
Chi and Han (2008: 697) explained that the Taiwanese profit sharing scheme in their study 
provided employees with compensation paid as a stock bonus. This review will therefore 
consider Chi and Han’s (2008) study to be the closest known study to an empirical test of 
ESO and PO using a possession based definition of PO. Chi and Han (2008) believed that 
the three forms of employee participation featured in the study were particularly relevant to 
the three rights, reasoning that: profit-sharing plans provide employees with the rights to 
financial returns from the organisation (i.e. the equity right); participation in decision 
making allows employees to influence organisational decisions (i.e. the influence right); 
and access to business information (i.e. strategic plans, or information about a merger or 
acquisition) helps employees to know more about the organisational status (i.e. the 
information right). Chi and Han (2008) suggested that employees who have extensively 
participated in these forms of employee participation are likely to develop a sense of PO. 
                                                     
2
 Pierce et al. (1991), in their discussion of ESO, hypothesized that the psychological state of ownership was 
more likely to be created when the ESO arrangement is designed and operated such that it reinforced the full 
complement of ownership rights and meets ownership expectations.    
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An interpretation of this empirical study, which tested antecedents of PO, can be seen 
below: 
 
 
Figure 4. An Interpretation of Chi and Han (2008) 
 
To measure the level of participation in profit-sharing plans, Chi and Han (2008) collected 
three objective indicators from each respondent. Included in this, amongst other things, 
respondents were asked to report the percentage of their total annual compensation paid as 
a stock bonus. Unlike any other known study that has investigated ESO, Chi and Han 
(2008) also identified the mediating mechanisms of justice perceptions (i.e. distributive 
and procedural justice) as links between ESO and PO for the organisation. Also unlike a 
number of empirical studies that had investigated the control route to PO, without ESO, 
(Pierce et al. 2004b, O’Driscoll et al. 2006, Mayhew et al. 2007), Chi and Han (2008) 
attempted to investigate all three routes in a ESO setting - in response to Pierce et al.’s 
(2004) recommendations for future research into these routes. Participation in decision 
making, access to business information and profit sharing were all found by Chi and Han 
(2008) to be positively related to the employees’ PO for the organisation.  
 
According to Chi and Han (2008), distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the 
organisational allocation of resources. It is suggested that employees make distributive 
justice judgments when receiving financial rewards (e.g. salary or bonuses from profit-
sharing plans) in exchange for the work they have done, which in turn influence their 
attitudes towards the organisation. Chi and Han (2008) further suggest that when 
employees feel fairly treated after participation in profit-sharing plans, they experience a 
sense of distributive justice and in turn, their positive attitudes (e.g. PO) towards the 
organisation may emerge.  
 
Procedural justice, according to Chi and Han (2008), refers to the perceived fairness of the 
procedure used to make decisions. In accordance with this, employees are suggested to 
perceive aspects related to procedural justice when they experience opportunities to 
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influence decisions, to express their voices, or to possess accurate information used for 
making decisions. Few studies have tested the employee’s perception of distributive or 
procedural justice, or whether their expectations have been met with regards to ESO. The 
lack of rich, in depth interpretations from employees perhaps reflects the quantitative 
nature of these studies.    
 
Chi and Han (2008) found that procedural justice and distributive justice were positively 
and significantly related to organisation based PO. Furthermore, it was found that 
employees’ perceived distributive justice mediated the relationship between their 
participation in profit sharing plans and PO for the organisation. In addition, employees’ 
perceived procedural justice mediated the relationships between their participation in 
decision-making and their access to business information, with PO for the organisation.   
 
Pierce et al. (1991) on the other hand, did not include procedural or distributive justice in 
their theoretical model, but did include the employee’s sense of legitimacy associated with 
ownership, as an antecedent to feelings of PO. Pierce et al. (1991) built on French’s (1987) 
suggestion that participation in decision making will only be effective when it is perceived 
as legitimate by the employee, suggesting that the  effects of ESO are likely to be affected 
by perceptions of ownership legitimacy. Pierce et al. (1991: 128) referred to legitimacy, 
meaning, “a sense of legitimacy to share in the equity of the organisation, to have access to 
organisational information, and to exercise influence over organisational affairs”. The 
sense of legitimacy referred to by Pierce et al. (1991) reflected the proposed feelings 
towards the rights associated with ESO. When employees felt a strong sense of ownership 
legitimacy (i.e. a sense of legitimacy to share in the equity of the organisation, to have 
access to organisational information, and to exercise influence) it was proposed there 
would be a positive relationship between formal ownership and PO. Whilst this is yet to be 
explored in any known literature investigating possession based PO and ESO, the 
perceived fairness of the organisational allocation of resources and the procedure used to 
make decisions (in Chi and Han’s 2008 study) in a general sense, is similar to the sense of 
legitimacy in Pierce et al. (1991). All attempt to relate the employee’s development of 
feelings of PO with their perspective on issues surrounding their participation in ESO, as 
well as the operation and management of it.   
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Pierce et al. (1991) also proposed a number of other antecedents to PO. It was proposed 
that management’s philosophical commitment to ESO will have a positive impact on the 
degree to which the employee-owner perceives it legitimate to share in the equity of the 
organisation, to exercise influence, and to have access to organisational information. Under 
conditions of a strong management-based philosophical commitment to ESO there was 
proposed to be a positive relationship between formal ownership and PO. The perception 
of how committed the management is to the ESO is scheme missing from empirical studies 
investigating PO and ESO.  
 
Employees may participate in ESO with primarily a financial orientation (see French, 
1987); this is proposed in Pierce et al. (1991) to weaken the relationship between formal 
and psychological ownership. Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that under conditions of met 
expectations (i.e., the degree to which the ESO system is congruent with employee 
expectations about the meaning of ownership in terms of equity possession, information, 
and influence), there will be a positive relationship between formal and psychological 
ownership. Employees’ expectations may differ, in mainstream ESO, the ownership rights 
may not always be the same, which again highlights the importance of identifying scheme 
features, as well as what employees expect. If greater influence or control is not expected, 
then it could be questioned whether employees will feel they need it or whether it would 
impact the development of PO. Currently, little is known about the extent to which a 
financial orientation restricts the employees’ feelings of PO, or the impact of ESO.  
 
3.4 Antecedents of Psychological Ownership (without ESO) 
 
This section of the chapter will discuss studies of possession based PO which have paid no 
particular attention to ESO. These studies have focused on the concept of PO and its 
antecedents, in an organisational context.  
 
Pierce et al. (2004b) observed that prior to their study there had been remarkably little 
empirical investigation in organisational research of PO conceptualized as a possessive 
phenomenon, and it can be said, that there has not been much since. Only a few studies 
have focused on the relationships between PO and other organisationally relevant attitudes 
and behaviours (e.g. VandeWalle et al. 1995; Van Dyne et al. 2004, which will be 
discussed in the outcomes section). Furthermore, the studies that have explored the role of 
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PO in organisational research (without ESO) have made few attempts to test thoroughly 
the three proposed routes to PO; most of the empirical studies have investigated only the 
control route to PO. For example, Pierce et al.’s (2009) theoretical study integrated 
research on the psychological aspects of job design with PO. It was proposed by Pierce et 
al. (2009) that five core job dimensions (Skill Variety; Task Identity; Task Significance; 
Autonomy; Feedback) contribute to the emergence of job-based PO. It was reasoned that 
complex jobs provide employees with greater opportunities to exercise control over work-
related activities, require that they invest more of themselves into the job, and result in a 
more intimate relationship with the job than that which is associated with standardized, 
simplified, short-time cycle jobs. This, according to Pierce et al. (2009), would allow 
employees to experience the three routes to PO (i.e., control, investment of the self and 
intimate association) which would in turn lead to the emergence of PO.   
 
Pierce et al. (2004b), O’Driscoll et al. (2006) and Mayhew et al. (2007) empirically 
investigated a number of contextual factors which they proposed would lead to the 
development of PO in work settings. Pierce et al. (2004b) hypothesized that the extent to 
which individuals experience control over their job and work environment is positively 
associated with feelings of ownership for both the job and the organisation. An 
interpretation of this empirical study can be seen below: 
 
 
 
Figure 5. An Interpretation of Pierce et al. (2004b) 
 
Pierce et al. (2004b) aimed to answer the question, “what kinds of organisational 
experiences give people feelings of ownership for the work that they do and for the 
organisation that they work for?” Pierce et al. (2004b) focused on the relationship between 
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work environment structure, specifically, personal experience of control that are exercised 
in the work environment, and PO. Pierce et al. (2004b) reasoned that unstructured work 
environments provide organisational members with opportunities to exercise more control 
in the work environment. Reflecting earlier studies such as Pierce et al. (1991) and Pierce 
et al. (2001; 2003), Pierce et al. (2004b) noted that there is evidence, of both a theoretical 
and clinical nature (e.g. Dixon and Street, 1957; Rochberg-Halton, 1980), suggesting that 
control exercised over an object eventually gives rise to feelings of ownership for that 
object.  
 
O’Driscoll et al. (2006) went a few steps further than Pierce et al. (2004b), by investigating 
work environment structure and some possible outcomes of PO. The question which they 
aimed to answer reflected this, they asked, does PO (of the job and the organisation) serve 
as an intervening variable in the relationship between work environment structure and 
employees’ attitudes and work-related behaviours? An interpretation of this empirical 
study can be seen below:  
 
 
 
Figure 6. An Interpretation of O’Driscoll et al. (2006) 
 
Like Pierce et al. (2004b), O’Driscoll et al. (2006) anticipated that unstructured work 
environments provide organisational members with opportunities to exercise more control. 
Unlike Pierce et al.’s (2004b) study, employees’ personal experiences of control was not 
tested as a mediator between levels of work environment structure and PO. Instead, the 
major purpose of O’Driscoll et al.’s study was to explore the possibility that PO (of the job 
and the organisation) can function as an intervening variable (between work environment 
conditions and employee attitudes and behaviours). Like Pierce et al. (2004b), O’Driscoll 
et al. (2006) proposed that in an unstructured work environment, the employee will 
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develop a closer and more intimate association with the job and the organisation. This was 
suggested to be because there is less structure telling the employee when and how to 
perform.  
 
One key difference between the two studies is that, unlike Pierce et al. (2004b), O’Driscoll 
et al. (2006) suggest that their study may be testing all three routes to PO. O’Driscoll et al. 
(2006) stated that as a result of less imposed structure in the work environment, the 
employee is called on to explore the situation and develop and critically evaluate his or her 
response options before acting. It was further suggested that through this process, a more 
thorough and detailed understanding of one’s job and situational forces confronting the 
organisation will emerge (satisfying the intimate knowledge of the target route). O’Driscoll 
et al. (2006) went on to state that under conditions of low levels of work environment 
structure, the employee is called on to invest more of himself or herself (i.e., the 
investment of time, energy, and personal resources) in the job and therefore in the 
organisation to successfully fulfil their organisational role and responsibilities. O’Driscoll 
believed that through these processes (i.e. Pierce et al.’s routes to PO), a sense of 
responsibility takes root and possessive feelings develop.  
 
Following studies by Pierce et al. (2004b) and O’Driscoll et al. (2006), Mayhew et al. 
(2007) aimed to answer the question, what is the impact of job autonomy as an antecedent 
to PO? The study also tested outcomes of PO, assessing the direct and indirect effects of 
autonomy and PO on commitment and job satisfaction. An interpretation of this empirical 
study can be seen below:  
 
 
 
Figure 7. An Interpretation of Mayhew et al. (2007) 
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Like Pierce et al. (2004b) and O’Driscoll et al. (2006), Mayhew et al. (2007) considered 
Pierce et al.’s (2001, 2003) theory of routes to  PO, noting how they had considered the 
antecedents of knowledge and investment of the self to be largely functions of occupation. 
Mayhew et al. (2007) suggested that carpenters, engineers, or teachers usually have greater 
opportunities to invest themselves in their work than do accountants or receptionists, 
because the nature of the former occupations allows for greater individuality and creativity 
in the execution of the job roles.   
 
Pierce et al. (2001) had previously suggested that highly autonomous jobs imply a greater 
degree of control and thus should increase the experience of PO. Pierce et al. (2004b) 
investigated this claim, to some degree, and as will be discussed in the following section, 
found a significant relationship between PO and control and job design autonomy. This led 
Mayhew et al. (2007) to propose that a relationship exists between PO and control, in 
particular job design autonomy, suggesting that greater autonomy provides employees with 
a sense that their job is their own, thereby increasing their liking of and satisfaction with 
the job.   
 
3.4.1 Levels of Work Environment Structure  
 
O’Driscoll et al. (2006) and Pierce et al. (2004b) both found that low levels of work 
environment structure were associated with increased PO. Following the findings in 
Mayhew et al. (2007) on autonomy, it can also be concluded that in all three studies 
autonomy was significantly related to both organisation based and job based PO. However, 
Pierce et al. (2004b) cast some doubt over the findings, stating that although these 
variables were significantly related to PO, there are a myriad of other factors that may 
contribute to feelings of ownership.  
 
Unlike the other studies mentioned, the central focus of Pierce et al.’s (2004b) 
investigation was on the mediating effects of control in the relationship between work 
environment structure and PO; this was not tested by O’Driscoll et al. (2006) or Mayhew et 
al. (2007). Pierce et al. (2004b) found that experienced control over the work environment 
and the job itself mediated the relationship between the three sources of work environment 
structure (technology, autonomy, and participative decision making) and PO of the job and 
(to a lesser extent) the organisation. The nature of this relationship suggested that the lower 
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the level of the work environment structure is, the higher the level of experienced control 
may be. A significant relationship between control (i.e., the mediator) and PO (i.e., the 
criterion) was found.  
 
3.5 The ESO Literature and the PO Routes   
 
A number of other ESO studies following Pierce et al.’s (1991) study have explored ESO’s 
impact, without testing for PO. However, in a large number of these studies reference is 
made to a number of factors that could influence ESO’s impact, such as, employee 
influence in the firm (control), the communication of ESO (information/knowledge), and 
the very nature and structure of ESO itself (levels of equity investment). Interestingly, 
some of these factors resemble very closely the proposed routes to PO. Although these 
studies test the relationship between some, or all, of the routes with ESO and different 
employee outcomes, PO (defined by possessive feelings) is usually not measured/tested 
for, or even mentioned. Where it is mentioned, PO is, at most, defined very loosely as 
something going on in employees’ minds, and accepted as something that might be 
happening. However, by making reference to what appears to resemble the PO routes, it 
may be that where positive outcomes are found, the impact is working through feelings of 
PO. A better understanding of how PO and ESO may relate to each other may also help 
explain some of the mixed findings in the research literature.  
 
Of the literature unmentioned so far, McHugh et al.’s (2004) study of 61 ESOP firms did 
not test for PO, but is the only known study to test all three routes. The study found that 
employee influence in operational decisions and information sharing (control and 
information routes) with employee-owners had a positive impact on managerial 
perceptions of firm performance. Support was not found however for their hypothesis 
positively linking the amount of employee equity possession (equity/investment route) 
with managerial perceptions of firm performance.  
 
McHugh et al. (2004) suggested, with reference to Pierce et al.’s (1991) routes to PO, that 
different experiences of these routes would impact the attitudes and behaviour of 
employee-owners, which would in turn, ultimately impact firm performance. However, 
from existing literature, little detail can be inferred about the relative effect of different 
routes.    
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Of all the three routes, the greatest attention following earlier work such as Long (1980); 
Rosen et al. (1987); Conte and Svenjar (1990); Levine et al. (1990), has been given to the 
potential importance of employee influence in the ESO context. Despite the doubts (Long 
1982; French and Rosenstein, 1984 etc.), this continues to be studied, and proposed as 
being of importance.  
 
Previously, a number of empirical studies had suggested that firms with ESO were more 
effective when ESO was combined with worker participation and influence in decision 
making (e.g. Conte and Svenjar, 1990; Levine et al., 1990; Long, 1980). Others had found 
that ESO affects employee attitudes primarily through providing employees with greater 
perceived influence and control (e.g. Buchko, 1992). Ivancic et al. (1986) had also 
concluded that voting rights promote a feeling of ownership (but did not specifically refer 
to feelings of possession or PO), as well as improve the commitment of employees to the 
organisation’s objectives. More recently, studies such as Hallock et al.’s (2004) have 
continued to infer from their findings that employees’ perceived influence on decision-
making, and perceived influence on stock performance, when examined separately are 
significant correlates of positive attitudinal changes, such as ESOP satisfaction.  
 
As in the earlier literature, the literature findings do not always provide positive links 
between PDM and ESO. McCarthy et al.’s (2010) Irish study for example, found that the 
establishment of the ESOP did not translate into a perception of increased participation in 
decision making among employees. Also, in Bakan et al.’s (2004) UK study, it was found 
that employee participation (the combination of financial participation (profit sharing and 
SAYE plans) and participation in decision-making) did not produce more favourable 
effects on employee job attitudes, than did participation in decision making on its own. 
This, as earlier suggested, may be due to employees not having expectations of additional 
control/influence rights.  
 
With regards to the other routes, relatively fewer studies have considered how information 
sharing, ESO communication and employee knowledge (the knowledge route) may also be 
an important source of leverage for influencing employee attitudes and/or performance (as 
suggested in Pierce et al., 1991). Klein et al. (1988) however, had previously found that 
when a company does not communicate ESOP information to its employees, the 
employees will lack awareness and understanding of the ESOP; employee ownership will 
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lack salience in the low information-sharing context. Consequently, Klein et al. (1988) 
suggested that the employer will not benefit from the motivating potential typically thought 
to be associated with employee ownership. In 1987, Klein also found that when a firm 
maintains an extensive ESOP communication program, employee job satisfaction increases 
and turnover intentions decrease.  
 
The literature has also highlighted the importance of ESO features relating to employee-
owner equity possession, and the investment of the employee into the organisation 
(investment route). Following earlier examples such as Long (1980), and Conte and 
Tannenbaum (1978), studies such as Tucker et al., (1989); Pendleton et al. (1998); Gamble 
et al. (2001), and Buchko (1992) have, with reference to Klein’s (1987) models of ESO, 
found support for both an instrumental and an extrinsic perspective of employee 
ownership. Buchko (1992) for example, found that, as well as greater perceived influence, 
greater financial value of ownership (Equity/Investment route) was positively related to 
organisational commitment and ESOP satisfaction.   
 
3.6 Employee Ownership and Antecedents of Psychological Ownership: Research 
Questions 
 
The rights Pierce et al. (1991) included as part of their model, and the other PO related 
propositions mentioned earlier, were not based on UK organisations, or in the context of 
voluntary plans such as the SAYE, SIP and EMI in the UK. Exploring how this process 
may occur in the UK would provide a new angle in the ESO literature on how PO may or 
may not, relate to ESO. Pierce et al.’s (1991) model remains one of the most 
comprehensive models to depict the ESO – attitudes/behaviours relationship via PO, using 
the possession definition of PO and is yet to be explored in detail in empirical work.  
 
Little is known about how employees participating in different types of ESO interpret the 
rights they have when participating or the extent to which the rights (e.g. in mainstream 
UK plans) reflect those in Pierce et al.’s model. The extent to which the models and 
findings in the PO literature (some of which has focused on ESO) can apply to ESO plans, 
which may operate in different ways and provide different ownership rights, is unknown. 
Furthermore, the majority of the work assumes that ESO arrangements provide employees 
with greater levels of influence at work.  
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Consistent with previous suggestions (French and Rosenstein, 1984), under conditions of 
met expectations (e.g. Pierce et al. 1991 suggest: the degree to which the ESO system is 
congruent with employee expectations about the meaning of ownership in terms of equity 
possession, information, and influence), it was proposed by Pierce et al. (1991) that there 
would be a positive relationship between formal and psychological ownership. However, if 
for example, greater influence or control was not expected by an employee, then it could 
be questioned whether employees will feel they need this or whether it would impact the 
development of PO if it was missing – or satisfied elsewhere in the organisation. Little is 
known about what employees themselves identify as being important factors in creating 
feelings of possession, and the extent to which they feel ESO plays a role in this.  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) believe that although their model is based on ESO, in the form of the 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), there are many parts (especially the core) that are 
applicable to a variety of ESO situations. It is also believed that an ESO system 
characterised by a meaningful equity, informational and influence component should 
produce PO regardless of its type. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that, although 
PO can exist in an organisational environment without employees being part of an ESO 
arrangement, legal ownership (ESO) may facilitate and speed up the emergence of PO. 
Pierce et al. (2003: 96) explains that this is because ESO allows the individual to explore 
the three routes (which mirror the ownership rights), proposed to lead to PO.  
 
However, it may be that not all share plans satisfy the routes to PO, or that they do so in 
different ways. It is not clear, for example, what ESO gives employees control or influence 
over, or whether feelings of PO for this change when participating in ESO. Furthermore, it 
is unclear what ESO increases employees’ knowledge of, or whether feelings of PO for 
this change as a result. Little is known about the extent to which employees, when 
participating, feel they are investing into the organisation, or any aspect of it. For example, 
the maximum the SAYE allows employees to invest/save may not be considered much to 
the employee – so they may not consider the investment of the self-route to be strong. 
Through ESO participation, employees may not feel they are investing themselves into the 
organisation; if this is the case, it is unknown whether this changes the way employees feel 
about the organisation (i.e. feelings of possession).  Knowledge is also lacking with regards 
to a situation in which ESO has not provided all or some of the routes to PO. If, for 
example, the employee feels the routes are fulfilled elsewhere in the organisation, do they 
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feel that in combination with any features of ESO, or ESO rights, their feelings of 
possession towards anything in the organisation are influenced?  
 
It is also not clear what happens when ESO contributes to pre-existing (before ESO 
participation) feelings of PO, as opposed to causing new feelings of PO (after ESO 
participation). A high financial orientation is proposed to weaken the relationship between 
formal and psychological ownership. However, little is known about whether the two can 
co-exist whilst still having an impact on PO or other attitudes or behaviours at work. Little 
is also known about the impact of different perceptions when employees are asked why 
management operates the ESO scheme (e.g. it may be perceived to be for financial 
reasons).  
 
The following research questions are designed to enable the researcher to explore such 
questions and gain a better insight into how employees participating in plans in the UK 
interpret ESO and the connections between ESO and a possession based form of PO. 
Questions 1 and 2 refer to ownership rights of UK ESO plans and the routes which are 
proposed to lead to feelings of possession (PO) towards a target of ownership within the 
organisation.   
 
Research Questions 1 and 2:  
  
1. What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
2. To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?   
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working 
through the three routes to PO?  
 
Exploring how employees in the UK interpret the characteristics of ESO, and exploring 
which parts of Pierce et al.’s (1991) model and other PO findings in the literature may be 
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applicable to UK all employee ESO, would develop knowledge as to how ESO may have 
an impact, in different contexts, and how this might be via PO.    
 
3.7 Outcomes of Employee Ownership 
 
In 2007, Sengupta, et al recognised that a majority of studies (dating back as early as 1978) 
report a positive impact from ESO on participants’ commitment levels (e.g. Long, 1978; 
Pendleton, 2001; Pendleton et al., 1998; Jochim, 1979; Bell and Hanson, 1987; Oliver, 
1984; Marsh and McAllister, 1981; Russell et al., 1979; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Long, 
1980; Buchko, 1992; Goldstein, 1978; Tucker et al., 1989; Brandes et al., 2003).  
 
However, when reviewing the research literature it is clear that not all studies find a 
positive impact on employee attitudes. Keef’s (1998) longitudinal study showed that 
employee share ownership did not result in the expected improvement in attitudes. 
Sengupta et al. (2007) also found that the presence of ESO at a UK workplace was not 
significantly associated with employee commitment to the organisation. Results in 
Sengupta et al.’s (2010) later study again suggested that workplaces with ESO plans in 
place do not have higher levels of commitment, other things equal. The results showed that 
CSOP, SAYE, SIP and other UK schemes all had a negative but insignificant association 
with employees’ commitment. When controlling for a range of factors such as 
establishment size, employee characteristics and workforce composition, irrespective of 
the type of ESO, the presence of ESO plans was not associated with higher levels of 
commitment, and was in fact associated with lower commitment levels.  
 
Sengupta et al.’s (2010) findings contradict a commonly cited view that ESO has its main 
impact on performance, by first impacting commitment. One possible explanation provided 
by Sengupta et al. (2010) for the findings referred to the theory of unmet expectations. It 
was suggested by Kruse (1984) that the existence of ESO plans raises expectations with 
respect to greater participatory rights amongst the employees in these workplaces, and the 
inability of the ESO plan to fulfil these expectations may result in disillusionment and a 
decline in the levels of commitment. However, as suggested from the review of early ESO 
literature, the same possibly can apply to the more recent literature findings - it may be that 
unmet expectations per se, rather than the unmet expectation of greater participatory 
rights/PDM, restrict ESO’s impact.  
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With regards to ESO’s impact on employee behaviours and performance, Jones and Kato 
(1995) found in their Japanese study that the introduction of an ESOP will lead to a 4-5-
percent increase in productivity; this productivity payoff takes 3-4 years. In another study, 
Blasi et al. (1996) found that with regards to profitability, productivity, and compensation, 
where differences were found between ESO and non-ESO companies, they are favourable 
to companies with ESO, especially among companies of small size. In 2002, Sesil et al. 
found that the adoption and maintenance of broad based stock option plans is associated 
with greater value added per employee. More recently, in 2008 Sengupta et al.’s analysis 
suggested that workplaces with ESO in place have higher levels of financial performance 
and labour productivity, other things equal. However, not all studies report positive 
findings. For example, Meng et al.’s (2010) Chinese study found, after examining a variety 
of performance measures, little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non- 
ESOP firms. 
 
Since the 1970s and 80s, research literature has continued to raise question marks over 
ESO’s impact. Park et al. (2004) for example questioned whether the positive findings of 
previous studies on the performance, and survival rate, of companies could be explained by 
greater employment stability. If so, this would suggest that ESO companies may provide 
greater feelings of employment security and continuance commitment. This could 
therefore lead to decreasing levels of unemployment.  However, once employees make a 
return from the ESO plan, the impact may change. For example, Selvarajan et al. (2006) 
found in their Irish study that employees who had exercised their stock options were more 
likely to be actively looking for outside career opportunities. Furthermore, Culpepper et 
al.’s (2004) study found that high financial value (in an ESOP) was associated with ESOP 
participants feeling freer to leave rather than being bound to the organisation.  
  
In studies were ESO is found to impact performance, the impact may be a result ESO’s 
influence on employees increased incentive to stay. This in turn, might help the firm 
economise on hiring/firing costs and protect valuable investments in specific human capital 
(Sengupta et al. 2008). This, as suggested by Sengupta et al. (2008), would describe a 
golden handcuffs explanation of the positive share ownership/performance relationship. 
Another possibility may be that in some of the studies workplaces with relatively higher 
performance are more likely to introduce ESO schemes.   
 
68 
 
In some studies it has been suggested that ESO can constrain firm performance. Blasi et al. 
(1996) explained that individual employees may have an incentive to shirk (avoid work) in 
a stock ownership scheme because it is a group-based reward system (as opposed to an 
individual performance related system). Although aligning the interests of principals 
(employers/ managers) and agents (employees) is suggested to be a benefit of employee 
share ownership, it may be that free rider problems among employees limit the incentive 
effects of group based reward systems because of the weak connection between individual 
effort and reward. This is known as the 1/N problem. Where N is the number of 
employees, if rewards are shared equally, each individual has an incentive to shirk because 
each employee will share only 1/N of the gains from any increased effort. This effect 
however, may depend on the extent to which the employee feels that employees can 
influence overall company performance, or share price.  
 
Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) observed from the literature that if n employees share together 
some return rights, then the magnitude of the returns is determined, in part, by the effort 
exercised by each of these n individuals. The cost of effort is borne by each individual who 
exercises it, whereas the returns to that effort are shared with all other n - 1 employees. An 
employee will receive a l/n share in employee return rights without making any effort 
beyond the minimum enforceable effort level. Therefore, if the cost of an individual’s 
effort exceeds his or her share in the additional returns induced by that effort, then the 
incentive effect of a share in returns on motivation to work will be nil.  
 
Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) suggest that since this is likely to be the case even for relatively 
small n or large returns to effort, variations in the share of employees in returns will 
generally have no effect on their motivation to work. Thus, although it might be in 
everyone’s interest to have a sharing scheme, free-rider effects may preclude the profitable 
institution of such a scheme. This may be a possible explanation as to why not all studies 
in this area report positive results of ESO on performance.  
 
3.8 Outcomes of ESO and Psychological Ownership  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) and Pierce et al. (2004a) are the only known papers to discuss ESO (of 
some form) and propose a number of employee attitudes and behaviours as outcomes of 
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PO (using the possession definition). The impact on employee attitudes and behaviours of 
ESO via PO, remains unexplored in the empirical research literature. 
 
In comparison to the ESO literature, in the organisational literature (that which does not 
focus on ESO) empirical research (e.g. O’Driscoll et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007) has 
been published relating to the outcomes of PO, towards both the job and the organisation. 
In addition, theoretical studies in the organisational literature (e.g. Pierce et al. 2001, 2003) 
have added a range of possible factors that could influence the outcomes of PO, and have 
also built upon Pierce et al.’s (1991) suggestion that PO may not always have positive 
results. However, like the antecedents of PO, many of these theoretical suggestions also 
remain untested, and are yet to be explored in any depth.  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that the formal state of ownership would have a more indirect 
impact on a set of employee attitudes and behaviours than the influence stemming from 
PO. Therefore, Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that the operationalised state of ownership 
operates upon employee attitudes and behaviour by operating through PO. Pierce et al.’s 
(1991) propositions are receiving growing attention in the ESO literature, but have rarely 
been explored empirically using the possession definition of PO.  
 
The focus of this section of the review will be on the outcomes of PO, conceptualised 
using feelings of possession. This will be considered in the context of the organisation, 
where employee participation in ESO arrangements is believed to satisfy the conditions 
(the routes) that lead to feelings of PO.  
 
3.8.1 Integration, Self–Esteem and Responsibility   
 
Pierce et al. (1991) stated that if the ownership system is to have favourable attitudinal, 
motivational, and behavioural consequences, it appears critical that through the design and 
implementation of an ESO system, the employee - owner comes to psychologically 
experience ownership in the organisation.  
 
Through this experience, Pierce et al. (1991) propose that the employee owner becomes 
integrated into the organisation. It is this stage of integration (proposed to be formed from 
feelings of PO) which is a central part of how outcomes emerge in Pierce et al.’s (1991) 
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model. In this model, outcomes of PO such as motivation, satisfaction and performance, 
depend on the development of PO feelings and integration of the employee into the 
ownership experience. It was stated that integration manifests itself in the development of 
such attitudes as organisational commitment and the belief that there is a common interest 
that links management and the employee owners.   
 
Pierce et al. (1991) believe that the formal characteristics of the ESO system as well as its 
context will play major roles in determining the type of effects arising from an ESO 
system. For example, Pierce et al. (1991) stated that different types (forms) of ownership 
may serve to moderate the relationship between ESO, and the degree to which the 
employee owner identifies with and internalizes the organisation.  Even with the 
appropriate design features (e.g. the three rights of ownership), Pierce et al. (1991) state, 
for example, that if management is not strongly committed to the legitimacy of employee 
equity possession, decisional influence, and informed citizenship, the system is unlikely to 
be highly effective in producing a strong sense of PO. Pierce et al. (1991) propose that the 
way in which PO emerges is likely to have an impact on the degree of PO experienced, and 
the attitudinal and behavioural outcomes that follow.  
 
However, regardless of the type of ownership, Pierce et al. (1991) propose that PO will 
lead to the integration of the employee owner into the organisation and the ownership 
experience. However, this may not be the case if the ownership arrangement does not 
provide the ownership rights exactly as described by Pierce et al. (1991), as it is also stated 
that for ESO to lead to PO, the ESO arrangement needs to be built around high levels of 
equity, influence and information (the ownership rights).   
 
In a similar way to Pierce et al. (1991) who suggested that integration mediates the 
outcomes from PO, Pierce et al. (2004a) suggested that from PO the employee owners’ 
self-esteem is strengthened, and the motivation to maintain and/or enhance their self-
concept results in an increase in work related motivation with subsequent performance 
effects. Both integration and self-esteem in these two studies are considered to be 
outcomes of organisation based PO that then lead to other outcomes, such as performance 
or motivation. Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed self-esteem, but did not empirically research 
this relationship. Van Dyne et al.’s (2004) study is the only known study to empirically test 
this, finding a positive relationship between PO for the organisation and organisation-based 
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self-esteem. However, this study did not feature any ESO, and did not test how the 
employee’s feelings of PO towards the organisation had emerged.  
 
While Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed that organisation based self-esteem would lead to 
feelings of employee motivation, Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that the integration of the 
employee into the ownership experience would create feelings of responsibility and 
identification with the organisation. Pierce et al. (1991) refers to a number of past studies 
to support this. For example, Webb (1912) suggested that ownership creates a sense of 
shared responsibility, and that ownership operates by creating a common interest and that 
together this common interest and the sense of responsibility stimulates a zeal and careful 
working. Whyte (1978) argued that through ESO a joint payoff (responsibility) relationship 
is created and through this process the individual becomes integrated into the organisation. 
Pierce et al. (1991) stated that through the participative process (of ESO) the employee’s 
sense of identification with the goals and values of the organisation are enhanced (Hammer 
and Stern, 1980). Feelings of responsibility developing from PO have been theoretically 
examined further by Pierce et al. (2001) and Pierce et al. (2003) but remain untested 
empirically as an outcome of PO in any known study.  
 
Referring to Pierce et al.’s (1991) ownership rights, Pierce et al. (2001) stated that the right 
to information about the target of ownership and the right to have a voice in decisions that 
impact the target are frequently associated with ownership. Pierce et al. (2001) suggested 
that employees who feel like owners of the organisation believe that they have the right to 
influence the direction taken by the organisation and that they have a deeper responsibility 
than those who do not feel ownership. However, whether employees participating in UK 
ESO schemes feel that they have the right to influence remains unexplored.   
 
Referring to such studies as Druskat and Kubzansky (1995) and Kubzansky et al. (1993), 
Pierce et al. (2001) also stated that feelings of ownership are accompanied by a felt 
responsibility and a sense of burden sharing for the organisation. With regards to feelings 
of responsibility (proposed to form from employee integration, Pierce et al. 1991), Pierce 
et al. (2001) state that feelings of responsibility include a responsibility to invest time and 
energy to advance the cause of the organisation, and to be protective, caring, and nurturing.  
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It is suggested that when an employee’s sense of self is closely linked to the organisation, 
as in the case of PO, a desire to maintain, protect, or enhance that identity results in an 
enhanced sense of responsibility for work outputs (Pierce et al. 2001). Other known PO 
studies that have tested for other possible organisational effects of PO, including 
stewardship, citizenship behaviours, personal sacrifice, and the assumption of risk on 
behalf of the target, have not tested whether they form from feelings of responsibility, 
despite Pierce et al. (2001) believing that they are all related to the broad notion of 
responsibility. Pierce et al. (2001) suggests that all of these can be thought of as 
responsibilities to protect, to care and make sacrifices for, and to nurture and develop the 
target of ownership. Empirical evidence has been found for some of these effects, and they 
are discussed in following sections (e.g., citizenship behaviours; VandeWalle et al. 1995).  
 
In Pierce et al.’s (2001) theoretical study, it was therefore proposed that employees’ PO 
toward organisations or organisational factors is positively related to expected rights and 
presumed responsibilities and leads to a number of particular behaviours associated with 
such rights and responsibilities (e.g., information seeking, stewardship). As a result of the 
employee experiencing ESO, becoming integrated into the ownership experience and 
experiencing feelings of PO, Pierce et al. (1991) proposed a number of social 
psychological and behavioural effects of ESO. They will be discussed in the following 
sections, along with the empirical and theoretical findings of other studies that have 
considered ESO and PO (Pierce et al. 2004b), and those that have considered PO without 
ESO in organisational research (VandeWalle et al. 1995; Van Dyne et al. 2004; O’Driscoll 
et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007; Pierce et al. 2001 and Pierce et al. 2003).   
 
3.8.2 Commitment  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed organisational commitment to be an outcome of PO. Little 
was said by Pierce et al. (1991) about the nature of this commitment, or its relationship 
with integration. Other studies have investigated commitment as an outcome of PO, some 
from PO towards the organisation and some from PO towards the job. In summary, it is 
found in these studies, where tested, that organisation based and job based PO are related 
to organisational, continuance or affective commitment. These studies will be discussed.   
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When comparing the empirical studies that tested for commitment, it can be seen that 
VandeWalle et al. (1995), O’Driscoll et al. (2006) and Mayhew et al. (2007) all measured 
affective commitment using either Meyer and Allen’s (1984) (VandeWalle et al. 1995) or 
Meyer and Allen’s (1990) (O’Driscoll et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007) 8 item affective 
commitment scale (figures 4, 7 8). In addition, Mayhew et al. (2007) used Allen and 
Meyer’s (1990) 8-item measurement of continuance commitment. In comparison to these 
studies, Van Dyne et al. (2004) used different scales. In their first sample they measured 
organisational commitment with six items from Porter et al. (1974), and in sample two 
measured affective commitment with four items from Meyer and Allen (1991).  
 
VandeWalle et al.’s (1995) study attempted to answer the question, does the PO that 
members have for their organisation actually make a difference in their behaviour? The 
study acknowledged that Pierce et al. (1991) had previously proposed that PO is an 
antecedent of organisational commitment, and that under certain conditions, financial 
ownership (i.e. ESO) leads to PO and an integration of employee and owner interests, 
which in turn, leads to beneficial behavioural and attitudinal employee responses. 
VandeWalle et al. (1995) attempted to investigate part of this proposition, hypothesising 
that organisational commitment would mediate the relationship between PO for the 
organisation and extra role behaviour. This hypothesis was supported, and a positive 
relationship was found. This finding provides strong support for the Pierce et al. (1991) 
model of PO and demonstrates both behavioural (extra role behaviour) and social 
psychological (organisational commitment) consequences for PO.  
 
The findings of O’Driscoll et al. (2006) complement findings by VandeWalle et al. (1995), 
which suggested that observed PO of the organisation is linked to affective organisational 
commitment. O’Driscoll et al. (2006) found in their study that organisation based PO was 
significantly related to extra-role behaviour and organisational commitment. Felt 
ownership over the specific job was also significantly correlated with affective 
organisational commitment, albeit not to the same degree as organisational ownership. The 
finding that individuals reported a greater degree of felt ownership for their job than for 
their employing organisation is not surprising given the range of organisations and 
occupations surveyed in the study, and that for many employees, the job is probably a 
more proximal and salient aspect of their working lives than is the organisation per se. This 
finding further supports the distinction between the two ownership targets.  
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Mayhew et al. (2007) also proposed that a positive relationship exists between 
organisational based PO and organisational commitment. Unlike some of the previous 
studies mentioned that investigated PO and commitment, Mayhew et al. (2007) believed it 
was necessary to specify further the type of commitment that they expected to be 
associated with PO. In their study Mayhew et al. (2007) described affective commitment as 
the “employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in, the 
organisation” (Allen and Meyer), and described normative commitment as an employee’s 
feelings of obligation to remain at the organisation (Meyer and Allen, 1991). Mayhew et 
al. (2007) also explained that continuance commitment relates to the extent to which an 
individual wants to stay with an organisation because of the cost associated with leaving 
(Allen and Meyer, 1990). Mayhew et al. (2007) found that organisation based PO was 
significantly related to affective commitment, and significantly more strongly than to 
continuance commitment. In the literature, it can be observed that whilst affective 
commitment has been investigated in some PO studies, continuance and normative 
components of commitment have been examined as outcomes of PO much less frequently. 
 
3.8.3 Employee Motivation   
 
Employee motivation has not been tested as an outcome of PO in any known empirical 
study of PO defined by possession, and has been theorised rarely. As part of their model, 
Pierce et al. (1991) suggested the simple perception of gains and losses associated with the 
employees’ current or future equity, as well as their influence and informational rights, 
may have a motivational effect. Furthermore, Pierce et al. (1991) stated that through the 
integration of the employee owner, having internalized the organisation’s goals and values, 
the perception of a positive relationship between constructive organisational behaviours 
(such as good organisational citizenship, work attendance, performance) and organisational 
efficiency and effectiveness should be realised, then the valence of these organisational 
behaviours and their outcomes will be heightened. This was suggested to contribute to the 
motivational process.  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that ownership (formal and psychological) will result in an 
increase in employee motivation (i.e., work attendance motivation, motivation to engage in 
acts of good organisational citizenship, and performance motivation) by working through 
the integration of the employee-owner with the organisation. Furthermore, Pierce et al. 
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(1991) proposed that as the employee-owner increasingly identifies with the organisation 
and becomes integrated into the ownership experience there will be an increase in the level 
of experienced meaningfulness of work, and an enhanced sense of responsibility for work 
and organisational outcomes, which in turn will positively affect employee motivation.  
 
3.8.4 Satisfaction   
 
Based on past research findings relating to outcomes of ESO, Pierce et al. (1991) proposed 
that in addition to a modest main effect for PO on employee job satisfaction, ownership 
(formal and psychological) will operate on satisfaction through the integration of the 
employee-owner into the organisation. Three known studies have since tested the 
relationship between PO for the organisation or job, and satisfaction. Where tested, the 
relationships between job and organisation based PO and satisfaction have been positive. 
However, satisfaction has been measured inconsistently in the PO organisational literature, 
and is yet to be empirically tested with both PO and ESO.  
 
VandeWalle et al. (1995) found that that overall satisfaction and PO for the organisation 
had a moderately strong, positive relationship, and Van Dyne et al. (2004) also found a 
positive relationship between PO for the organisation and job satisfaction. Mayhew et al. 
(2007) differed from these two studies in that they tested PO for the job with job 
satisfaction. It was found in this study that job based PO was significantly related to job 
satisfaction and that contrary to their predictions, organisation based PO was also related to 
job satisfaction.  
 
3.8.5 Performance and Employee Behaviours   
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that ownership (formal and psychological) operates on 
employee behaviour (i.e., performance and work attendance) by operating through the 
integration of the employee-owner into the organisation. However, little empirical work 
has been done focusing on ESO’s impact on performance behaviours, via a possession 
based form of PO. The organisational literature has however empirically tested the 
relationships between feelings of both job and organisational based feelings of PO, and 
performance behaviours such as ‘citizenship’, ‘in role and extra role behaviours’. These 
will be discussed in the following section.    
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Like Pierce et al. (1991), Pierce et al. (2004a) (Figure 3) also suggested a process through 
which objective ownership (i.e. ESO) may have an impact on performance via PO. In 
explaining the rationale for their theoretical study, Pierce et al. (2004a) stated that previous 
studies (referring to Pierce et al. 1991 and Pendleton et al. 1998) had suggested that PO 
may provide an important lens into understanding the effects of ESO. However, as 
explained in the earlier discussion of PO’s definition, Pierce et al. (2004a) believed that 
neither Pierce et al. (1991) nor Pendleton et al. (1998) (Pendleton et al. 1998 used a 
definition of PO that was not based on possession) informed our thinking about the 
possession based version of PO. Pierce et al. (2004a) responded by aiming to employ the 
psychology of ownership to explain how and why this ESO – performance relationship 
unfolds.   
 
In summary, Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed that an important boundary condition for 
performance effects stemming from ESO relates to the construction of an ESO system 
around the three common ownership rights, as originally proposed by Pierce et al. (1991). 
Pierce et al. (2004a) theorized that providing ESO in the employing organisation (i.e. 
including the ownership rights: giving equity, sharing important organisational 
information, permitting involvement in organisational decision making) send signals to the 
employee about their value and importance to the organisation. As this message becomes 
integrated into the employees’ self-beliefs, Pierce et al. (2004a) suggest that employees 
with ownership will come to believe that they are significant, worthy, and valuable to the 
organisation - these beliefs and self-perceptions are the essence of the organisation based 
self-esteem mentioned in earlier sections.   
 
Following this, Pierce et al. (2004a) proposed that employees are then motivated to 
maintain and/or enhance their self-image so they put forth the goal directed efforts and 
sustain their motivation level, which in turn contributes to higher levels of performance. 
Thus, Pierce et al. (2004a) argue that ownership affects organisation based self-esteem, 
which in turn influences the individual’s performance motivation, with a subsequent 
impact upon performance (i.e. both in role and extra role behaviours – outcomes which are 
discussed on the next section).    
 
To summarise this study, it could be argued that by including the two states of ownership, 
Pierce et al. (2004a) were offering the conceptual argument that ownership operates as a 
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dual state – i.e. part objective and part psychological. Pierce et al. (2004a) suggested that 
(a) the objective state of ownership (i.e. ESO) can influence the emergence of the 
psychological state of ownership, (b) both states of ownership are related to performance, 
and (c) the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part of the equation if 
objective ownership is to have positive performance effects. 
 
These propositions regarding performance, made by Pierce et al. (1991) and Pierce et al. 
(2004a) remain untested in any known ESO literature. However, the PO – organisational 
literature has tested various forms of employee performance (citizenship and in role 
behaviour) but with no inclusion of ESO. VandeWalle et al. (1995), for example, 
investigated both extra role and in role behaviour, finding that as well as PO and extra role 
behaviour being positively related, the relationship between PO and extra role behaviour 
was stronger than the relationship of PO and in role behaviour. Van Dyne et al. (2004) 
found a positive relationship between PO for the organisation and organisational 
citizenship behaviour. O’Driscoll et al. (2006) found that both dimensions of ownership 
(PO for the job or organisation) were found to play pivotal roles in the development of 
citizenship behaviours, in different ways. From their results, O’Driscoll et al. (2006) found 
that individuals who scored highly on PO of the job may display extra-role behaviours that 
focus more specifically on job-related activities, such as looking after their work 
environment and helping colleagues with specific aspects of their work. In contrast, 
individuals high on organisational based PO may be more inclined to exhibit behaviours 
that serve to promote the welfare of the organisation more broadly. Such activities might 
include serving on committees that deal with organisational issues, assuming leadership 
functions within the organisation, and taking on tasks that benefit the organisation even 
though they may have no advantage in terms of the individual’s specific job. 
  
O’Driscoll et al.’s (2006) results suggest that, although the two forms of ownership are 
interconnected, felt ownership for the job and felt ownership for the organisation are not 
synonymous and play distinct roles in the development and maintenance of work attitudes 
and behaviours.  
 
Mayhew et al. (2007) also investigated whether PO was associated with positive benefits 
for the organisation, testing helping and voice extra role behaviours (behaviours or actions 
that are not expected as part of the employee’s job role). Just as no support was found for 
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in role behaviour (expected behaviours as part of the employee’s job), no support was 
found for a relationship between (a) job based or organisation based PO and (b) helping or 
voice extra role behaviour. This contrasts with previous research by VandeWalle et al. 
(1995) which supported the relationship between organisation based PO and both general 
extra role behaviour and organisational citizenship behaviour.   
 
The difficulty in being able to identify PO’s impact, particularly with regards to intangible 
behaviours or those that are subject to debate as to whether the employee is or is not 
expected to carry them out, is that they may be exhibited in subtle ways and do not 
necessarily translate into observable actions (such as citizenship) in the work setting. 
Therefore, where extra role behaviours, for example, have not been found to be positively 
related to PO (e.g. Mayhew et al. 2007), it may be that the researcher, or the respondent, 
was unable to identify or recognise them.  
 
3.9 Negative Outcomes of Employee Ownership and Psychological Ownership  
 
Pierce et al. (2001, 2003, and 2009) proposed both positive and negative outcomes of PO. 
Negative outcomes, or an indication of what may cause or constitute too much PO has not 
featured within the PO literature, despite some studies failing to find positive relationships 
between PO and various organisational outcomes. Pierce et al. (1991) considered the 
possible negative effects of PO, but did not include them in their model.   
 
Pierce et al. (1991) add in their discussion several additional individual differences and 
demographic factors that may influence employee responses to formal ownership 
arrangements of an employee ownership system. They included employees’ perceptions of 
legitimacy and expectations regarding employee ownership, and positioned these variables 
as moderators of the effects of employee ownership on subsequent employee reactions 
such as PO, organisational commitment and satisfaction. However, Pierce et al. (1991) 
suggest that according to anecdotal evidence, many individuals may fear the ownership 
experience, and not everyone wants an increase in influence and responsibility that might 
be associated with ownership. They suggest that this may produce fear, anxiety, 
uncertainty, a need for an expanded time commitment to the organisation, and role strain 
for some employee owners. Therefore, it is possible that in some contexts where ESO does 
not provide influence or control rights, this might be interpreted by employees as a good 
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thing, and their expectations may be met. However, this does not support the ESO 
literature that highlights the importance of participation in decision making existing 
alongside ESO.  
 
In contrast, Pierce et al. (2003) state that individuals separated against their will from that 
for which they feel strong ownership (e.g., as a result of a restraining order, divorce, or 
estrangement) may engage in deleterious acts such as sabotage, stalking, destruction, or 
physical harm as opposed to letting others control, come to know, or immerse the self into 
the target of ownership. Pierce et al. (2003) do not suggest, however, that PO will 
necessarily lead to dysfunctional effects. Instead, Pierce et al. (2003) propose that it may 
lead to such effects if certain conditions are in place. These conditions may also be related 
to certain personality characteristics (e.g., a high need for personal control or an 
authoritarian personality) as well as to the combination of the particular motives (i.e., 
roots) and routes that have led to the feelings of ownership.  
 
3.10 Outcomes of Employee Ownership and Psychological Ownership: Research 
Questions  
 
Just as there is little research investigating ownership rights and routes to PO, there is, by 
implication, little research that specifically considers the impact that PO can have as a 
consequence of different rights or routes. For example, no known study has investigated 
the organisational outcomes of PO when the intimate knowledge of the target route is 
satisfied – by ESO or any other means. Therefore, whether ESO can satisfy this source and 
how it may have an impact on employee attitudes and behaviours via PO is unknown. It 
may be that once PO is experienced, the outcomes have no relationship with the specific 
causes of PO feelings, but this is difficult to determine from the literature, since there is 
little evidence investigating the impact of different routes. Therefore in studies that have 
not investigated antecedents of PO (e.g. VandeWalle et al. 1995; Van Dyne et al. 2004), it 
is not known how PO emerged or whether those outcomes are specific to that cause or 
route.  
 
With regards to the impact of ESO on employees’ attitudes and behaviours at work, few 
studies in the research literature have explored whether, as Pierce et al. (1991) believed, 
the formal state of ownership (ESO) has a more indirect impact on a set of employee 
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attitudes and behaviours than the influence stemming from PO. Studies have also failed to 
explore in any depth whether employees themselves feel that ESO has had an impact on 
their attitudes by operating through feelings of PO. Little is known about whether 
employees feel that both ESO and PO influence their feelings at work. Knowledge is also 
lacking about how ESO may influence employees’ feelings of responsibility (e.g. a 
responsibility to invest time and energy to advance the cause of the organisation), 
motivation (e.g. work attendance motivation, motivation to engage in acts of good 
organisational citizenship, and performance motivation), extra or in role behaviour, or 
performance, and the extent to which any impact may act through PO.   
 
Research also, does not provide answers to the question of what happens when employees 
feel that ESO does not (or should) fulfil any missing routes/expected rights. Little is known 
about the routes employees feel most effectively lead to changes in their attitudes or 
behaviours, or how ESO can best satisfy them. Few studies have considered whether or not 
negative outcomes emerge when too much PO is caused, or when for example, employee 
ownership does not provide employees with what was expected.  
 
Research Questions 3 and 4:  
  
The following questions are designed to obtain employees interpretations about if, and 
how, ESO is felt to have an impact. The questions are also concerned with the role 
employees feel PO plays in this process.  
 
3. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their attitudes?  
4. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their behaviours?  
 
As with research questions 1 and 2, exploring how employees in the UK feel ESO has an 
impact, and exploring which parts of Pierce et al.’s (1991) model and other PO findings in 
the literature, may be applicable to UK ESO plans, would develop knowledge as to how 
ESO may have an impact, in different contexts, via PO.   
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3.11 Conclusions  
 
The ESO research literature overall contains a mixed set of findings. There does not appear 
to be a general consensus whether ESO does or does not have positive or significant 
influences on the way employees think, feel and behave at work. There is reason to believe 
however, that ESO does, in some circumstances, have an impact on employees’ attitudes 
and behaviours at work. Whilst a number of these studies make no mention of PO, it is still 
a plausible possibility that feelings of PO can help explain the findings.  
 
This conclusion that ESO research literature is inconclusive has been echoed many times 
in the literature. For example, Pendleton (2001: 155) stated that “ESO per se rarely appears 
to lead to major changes in either individual attitudes or in perceptions that the running of 
the firm has fundamentally changed”. Kruse (2002: 4) concluded that “studies are mixed 
between favourable and neutral findings on job satisfaction, motivation, and other 
behavioural measures” and “there is clearly no automatic improvement of attitudes and 
behaviour associated with being simply an employee-owner”. More recently, Sengupta et 
al. (2007: 1510) stated that “evidence on the relationship between share ownership and 
commitment yields mixed results”, and Landau et al. (2007: 12) stated that “the findings in 
the literature are mixed, both as to whether, and how, ESOPs have an impact on employee 
attitudes”.   
 
The same can be said for ESO’s impact on firm performance. In most cases major effects 
are rare. Again, this seems to be the consensus. Kruse (2002: 6) stated “studies are split 
between favourable and neutral findings on the relationship between employee ownership 
and firm performance”. More recently, Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 328) stated that 
“employee share ownership has positive effects on performance (especially productivity) 
but these outcomes are often small and/or statistically insignificant”. Knyght et al. (2010: 
1314) also concluded along the same lines.   
 
To understand the mixed findings better, there have been a number of suggestions made in 
the literature that support the need to consider ESO plans, and their features, more closely 
in future research. Kaarsemaker et al. (2010: 326) for example, stated “no studies have 
compared the attitudinal effects of different types of employee ownership”. Sengupta et al. 
(2010: 8) recently suggested “the type of ESO scheme plays a critical role in determining 
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the performance outcomes in ESO firms”; and according to Poutsma et al. (2006: 662), 
“more finely tuned distinctions between types of plan would be helpful in future research”. 
There are also a number of suggestions as to how future studies could take alternative 
approaches to quantitative methods frequently taken. Knyght et al. (2010: 1316) for 
example, suggested that “future research should avoid the manipulation of large, readily 
available data sets, which have dominated previous studies and should concentrate more on 
detailed studies of individual firms that have adopted ESOPs”. Furthermore, Sengupta et 
al. (2010: 8) suggested that in future research “qualitative data could add value by 
providing insights into the causal processes”.  
 
There are a number of possible explanations for the mixed findings, when considered in 
the context of PO, although given the lack of PO research it is difficult to be sure of any 
one possibility. However, it may be that in cases where ESO is not found to have a 
significant impact, ESO fails to satisfy all, or certain routes to PO; that prior to 
participation, employees already experienced a certain amount of PO which limited any 
impact ESO could have; that other factors at work satisfy the routes more effectively; that 
all the routes need to be satisfied by ESO in order for ESO to make any impact, or it may 
be, that different people in different organisational roles require different routes to be 
satisfied in different ways. There are many possibilities, and by understanding the 
relationship between ESO and PO better, questions such as these can begin to be 
addressed.  
 
This research study will therefore focus on providing an in-depth account of the 
differences employees participating in an ESO plan in the UK, believe the plan makes to 
the ways they think, feel and behave, particularly regarding their relationship with their 
employer. Although it is theorised that ESO can enhance employees’ sense of PO and lead 
to changes in behaviour and attitudes, these connections have not yet been tested 
thoroughly. The aim of this study is to adopt a loose conceptual framework, drawn from 
the literature review findings and the identification of key concepts and relationships and 
explore with employees how they explain for themselves their experiences of ESO.  
 
In the context of ESO, this review has presented antecedents of, and outcomes of PO, and 
many other factors that are proposed to influence the way in which ESO, in some 
circumstances, might lead to feelings of PO. Summarising the literature reviewed in this 
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chapter, the loose conceptual framework in the diagram below summarises the key 
concepts and relationships specified in causal models of ESO and PO.  
 
 
Figure 8. A Summary of Key Concepts and Relationships Specified in Studies of ESO and PO 
 
The key concepts and relationships displayed above may or may not feature in ESO 
participants’ responses – something this study will explore whilst answering the research 
questions presented in this chapter. The study will aim to explore with ESO participants 
how they interpret the relationships displayed, and what they feel is important in 
explaining their ESO experience.  
 
The key concepts and relationships displayed represent what may be important in 
explaining the role of PO, and any ESO impact that may work via PO. If PO is, for 
example, an important part of employees’ explanations, then the routes to PO, (control, 
influence and investment) may be areas to explore in finding out how and why PO is 
important. Furthermore, the ways in which those routes are satisfied at work may also help 
explain the employees’ changes in attitudes or behaviours, as might the reasons they joined 
the plan, or their perception of management’s commitment to ESO.  
 
The following chapter will present the methodology for this study, and the approach that 
will be taken to explore the research questions presented in this review. The methodology 
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will first present the philosophy adopted in this study, before presenting the research 
design, and the decisions made relating to data collection and analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This research study focuses on providing an in-depth account of the differences employees 
participating in an ESO plan in the UK, believe the plan makes to the ways they think, feel 
and behave, particularly regarding their relationship with their employer. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the Literature Review reveals that the concept “Psychological 
Ownership” (PO) has recently become popular in the research literature. PO appears to 
have been given more than one conceptual definition and has been positioned 
inconsistently in different models of ESO. Although it is theorised that ESO can enhance 
employees’ sense of PO and lead to changes in behaviour and attitudes, these connections 
have not yet been tested thoroughly. 
 
Taking an interpretive approach, this study explores ESO participants’ interpretations of 
the effect of ESO plans, by taking into account the role of PO, characterised by feelings of 
“mine” and “ours”. This study explores different employees’ perceptions, and tries to 
explain what is happening in different cases when employee share plans are felt to have an 
impact, but also when they are not felt to have an impact. The qualitative design of this 
research centres on employees participating in an ESO plan in the UK, and aims to 
generate comprehensive and contextual information to address the following four research 
questions:  
 
1. What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
2. To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working 
through the three routes to PO?  
3. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their attitudes?  
4. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their behaviours?  
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This chapter will first discuss the methodological philosophy adopted for this study, before 
presenting the research design, and the decisions made relating to data collection and 
analysis. The credibility of the findings, with regards to reliability and validity, ethical 
considerations, and the methodological limitations of this study, will be addressed in the 
final part of this chapter.  
 
4.2 Rationale for the Methodology  
 
A review of the research literature (chapter 2 and 3) led the researcher to identify areas of 
research where knowledge was underdeveloped and unexplored. Furthermore, the review 
also aided the researcher in gaining an insight into the philosophical approaches, and 
assumptions, made in existing research literature that had, in most cases, tested or theorised 
causal models of ESO’s impact. In contrast to the approach taken in most of the ESO 
research literature, this study generates (and justifies) knowledge within the subjectivist, 
interpretive tradition of social science, and explores a set of research questions that aim to 
ascertain, in depth, how employees themselves interpret share ownership, and assess its 
impact. Before elaborating on the research approach taken and its justification, this chapter 
will present a definition of “research” that has influenced and helped shape the study:  
 
“Research is about generating knowledge about what you believe the world to be” 
(Lee, 2008:6).   
 
Given that there are different definitions about what knowledge is, what the real world is, 
and about the type of knowledge we can generate and agree on (and how we can get that 
knowledge); this section of the chapter will first explain the stance taken with regards to 
knowledge, and what the research approach taken suggests ‘the world to be’.  
 
In order for a piece of information to be knowledge, it is stated by Lee (2008) that it must 
be justified. It can therefore be argued that it is important for the researcher to be able to 
justify a piece of information and state what it is believed to be evidence of, when claiming 
it to be knowledge. On the issue of justification, it is clear that the approach taken in this 
study differs from that in much of the ESO research literature. As well as being 
predominantly quantitative, it could be argued that the vast proportion of research literature 
on ESO takes a different approach in terms of what it assumes we can know, and therefore, 
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what information can be evidence of. The difference rests in the way in which the world is 
viewed, specifically, the ontological and epistemological position taken by the researcher.  
 
The ESO research literature, in most cases, pursues a traditional scientific ontology, 
viewing reality as being ‘out there’, a single objective world which we can measure and 
explain if we have the tools to do so. Lee (2008: 43) reflected on a collection of research 
studies conducted in a realist research tradition, stating “they all fundamentally have at 
their base, the belief that the world could ultimately be objectively measured and that the 
knowledge gained throughout the research could reflect reality”. The same can be said for 
most of the ESO research literature, including studies where feelings of possession (PO) 
have been introduced. In most cases the research approach taken in the literature suggests 
that it is possible to “measure unobservable factors like motivation and satisfaction in a 
systematic and reliable way” and that there is “an underlying reality to be discovered, 
which contains regular and consistent patterns which can ultimately be generalised” (Lee, 
2008:43). 
 
This approach is in contrast to an interpretive research approach, as adopted in this study. 
Interpretive researchers place an emphasis on understanding rather than explaining, which 
according to Lee (2008: 59) is “a major difference between interpretive viewpoints and 
traditional scientific ones”.  
 
The purpose of this research study is to understand employees’ perspectives and 
experiences of ESO, and unearth some of their experiences and the meaning behind the 
reasons they give when explaining how, and why, ESO influences the way they think, feel 
and behave at work. The aim is to consider the context in which ESO participants express 
these feelings, which therefore requires a methodology and a philosophical approach that 
allows the researcher to delve deeper into explanations and be open to new, unexpected 
interpretations.  
 
The ontological approach taken (beliefs about what the world we are studying actually is) 
is consistent with the aims of the study, as well as the personal standpoint of the researcher 
(as explained in section 4.6). The approach taken does not assume a single objective world, 
and instead takes the view that there are multiple realities; that “reality exists within the 
minds of social actors, individuals and groups within different socio-historical contexts” 
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(Lee, 2008:60). The study adopts a social constructionist ontology, which, according to 
Hackley (2003), “appears to underline most major interpretive approaches”. Social 
Constructionism would view objectivity as “an impossibility” (Burr, 2003: 152), as each of 
us must encounter the world from some perspective or other. Burr (2003: 152) states that 
“the questions we come to ask about the world, our theories and hypotheses, must also of 
necessity arise from the assumptions that are embedded in our perspective”. In this study, 
reality is viewed as being collaboratively constructed between social actors as they interact 
with each other, and is believed to be “unstable, constantly changing, and unavoidably 
subjective” (Lee, 2008:60).   
 
As revealed from the literature review, existing knowledge is incomplete with respect to 
ways in which PO and the role of other concepts and relationships are proposed to assist 
ESO in having an impact. One of the advantages of interpretive research, according to 
Strauss and Corbin (1990), is to uncover little known phenomena and explore intricate 
details of individuals’ lives. Achieving this will assist the researcher in understanding the 
experiences of the ESO participants in this study, and to contribute knowledge of how PO 
may, or may not, play a role in explaining how ESO can have an impact in the cases 
explored.  
 
The subjective, epistemological (the view of what we can know about reality), approach 
taken, contrasts with (at least in the social sciences) the view that there is a single objective 
world that we can measure. Instead, this study views phenomena as interpreted by the ESO 
participant, as being inextricably bound up with time and context; the researcher is unable 
to separate knowledge of phenomena from its context. The type of knowledge that can be 
generated is believed to be context specific, and therefore, difficult to generalise. In order 
to understand context in this interpretivist study (unlike many ESO studies that adopt more 
realist/positivist approaches), the researcher will immerse himself in the context, and seek 
narrative and explanation, in order to understand the meanings and experiences he is 
attempting to study. To do this, a qualitative methodology was adopted.   
 
It could be argued that the reliance on quantitative data collection in the majority of ESO 
research may lead to gaps in our understanding of the experiences of the people 
participating in ESO. As Silverman (2000: 7) states, “a purely quantitative logic would 
simply rule out the study of many interesting phenomena relating to what people actually 
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do in their day to day lives”. In addition, Silverman (2001: 29) stated that “dependence on 
purely quantitative methods may neglect the social and cultural construction of the 
variables which quantitative research seeks to correlate”. With regards to quantitative 
methods, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002: 42) state that “these methods tend to be rather 
inflexible and artificial; they are not very effective in understanding processes or the 
significance that people attach to actions; they are not very helpful in generating theories”. 
Lee (2008: 65) explained that interpretive epistemology is “generally concerned with 
understanding the world from the perspective of participants in that world”, and went on to 
state:  
 
“...usually if we quantify the world, we are placing our own perspective onto it and 
trying to map that perspective onto all participants. Individual interpretations of the 
world are ignored, which is the opposite idea to the interpretive approach”.  
 
Burr (2003: 149) states that in social constructionist research there is a preference for 
qualitative methods of enquiry since these are often ideal for gathering linguistic and 
textual data and are viewed as less likely to de-contextualise the experience and accounts 
of respondents. Lee (2008: 65) provides a perspective of how the choice between a 
quantitative and qualitative approach can depend on your view of reality, stating:  
 
“The social constructionist ontology necessitates gaining data on how individuals 
construct reality. Quantifying the social world means imposing a worldview upon 
reality, since the social world is constructed of language and meaning – the nuances 
of which are lost if quantified”.  
 
Lee (2008: 65) explains that interpretive approaches usually use qualitative data as their 
main source of insight, stating “the inductive nature of interpretive approaches is naturally 
consistent with qualitative data, which does not necessarily require existing theory to 
structure its content”. Social constructionism and qualitative methods are “fairly 
complementary”, according to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002: 42), who state “they have 
strengths in their ability to look at how change processes over time, to understand people’s 
meanings, to adjust to new issues and ideas as they emerge, and to contribute to the 
evolution of new theories. They also provide a way of gathering data which is seen as 
natural rather than artificial”. By adopting a qualitative approach, this study attempts to 
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provide, in greater depth than provided in many previous studies, insights of how subjects 
define and explain their interpretations of their ESO experience.  
 
In summary, the ontological beliefs about what the world being studied actually is, differs 
in this study from most of the ESO research literature. This study considers reality to be 
constructed in the minds of those that experience it, rather than being objective and 
separate from our perception of it. With regards to the epistemology (usually thought to 
follow from ontology and is the study of what we can know about reality), knowledge is 
believed to be specific to a particular time and place, making it difficult to create unbiased, 
generalisable knowledge. Following from these ontological and epistemological positions, 
the axiology (aims of the research) of this study does not aim to explain and predict the 
world; instead it seeks to understand individual’s interpretation of it.  
 
The choice of method to collect data is, as stated by Bryman and Bell (2003:4-7), “linked 
to the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between different viewpoints 
about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined”. In light of the 
philosophical approach taken and the decision to pursue a qualitative approach, the 
following section will present the choice of method.  
 
4.3 Research Design and Data Collection  
 
4.3.1 Choice of Methods 
 
The choice of research method, according to Easterby-Smith et al., (1994) is tied to the 
philosophical position adopted by the researcher. Bechhofer and Paterson (2000: 2) stated 
that, when considering how to collect data, one should “choose a set of procedures that 
enables your aims and objectives to be realised in practice”. Similarly, Bell and Hanson 
(1999) raised the point that the initial question is “what do I need to know and why?”, and 
only then do you ask “what is the best way to collect information?” With this in mind, the 
method of data collection was selected because it was believed to be an appropriate way to 
achieve the objectives of exploring the research questions in the interpretive research 
tradition. 
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In order to examine a single situation intensively (the individual employees’ experience), 
focus on unique features of one setting (the company and the ESO plan participation) and 
see if the causal mechanisms specified in the research literature (which may or may not be 
true in an absolute sense) are authentic to the experience of those participating in ESO 
plans, semi-structured interviews were chosen. A semi-structured interview typically refers 
to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form 
of an interview guide, but is able to vary the sequence of questions (Bryman 2004: 543). 
Interviews can, according to Banister et al. (2003: 50) permit exploration of issues that 
may be complex to investigate through quantitative means.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were considered to be appropriate given that the study aimed to 
seek rich, in-depth answers which tapped deeply into the respondents’ own experiences, 
feelings and opinions. In deciding how to structure the interview, the researcher had a 
choice. A highly structured design could have been selected, although this may not give the 
opportunity to follow up questions or allow conversations to develop that explore 
unexpected topics that arise. An unstructured approach could also have been taken, with 
little structure or order. A semi-structured interview approach was preferred to an 
unstructured interview, where it may have been difficult to ensure that the respondent 
would talk about anything relevant. Likewise, the researcher opted against a heavily 
structured interview, where the freedom of the interviewee to talk about what was 
important to them, may have been restricted.  
 
A semi-structured interview, according to Mishler (1986), is a more open and flexible 
research tool, and can document perspectives not usually represented (or even envisaged 
by researchers). According to Kvale (1996), semi-structured interviews lie in-between 
highly structured and unstructured approaches, and use an interview guide that focuses on 
the central theme of the research study. Banister et al. (2003: 50) state that the aim of a 
semi-structured interview may be to explore precisely those areas where the interviewee 
perceives gaps, contradictions, and difficulties.  
 
Using semi-structured interviews, open questions were asked, as well as some specific 
questions addressing some of the key concepts and relationships between ESO, PO and 
employee attitudes and behaviours, as featured in the literature review. A semi-structured 
approach also gave the researcher a lot of flexibility to follow up individual points. 
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Bryman (2004: 543) states that in a semi-structured interview, questions are often more 
general in their frame of reference from that typically found in a structured interview 
schedule, and the interviewer has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what 
are seen as significant replies.  
 
Semi structured interviews were chosen because of their ability to potentially provide 
depth and detail, vivid and nuanced answers, rich with thematic material (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005: 29). The interviews were intended, and designed, to help generate data with 
the following qualities:  
 
Depth and detail:   
 
To obtain answers of depth and detail, the semi-structured interviews were thought to be 
appropriate as they allowed the details of ESO participants’ answers to be explored. For 
example, if the interviewee stated that they felt the SAYE scheme was “expensive” to join, 
the researcher might want to know what expensive means to them. When questioning 
about a process or event, (e.g. from joining the ESO scheme to selling the shares) the 
researcher may want to ask about a sequence, and the details of that sequence. This may 
require a number of how, and why, questions related to what employees felt at particular 
times.  
 
Using follow up questions and probes (see section 4.3.4) to obtain detail would help the 
researcher to encourage the interviewee to provide specifics that would enable deeper 
understanding of what was, for example, unexpected. This might be the discovery that a 
feeling, event or experience, which at first was thought to be minor, was actually 
significant. As stated by Rubin and Rubin (2005: 131), “detail adds solidarity, clarity, 
evidence, and depth adds layers of meaning, different angles on the subject, and 
understanding”.  
 
Vividness:  
 
A semi-structured interview was also felt to allow main questions and follow up questions 
to be asked that could evoke vivid descriptions. By obtaining vivid anecdotes or examples 
this might allow the researcher to imagine, or picture, what the employee is explaining and 
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be able to respond intellectually and emotionally, with further questions and analysis. The 
researcher also intended to ask some background questions to learn about the overall 
context (e.g. how long the person has worked in the company, how long they have been in 
an ESO scheme, what they liked/disliked about their job). This was felt to be a method of 
personalising the study, in order to present the interviewees, and their interpretations, as 
being ‘real’, rather than abstractions.  
 
Nuance:  
 
Semi-structured interviews were felt to be appropriate in helping answer the research 
questions, and provide nuance. The process through which ESO has (or does not have) an 
effect on employee attitudes and behaviours, and the way in which feelings of PO can 
develop and play a part in this relationship may vary; it may happen in different ways in 
different circumstances or at particular times. Nuance implies that there are various shades 
of grey, and this study wanted to be open to this, and the different interpretations of ESO’s 
impact. To do this semi-structured interviews would seek precise descriptions, for 
example, the employee may feel PO– not to everything, but to the things they had control 
over, or, how certain aspects of ESO (e.g. rights, understanding, or levels of investment) 
may influence the employee’s feelings.  
 
Richness:  
 
The interview may contain ideas and different themes, including some that were not 
anticipated before the interviews. Seeking richness would help the researcher to unravel 
the complexity of other peoples’ worlds.  
 
By allowing interviewees to provide extended descriptions and narratives, it was hoped 
that this would help provide richness in the data. Where the interviewee was asked to 
elaborate, the researcher would however, have to listen carefully and intently to detailed 
answers.  
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4.3.2 Shaping the Study 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 16) ask, “Prior to fieldwork, how much shape should a 
qualitative research design have?” The use of the word ‘shape’ here refers to the question 
of whether there should be a conceptual framework and set of research questions in place 
before data are collected; the extent to which the research imposes theory on the data.  
 
In the Literature Review (chapters 2 and 3) the key concepts and relationships specified in 
positivist causal models of ESO and PO were presented in graphical form, and translated 
into a set of interview questions. The questions were designed to explore whether the 
causal models (specified in the research literature) fit with the way employees explain for 
themselves their experiences of and reactions to employee share ownership. This section of 
the Methodology will reflect on this, in order to explain the shape (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 16) of this qualitative study.  
 
There are benefits and disadvantages of having a highly inductive, or highly deductive, 
approach. For example, it could be argued that social processes are too complex, too 
relative and too elusive to be approached with explicit conceptual frames or standard 
instruments (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 17). With this view, the preference for a more 
loosely structured, emergent, inductively grounded approach to data collection would 
appear to make sense. However, it could be argued that if the design was very loose, 
everything would look important at the outset, and could potentially be very time 
consuming when collecting and analysing data. Tuckett (2005) points out that (before data 
collection) engagement with the literature can enhance your analysis by sensitizing you to 
more subtle features of the data. Furthermore, having no prior conceptual framework or set 
of research questions could lead to “indiscriminate data collection and data overload” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 17).  
 
In contrast to loosely structured designs, Miles and Huberman (1994: 17) state that:  
 
“...tighter designs are a wise course, we think for researchers working with well-
delineated constructs...we should remember that qualitative research can be outright 
confirmatory – that is, can seek to test or further explicate a conceptualization. 
Tighter designs also provide clarity and focus”.  
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However, there is the possibility that highly structured, tight, designs could lead the 
researcher to miss features in the case, feelings or experiences the subject feels to be 
important, that the researcher did not expect. It could also lead to a misreading of 
informants perceptions.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 17) state that “any researcher, no matter how unstructured or 
inductive, comes to fieldwork with some orienting ideas” and “much qualitative work lies 
between these two extremes”. In most real world research contexts, according to Lee 
(2008: 7), induction and deduction tend to be linked together, almost sequentially in some 
cases”. In having a set of research questions, an idea about what may be important in 
explaining how ESO has an impact, and a semi-structured interview guide, this study lies 
between the two extremes.   
 
4.3.3 The Influence of the Research Literature 
 
Following the review of the literature, the research questions and interview questions 
(designed to help answer the research questions, see Section 4.3.4) have been structured by 
the researcher, and have been influenced by the researcher’s background knowledge of the 
concepts being explored. The literature review provided the researcher with the 
opportunity to pursue theoretical interests in the field, in order to contribute to what was 
already known. At the outset, before any data were collected, the researcher had a 
rudimentary framework (drawn from positivist models of ESO and PO), a set of general, 
open ended research questions, some notions about sampling (i.e. people, companies and 
ESO plans) and some initial data gathering devices in mind (i.e. with regards to what 
methods would help provide the depth and detail desired). The researcher also, by reading 
what had been found elsewhere in others’ research, had an idea about what the employees 
may talk about in relation to ESO and PO. Miles and Huberman (1994: 17) provide a 
summary of the stage at which many qualitative researchers are at, prior to data collection, 
which reflects the position of the researcher in this study prior to data collection:   
 
“Something is known conceptually about the phenomenon, but not enough to house 
a theory... the researcher has an idea of the parts of the phenomena that are not well 
understood and knows where to look for these things”.  
 
96 
 
The Literature Review included a graphical diagram (Figure 8, See Literature Review) 
showing the key concepts and relationships specified in positivist causal models of ESO 
and PO. A conceptual framework can “explain graphically the main things to be studied, 
the key factors, constructs or variables, and the presumed relationships among them” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 18). However, this study does not specify, in detail, what will 
and will not be studied, and does not present a graphical display of relationships, indicated 
by arrows to be tested. Instead, the model in the Literature Review is more of an 
exploratory design, than a confirmatory design (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 20) and aids 
the construction of interview questions, follow up questions and probes, which can be used 
to seek detail on responses that may be relevant to existing knowledge of the subject. The 
diagram (Figure 8) in the Literature Review, displays the key concepts and relationships 
that may, or may not, feature in ESO participants’ responses, and the researcher was open 
to this. Responses, whether they do or do not refer to the key concepts and relationships, 
will tell the researcher something about what is stated in past research literature, and the 
extent to which these ideas and findings are authentic to the experiences of the employees 
interviewed. Through data collection, the study aims to create an opportunity to see 
whether employees explain these relationships for themselves, and how they feel about 
feelings of PO in relation to ESO.   
 
The research questions follow from the literature review findings and the identification of 
key concepts and relationships. Miles and Huberman (1994: 22) state that it is a direct step 
from conceptual framework to research questions, and if the conceptual framework is 
constrained, so are the research questions. Although open to key findings in the literature, 
the study adopts a loose conceptual framework, and is open to unexpected concepts and 
relationships. The research questions were formed around the following process:  
 
 
Figure 9. A ‘Loose’ Conceptual Framework 
 
The rationale for the research questions, in relation to theory, is outlined in the literature 
review (chapters 2 and 3). The process above displays the basic premise behind the 
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research questions, and the structure of them. That is, that ESO in the UK, in its different 
forms, may have an impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviours at work, and this may 
be via feelings of PO. The key concepts and relationships displayed in the literature review 
(Figure 8, See Literature Review) add detail to this process, drawing on the literature and 
the factors that may be important in explaining any impact via PO. For example, if PO is 
an important part of employees’ explanations, then the routes to PO, (control, influence 
and investment) may be areas to explore in finding out how and why PO is important. 
Furthermore, the ways in which those routes are satisfied at work may help explain the 
employees’ experience, as might the reasons they joined the plan, or their perception of 
management’s commitment to ESO. The semi-structured interview questions used to 
explore these research questions, and the experiences and feelings described by 
interviewees, assist in exploring these theoretical assumptions and the related theories in 
the literature.  
 
4.3.4 Structuring the Interview Questions 
 
The interview structure and questions were developed with the aim to elicit information 
relating to the four research questions. The interview questions (see Appendix 2) for both 
the ESO participants and ESO managers, were created following the literature review and 
the identification of key concepts and relationships.  
 
The interview was organized by combining main questions; follow up questions, and 
probes. Using this mix of three different types of questions, Rubin and Rubin (2005: 134) 
state that this will allow the researcher to “structure interviews that are on target, that elicit 
depth, detail, vividness, nuance, and richness”. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005):  
 
 Main questions will help ensure that the researcher covers all the major parts of the 
research problem. 
 Follow up questions will ask for explanations of themes, concepts, or events that 
the interviewee has introduced. 
 Probes will help manage the conversation by keeping it on topic, to signal the 
desired level of depth, and ask for clarification. 
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Although this structure was adopted, “the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to 
reply” (Bryman, 2004: 321). Using semi-structured interviews meant that questions did not 
have to follow on exactly in the way outlined in the schedule, however the researcher did 
make an effort to maintain the same structure, and order of main questions. By and large, 
most of the main questions were asked in the same way, in the same order, in most of the 
interviews.  
 
Main questions:  
 
The main questions in this study were used to encourage the interviewee to talk about the 
research issues at the core of the study: their experience of ESO, the relationship between 
ESO and PO, and the explanations of how ESO has an impact. The main questions helped 
ensure that the central question, that is, the impact of ESO and the role of PO, was 
examined thoroughly and that many parts of it would be explored.  
 
Main questions also allowed the researcher to send the interviewee towards the research 
questions with some freedom; they were open enough for the employee to say what they 
felt without theories being imposed on their answer, which meant the researcher was not 
open to unexpected ideas and descriptions. Follow up questions and probes helped to 
answer the research questions and, where necessary, bring the interviewee back to the 
topic.       
 
Follow up questions:  
 
The researcher had to listen carefully and hear the meaning of what the interviewee said, 
and then ask additional questions to explore particular themes, concepts, and ideas 
introduced by them. On occasions, where the interviewee provided one word answers, or 
had little to say, follow up questions were asked, and were inspired by what had been read 
in the literature. Follow up questions were important in obtaining depth and detail, and to 
identify concepts (based on definitions from the literature) such as organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, organisation based self-esteem and psychological ownership 
(PO).  
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Not every part of every answer was followed up, choices had to be made. The researcher 
pursued matters that seemed most important to the interviewee, since it is their 
interpretation that was being explored, and matters that appeared relevant to the research 
questions.  
 
The researcher also followed up on matters which were unclear or that were unexpected, 
that may take the researcher in a new direction in understanding the research topic. 
Following the work of Rubin and Rubin (2005: 129 – 137) the researcher defined some of 
the aims for the follow up questions:  
 
 Ensure that missing or implied information is tracked down  
 Ensure contradictions are addressed, if not resolved  
 Ensure alternative arguments are examined  
 Ensure all sides of an employee’s argument and different perspectives of ESO’s 
impact are explored (within the time available).  
 
Probes:  
 
Probes were used to keep the interview going, and to provide clarification, which helped 
elicit more information without changing the focus of the question, or the subject.   
 
Probes were used in different ways, for example, if an interviewee said “I paid £250 per 
month into SAYE until last year”, if it was felt it was important to the research question (or 
if the researcher felt the interviewee did) then the researcher might ask “Why until last 
year?” Elaboration on answers was encouraged. Once the employee recognised at the start 
of the interview that length and depth in answers was ok, fewer probes were needed 
throughout the interview. Where possible, the researcher avoided using probes and instead 
stayed silent in order to wait for the interviewee to continue, think, and state what they felt 
with as little influence as possible.  
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4.3.5 Addressing the Research Questions  
 
Interview questions were used to explore the key relationships and concepts found in the 
literature, but were also open enough to allow the employee to talk about what they felt 
was important.  
 
Interview questions explored a number of areas, including: the way employees felt about 
the company they work for and their job; why they participated in the ESO plan and their 
expectations; the difference ESO participation has had on their life at work and whether 
this has any relation to the three routes to PO; the concept of Psychological Ownership: the 
extent to which they feel this at work and whether it is in any way related to ESO; the 
nature of any impact from ESO and PO on their attitudes and behaviours at work; and 
feelings about the whole process (ESO participation – impact of participation on how they 
think, feel and behave). The approach taken when conducting interviews, in relation to the 
research questions will be presented, starting with Research Question 1.  
 
Research Question 1: What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in 
UK ESO plans (SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work?   
 
A number of open interview questions designed to answer the first Research Question 
explored how employees interpreted the rights (e.g. voting rights) that participating in the 
ESO plan had given them. They also explored their expectations of ESO participation and 
the extent they felt they had been met. The questions addressed whether the employee 
experienced the routes at work, the aspects of their work life these experiences related to, 
and any relationship they may have with ESO, or the rights employees perceived to be 
related to ESO.  
 
With theory in mind, attention was paid to whether employees mentioned ESO, PO, or any 
of the routes when talking about the level of control, knowledge or investment (‘of them 
self’ or financial) they had at work, or had obtained, and the reasons why. Following the 
more open questions, some specific attention was paid to whether the interviewee had any 
specific expectations relating to the PO routes when participating in ESO, and whether 
they could identify any link with ESO. During follow up questions and probes, the 
researcher considered specific theories and relationships (particularly when responses 
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suggested specific concepts or relationship might be at work). For example, whether the 
employee felt procedural justice towards the rights that they interpreted to be part of ESO 
(or the sources of the routes to PO), whether they felt distributive justice, or whether the 
company’s approach to ESO had influenced their experience.  
 
Specific questions were able to trigger conversation relating to the extent ESO had 
provided them with more influence or control within their jobs, or over the company, 
knowledge or greater understanding of anything relating to the company or their jobs, or an 
opportunity to invest themselves, their effort, attention or energy, into anything at work. 
Where ESO was not felt to have provided all or some of the routes to PO, questions 
explored whether the employee felt the routes were fulfilled elsewhere in the organisation; 
this assisted in understanding whether these experiences preceded or existed irrespective of 
ESO.  
 
Research Question 2: To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK 
ESO plan has influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation 
(e.g. their job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working through the 
three routes to PO?  
 
The second research question required a number of interview questions that explored 
whether employees felt possession over anything related to the company or their jobs. 
Through questioning, the researcher wanted to understand when and how the employee felt 
PO, the extent to which this was from ESO participation, whether this worked through any 
of the routes, and whether these routes were the routes satisfied by ESO. Similar to Van 
Dyne et al.’s (2004) survey, that uses an analogy of property, an analogy was provided to 
employees during the interview as a way of introducing the concept of PO. Employees 
were given an example of a football fan that supports a football team. It was suggested to 
the interviewee that the football fan does not own the football club, but sometimes refers to 
the club as their team, or refers to the club and themselves as us. They appear to feel some 
ownership or possession over it.   
 
With no mention of ESO from the researcher, employees were asked whether they felt PO, 
over what, and why they believed they had these feelings. Questions explored whether the 
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routes to PO (wherever and however they might be fulfilled), and rights of ESO identified 
by the employee in Research Question one, had an impact on any pre-existing feelings of 
PO or new feelings of PO.  Questions aimed to elicit what employees felt affects the way 
in which their feelings of PO (for anything in the organisation) develop or change, when 
they participate in a UK ESO plan.  
 
With theory in mind, the researcher considered whether, for example, the employees’ 
expectations of ESO, and the extent to which they were met, had influenced their feelings 
of PO towards anything in the organisation. Feelings and experiences that may have 
influenced feelings of PO at work were considered when listening to responses and 
following up with more questions. For example, this might include a sense of ownership 
legitimacy (that it is legitimate to share in the ownership rights associated with ESO) or a 
feeling, or opinion of, management’s philosophical commitment to ESO. Thought was also 
given during interviews to the extent employees approached employee ownership with 
primarily an investment/financial expectation, why employees felt management operated 
the ESO plan (e.g., for employee centred versus organisational reasons), and whether they 
felt that this has influenced their feelings of PO.   
 
Questions were quite open regarding whether employees felt PO at work. Where ESO was 
felt to have an influence employees were asked why, and how, they believed ESO had 
influenced their feelings towards those particular targets. Responses indicated, in some 
cases with follow up questions, whether the routes to PO, were satisfied by ESO and 
whether this helped in any way to lead to feelings of PO. 
 
Deeper discussion allowed questions to be asked that explored the extent to which 
employees felt the feelings of ownership they had developed for a target had been affected 
by specific target attributes that (as explained in Pierce et al. 2003: 94) influence the 
capacity of the target to facilitate or impede the routes through which the feelings of 
ownership emerge.  
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Research Question 3: Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is 
an important part of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes? 
 
Research Question 4: Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is 
an important part of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
Research Questions 3 and 4 followed similar lines of questioning, but in practice differed 
because responses, often based on prior responses, led to different follow up and probing 
questions. Questions aimed to obtain an understanding of the difference employees felt the 
ESO plan had made to the way they thought, felt and behaved at work. They also aimed to 
explore employees’ explanations of how and why they felt there was an impact, or where 
there was not felt to be an impact, what they felt prevented this or felt could change to 
result in their being an impact to their attitudes or behaviours at work. As the concept of 
PO had been introduced to the interviewee, questions were able to address whether they 
felt ESO has had an impact on their attitudes or behaviours by operating through feelings 
of PO.   
 
Key concepts and relationships in the literature were again used to identify areas of 
responses that might help explain how and why the ESO plan had an impact, such as the 
employees’ integration into the ownership experience or organisation based self-esteem. 
As well as listening closely to very open questions related to ESO’s impact, specific 
questions were asked relating to whether employees felt that ESO, PO, and/or any impact 
ESO may have had on PO, had resulted in an increase in employee motivation, 
commitment, sense of responsibility for work and organisational outcomes, job 
satisfaction, extra role behaviour, in role behaviour or other areas of performance. The 
questions were open, and allowed the employee to provide their own explanation of why 
they thought participating in ESO had an impact.  
 
Interview questions also aimed to explore whether the attitudes and behaviours employees 
felt PO impacted depended in any way on how the routes to PO were fulfilled. There was 
also the possibility, which was addressed with interview questions, ESO, PO, and/or any 
impact ESO may have had on PO, had negative effects on the employee.   
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Short Questionnaire  
 
Each employee was also asked before the interview questions began to complete a short 
questionnaire (1-2 pages). This allowed the researcher to obtain details, such as, the 
employees’ gross income, length of service, age, and full time or part time status. The form 
also included questions relating to the employees’ participation in the ESO plan, the 
amount contributed each month to the ESO plan and whether the employee had purchased 
shares and/or exercised any. This information can be seen in the results chapters and each 
of the forms, relating to the SIP, EMI or SAYE plans, can be seen in Appendix 4.  
 
ESO Manager Interviews  
 
One semi-structured interview was conducted with the person who it was felt, within the 
company, was best equipped to answer questions on how the ESO plan had been run in the 
company, why it was introduced, and the impact. This person was usually a manager with 
high degree of responsibility within the company and was responsible for many of the 
decisions relating to the day to day operation of the ESO plan. They were also able to 
speak on behalf of the company about why the company had the ESO plan. In this study 
they are referred to as the ESO managers.  
 
The questions asked were designed to find out why the company had an ESO plan, what 
senior management hoped to achieve, whether the expectations had been met, and what 
impact the ESO manager believed (or assumed) the ESO plan had on employees’ attitudes 
and behaviours at work. The interview questions can be seen in Appendix 3.  
 
Questions were designed to be open, and mirrored many of the main questions asked to the 
ESO participants in the company, but were reworded to ask what impact the manager felt 
the ESO plan had on employees. Follow up questions and probes were used in the same 
way, to try and elicit meaning and explanation.  
 
4.3.6 Sampling 
 
Lee (2008: 212) explain that the reason we can’t rely on the standard statistical logic of 
sampling in qualitative research is due to its reliance on small samples, and the necessity to 
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generate rich information about the research questions. Therefore, Lee (2008: 212) state, 
“we need a sampling method that helps us select cases that are likely to be able to provide 
us with the rich information”. Miles and Huberman (1994: 27) state that sampling in 
qualitative studies usually involves defining aspects of the case(s) that can be studied 
within the limits of the time, that connect directly to the research questions.  
 
With reference to qualitative sampling, Silverman (2000: 104) asks, “Are there any 
grounds other than convenience or accessibility to guide us in this selection?” Purposive 
sampling is described by Silverman (2000:104) as a procedure that allows us to “choose a 
case because it illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested”. 
Furthermore, it is stated that purposive sampling demands that we think critically about the 
parameters of the population we are interested in and choose our sample case carefully on 
this basis.  
 
In order to explore employees’ experiences of ESO, decisions had to be made regarding 
which type of ESO plan(s), companies, and employees. A number of sampling decisions 
had already been made, as a result of designing research questions. Since the study focused 
on the perceptions of ESO participants, all companies in which employees were 
interviewed had to have an ESO plan. Furthermore, all interviewees had to be participants 
in an ESO plan. The sponsors of the research were also interested, specifically, in all 
employee plans in the UK.    
 
In this study, the type of ESO plan was of interest to the researcher, given that a lot of 
research had been conducted in the USA and little had focused specifically on UK plans 
such as the SIP or EMI scheme. Very little research had investigated the human impact of 
different types of ESO plans, especially in the UK, that give employees the opportunity to 
obtain shares and become shareholders, in different ways. Three popular all employee ESO 
plans in the UK were chosen, the Share Incentive plan (SIP), and the Save as You Earn 
(often referred to as Sharesave) (SAYE), and the Enterprise Management Incentive 
Scheme (EMI). Table 3 shows a breakdown of the number of companies in the UK using 
these schemes.  
 
 
 
106 
 
Table 3. The Number of Companies Operating Tax Advantaged Employee Share Schemes in the UK by 
Year Scheme is in Operation   
 
(HMRC, 2010) 
 
The SAYE and SIP are the two most frequently used, government approved, all employee 
share schemes in the UK and the sponsors of the research were keen to understand more 
about their impact. Of the discretionary schemes, the EMI Scheme (specifically designed 
for small businesses and is not open to all employees) is more frequently adopted than the 
CSOP and was chosen to contrast the SIP and SAYE – both of which are all employee 
plans that can be operated in large companies.  
 
Within these three plans, employees are able to obtain a share in the company in which 
they work, in different ways. For example, in the SAYE plan employees decide at end of a 
period of time, during which they have saved money each month, whether to exercise share 
options using their savings plus bonus, or keep the money. In contrast, in the SIP 
employees have the  opportunity to buy shares without having to save money (Partnership 
Shares); in some cases they receive free shares (Free Shares) or buy shares matched by free 
shares (Matching shares).  
 
Yin (1984) states that cases may have sub cases embedded within them. In this study, this 
could be considered to be the different companies and the ESO participants. Miles and 
Huberman (1994:27) state “qualitative researchers usually work with small samples of 
people, nested in their context and studied in depth, unlike quantitative researchers, who 
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aim for larger numbers of context stripped cases and seek statistical significance”. The 
approach taken in this study, stratified purposeful, is defined by Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 28) as being able to “illustrate subgroups and facilitate comparisons”.  
 
Within each of the ESO plans, interviews were conducted in three different companies 
(nine companies in total). Within each company, four employees and an ESO plan 
manager were interviewed. In one company (company 9), five employees were 
interviewed. This resulted from the ESO manager, who arranged the interview times and 
reserved rooms for interviews, mistakenly finding one extra employee. As the extra 
interview had been arranged, and the employee had been sent the details of the interview 
and re-arranged their work duties, it was conducted. In total, 46 interviews were 
conducted; including 9 ESO managers and 37 employees participating in an ESO plan.  
 
Whilst the study could focus on one individual in one company, participating in one type 
of ESO plan, selecting more than one type of ESO plan and a variety of companies and 
interviewees was felt to help determine, in more detail through comparison, the conditions 
under which the findings hold. It was believed by the researcher, that although the 
intention was not to claim the findings to be representative of a larger population, 
comparisons could be made between what was felt to be important by different employees 
in different environments.   
 
Multiple case sampling adds confidence to findings, according to Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 27). By looking at a range of similar and contrasting cases (as opposed to one), it 
may be possible to understand better a single case finding, by specifying how, where and 
why it may be more likely to occur. In this approach, the study would “generalise from one 
case to the next on the basis of a match to the underlying theory, not to a larger universe” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 29).  
 
There were a number of contrasts that were sought in order to aid comparisons between 
specific situations within certain settings. The choice of ESO plan, company and employee 
was made, partly on conceptual grounds (the researchers view based on past literature, of 
what may offer interesting contrasts) and on what was possible within the time available. 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show some contrasting characteristics of the employees interviewed and 
the companies in which they were employed. Most of the companies and employees in the 
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tables below have a few properties (cells) they share with many others, some properties 
they share with some others and some properties they share with no others. Each is 
essentially unique.  
 
The tables below show the basic criteria that were considered when searching for 
companies and participants in which to conduct the research. Within these criteria, the 
researcher sought some variety, so that each interviewee was clearly experiencing ESO 
under different conditions to the next employee. This resulted in differences with regards 
to the plan they participate in (which might mean they think about ESO and share 
ownership in different ways), different levels of gross income (and perhaps a greater 
opportunity to invest more in ESO), and differing lengths of service in the company (which 
might mean they have more experience of ESO and, perhaps, more developed feelings of 
PO). The Tables display 3 cases (ESO plans) and eight sampling dimensions, resulting in 
each of the cases being a unique configuration.  
 
Table 4. Sample Criteria and Characteristics of the Chosen Companies and Employees (SIP) 
 
SIP 
 
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
Industry Real Estate Market Research Biology/ Consumer Care 
Number of Employees 42 850 3500 
ESO plan(s) in place SIP SIP SIP; SAYE 
Age of Business (yrs) 10 - 15 15 - 20 15 - 20 
             
Employee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gender F F M M F M M F F F M F 
Length of Employment (yrs) 
 
Up to 3   
    
  
  
  
   
More than 3 and up to 10 
 
      
  
    
 
  
 
  
More than 10 
    
  
     
  
 
Gross Earnings (£) 
  
Up to 24,999   
       
    
 
  
25,000 - 54,999 
 
        
  
  
  
  
 
55,000+ 
     
    
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Table 5. Sample Criteria and Characteristics of the Chosen Companies and Employees (EMI) 
 
EMI 
 
Company 4 Company 5 Company 6 
Industry Care Service Neuroscience Research Management Consultancy 
Number of Employees 850 22 11 
ESO plan(s) in place EMI; SAYE EMI EMI 
Age of Business (yrs) 1 - 5 5 - 10 1 - 5 
             
Employee 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Gender M M F M F M M F M M F M 
Length of Employment (yrs) 
Up to 3 
    
  
 
    
 
      
More than 3 and up to 10   
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
More than 10 
 
  
 
  
        
Gross Earnings (£) 
Up to 24,999 
       
  
    
25,000 - 54,999 
  
    
 
    
  
    
 
55,000+     
  
  
   
  
  
  
 
Table 6. Sample Criteria and Characteristics of the Chosen Companies and Employees (SAYE)  
 
SAYE 
 
Company 7 Company 8 Company 9 
Industry Telecommunications Retail 
Financial 
Services 
Number of Employees 105,000 75,000 204,200 
ESO plan(s) in place SAYE; SIP SAYE SAYE; SIP 
Age of Business (yrs) 20+ 20+ 20+ 
              
Employee 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 
Gender M M M M M F F F F F M F M 
Length of Employment (yrs) 
    
Up to 3 
  
  
          
More than 3 and up to 10   
       
  
    
More than 10 
 
  
 
          
 
        
Gross Earnings (3) 
  
Up to 24,999 
      
    
     
25,000 - 54,999 
 
  
  
    
  
  
  
    
55,000+   
 
    
     
    
  
 
 
The approach to sampling was pragmatic to some extent. Silverman (200: 105) states that 
there may not be examples to fit every cell, and your resources will not allow you to 
research every existing unit. The choice of company and employee depended  on which 
ESO managers wanted to participate, which ones could give the researcher the opportunity 
to interview the required number of people, and within those companies, which employees 
the managers were willing to let the researcher interview.  
 
However, the researcher was successful in being able to conduct interviews in companies 
of different sizes, from a variety of sectors, and with employees that differed in terms of 
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their age, gender, amount of ownership, seniority in the company, gross income, 
experience of ESO and time employed in the company.  
 
4.3.7 Organising and Conducting the Interviews  
 
As shown in Figure 10 below, 37 interviews with ESO participants of the SIP, SAYE and 
EMI plans took place in 9 different companies in the UK, between November 2009 and 
September 2010. In addition, 1 interview was conducted with 1 ESO plan manager in each 
company, resulting in 46 interviews in total. Companies were located in different areas of 
the UK, as far north as Edinburgh, and as far south as London. The interviews ranged in 
length from twenty five minutes to over one hour, and all interviews were audio recorded 
with permission from both the contacts within the company (in most cases the manager of 
the ESO plan) and the interviewees.   
 
 
 
E1 = Employee 1 
PM = ESO Plan Manager 
 
Figure 10. 37 ESO Participant Interviews and 9 Plan Manager Interviews: 3 Different ESO Plans and 9 
Different Companies  
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The process of finding companies that would be willing to participate was assisted by the 
sponsors of the research, ifs Proshare. Following discussions with sponsors regarding the 
type of ESO plans they were most interested in, and their preference with regards to 
company size, industry and location, the researcher was introduced to a number of ESO 
plan administrators in the UK. In order to attract interest in the study from companies 
which were operating one of the ESO plans of interest to the study (SIP, EMI or SAYE), 
administrators agreed to forward an electronic letter, by e-mail, to ESO managers (or 
employees involved in the management of ESO within the company they worked for). The 
letter (see Appendix 5), which contained the direct e-mail and telephone details of the 
researcher, introduced the study and invited the contact within the company to contact the 
researcher directly if they were interested in participating. The invitation explained the aim 
of the study and stated that the researcher was seeking companies that would be willing to 
allow four different employees participating in one of the specified ESO plans, and one 
ESO manager in the company, to be interviewed. The letter stated that the interviews 
would last up to one hour and, with permission, would be audio recorded. The incentive 
was that the researcher would provide the company with a brief summary of findings 
following the interviews. In addition to contacting companies via ESO administrators, the 
researcher was also able to generate interest in the study by presenting at the Annual ifs 
Proshare Conferences in 2008, 2009 and 2010, held by the sponsors of the research. 
Networking and Sponsors’ social events also assisted in generating interest and 
communicating to ‘the share plan community’ that this research was being conducted and 
that the researcher was seeking companies to participate.  
 
Consequently companies made contact with the researcher, in most cases by e-mail, 
expressing an interest to be involved. Further information was provided by the researcher, 
with regards to the amount of people that would be required for interview, the amount of 
time expected to be required and a brief explanation of the type of questions that would be 
asked. The researcher also informed the manager within the company that all information 
provided by employees during interview, including personal data, would be treated in strict 
confidence. Companies were also informed of how the data would be used (i.e. in a Ph.D. 
thesis, publications and reports).   
 
Not all of the companies that made contact with the researcher were operating a SIP, EMI 
or SAYE plan, or wanted to participate once they learnt of how long interviews were 
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expected to last. In some cases, managers of some companies offered the researcher the 
opportunity to conduct one interview, or four or five fifteen minute interviews, but this was 
not felt to be likely to provide the researcher with the depth and detail required. Some 
companies agreed to participate but eventually did not, due to not being able to spare the 
time. There were also other managers who expressed an interest, but needed to obtain 
permission from their senior colleagues, which, in some cases resulted in them not being 
able to participate.  
 
When an ESO manager from within a company had confirmed employees within that 
company could be interviewed; when they had received the participant information sheet 
(see Appendix 6) and understood what was required, the ESO manager was provided with 
some criteria which they could use to select interviewees. ESO managers were asked to 
select four employees, and in most cases expressed that this was not an easy task given that 
their staff were busy and that workloads varied and were unpredictable. To avoid making 
the selection task too time consuming and tedious for the ESO managers (whose offer of 
help was very much appreciated by the researcher), some selection criteria were provided. 
This was intended to provide some variation and contrast between interviewees. ESO 
managers were asked if possible, to seek variation in terms of:  
 
 The seniority of the employee in the company  
 The amount of shares or options the employee owned in the plan  
 The amount of time the employees had worked for the company  
 The amount of time the employees had been participating the ESO plan  
 
ESO managers provided the researcher with dates and times of the interviews and the 
researcher travelled to the employees’ place of work. Prior to arriving, the ESO manager 
had provided each interviewee, as well as themselves, with a Participant Information Sheet 
(see Appendix 6), which explained the purpose of the interview. All interviews were 
conducted in privacy, in a pre-booked room at the employee’s place of work. Only the 
researcher and interviewee were present during the interview.  
 
This also applied to the ESO manager interviews, who also received a copy of the 
Participant Information Sheet. The manager interviews enabled a comparison of views 
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between the people within the company operating, implementing, and making decisions 
about the ESO plan, and the employees that did not manage the plan in any way but were 
participating in it.  
 
Conducting the Interviews  
 
The researcher drew on suggestions made by Arksey et al. (1999: 102) regarding the way 
in which an interview can be conducted. To open the interview, the researcher introduced 
himself, briefly stating what the research aimed to achieve (to explore the impact of ESO 
on employees’ attitudes and behaviours), indicated the significance of the study, its 
potential benefits and informed the interviewee that their comments would be valuable. It 
was explained to the interviewee how the interview would be conducted, how long it 
should last, and the general areas to be covered. This involved informing them that they 
would be asked some general questions to start with about their role in the company and 
what they like and dislike about their job. Then they would be asked about their 
involvement in the ESO plan, why they joined and some questions relating to their 
experience of it. Then finally they would be asked about the way in which the plan had 
influenced the way they feel, think and behave at work.  
 
During the interviews the researcher listened, made eye contact, was sensitive to signs of 
emotional reaction, and avoided conveying a sense of urgency or impatience. When 
closing the interview effort was made to leave the interviewee with a feeling of success, for 
example, by indicating gratitude, and by informing them that their contribution was 
valuable and insightful. The researcher then confirmed that the results would be analysed, 
informed the interviewee how and when the results will be made available and asked 
whether they would like to add any comments or raise an issue that had not been 
mentioned. The researcher asked employees whether they felt they had been able to 
provide all of the information they wanted to provide relating to the ESO plan and the 
impact it had on them. Interviewees were also informed after the interview that they could 
get in contact with the researcher should they wish to alter or contribute to what they had 
stated during the interview, or know more about the research.  
 
 
 
114 
 
Audio recording  
 
According to Bryman (2004: 329), in qualitative research, the interview is usually audio-
recorded and transcribed. In this study, all interviews were transcribed, with the permission 
of the interviewee. There were many benefits of this, for example, during the interview the 
researcher was able to maintain eye contact and listen carefully to what was being said, and 
was able to engage in conversation. Bryman (2004: 329) highlighted this advantage, 
stating:  
 
“...because the interviewer is supposed to be highly alert to what is being said, following 
up interesting points made, prompting and probing where necessary, drawing attention 
to any inconsistencies in the interviewee’s answers, it is best if he or she is not distracted 
by having to concentrate on getting down notes on what is said”.    
 
Audio recording the interviews also allowed transcripts to be used in the analysis, which 
was to follow the data collection (see Section 4.4).  
 
One on one interview  
 
It was felt to be appropriate for each employee to be interviewed individually. The 
questions related to their participation in an ESO plan and it was not common knowledge 
in all the companies who was and who was not participating. In some situations, the ESO 
plan manager had selected employees and requested their names to be kept confidential. 
Furthermore, it was assumed that not all employees would want to discuss their financial 
matters in front of colleagues. Joint interviews, according to Arksey et al. (1999: 76), could 
potentially lead to “individuals being unwilling to disclose detailed, honest information in 
front of their colleague and instead provide a more acceptable public response; one 
informant dominating, to the extent of silencing the partner and could risk of stirring up 
antagonisms and conflicts of interest”.  
 
Length of interview  
 
The researcher requested up to one hour to interview each employee. The contact in each 
company, usually the ESO plan manager who was also interviewed, agreed to this. In 
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company 8 the ESO manager was reluctant to provide this much time, as in order to be 
interviewed, employees had to be removed from the retail department they were working 
in. In this case the researcher negotiated approximately 30 to 40 minutes for each 
employee. The length of time that an interview would last was unpredictable. As Arksey et 
al. (1999: 61) states, “You may plan for them to last about one hour, but just as it is a 
struggle for some informants to say anything at all, others have been known to talk far too 
much!” This was the case. Some employees felt they had said everything they could about 
their experience of ESO and the impact it had after 20 minutes, whereas others were 
talking for the majority of one hour.  
 
Interview Bias  
 
Creswell (2009: 192) state that in “good” qualitative research, the researcher comments 
how their interpretation of the findings is shaped by their background, such as gender, 
culture, history, and socioeconomic origin. Gill and Johnson (2005: 228) state that it is 
important for the researcher to “reflect upon and articulate the assumptions he or she 
deploys in apprehending and interpreting his or her own experiences”. From a social 
constructionist perspective, it could be assumed that there is no one ‘objective reality’ to be 
discovered, that the interview can bias. However, Easterby-Smith et al. (2003: 93) state, 
“there is a very real concern about interviewers imposing their own reference frame on 
interviewees, both when the questions are asked and when the answers are interpreted”.   
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2003: 93) go on to state that “In order to avoid bias, there is often a 
tendency to leave questions open. There will be some occasions when researchers will 
want to focus on discovering responses to specific alternatives, and in this case probes can 
be useful”. To avoid bias, probes, according to Easterby-Smith et al. (2003: 93), should 
never lead. In this study probes were used to elicit greater depth and attempt was made not 
to lead. For example, instead of a leading probe, such as “so you would say that the ESO 
plan makes you really committed?” the probe might be, “would you be able to elaborate on 
that?”, or “How do you mean?”   
 
Rubin and Rubin (2005: 157) also highlighted the need “to be cautious about imposing 
your own understanding or examples in presenting main questions”. Asking questions that 
contain many assumptions in the wording could result in the interviewee finding it difficult 
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to apply the question to their own experiences. Effort was made to design questions that 
did not impose ideas, or assume relationships between concepts, feelings, events, or 
experiences. Open questions were used wherever possible, and on the basis of what was 
said in response, follow up questions and probes (with existing research literature on the 
subject in mind) addressed specific concepts and relationships that were mentioned by the 
interviewee or central to the research questions.   
 
4.3.8 Pilot Interviews 
 
Piloting an interview schedule can provide interviewers with some experience of using it 
and can infuse them with a greater sense of confidence, according to Bryman (2004: 159). 
Arksey et al. (1999: 93) state that there are important considerations relating to wording 
and phrasing that need to be taken into account when designing questions, and that it is 
only when the questions are used in a trial run that you become aware of any shortcomings. 
The importance of conducting pilot interviews may help the researcher identify unclear, ill 
thought out questions that run the risk of producing data that might be inadequate in terms 
of both quality and quantity (Arksey et al. 1999: 95).  
 
Pilot interviews were conducted with three employees prior to data collection. Interviews 
were conducted with one employee who had previously participated in an ESO plan, and 
two who were currently participating. The first interview schedule (see Appendix 7) shows 
a list of the original interview questions. The pilot interviews helped the researcher identify 
ways to reword main questions and translate the research topic into terms that the 
interviewee was able to relate to and discuss. It was also possible to detect where in the 
interview respondents’ interest was lost, and where questions where not understood or left 
unanswered.  
 
The pilot interviews resulted in a number of amendments to earlier drafts of the interview 
schedule. Prejudicial language was considered following the pilot interviews, and 
consideration was given to areas of the interview where language was construed to contain 
assumptions that might reinforce beliefs about the nature of ESO and the way it has an 
impact. The pilot interviews also allowed the researcher to identify areas of ambiguity in 
the interview, for example, where employees might infer that a question was addressing 
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their views of ESO generally, or their experience of all the different ESO plans they had 
participated in.  
  
The opportunity for the researcher to practice using follow up questions and probes was 
also useful, in preparation for the interviews that would follow. Opportunities where the 
researcher could have followed up, but did not, on statements, ideas, or claims, where 
identified, which helped the researcher realise the demanding level of concentrations that 
was needed to spot these opportunities and to avoid missing out on important clarification 
and detail. Some responses were imprecise, using words such as “a bit”, “some”, “average” 
and “expensive”, as well as many others. The researcher had practice identifying areas 
such as these for follow up questions.  
 
Where questions addressed the concept of PO, and any relationship between the routes to 
PO and ESO, effort was made to ensure that in the pilot interviews, when these questions 
were asked they were worded without the assumption that these concepts should be linked 
or are linked. The questions instead gave the interviewee an opportunity to hear the 
question and consider if, in their experience, there is any link.  
 
Double barrelled questions were also amended in the few instances where they had been 
overlooked in the first draft of questions. Questions that asked two questions in one 
statement, for example, referring to both attitudes and behaviours, or asking both how 
someone felt and the impact this had.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis  
 
4.4.1 Early Steps in Analysis  
 
To help organise data for later, deeper analyses, the interviews were transferred from a 
Dictaphone (used to audio record the interviews) to a computer using a USB cable. The 
data were transcribed, resulting in one electronic transcript for each interviewee. The 
researcher felt it was important to have a written transcription of the interviews so that data 
could be read, edited for accuracy, commented on, compared with other transcripts, coded 
and analysed.  
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Miles and Huberman (1994: 51) suggest using a Contact Summary Sheet, described as a 
single sheet with some focusing or summarizing questions about a particular field contact. 
On this form, an overall summary is noted about the main points in the contact by the 
researcher. Marshall and Rossman (2006: 161) states that writing notes, reflective memos, 
thoughts, and insights is invaluable for generating unusual insights that move the analysis 
from the mundane and obvious to the creative. An example of a Contact Summary Sheet 
used in this study can be seen in Appendix 8. As advised by Miles and Huberman (1994: 
52), the form was used to capture thoughtful impressions and reflections, was kept simple, 
and concentrated on the primary concepts, questions and issues being explored. Comments 
and notes made during interviews provided a reflective overview of what went on in the 
interview and helped reorient the researcher with the interviews when returning from data 
collection, and during data analysis.    
 
4.4.2 Analytical Approach  
 
In this study, the researcher was influenced by a range of perspectives of how qualitative 
data can be coded and interpreted (e.g. Miles and Huberman, 1999; McCracken, 1988; 
Marshall and Rossman 2006; Creswell, 2009; and Easterby-Smith et al. 2003). However, 
the approach taken in this study most resembled a process of Thematic Analysis described 
by Braun and Clarke (2006). Braun and Clarke (2006: 78) state that “Thematic Analysis 
provides a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and 
detailed, yet complex, account of data”. However, Thematic Analysis is, according to 
Braun and Clarke (2006: 79), “widely used, but there is no clear agreement about what 
Thematic Analysis is and how you go about doing it”.  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006: 79) define Thematic Analysis as a method for “identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” that “can help to organize and 
describe data, and assist in interpreting”. It was stated by Braun and Clarke (2006) that 
when considering using a Thematic Analysis, a number of choices need to be considered 
and discussed. One of these, is the question of “what is a theme”?  
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Braun and Clarke (2006) state:  
 
“A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research 
question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the 
data set” Braun and Clarke (2006: 82).  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006) also state that in qualitative analysis, there is no hard-and fast 
answer to the question of what proportion of your data set needs to display evidence of the 
theme for it to be considered a theme. Furthermore, it is argued that the ‘keyness’ of a 
theme is not necessarily dependent on quantifiable measures (or prevalence), but rather on 
whether it captures something important in relation to the overall research question.  
 
In the analysis of the data in this study, some findings were prevalent within individual 
ESO participants’ accounts, within one share plan, or in one or two companies. Not all 
findings were necessarily prevalent across the whole data set. For example, in company 4 
(see chapter 6, section 6.2), it appeared that there was an enhanced feeling that 
accompanied the way in which employees were invited to join the ESO plan, which made 
employees feel wanted, trusted and valued. Although this experience was reflected in the 
accounts of only 4 employees from the 37 ESO participants interviewed, the “secretive” 
feeling of the selection process in company 4 that made employees feel special, trusted and 
valued may well have captured in relation to the research questions, an important element 
of how ESO can influence (in some situations) the way participants think and feel at work.  
 
Inductive or Theoretical  
 
Thought was also given to the balance between inductive and theoretical approaches when 
analysing the data. An argument could be made that the study reflected both an inductive 
and a theoretical (or deductive) approach to Thematic Analysis.  
 
The study was inductive in the sense that the researcher approached the data with an open 
mind, and was open to the possibility that explanations of ESO’s impact (or lack of) may 
emerge that had not been found in past research literature. However, a theoretical process 
was being explored, as reflected in the research questions. In comparison, by implication of 
having research questions that addressed both ESO and the potential role of PO, analysis 
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was driven by the researcher’s theoretical and analytic interest in the area, and was 
therefore more analyst driven” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:84) than a purely inductive 
approach might suggest.  
 
Braun and Clarke (2006:84) believe that the choice between inductive and theoretical 
approaches influence how the data are coded. In this study, the researcher coded with four 
research questions in mind (in line with the theoretical approach). Whilst coding the data 
the researcher was interested in the way PO and routes related to ESO in the data, and how 
ESO had (or why it did not have) an impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviours. This 
inevitably resulted in a number of findings that focused on the role of PO and reflected the 
researcher’s interest in contributing knowledge to theories linking ESO and PO together. 
However, the approach was also inductive, in that the researcher was interested in how 
ESO participants themselves talked about PO, the routes to PO and explained their 
experience.  
 
4.4.3 Coding 
 
Before coding the researcher listened to the audio recording of the interview and read 
through all the data. A first step, suggested by Creswell (2009: 185), is to obtain a general 
sense of the information and to reflect on its overall meaning, and to ask oneself, what 
general ideas are participants conveying?  
 
Codes identify a feature of the data (semantic content or latent) that appears interesting to 
the analyst (Braun and Clarke, 2006:88). Creswell (2009: 186) state that coding is the 
process of organising the material into chunks or segments of text before bringing meaning 
to information. It involves taking text, segmenting sentences, or paragraphs, into categories 
and labelling those categories with terms. The ‘start list’ of codes, according to Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 58), comes from the conceptual framework, list of research questions, 
problem areas, and key variables that the researcher brings to the study. Creating a start list 
of codes was found to be helpful, “it forces the analyst to tie research questions or 
conceptual interests directly to the data” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 58). After listening 
to and reading the transcripts, a start list of codes was developed (this list can be seen in 
Appendix 9). The first column has a descriptive label for the general categories and the 
individual codes. There is also a list of code definitions).  
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The researcher approached the data with specific research questions in mind, and coded 
with the aim of answering the questions. Main codes were developed to represent the main 
process being considered (ESO – PO – outcomes), and the key concepts and relationships 
in past research literature. Using start codes allowed the researcher to identify which 
research question each coded data extract was relevant to, and what the interviewees’ 
experiences meant with regards to the overall questions of the study. For example, some 
start codes related to employee expectations, the impact of ESO on the influence they had 
at work, the extent to which PO routes were already (without ESO) felt to be satisfied at 
work, the impact on the employees’ motivation etc. Some start codes emerged and were 
added to the code list as coding commenced. Start codes gave the researcher a way of 
organising extracts and a way of breaking down the transcript for further analysis whilst 
maintaining focus on the research questions.  An example of a data extract and the 
application of main codes can be seen below in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Data Extract and Codes 
 
Data Extract Researcher’s Notes Codes 
“I am deeply committed to the job and 
the company, otherwise I wouldn’t have 
stayed for thirteen years, through 
difficult times, but, on a dark day, yeah 
you are facing some difficult decisions 
and a lot of complaints then the scheme 
does help you think, you know, keep 
going, at the end of three years there is a 
potential, extra reward” (Employee 14) 
Already felt a high commitment?  
 
ESO is a Financial motivation?  
 
“Extra (financial) reward” from the ESO 
plan added to the employees’ 
continuance commitment: A feeling that 
they must, “keep going” (remain with the 
organisation?) based on circumstances.  
COMM 
 
 
 
ESO/CON-
COMM 
 
Importing coded extracts  
 
Once all the transcripts (46) had been coded, the researcher began with company 1. The 
research questions, in order, followed a process, from participating in an ESO plan, to any 
impact on the participant’s attitudes and behaviours at work. This formed the structure 
within which extracts were placed depending on the main codes they had been assigned. 
 
Within this structure, as extracts were inserted, sub-headings evolved referring to specific 
parts of the overall process being explored. For example, sub-headings evolved for each 
individual route, the different feelings of PO experienced at work, and the different 
explanations employees gave of the ESOs plan’s impact on their attitudes and behaviours. 
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Within the sub-sections, further sub-sections evolved within which extracts and notes 
relating to individual employees or patterns within companies were placed. Where extracts 
were felt to relate to more than one area of the structure, the researcher made notes 
indicating this.  
 
The researcher proceeded to read, re-read, sub code, and explain what was being found in 
the data. As stated by Easterby-Smith et al. (2003:124), “it may be found that the note 
(code) about a particular concept was different to what the respondent actually said”. In 
some instances it was clear during coding that people in the same organisation were 
interpreting similar concepts in different ways. In these cases, re-coding was necessary. 
For example, a number of people used the concept ‘commitment’ as an explanation for 
how they felt as a result of participating in the ESO plan. However, on probing what 
people meant by commitment, it was found that the same word was used to describe 
different types of commitment, as defined in the research literature. Analysis was not a 
linear process of simply moving from one phase to the next (Easterby-Smith et al. 
2003:124). Instead, it was more of a recursive process, where movement went back and 
forth, constantly re-evaluating extracts.   
 
Once extracts had been imported based on their main codes, reading, re-reading, sub 
coding, and explaining what was being found in the data was useful in allowing the 
researcher to identify and edit themes within the sub sections and further sub sections, 
within the structure. The researcher explored coded extracts in more detail as each 
employee’s story became more visible, and considered how different codes may combine 
to form an overarching theme. The relationships between codes were considered, for 
example, in company 8 Employee 29 felt that the impact of the SAYE plan on feelings of 
PO worked through the knowledge route; in company 7, Employee 27 felt more engaged 
with the company, and described this as working through the knowledge route. The 
researcher ensured clear notes and codes were used to identify links between extracts. Very 
little data was discarded at this stage, although the researcher was starting to gain a sense 
of the significance of individual themes within each individual transcript in helping to 
answer the research questions, or explain alternative processes employees felt explained 
the impact of ESO on their experience.  
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This process did not prevent the researcher from identifying explanations that did not 
conform to the relationship at the centre of the study: i.e. the question of whether PO was 
mediating this impact. For example, (as seen in the findings chapters) the length of time 
before an employee felt they would make a financial return and the feeling associated with 
being a shareholder as opposed to an option holder. These emerging themes also required 
start codes to be developed (that were unexpected).   
 
Marshall and Rossman (2006: 161) state that interpretation brings meaning and coherence 
to the themes, patterns, categories, developing linkages and brings a story line that makes 
sense. At the end of the analysis, and after narrative had been added explaining the extracts 
and the links between them, the researcher felt confident that employees’ stories had been 
interpreted from the data and their accounts had been reflected.  
 
Once this process had been completed for company 1, this process was repeated for the 
remaining companies, one at a time. This resulted in findings for 9 different companies. 
The findings for the three companies in the SIP plan were then contrasted and compared, 
which helped the researcher assess employees’ collective experience of the SIP plan. This 
was then repeated for the EMI and SAYE plans. Overall, this process resulted in 3 results 
chapters: 1 chapter for each of the 3 different ESO plans. Each chapter comprised results 
for 3 different companies.  
 
When writing the Results chapters, some extracts were retained to provide examples and 
accompany explanation of what was happening. Braun and Clarke (2006: 94) stated that 
the extracts should be illustrative of the analytic points the researcher makes about the 
data.  
 
Effort was made to ensure that the selected quotes reflected the general storyline of the 
four employees, rather than a singular opinion. In some cases, some individual’s 
experiences, or some circumstances in which the ESO plan had been introduced and 
operated, were fundamentally different to others and this was made explicit.    
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4.5 Reliability and Validity 
 
This Methodology chapter has, in response to the issue of reliability and validity, aimed to 
demonstrate that what has been done throughout this study, with regards to choice of data 
collection method, sampling, approach to interviewing and analysis, was fit for the 
research purpose.   
 
To address issues of validity in qualitative work, Easterby-Smith et al. (2003:53) believe 
the researcher should ask “does the study clearly gain access to the experiences of those in 
the research setting? Validity, to Hammersley (1990: 57) means “truth - interpreted as the 
extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomenon to which it refers”. 
However, the assumptions that underpin this study, and in a lot of qualitative work, mean 
that the study is not looking for principles that are true all the time and in all conditions. 
Instead, “the goal is understanding specific circumstances, how and why things actually 
happen in a complex world. Knowledge in qualitative interviewing is situational and 
conditional” (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 38). 
 
Arksey et al. (1999: 52) state “the concepts of reliability and validity cannot be imported 
from positivist approaches to qualitative ones”. In this study, the researcher did however 
want to provide an account that communicated as much as possible, the setting and the 
situation, as the researcher had come to understand it and followed a number of steps 
suggested by Arksey et al. (1999) with regards to how validity and reliability can be 
enhanced. 
 
For example, Arksey et al. (1999: 52) argues that using interviewing techniques that build 
rapport, and give the respondent scope to express the way they see things, can, in 
qualitative work, enhance validity. Effort was made in this study to do this, using open 
questions during semi-structured interviews, and by asking friendly, non-intrusive 
questions at the start of the interview to build rapport. Other steps were also taken, as 
suggested by Arksey et al. (1999: 52), for example, questions and conceptual definitions 
were drawn from the literature, pilot work was used to help make interview questions clear 
to respondents, and prompts were used during interviews to help interviewees illustrate, 
expand and clarify initial responses. Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases the 
125 
 
interview ended only when the interviewee felt they had been able to express to the 
researcher all of the views they wanted to express, in response to the questions.  
 
The researcher also considered how to enhance the reliability of qualitative work. 
According to Hammersley (1990: 57), reliability refers to the degree of consistency with 
which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same 
observer on different occasions. With reference to reliability, Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2003:53) ask, “Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data?”   
 
Qualitative researchers, with their in-depth access to single cases, have to ask how they are 
going to convince themselves (and their audience) that their findings are genuinely based 
on critical investigation of all their data and do not depend on a few well-chosen examples. 
This is sometimes known as the problem of anecdotalism (Silverman, 2000: 176). Arksey 
et al. (1999: 54) state that qualitative researchers have responded to the problem of 
demonstrating the credibility and trustworthiness of non-positivist research by recognising 
the value of continuing to ask, but not being bound by, the questions raised by classic 
accounts of validity. Arksey et al. (1999: 54) identify three criteria: consistency, truth value 
and neutrality.  
 
Akin to reliability, Arksey et al. (1999: 54) believe that to demonstrate consistency the 
qualitative researcher is required to state clearly what has been done and the decisions that 
have been made. In response to this, this Methodology chapter has aimed to provide an 
audit trail of what was done and why. To meet the requirement of truth value, it is 
suggested that the researcher “provides evidence that what the researcher has captured is 
recognizable as a fair representation of things as informants see them”. Throughout the 
interviews, the researcher clarified with interviewees that what they said was what they 
meant, and tried to clarify interpretations and meaning using follow up questions and 
probes. Furthermore, extracts from interviews have helped demonstrate how interviewees 
explained themselves of their experience.   
 
In some cases, conceptual definitions from the literature, and the items used to measure 
them, were used by the researcher during conversation to help clarify what certain feelings 
meant and how the interviewee was defining words such as ownership or commitment. For 
example, when an employee stated they felt connected it may turn out that through 
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probing, the interviewee was actually referring to PO, consistent with Dyne et al.’s (2004) 
definition which emphasises possession and uses possessive vocabulary as reflected in 
everyday associations with property and possessions. Alternatively, they might have been 
referring to ‘affective commitment’, consistent with Meyer and Allen’s (1984) definition 
which assesses commitment characterized by positive feelings of identification with, 
attachment to, and involvement in, the work organisation.  
 
With regards to ‘neutrality’, the researcher considered his own role in the research and this 
was reflected in how the interview questions were designed (see section 4.3.7, Interview 
Bias). Just as the researcher accepts that the interviewee has their own interpretations, it is 
also accepted that the researcher had an influence, and that a different researcher may have 
had a different influence. Attempts were made to reduce the researchers’ influence by 
asking interviewees the same set of main questions, worded consistently, and by asking 
follow up questions whenever concepts were unclear or where questions were not 
answered.     
 
4.6 Personal Standpoint of the Researcher  
 
Lee (2008: 69) state that “A project can only be interpretivist if you as a researcher are 
interpretivist, not if it fulfils some characteristics on a table”. The approach taken in this 
study does match that of the researcher. It could be argued that the approach taken in this 
study was influenced by the way in which the researcher thought about assumptions and 
limitations in past research studies, in the context of his own philosophical standpoint.  
 
The association of the researcher with the sponsors of the research, who refer to 
themselves as “a voice for the employee share ownership (ESO) industry” and who 
planned to distribute findings of the study, was considered. All interviewees and company 
contacts were informed that in any feedback to ESO managers after the data collection, 
neither the company nor individual would be identifiable. To protect their identity, 
participants were informed that their names, and the name of the company, would not be 
included in any summary of findings. The sponsors were not informed of the identity of 
companies or participants. 
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Prior to starting this study, the researcher had no experience of ESO plans, in research or 
within employment – and therefore attended courses to understand the mechanics of the 
plans. The researcher approached this research with no preference as to whether ESO 
should or should not have an impact on employee attitudes or behaviours, or whether an 
impact was a good or bad outcome. The researcher’s aim was to make a contribution to 
academic literature and develop understanding of how people understand ESO’s impact on 
them.   
 
4.7 Methodological Limitations  
 
Causality  
 
In this study the researcher is interested in understanding ESO participants’ accounts of 
what led to what. However, Miles and Huberman (1994: 145) state that “a case could be 
made that causality is not a workable concept when it comes to human behaviour”. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 145) “people have complex intentions operating 
in a complex web of others’ intentions and actions”. One potential limitation therefore, is 
that in this complex web of factors influencing ESO and its’ impact, misinterpretation may 
occur in both the researcher’s analysis of data and in the interviewees’ explanations. For 
example, Gilovich (1991: 21) provides evidence that people misperceive and misinterpret 
data, make too much of ambiguous data, and often end up with biased interpretations 
(seeing what we want to see).  
  
As well as ‘seeing what they want to see’, interviewees may not be able to identify the 
relationships between feelings they report. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) proposed that when 
people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, (that is, on the processes mediating 
the effects of a stimulus on a response) they do not do so on the basis of any true 
introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or 
judgements about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given 
response. Similarly, Read et al. (1989) claims that people construct scenarios that make 
sense of a sequence or order of events; and they often impose a causal structure on those 
events as a way of making them meaningful. It is therefore possible that interviewees may 
struggle to explain, or even contemplate, the actual reasons why they felt a certain way or 
made a particular decision.  
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It is also possible that interviewees may appear unpredictable; they may feel that they acted 
out of free will, that their choice, feeling, or action was their decision, independent of any 
obvious or plausible cause that might be expected. These acts, thoughts and feelings may 
even contradict proposed theory on how ESO has an impact. Some research in 
neuroscience accepts that people may feel their decision had no cause, was free will and 
that it was their choice, but at the same time, reject the notion of ‘free will’. Illes (2006: 
52) explains that it is easily understood why it may seem, introspectively, as though one’s 
choice was uncaused, stating: “First, our brains are not conscious of all relevant neural 
events antecedent to choice. From the inside – introspectively, as it were – a person will 
have no apprehension of non-conscious antecedent causes”. Illes (2006: 52) goes on to 
state that “we, in fact, have no introspective access to many events that happen in our 
brains”, and “one may therefore be inclined to consider their choice as springing from 
nothing - nothing but his free will”. Others’ also support this, Greene and Cohen (2004: 
1775) argues that the neuro-scientific evidence shows that, for humans, “every decision is 
a thoroughly mechanical process, the outcome of which is completely determined by the 
results of prior mechanical processes”. Furthermore, neuro-ethicist Martha Farah argues 
that neuro-scientific evidence shows that “all behaviour is 100% determined by brain 
function, which is in turn determined by the interplay of genes and experience” (Farah et 
al. 2005: 34). Interviewees’ reasons for being committed, for being motivated, working 
hard, doing extra work, or participating in decision making, may therefore be difficult to 
explain. This may be especially difficult if we are not conscious of all relevant neural 
events antecedent to, in this study for example, the act of working harder or checking the 
share price more frequently. ESO may be an obvious answer to state as a cause.  
  
Nevertheless, whether it is because of the complex nature of all the influences on the 
interviewee, influencing what they say and do, or whether it is because people have free 
will, the researcher takes the position that interviewees are unpredictable, or at least, very 
difficult to predict. The researcher also assumes in this study that the interviewee will (as 
much as is humanly possible) provide explanations that they feel, at the time of interview, 
are important in explaining ESO’s impact. The researcher has, as much as possible, tried to 
make both the researchers’ and interviewees’ assumptions explicit in the data analysis.  
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Generalisability  
 
There is some criticism that qualitative research findings rely too much on the researcher’s 
often unsystematic views about what is significant and important (Bryman, 2004: 284). 
Furthermore, there are criticisms that qualitative research can be difficult to replicate. 
Bryman (2004: 284) states that it is almost impossible to conduct a true replication, since 
there are hardly any standard procedures to be followed. The investigator is the main 
instrument of data collection and so what is heard and what the researcher decides to 
concentrate on is very much a product of their predilections. However, this limitation, if it 
is believed to be one, may not be limited to qualitative work. Fielding et al. (1986: 12) 
explain that some interpretation takes place when using quantitative measures, and that 
ultimately, all methods of data collection are analysed qualitatively, as the act of analysis is 
an interpretation.  
 
With regards to generalisability in qualitative work, Easterby-Smith et al. (2003: 53) state 
an important question to address is, “do the concepts and constructs derived from this 
study have any relevance to other settings?” In this study the researcher will consider how 
likely it is that the results could occur in similar or different situations, and whether there 
are key issues which could affect the occurrence of similar events. The relevance of the 
results produced in this research design will not necessarily be completely bound to a time, 
place or situation, even though the interpretation is. By providing details of the research 
process and decisions made in this chapter, profiles of participants (i.e. salary, ownership 
status, length of ESO participation etc.), and a rich description of employees’ experiences 
of ESO and PO in the Findings chapters, this study aims to help readers decide whether the 
findings of this study can be applied to other contexts (Morrow, 2005).  
 
4.8 Ethics  
 
Committing to ethical responsibility is a primary concern of this research. Participant 
Information and Consent Forms were used, as set out by Loughborough University’s 
Ethical Advisory Committee in their Code of Practice on Investigations Involving Human 
Participants.  
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Prior to the day of interview, participants were provided with a Participant Information 
Sheet that contained a number of answers to questions they may have about the interview 
process. For example, “What is the purpose of the study?”; “Will my taking part in this 
study be kept confidential?” and “What personal information will be required from me?” 
The document also provided information relating to what will happen to the results of the 
study, who the participant could contact should they have any more questions, and what 
they should do if they are not happy with how the research was conducted. At the 
beginning of each interview, each participant was asked whether they understood this 
form, whether they had any questions, and were reminded of the purpose of the study and 
that all information provided, including personal data, would be treated in strict confidence 
and kept anonymous.  
 
An Informed Consent Form was signed by each participant before the interview began; 
after they had stated they had read and understood the Participant Information Sheet, and 
after they had agreed to be audio recorded. The form clarified that the interviewee agreed 
with a number of statements relating to the information they had read and their rights as a 
participant in the study (see Appendix 10).   
 
Although the researcher knew the name of the interviewee, and the interviewee had signed 
their name on a consent form, during audio recording the interviewee was not asked for 
their name, and in all other documentation was referred to as, for example, Employee 1.  
 
4.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodology adopted for this study and the rationale, and 
explained that a qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews was taken. The 
study adopted a purposeful sampling procedure and focused on exploring the impact of 
three different ESO plans by conducting interviews with 46 employees in 9 different 
companies.  
 
The study adopts a loose conceptual framework, drawn from the literature review findings 
and the identification of key concepts and relationships. The role of PO in employees’ 
interpretations of ESO’s impact was explored by developing interview questions that 
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helped answer the research questions; and to obtain depth and detail, followed a procedure 
of using main questions, follow up questions and probes.  
 
Pilot interviews prepared the researcher and allowed the researcher to consider carefully 
the wording and order of interview questions. Data were audio recorded, transcribed, and 
coded both inductively and theoretically. The data were analysed and themes identified. 
Potential limitations of this study, relating to causality and generalisability of qualitative 
research, have been presented and ethical steps taken have been stated. The findings 
presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the results from the application of this methodology.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE FINDINGS  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate what differences employees participating in 
an ESO plan believe the plan makes to the ways they think, feel and behave, particularly 
regarding their relationship with their employer. This study is specifically interested in 
exploring the role of PO in this process, as a possible explanation for how share plan 
participation can impact upon employee attitudes and behaviours at work. The analysis of 
the information was focused around the following four key research questions:   
 
1. What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
2. To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working 
through the three routes to PO?  
3. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their attitudes?  
4. Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how UK ESO has an impact on their behaviours?  
 
To answer question one, the researcher aimed to understand how employees felt 
participating in the share plan had impacted their experience of the three proposed routes to 
PO. The interview questions were designed to explore the extent to which participants felt 
they had control, influence and an input in decision making at work, knowledge at work 
(i.e. of the company, share price performance, and their job), and the extent to which they 
invested themselves into the company and their job.  
 
To answer question two, the researcher designed the interview questions to seek 
interpretations of feelings of ownership and possession at work and the causes of these 
feelings; specifically, whether or not share plan participation helped create PO, and how. 
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The questions aimed to unearth the experiences and feelings which led to feelings of 
ownership and possession, to see whether employees felt that PO was working through the 
routes that were explored in question 1.  
 
To answer question three and four, the researcher aimed to seek, based on their experience, 
employees’ explanations of any relationship they believed existed between share plan 
participation and their attitudes and behaviours at work. In situations where employees 
perceived there to be no impact, questions explored why, and asked how employees 
believed share plan participation could have such as impact. The role of PO in explanations 
of how the share plan had its impact was of interest to the researcher.  
 
A semi-structured interview approach was used to elicit the required information together 
with a short questionnaire3 to supplement the findings. The data collected for analysis were 
coded and organised under the key research question headings. Patterns and trends drawn 
from the interview questions have been gathered together to respond to the key research 
questions. The findings will be presented using direct quotations from the interview data to 
reflect participants’ perspectives. To protect the identity of the 37 Share plan participants, 
they have been referred to as ‘employee 1’, ‘employee 2’...to ‘employee 37’. The share 
plan managers have been referred to as, ‘SIP manager 1’, ‘SIP manager 2’…’SAYE 
manager 1’, ‘SAYE manager 2’ etc.  
 
Research findings will be presented for each of the nine companies and will be organised 
into three main chapters, one chapter for each share plan (this will include: 3 companies 
with the SIP, 3 companies with the SAYE, and 3 companies with EMI). Each Share plan 
results chapter will begin with an introduction and end with a presentation of findings for 
that share plan. A discussion of the findings (chapter 8) in the context of what is already 
known will follow the results.  
 
                                                     
3 The short questionnaire obtained employee details such as gender, income, number of dependants, as well as 
information relating to their participation in the share plan, such as the value of their shares/options and whether they had 
sold any in the past two years. See Appendix 4.  
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5.2 THE FINDINGS: THE SHARE INCENTIVE PLAN (SIP)   
 
5.2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will begin by presenting the findings for the first three companies, all of 
which offer employees the opportunity to participate in a SIP. The results will be presented 
for company 1, followed by company 2 and company 3. To begin, a summary of each 
company and an overview of the SIP manager’s responses will be presented. The SIP 
manager’s responses will relate to why they believe the company operates the plan, and the 
impact they feel it has had on attitudes and behaviours across the company.    
 
Using data collected from each company (four employee interviews and one manager 
interview), findings for each Research Question will then be presented and summarised. 
Details of the SIP companies can be found in Table 8, and details of the employees 
interviewed in these companies can be found in Table 9. Please see below.  
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Table 8. The Share Incentive Plan (SIP) 
 
 SIP Company 1 SIP Company 2 SIP Company 3 
Number of employees at the company 42 (40 in UK) 850 (180 in UK) 3500 (964 in UK) 
The company’s annual turnover (£) 2,923,000 20,277,000 916,200,000 
Industry Real Estate Market Research 
Consumer Care/ Industrial 
Specialities 
Stand-alone/ group company Standalone Is a Subsidiary Has Subsidiaries 
Ownership and stock exchange listing UK Owned Foreign Owned UK Owned 
Stock exchange listed Unlisted NASDAQ FTSE 250 
Age of Business    
More than10 years and up to 15 years     
More than 15 years and up to 20 years    
More than 20 years      
Plans Offered to Employees    
Save as you earn (Sharesave/SAYE)     
Enterprise management incentives (EMI)    
Share incentive plan (SIP)       
     (SIP) Only partnership shares    
     (SIP) Partnership and free shares    
     (SIP) Partnership and matching shares      
     (SIP) Partnership, matching and free shares    
     (SIP) Free shares only       
Other plans offered to all employees    
Date SIP shares were first awarded  2008 2007 2003 
Free Shares    
Percentage of the workforce which have free shares 60% (UK) - - 
Eligibility criteria used to determine which employees 
are eligible to apply for free shares. 
1 Year Service - - 
Performance conditions and / or forfeiture, award of 
free shares is subject to. 
None - - 
Partnership Shares    
Length of service an employee must have completed 
before they are eligible to apply for partnership shares  
- 3 Months 1 Year 
Percentage of the workforce awarded partnership 
shares 
- 15% (UK) 51% (UK) 
Matching Shares    
Percentage of the workforce in this company awarded 
matching shares 
- 15% (UK) 51% (UK) 
Eligibility criterion used to determine which employees 
are eligible to apply for matching shares 
- 3 Months 
All employees who join 
the SIP are eligible 
Performance conditions and / or forfeiture, award of 
free shares is subject to 
- None None 
Matching shares: matching basis offered (for every 
partnership Share) 
- 3 for 17 1 for 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Table 9. Interviewees Participating in the SIP  
Companies using the Share Incentive plan (SIP) SIP Company 1 SIP Company 2 SIP Company 3 
Employee (E) E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 
Gender/ Age/ Number of dependants             
Gender F F M M F M M F F F M F 
Age 29 44 38 42 40 38 50 40 20 30 35 27 
Number of dependants 0 2 2 1 0 2 4 0 0 1 3 2 
Education             
A-Level (or equivalent)                 
Bachelor’s degree (or equivalent)                 
Higher degree (or equivalent)                 
Length of Employment and Work Status             
1 year or less             
More than 1 year and up to 3 years                
More than 3 years and up to 5 years                  
More than 5 years and up to 10 years               
More than10 years and up to 15 years              
More than 15 years and up to 20 years              
Work status: Full Time (FT) Part Time (PT) F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T P/T 
Length of Participation in the SIP plan             
More than 1 year and up to 3 years                       
More than 3 years and up to 5 years              
More than 5 years and up to 10 years              
Gross Earnings             
£14,999 or less              
£15,000 - £24,999                
£25,000 - £34,999                
£35,000 - £44,999               
£45,000 - £54,999              
£55,000 - £64,999              
Over £75,000              
SIP Participation: Partnership Shares and 
Matching Shares 
            
Amount employee contributes each month to 
purchasing partnership shares (£) 
- 
- - - 
75 150 125 125 50 125 200 70 
Current value of employees’ shares (£) - - - - 4880 U 2000 3000 U 10,000 2,303 1,500 
Sale of shares in the last 12 months 
            
Sold all or some shares and paid income tax and 
National Insurance Contributions (NIC) 
- - - -         
Sold all or some shares free of income tax and NIC - - - -           
Has not sold any shares - - - -               
Decision to sell shares 
            
Sold because employee needed the money for 
another purpose and was prepared to pay income 
tax and NIC 
- - - - - - - - - 
  
- 
Sold because the shares were free from income tax 
and NIC and employee wanted the money 
- - - - 
- - - - - 
    
- 
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Table 9 Continued. 
SIP Participation: Free shares             
Current value of free shares (£) 1,133 U U 1,500 - - - - - - - - 
Sale of Free shares in past year             
Employee has sold all or some of my free shares 
and paid income tax and NIC 
    
- - - - - - - - 
Employee has sold all or some of my free shares 
free of income tax and NIC 
    
- - - - - - - - 
Employee has not sold any free shares         - - - - - - - - 
Employee View of SIP Shares in Relation to 
Salary (L) In lieu of a higher salary (S) 
Supplementary/Added Bonus 
L L L L L L L L S L L L 
 
U = Unknown. Employee was unable to provide an answer when asked.   
 
5.3 Company 1  
 
Company 1 is an Ethical Retail Estate company employing 42 people. The company is UK 
owned, unlisted, and is 12 years old (see Table 8).   
 
According to its’ website, company 1 is “an international family of organisations with the 
common aim of making the best use of property for society and the environment”. The aim 
of the company is to “strengthen and facilitate the work of the social change sector in the 
UK and abroad, by providing fair and affordable rents and services to organisations 
working to achieve social change”. The office spaces, which are purchased and developed 
by the company, provide spaces for charities, social enterprises, and community and 
campaign groups, allowing them to come together and share skills and ideas.  
 
Ethical values and a commitment to achieving social change clearly feature in what this 
company does and what it wants to achieve. It appears, particularly from interviewing the 
Operations Director (who also manages the SIP) and four employees, that the management 
consider it desirable for employees to share the ethical beliefs of the company. It was 
apparent when interviewing the four employees that they all shared a passion for social 
change, and were enthusiastic to state their support for the ethical goals of the company. 
When recruiting new employees, it is stated on company 1’s website that the company 
“needs people who have a long-term commitment to achieving social change”.  
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5.3.1 Company 1: The Share Incentive Plan (Free Shares Only) 
 
The company has been running one share plan, the Share Incentive Plan (SIP), for the past 
two years. The company awards the Free Shares element of the plan to employees 
annually, and has never offered Partnership or Matching Shares as part of their SIP. To be 
eligible for the award of Free Shares, employees are required to work for the company for 
one year, after which employees are given shares.  
 
The company has performance targets (related to company profit and environmental 
targets) which are reviewed annually. Depending on how well the company has done, a 
percentage of retained profit is contributed into the share scheme. Free shares are then 
distributed to employees. The amount an employee receives is dependent on the 
performance of the company, how long they have been working for the company, their 
position (e.g. director or junior level), and the amount of hours worked (e.g. Full time or 
part time).  
 
To avoid paying national insurance and tax when selling the shares, employees have to 
keep the shares for three years from the date they are granted. If an employee leaves the 
organisation voluntarily or is dismissed, they lose shares allocated to them. If the employee 
is made redundant they can keep all of their shares. At the time of the interview, 
approximately 60% of the workforce had free shares in the company as a result of 
participating in the SIP. 
 
5.3.2 Company 1 Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SIP  
 
One of the reasons the company has the SIP, according to the SIP manager, was to “protect 
the ethics of the company”, because, “the more small shareholders we have, the more 
difficult it would be for some of the larger shareholders to decide to change the mission of 
the company or sell the buildings, the SIP is protecting our mission”.  
 
The SIP manager also stated that the SIP was in place to help make sure employees feel 
part of the company as much as they work for it, and as a way to help retain them for 
longer. The plan was also believed to be a way to motivate employees to have a greater 
input in decision making, by making employees feel like owners. Although company 1 had 
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conducted no research into the impact, the plan manager expected there to be a 
psychological impact, stating, “commitment and motivation is the other added benefit of 
course”.  
 
However, the plan manager did express some reservations about the impact of the plan, 
stating that the amount of shares employees held was small and that this may override any 
psychological impact and limit the impact of the SIP on staff retention, stating  “…if they 
want to go they are going to go”. The SIP manager believed that psychologically, 
employees already felt they were “really part of the company” and that the SIP might make 
them “a bit more loyal”.  
 
The SIP manager felt that there was already a strong sense of belonging within the 
company and suggested that the impact of the plan, on employees’ sense of belonging and 
commitment, depended on the employees’ commitment to the mission (environmental/ 
social change goals of the company) prior to joining the plan. The manager was concerned 
that the small numbers of shares may not have had the desired impact on employees 
already committed to the company ethos, but hoped that the SIP would be able to have a 
greater impact in the future. The plan manager stated:  
 
“We are in a phase of growth where we are preparing ourselves to have people who 
are less committed to the mission and we might need more tools like this share 
scheme to make sure they fulfil the ownership of what we do. I think at some point 
we will have a population of people who are less committed to the company 
naturally and we will need more tools to make them, to build the theme of 
belonging to the company…” (SIP Manager 1).   
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5.4 Company 1 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
5.4.1 Company 1: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
5.4.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target    
 
When asked about the amount of control and influence they felt they have at work, the 
interviewees provided divergent views. Employee 1 did not feel she had any control or 
influence at work, stating that she found it difficult to keep track of “who is doing what” in 
the company because the business had grown and changed so much. Employees 3 and 4 
felt they had an influence in what the company did, at a more strategic level, Employee 2 
felt she was more able to influence how the company did it.  
 
With regard to the role of the SIP in providing control or influence at work, none of the 
interviewees felt that participation in the SIP had made them feel that they wanted to be 
more involved, or have any more control/influence, at work. Employees either felt they 
already had control and influence at work, or, in the case of Employee 1, felt her desire for 
more control at work was a result of other things, specifically, a lack of knowledge of what 
was “going on” elsewhere in the business.  
 
Employees were unsure whether the SIP was capable of providing them with more 
influence in the company; stating their uncertainty regarding voting rights. Employee 1 did 
not feel she understood the SIP well enough to know whether it had provided her with 
more control or influence at work, stating that although she already attended the AGM as 
an employee, she was unsure whether the SIP meant she could vote. Of the four 
employees, only Employee 3 felt that the SIP provided some additional influence at work 
that he would not otherwise have had. Employee 3 stated:  
 
141 
 
“I can vote at AGMs which I couldn’t before, erm, so yes, there are additional 
rights. I do vote, but I have not used them controversially or anything (laughs). I 
suppose I do use them, but not terribly effectively” (Employee 3).     
 
Only Employee 3 was confident that there were shareholders rights that allowed him to 
vote at AGMs, which he could not do before participating in the SIP. However, Employee 
3 was unable to identify when asked, anything that he had been able to control or influence 
using this vote.       
 
5.4.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
To help identify the extent to which the SIP had satisfied the knowledge route, employees 
were asked whether they wanted, or had been able, to understand more about the company 
or anything related to their life at work, since participating in the SIP. Employees 3 and 4, 
the more senior employees, felt that the SIP had no impact on their interest in 
understanding the company, as they were already involved at quite a high level. Employee 
2 felt her job required her to know a lot about the company anyway, so therefore felt the 
plan had no impact on this. Employee 1, whilst admitting that she did not know “what was 
going on” in the company, stated that she already (before SIP participation) had an interest 
in understanding and being involved in the company, and this was not because she 
participated in the SIP.  
 
None of the employees described their knowledge of the share plan as being good, 
describing it as, “not in depth, “average” or “ok”. It was suggested that there could be more 
communication reminding employees they are part of the plan, explaining the link between 
the performance of the company and the shares, in order to encourage people to feel more 
involvement in the company’s performance. When asked specifically about the company’s 
communication of the SIP, employees described it as “good, but not excellent” (Employee 
2), “perfectly good” (Employee 3) and “reasonably good” (Employee 4), and all employees 
felt that, based on this positive evaluation of communication, the company was committed 
to the plan.  
 
Employee 1 stated she “doesn’t really think about the plan very much”. This was a feeling 
expressed at some point by all employees during the interviews, which may help explain 
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the lack of knowledge employees felt they had with regards to how the SIP worked. 
Employee 2 expanded on this feeling, stating that she believed employees in the company 
“forget they are part of it” (the plan).  
 
A frequently cited reason for not being interested in the SIP related to the design of the 
plan itself, specifically, the long term, intangible, nature of ESO. For example, as 
Employee 1 would not be able to obtain the shares for a number of years, she was unable 
to see how the plan was going to affect her life at the moment. Employee 2 also shared this 
view, and explained why not owning shares limited the plan’s impact: 
 
“Well, from my point of view, it is because the shares don’t belong to me directly. 
They are owned through a trust, so I don’t have to do anything with them, and as I 
say, I don’t think I have a right to own directly or sell them until I have had them 
for three years or something” (Employee 2).   
 
When asked why the company operates the SIP, responses suggested, particularly from 
Employee 1, that the offer of shares communicated a message about the company, was a 
signal of its broader ethical stance, and was an indication of how the company wanted 
employees to feel.  
 
“Because it is a really nice company that cares about the employees, and want to 
make the employees feel valued and feel part of it, and it (SIP) is a way of making 
you feel part of the company” (Employee 1).   
 
5.4.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
As discussed by authors such as Pierce et al. (2000, 2001) and Chi and Han (2008) 
organisations can provide a wealth of opportunities for their members to invest themselves 
into different facets, such as jobs, products, customers, projects, work teams, or 
assignments. The investment of an individual’s energy, time, effort, and attention into 
objects is suggested to cause the self to become ‘one’ with the object and to develop 
feelings of ownership toward that object (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981).  
This section will consider, using the data collected, whether employees interviewed in 
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company 1 invested themselves into their jobs, the company, or any aspects of their work 
life, as a consequence of participating in the SIP.  
 
Task significance (which has been proposed to have a positive relationship with the 
investment of the self-route, Pierce et al. 2008) refers to the degree to which the job has a 
substantial impact upon the lives or well-being of others. Hackman and Oldham (1975) 
envisioned task significance as having an influence upon the degree to which the employee 
experiences his/her job as one that is meaningful. Employees in company 1 were very 
conscious that their work-related effort could have an impact upon the lives, happiness, 
and/or well-being of others, and were pleased to work for a company concerned with social 
change. However, there was no evidence that the SIP influenced this in any way.  
 
Employees indicated on many occasions throughout the interviews when asked about the 
impact of the SIP that they were highly motivated to work by the company’s ethics, which 
were important to them. Employees stated they worked for the company because they 
wanted an ethical job. Employees felt the offer of ESO was a reward for the support they 
already gave the company and an acknowledgement of the ethical passion they shared. The 
ethics of the company and the employees’ personal interest in these views, that existed 
prior to, and irrespective of, SIP participation, appeared to satisfy the “investment of the 
self-route” more directly than SIP participation. The findings suggest employees felt the 
ethics represented what they believed. It seems from the responses that it was this (more so 
than the SIP), which motivated employees to invest their time, energy and attention into 
the company. 
 
Although none of the employees felt they were able to create, shape or produce anything 
because of the SIP (i.e. ways employees invest themselves into targets, Pierce et al. 2001), 
it was only when talking to employees about feelings of ownership at work (please see 
section 5.4.2) and behaviours (please see section 5.4.4) that Employees 1 and 3 provided 
some evidence to suggest that feelings of ownership were increased slightly, by feeling 
more emotionally part of the company. The descriptions provided by these employees 
(appreciation, confirming employee status, being part of the company), did not strongly 
support the possibility that the SIP had acted through the investment of the self route and 
led employees to invest more ideas, skills, time, effort or attention into the company (as 
suggested in Pierce et al. 2001). Taking this and the other responses into account, it can be 
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concluded that there was little evidence overall to suggest that employees felt the SIP had 
satisfied this route. The SIP gave employees the opportunity to have some ownership of 
what they (already) believed in, as opposed to being a cause of their belief.   
 
5.4.2 Company 1: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
When the concept of PO was introduced to employees during the interviews, all employees 
believed they felt PO at work. When asked what employees felt possession or ownership 
over, employees referred to buildings, tenants, certain job responsibilities, or the company 
as a whole. With regards to feelings of ownership towards their job, as opposed to the 
company, Employees 2, 3 and 4 stated that they felt ownership towards their jobs because 
they had knowledge of, and control over their jobs, a feeling Employee 1 felt was missing 
from her job and was preventing feelings of job based PO. A feeling of responsibility was 
also stated as a cause of job based PO by Employees 3 and 4.   
 
Employees stated that sharing the company ethos and feeling a common cause, had led to a 
feeling of ownership over the company. Employee 1 also suggested that the fact she was an 
employee of the company and was able to contribute, gave her a feeling of ownership, 
stating: “I feel ownership because I work here; I contribute to the work that we do”.  
 
Conversations turned from feelings of ownership at work to the role of SIP participation as 
a possible cause of PO. When asked whether participating in the plan had an impact on 
what they felt was “yours”, or “ours” at work, two employees felt there had been some 
impact. The remaining employees felt SIP participation had no relationship with their 
feelings of PO, explaining they felt ownership and possession at work before they 
participated in the SIP.  
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Employee 3 felt that the SIP had some impact on company based PO, albeit a small impact, 
but stated the impact was “not significant”. Employee 3 described the share plan as a 
“token gesture” that he was “appreciative of”, but “does not think about very much”.  
Employee 1 also felt that the SIP had an impact on feelings of possession, because being 
given shares made her feel “more of an employee” and “part of the company”– which she 
felt led to feelings of possession. (This was later found to impact commitment, see section 
5.2.3). When asked whether the SIP had any impact on feelings of PO, Employee 1 stated:   
 
“Yes, yes, because it (SIP) is confirming that you are a staff member and that you 
actually work here. You are getting money and then they are giving you stuff, so 
yeah… So, yes, I would feel that (possession/ownership) anyway, but it is nice that 
I am getting paid for a job, and getting free shares is saying, yes, you are part of it” 
(Employee 1).  
 
5.4.3 Company 1: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employee 1 was the only employee to feel that SIP participation had led, not only to 
greater feelings of PO at work, but also, because of this enhanced PO, to a greater sense of 
commitment towards the company, and feeling of being valued. However, Employee 1 
emphasised that this was not a major impact, stating that this would be felt even without 
participating in the SIP or owning shares in the company.  
 
Employee 1 was unable to identify how the SIP could have a greater impact on employee 
attitudes at work, stating “It is nice that they do that (SIP), but it is not why people would 
work here”. Employee 2 also felt that the SIP made little difference to the way she felt 
about the company or her job, stating:  
 
“It (SIP) is one of the positive things about the company. Not a huge shift, because 
I already have a very high opinion of the company. It is definitely a positive thing” 
(Employee 2).   
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The remaining employees gave no indication that the SIP had an impact on the way they 
felt about the organisation, and did not associate the plan with feelings of commitment, 
satisfaction or motivation. When asked whether the SIP had an impact on his feelings 
towards the company, Employee 3 stated:  
 
“It is nice to feel that you own part of it, but you know that is it really. I am well 
motivated anyway, so I don’t feel err, it has added to that. I think it feels to me as 
something very much for the future and it is something to hang on to because I 
want a share of the company, and it is a very minor share but it is important” 
(Employee 3).    
 
Employee 4 felt that he was already committed, motivated and satisfied with his job, and 
could not think of any way that the share plan could be changed or operated differently in 
order to impact employee attitudes.  
 
“It is nice to have, but it does not really affect me day to day. It is a nice thing to 
have on the side. I mean, it may be that it is in trust for five years, so I know it is 
there but I don’t see any benefit at the moment, and that is not a complaint. So there 
is nothing I can think of that could make it better” (Employee 4).  
 
5.4.4 Company 1: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
Employees did not feel the SIP had an impact on what they did at work (i.e. work 
behaviours), reiterating the same reasons given when asked about the limited impact on 
attitudes. Employee 3 further explained that the SIP was “symbolic”, rather than financial, 
and that his motivation for wanting the company to be successful was the opportunity to 
have more interesting projects and to help more people.  
 
However, after being asked whether the plan might impact the amount of time they would 
work for the company, two employees felt that participating in the SIP might influence 
this, although, this was not described as being significant and was described only as a 
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possibility.  Employee 4 felt that the plan might “possibly” influence the amount of time he 
would work for the company, stating:  
 
“I suppose if I was thinking of leaving, which I am not, leaving within a year of 
getting the shares you would lose them, so that could possibly influence that 
decision. But I am only guessing” (Employee 4).     
 
When asked about the impact it might have on the amount of time she would work for the 
company, Employee 2 also believed it “might slightly”, but felt there were other, more 
significant reasons that would influence this, including the location of the job, the ethics of 
the company and the salary.  
 
5.5 Company 2   
 
Company 2 is a market research company employing 850 people worldwide, including 180 
in the UK. The company is foreign owned, listed on the NASDAQ, and is 35 years old. 
(See Table 8) 
 
According to its’ website, the company has grown to become one of the largest market 
research and consulting firms in the world and the global leader in conducting online 
research. The company offers solutions to business, education, healthcare and non-profit 
organisations, in six continents. Company 2 focuses on a range of industry sectors, to 
provide, as stated on their website, “the specialized expertise and insight required to 
resolve top-level client needs”. Sectors in which company 2 attracts clients include 
healthcare, media, retail, technology and telecommunications.  
 
5.5.1 Company 2: The Share Incentive Plan (Partnership and Matching Shares)  
 
Company 2 has been running one share plan, the Share Incentive Plan (SIP), for the past 
three years, since 2007. The company awards the Partnership and Matching Shares element 
of the plan to employees, and has never offered Free Shares as part of their SIP.  
 
To be eligible for the award of Partnership and Matching Shares, employees are required to 
work for the company for three months, after which they can purchase shares during a set 
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period of 3 months at the best market price during that period of time. For every seventeen 
Partnership Shares purchased by the employee, the company gives the employee three 
shares (which are known as Matching Shares).  
 
Partnership and Matching Shares are not subject to performance conditions. When an 
employee purchases shares they can sell them at any time, but if they keep them for five 
years, the shares then become subject to tax breaks should they be sold. If the employee 
leaves the company the employee would have to sell the shares, as leaving the company 
would also mean that they are leaving the SIP. The shares would be subject to tax if the 
employee leaves the company. At the time of interview, approximately 15% of the 
workforce participated in the SIP.   
 
5.5.2 Company 2 Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SIP  
 
SIP manager 2 was employed as a HR Director for Europe and Asia, working closely with 
the Managing Director and the Finance Director to manage HR approaches. The plan 
manager worked with the Finance Director (who was also interviewed as a SIP participant, 
Employee 7) to implement the SIP in company 2.  
 
The plan manager’s HR assistant (also interviewed as a SIP participant, Employee 8) was 
responsible for the day to day running of the plan. SIP manager 2 described the plan as 
“one of those things that I set up and got off the ground and has now rolled into the day to 
day administration of HR”.  
 
When asked why the company has the SIP, the Share plan manager in company 2 
described the SIP as a long term incentive that will encourage people to be “emotionally 
and financially tied to the company, because they are investing their own money in us”. 
The SIP manager described the plan as ‘a potential financial benefit’ that could impact 
staff retention, stating:  
 
“We want them to benefit from the growth of the company and recognise that if 
there is personal investment there is incentive to stay long term because you get the 
tax breaks” (SIP Manager 2).   
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It was felt by SIP manager 2 that introducing the plan was something he could do that 
would be of minimal cost to the business and would provide something that employees 
wanted. The plan was described as a response to questions such as “why can’t we buy 
shares in the company, surely this would be a good thing to be doing?” asked by 
employees. SIP manager 2 explained that company 2 introduced the SIP “to meet 
employee demand as well as enhance the company’s benefits offering”, stating “it was a 
very conscious decision to give something that we felt would be received well by people”.   
 
When asked about the impact of the plan, SIP manager 2 was unsure what impact the plan 
had, or would have in the future, but could envisage both positive and negative outcomes 
of the plan on staff retention. SIP manager 2 believed that allowing employees to 
potentially gain from their shares when they left the company (as a consequence of selling, 
as opposed to forfeiting, them), would weaken the SIP as a retention tool. However, in 
contrast, as employees would be required to pay tax on the shares when leaving the 
company (or face losing the shares), the SIP manager 2 felt that this would have a positive 
impact on retaining employees. SIP manager 2 stated:  
 
“In terms of the long term tie in, it slightly weakens the tie in that people have to 
the business, because they are not losing shares but at the same time we actually 
think the tax you would have to pay and all that stuff, does give enough of an 
incentive to stay with the business” (SIP Manager 2).   
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5.6 Company 2 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
5.6.1 Company 2: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
5.6.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
All of the employees, despite their different roles and levels of seniority within the 
company, felt that they had some control and influence in decision making at work. 
Employees provided examples, describing how they could make decisions, spend budgets 
and provide advice to more senior colleagues. When asked whether participating in the SIP 
made employees feel that they wanted more control or influence at work, employees were 
clear in their responses that participating in the SIP was not felt to impact this. Employees 
stated that the plan did not have this impact because they had control and influence 
“anyway”, within their job. Examples of employee responses are below:  
 
“No. Because I think I have always been, you know, I run my own department and 
I have a very good manager who supports me and allows me to make my own 
decisions, so it has not really changed I guess. If I was not so senior, it may have 
changed that opinion. But I had that already” (Employee 5).  
 
“No because I am already involved considerably anyway” (Employee 7).  
 
In addition to not wanting more control or influence, employees felt that, as participants in 
the SIP, the plan had not provided them with any control or influence at work. This was 
despite most employees recognising that SIP participation gave them voting rights at the 
company AGM. Employees did not feel the amount of shares they held in the company, or 
the voting right allowed them to impact change. Employee 5 stated:  
 
“We do have voting rights, but I don’t really see that as giving me a greater say in 
the company. It is not something that I have considered yet, we will have voting 
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rights but I am not sure that my vote could really change anything. I think I have 
got more influence from working in the company than through owning shares” 
(Employee 5).  
 
Furthermore, there was a feeling employees should be, and are, aligned to the goals of the 
company and motivated to influence decision making as much as they can, irrespective of 
SIP participation one employee stated, “Everybody should be arguing in the shareholders 
general interest as much as they can anyway”.  
 
5.6.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
When asked whether they wanted (or had been able) to understand more about the 
company or anything related to their life at work, since participating in the SIP, employees 
stated that they would want to understand how the business was performing irrespective of 
whether they participate. However, employees did feel that the plan had some, although 
often described as small, impact on their interest in understanding the company. The SIP 
was not felt to be the only influence on this. For example, employees explained that the 
potential threat of being delisted in the previous year, when the company’s share price fell 
very low had also helped create greater interest in the company and its performance.  
 
Understanding the performance of the company and the business “as a whole”, were areas 
where the plan was felt to have most impact with regards to knowledge and understanding. 
Employees 5 and 7 stated that they felt the plan had an impact, stating:  
 
“I think, since I participated in the scheme I am more aware of the company 
globally and I think more about that as a business rather than just the UK business” 
(Employee 5).                
 
“...you tend to go to the company website to see the share price, to see whether a 
press announcement has come out and what that is about. Therefore you have been 
encouraged (because of SIP participation) to take a greater, in depth, overview of 
the company” (Employee 7).    
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When asked about other aspects of their life at work, for example, their interest in 
understanding their jobs or aspects of them, employees felt that the plan had no impact.  
 
Employees felt that the company communicated the SIP very effectively and made it easy 
for employees to ask questions and learn about the plan. When asked how well they 
understood the share plan, employees’ responses ranged from “very limited” to “good”. 
The plan was considered to be a long term investment and not something that needed to be 
understood “at the moment”.  
 
Although the plan did motivate employees to check the share price and want to understand 
more about the company, employees stated that they did not need to understand the share 
plan in detail now, because they were not intending to sell the shares at the moment. 
Employee 6 explained why he felt his knowledge of the share plan was “very limited”, 
stating: 
 
“It is mainly because of my priorities at the moment. I have two kids starting 
school, and a wife that is changing career. At work I have got many more day to 
day issues that are keeping me more occupied and  keeping me busy, and, all I 
know is that I have joined this scheme (the SIP) and at one point in the future there 
will be a point when I can think, how much are my shares worth? I haven’t got 
there yet. So, it is not as relevant to me. At the moment it goes out of my monthly 
pay-packet and that is fine” (Employee 6).  
 
5.6.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
The extract below, from an interview with Employee 5, show an example of how 
employees described the “rough times” the business had experienced, and how 
participating in the SIP demonstrated belief in the company’s recovery.  
 
“As a business we have gone through some really rough times over the last couple 
of years. I joined the scheme 18 months ago and at that time the company was not 
doing well and it actually got a lot worse after that. By joining the scheme I thought 
that it showed my team that I have belief in that, because morale was very low” 
(Employee 5).   
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Although the company was going through a difficult time when the employees joined the 
SIP, the relatively low amount of money employees could invest in the plan meant that it 
was not considered to be high risk. Employees provided mixed views with regards to 
whether the amount of shares, or the size of their investment, would affect the way they 
felt about the company. Most employees felt that it would take a very large amount of 
shares, or a more immediate financial return, to change their feelings towards the company, 
but were unable to articulate clearly how their feelings towards the company might change. 
Employee 7 however, felt that a much greater amount of shares would make him feel more 
committed, but this was not expressed by others.  
 
Employees felt that SIP participation was a demonstration of their belief in the company, 
and that any change in volume of share ownership would be unlikely to cause them to feel 
differently about the company. Employee 5 stated:  
 
“No, it wouldn’t change anything. When I bought the first lot and the share value 
dropped significantly, so they were almost, you know, worthless, it didn’t really 
affect the way I felt. I just really wanted the company to turn around. I believe that 
because I work here I can make a difference. For me it was about investing in the 
company” (Employee 5).    
 
Employees’ belief in the company did not appear to be a result of SIP participation; 
instead, participating in the SIP was a way of demonstrating this belief. The SIP seemed to 
be a representation of, rather than a cause of, employees’ psychological investment into the 
company. Furthermore, the SIP, the amount of money invested into it, and the size of the 
ownership share, did not appear to impact the extent to which employees invested 
themselves, or felt invested, into their jobs.  
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5.6.2 Company 2: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
i. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working 
through the three routes to PO?  
 
Three employees indicated that they felt a sense of ownership at work, over different 
aspects of their jobs and the company, but did not feel this was related to the SIP. Areas of 
work in which ownership was felt, included, teams of employees, the way jobs were 
carried out, the quality of work produced, and customer segments.  
 
Employees indicated that long periods of time spent working for the company, familiarity 
with colleagues and the business, and feelings of responsibility, influenced what they felt 
ownership over. When employees were asked to elaborate on why they felt a sense of 
ownership, employees were very clear that they did not feel participating in the plan had an 
impact on their feelings of ownership at work.  
 
Employee 5 thought employees felt ownership because they are encouraged to make 
decisions and take control, and are given opportunities. Employee 8 agreed that the size of 
the company did not affect feelings of ownership, and went on to state “I think it is how 
you are treated and respected that impacts these feelings”.  
 
Other employees felt that in a smaller company employees were more likely to experience 
feelings of ownership at work. Employee 6 stated reasons for this, referring to the 
employees’ ability to see the impact of their actions, and understand the influence that they 
have as an employee in the company.  Employee 7 reiterated this, stating that ownership 
was less likely to be felt in larger organisations because they are more impersonal, whereas 
smaller organisations can provide the employee with greater knowledge of colleagues and 
the organisational hierarchy.   
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5.6.3 Company 2: Findings for Research Question 3 
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees did not feel that participating in the plan made a difference to their attitudes at 
work, towards the company, or their jobs. When explaining the plan’s limited impact on 
their attitudes, employees provided examples of different feelings they experienced at 
work, including their commitment, pride, motivation and desire to do a good job, to 
explain how they felt about the company, and why the SIP had little impact. Responses 
included:  
 
“The SIP is probably less motivational than simply the desire to do a good job or 
going home with the knowledge at the end of the day, of a job well done” 
(Employee 6).    
 
“There has been little impact. I don’t mean that negatively because if I wasn’t 
feeling positive and committed to this company I wouldn’t be here anyway” 
(Employee 7).   
 
“I have worked for organisations where there are no share options and I would not 
do anything less than what I would do if I had” (Employee 8).   
 
The long term nature of the plan, with regards to the financial returns it could bring, and 
the feeling that the plan was “a savings plan”, “something to worry about in the future”, 
and “not a tangible benefit” also featured in employees’ responses when explaining why 
the plan had little impact on their feelings at work, or towards the company.   
 
Employees provided their views, at various stages throughout the interviews, about what 
they felt would be needed in order for the plan to impact their attitudes at work. One theme 
that emerged from this was the feeling that, if the communication of the plan is good, less 
senior employees may be more likely to feel ownership and an impact on their attitudes at 
work, because of SIP. It was felt that more senior employees have more control and 
responsibilities, and are more likely to already feel ownership at work.  
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Other responses suggested that employees, particularly in senior positions, should already 
have high levels of commitment, motivation and feelings of ownership, and that any 
change via SIP participation would only result from owning significantly high levels of 
shares. Employee 6 stated:  
 
“I think you would have to have the wrong sort of employees. If at the level I am at 
you need people to have the SIP in order to be motivated and feel a sense of 
ownership, then you have got the wrong people. If £125 worth of shares was 
required for me to have those things then I should not be in my job in the first 
place” (Employee 6)  
 
5.6.4 Company 2: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
When asked about the impact of participating in the plan on what the employee does at 
work, with regards to their behaviours, employees felt, as they did with attitudes, that there 
had been little impact. In most cases employees repeated what had already been said when 
talking about attitudes and did not differentiate between their attitudes and behaviours. As 
with attitudes, the small amount of shares held and the employees’ belief that they would 
feel and act in the same way without the share plan, were reasons for the limited impact.  
 
One employee however, felt that the plan would influence the amount of time she would 
work for the company, but this was not a view shared by other employees interviewed. 
Employee 8 stated:  
 
“Yes. I think because of the terms of the plan, for example if you stay five years or 
more you are exempt from tax and NI etc, and if you are contributing quite a large 
amount, you could have quite a significant output to pay in tax if you left early. 
That plays a part on whether I will leave the company” (Employee 8).       
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5.7 Company 3  
 
Company 3 operates in two sectors, Consumer Care and Industrial Specialities, and is 
described on the company website as being “world leaders in speciality chemicals”. The 
company uses a wide range of technologies to transform basic natural oils and fats into 
speciality chemicals for a diverse range of markets. Research is also a major part of what 
this company does, as it seeks to create new products. Areas of research conducted by this 
company include new natural based specialities for skin and hair care, sun care, and for 
many industrial applications such as crop care, home care, lubricants, polymers and 
coatings. Company 3 has manufacturing and research facilities throughout the UK and 
mainland Europe, North and South America, India, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia and 
Japan. Company 3 employs 3500 people worldwide, including 964 in the UK, is UK 
owned, listed on the FTSE 250, and is 85 years old (see Table 8).  
 
5.7.1 Company 3: The Share Incentive Plan (Partnership and Matching Shares)  
 
Company 3 has been running the Share Incentive Plan (SIP), for the past seven years, since 
2003. Partnership and Matching Shares are awarded as part of the plan; Free Shares have 
never been offered in the company. Unlike company 1 and 2, company 3 also offers 
employees the chance to participate in a SAYE plan.  
 
To be eligible for the award of Partnership and Matching Shares, employees are required to 
work for the company for one year, on a permanent basis, after which employees can 
invest up to £125 a month, and purchase shares at the market rate. For every Partnership 
Share purchased by the employee, the company gives the employee one share (known as 
Matching Shares). All employees who join the SIP are eligible to receive matching shares, 
and neither Partnership nor Matching Shares are subject to performance conditions.  
 
When neither employees purchase shares they can sell them at any time. However, if the 
employee wants to sell their shares between 1 and 3 years of purchase, the employee will 
lose matching shares awarded by the company and will have to pay tax and national 
insurance on the sale of the shares. If sold between 3 and 5 years of purchase, the 
employee can sell the shares they purchased and the matching shares, but will again have 
to pay tax and national insurance when selling them. After five years, the employee can 
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sell their shares free of tax and national insurance. Employees can therefore sell shares five 
years from purchase, month by month (if they have purchased monthly) tax free, if they 
wish. Shares are always sold at the market rate, but can potentially make savings through 
tax and profit through matching shares. At the time of interview, approximately 51% of the 
workforce participated in the SIP.   
 
5.7.2 Company 3 Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SIP  
 
SIP manager 3 was responsible for the SIP plan “from an administration point of view”. 
The company 3 plan manager’s supervisor was responsible for overviewing the SIP 
management, and acted as the main point of contact should there be any changes to the SIP 
or if SIP communications needed approving. However, SIP manager 3 managed all the day 
to day responsibilities of the SIP, communicating with employees, sending out SIP 
invitations, making deductions from pay, submitting administration reports to external plan 
administrators, and arranging for employees to be able to buy shares each month.  
 
When asked why the company offers the share plan, the plan manager stated “basically, I 
think staff retention; I think that is the main point”. The management intended the plan to 
have an impact on commitment, by giving employees something that was of no cost to 
them (matching shares). When talking about the share plan in relation to the image of the 
company, the plan manager stated that the company was over 80 years old and had always 
been viewed as “a family company”, and that the company wanted to “keep that family 
image, and help the community, so one of the things they can do is offer them these 
shares”. It was also acknowledged that one reason for having the share plan, in the plan 
manager’s view, was because “it is of benefit to the company, because they won’t be 
paying any tax or national insurance either, so they are making that saving”.  
 
When asked whether she believed that participating in the share plan influenced how 
employees felt about the company, SIP manager 3 believed it did. When explaining why 
she believed this, the plan manager referred only to numbers of participants (take up) and 
sums of money invested, as indicators of attitudinal impact. With regards to SIP’s impact 
on motivation, the manager stated:  
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“Possibly as a motivational tool, yes. I don’t know if it was set up for that, but it 
will have definitely contributed to that, yes. They (employees) will have been able 
to see that as well” (SIP Manager 3).   
 
Furthermore, the plan manager also felt the SIP had an impact on employees’ interest in 
the company, stating:  
 
“They see the share price and they want to know why the share price is like that, 
and what the company has done to get the share price that high, I can understand 
that employees would want to understand more about that” (SIP Manager 3).    
 
5.8 Company 3 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
5.8.1 Company 3: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SIP and EMI) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
5.8.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
Employees felt that they had a small amount of influence at work. The exception was 
Employee 9, the youngest and least senior employee interviewed, who, when asked about 
the influence or control she has at work, stated “none at all”. Employee 9 however, did not 
want any more input at work, and was happy “just” receiving her wages because, as she 
sated, she was “not really passionate about her job, and does not live to work”. In contrast, 
Employees 10, 11 and 12 stated that they felt they had some input in decision making at 
work, but clarified this was within their teams or departments rather than over the company 
as a whole.  
 
When asked whether participating in the share plan made employees feel that they wanted 
to have more control/influence at work, all employees interviewed felt there had been no 
impact. However, employees provided a range of different reasons why. A lack of interest 
in the share plan, the long term nature of the plan (before a financial return could be made), 
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being a junior member of staff, having a small amount of shares and not having an 
influence in the direction of the business, were reasons given to explain why SIP 
participation had not had an impact on employees’ desire for more control or influence at 
work.  
 
When asked whether participating in the plan had given the employees any influence or 
control at work, most made reference to voting rights they were granted as shareholders. 
Whilst Employee 11 was aware of this right, and used it, the remaining employees were 
not certain whether they were able to. It appeared from the responses that these employees 
were not very interested in using it, or learning more about this opportunity. Employee 9 
stated:  
 
“There are voting rights, I got a letter in April, but I didn’t read it and that was 
something about voting, that is really bad isn’t it? I don’t know if I have them, it is 
not something that I am interested in” (Employee 9).   
 
There were two main reasons for this lack of interest, one being that employees felt there 
was “too much information to read”, and the second being that employees felt they were 
unable to have an impact even if they did vote. The exception, Employee 11, who was 
clear about his right as a shareholder, used the vote, also felt the vote had little impact on 
what the company did, stating “my vote would not register”.  
 
5.8.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Employees 10 and 11 stated, without much hesitation, that they were interested in the share 
price and company performance more, because they were participating in the SIP. 
Employee 10, when asked whether the plan led her to understand more, or want to 
understand more, stated that she was “a bit obsessed with the share price”, going on to 
state:  
 
“When it was coming up to October, and I knew the plan was maturing, I was like, 
ooh, I wonder what the share price is doing, how much money have I made. It is 
not always at the front of my mind, but only at a time when I know that I want my 
money” (Employee 10).   
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Elaborating on this, Employee 11 provided a link between SIP participation and company 
knowledge, stating that he felt participating in the plan had led him to “keep an eye on the 
share price” because he had shares and wanted to know when would be the best time to 
sell. Employee 11 also felt that the SIP influenced him to take more of an interest in the 
company’s performance, but stated that he would be interested in this even if he wasn’t 
participating in the SIP.  
 
Employees described their knowledge of how the SIP worked as being “basic”, “not great” 
“average” and “quite good”. Employee 10, compared to the other employees, appeared 
more confident of  how the share plan worked stating that she felt her knowledge of the 
plan was “quite good”, and that she “understood it”. Like the other employees, Employee 
10 viewed the plan as a long term investment, stating:  
 
“The bad thing is that it is a massive long timescale, so, if I do it, and invest every 
month, for five years it is going to be a full ten years before I have got it all out, I 
can sell them every month  after the first five years. So, it is long term before I get 
my returns, so I tend to forget about it” (Employee 10).   
 
The long term nature of the plan was also highlighted by employees 9 and 11, whose 
responses suggested that because of the long wait for a return, they did not need to read 
about the SIP, or develop their SIP knowledge.  
 
Employee 11 described his knowledge of the share plan as being “quite basic”. He felt this 
was because it is only when “taking shares out or selling them”, that he would read the 
literature relating to the SIP. Employee 11 said that he only needs to re-read the 
information, and remind himself of the rules, when there is a change made to the plan, 
when selling the shares, or if he was considering leaving the company.  
 
5.8.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
Employees stated that they did not feel like shareholders, and did not think about the plan 
very much. They also suggested that they would probably sell the shares when they were 
entitled to the tax and National insurance savings, as opposed to being shareholders. The 
reasons for not feeling like shareholders appeared to relate to a feeling that they were 
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unable to do anything “with it”, and because the amounts invested was felt to be small.  
When asked how they felt as shareholders, Employee 9 and 10 stated:  
 
“Technically, I am, but I don’t feel like it until I have got a certificate saying that I 
have so many shares in the company” (Employee 9).  
 
“Not really, I don’t, I feel like I am just a grain of sand on the whole planet. It (the 
SIP) does not bother me at all. I don’t feel like a shareholder, I just feel like I have 
got some savings” (Employee 10).  
 
Although they did not feel like shareholders, employees felt that the SIP was a good 
benefit to have, and described it as being high on the list of benefits that the company 
offered. For example, Employee 11 stated that the matching shares provided by the 
company and the fact he had made money from the SIP in previous years, made the SIP 
“very attractive”. Two employees stated that they valued the company pension scheme as 
being more important to them than the SIP, because they felt it was “more guaranteed” to 
give them a financial return.  
 
As well as stating that the SIP gave them no more control or influence, employees also 
indicated that they did not feel they had an impact on the share price. When asked what she 
felt did impact the share price, Employee 9 stated “how many products we sell”. Employee 
11 explained that he didn’t think he was the only employee who felt there was a 
“disconnection” between the employees’ efforts and an impact on share price.  
 
Employee 11 stated that because he felt a “disconnection” between his own performance 
and that of the company overall, he viewed the plan as a “little bonus” or a “savings 
scheme”, but felt someone who owned a very large number of shares, would view the plan 
differently. Employee 12 provided further explanation regarding the link between what 
employees did and the share price, stating that when the share price has risen, the company 
does not communicate why.  
 
Employees did not feel like shareholders, did not feel they could influence the share price, 
and provided little reason to believe that they invested additional energy, time, effort, or 
attention into any aspect of the company as a result of participating in the SIP.  
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5.8.2 Company 3: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
When asked about feelings of ownership at work, Employees 9 and 12 stated that they did 
not experience any feelings of ownership or possession over any aspect of the company or 
their jobs. In contrast, Employees 10, and11 (the two employees who had worked for the 
company longest) explained that they felt PO over departments, the company and various 
responsibilities. When asked what the employees felt caused those feelings of ownership at 
work, responses related to a feeling of pride in the company, their own personalities,  and 
the experience of being employed in the company during difficult periods.  
 
When asked whether participating in the SIP had an impact on feelings of ownership or 
possession at work, employees stated that it would not make a difference whether they 
were in the share plan or not. Employees stated that the small number of shares they 
(individually) owned prevented the SIP from influencing feelings of ownership.   
 
5.8.3 Company 3: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees did not feel that the plan gave them anything that they would not have 
otherwise have had, except for an opportunity to save money. Employee 10 added to this, 
stating that she used it as “a personal savings thing that is just going on in the background”. 
Employee 11, when asked what the plan had given him that he did not have before 
participating, stated that this was a difficult question, and responded:  
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“The only thing I could think of is an opportunity to invest in the company, and 
share in its’ success, in a way” (Employee 11).  
 
When asked more specifically, (providing examples such as commitment and motivation) 
whether the opportunity to participate in a SIP had changed the way employees viewed the 
company, Employees 9 and 12 felt there had been some impact, but the remaining 
employees did not. Employee 9 stated:   
 
“Probably yes, because I do find them quite generous with the fact that they do 
match the shares, I do see it as quite a good thing. I definitely think it has made me 
more committed to the company because of the benefits, but purely on a selfish 
basis in that I didn’t want to have to pay tax, and it is a good thing for me to be able 
to save money” (Employee 9).   
 
Employee 12 felt that because they (the company) offer the plan, she “values” the 
company more because “there are lots of companies out there, large companies, that don’t 
invest in their people quite as much, so it probably gives me a higher opinion of the 
company that they are prepared to invest that much in me”. Employee 12 also felt that 
participating in the plan had given her a greater sense of job satisfaction because “it is a 
great bonus; it is a great perk of the job”.  
 
In contrast, Employees 10 and 11 did not feel that participating in the plan had changed the 
way they felt about the company, with regards to commitment, motivation, job satisfaction 
or a sense of responsibility, because they already felt these attitudes at work.  
 
When asked, employees were able to provide some suggestions as to how the SIP could 
have a greater impact on employee attitudes. Employee 9 felt that in order for the plan to 
have a greater impact on her attitudes at work, she would need more praise when the share 
price rises. Employee 11 stated that receiving one or two shares a month through the SIP 
would not be enough for the plan to have an impact, believing it would take a much larger 
amount of shares to change employees’ attitudes at work, stating:  
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“If people started to get a large amount of shares, then it does make a big difference 
to their financial well-being, then I imagine that, commitment and that kind of stuff 
would follow in a similar trend” (Employee 11).   
 
5.8.4 Company 3: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
There were few signs of any impact on employees’ behaviour at work. Whilst most 
employees simply stated that the plan had no impact on how hard they worked, or how 
they performed, Employee 12 elaborated further. Employee 12 stated that the impact of the 
SIP on her was “minimal” and that whilst the plan had not had a “massive impact on her”, 
believed that at the back of her mind “bubbling away” was the knowledge that if 
employees work harder the share price could rise. Despite this, Employee 12 felt unable to 
state (after much thought) that being a shareholder made her perform, or want to perform, 
more effectively.   
 
There was some indication from employees’ responses that the plan had an impact on staff 
retention. Employee 10 for example, stated that the plan would make her “think twice” 
about leaving, because she would have to think about the potential gain, financially, from 
being in the plan. In addition, Employee 12 also felt that participating in the plan had made 
her want to stay employed with the company for longer because “it is a great bonus; it is a 
great perk of the job”.  
 
One exception was Employee 11, who felt that the amount he had invested in the SIP, and 
the amount of shares he held, was too small to impact the amount of time he would work 
for the company. 
 
5.9 THE SIP FINDINGS: COMPANIES 1, 2 AND 3  
 
This chapter presented findings addressing the four research questions. The analysis 
revealed that there was no clear and obvious way of explaining employees’ experiences of 
the SIP’s impact in relation to which routes were satisfied by the SIP or those that were 
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not. Experiencing an impact from the SIP on a route did not mean that the employee would 
feel more PO at work, or an influence on their attitudes or behaviours. Outcomes (PO, an 
attitude or behaviour) from the SIP were also evident without their needing to be an impact 
from the SIP on any routes (or any feelings of PO). 
 
In a few cases the SIP added, in a small way to PO. This impact however, was not felt to 
be working through any routes that had been influenced by the SIP. When exploring 
responses relating to why employees felt PO, the findings do add support to the 
propositions and findings in the research literature relating to the conditions needed to 
develop feelings of PO. They also question the SIP’s ability to provide these routes, or add 
to routes already experienced.   
 
The impact of the SIP was in most cases financially driven. Employees were more 
interested in performance and share price because they wanted to know how much money 
they had made, and believed they would stay employed for longer because they could 
make money. The SIP did not need to create a feeling of PO in order to impact these 
outcomes, which raises the question of how the SIP could have an impact on, for example, 
affective commitment as opposed to continuance commitment, and whether it would need 
to satisfy the routes in different ways to what was found, and how.  
 
5.9.1 SIP Rationale and Impact: The SIP Managers  
 
SIP managers were not confident of whether the SIP had an impact on employee attitudes 
and behaviours. Managers were only able to infer from participation rates what employees 
thought about the company, and sometimes assumed participation to be a sign of positive 
attitudes towards the company. The SIP manager in company 1 was the most sceptical 
about the SIP’s impact, believing that a sense of belonging and commitment depended on 
the employees’ commitment prior to joining the plan. The results did suggest that many 
employees felt they were already committed before participating in the SIP. The SIP 
manager in company 2 was also cautious when speaking of the SIP’s impact, and was 
unsure whether the plan had made employees more “emotionally and financially tied to the 
company”, as was intended. The impact of the plan on attitudes and behaviours was not 
obvious to the plan managers, and in most cases (particularly regarding performance and 
behaviours), managers stated they had “no idea” if the plan had an influence.  
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The plan manager in company 3 however was much more confident in stating the plan had 
made employees more motivated at work, interested in the company, and that it had helped 
retain them. Little evidence however was provided by the manager when asked what had 
led her to believe this, referring only to growing participation rates as a sign of how 
employees felt at work.  
 
All three SIP managers stated that their companies had introduced the SIP to help retain 
employees. Two of them (companies 1 and 2) had doubts that the plan was able to do this. 
The reasons for this related to the fact employees owned small amounts of shares that were 
of low value, and the possibility that the employees could still gain financially from the 
shares even if they left the organisation. This suggested that the SIP managers believed that 
in order to retain employees the SIP must provide a financial incentive to stay. 
 
5.9.2 How SIP Participants Interpret Share Ownership and Assess its Impact 
 
Figure 11 addresses the research questions, displaying employees’ perceptions regarding 
whether participating in the SIP satisfied the routes to PO at work, and/or PO towards 
anything within the organisation. The diagram also displays whether employees perceived 
an influence from the SIP on how they felt and behaved at work, as well as the likelihood 
they would work for the company for longer.  
 
 
 
168 
 
 
E = Employee 
Company 1 (Red); Company 2 (Blue); Company 3 (Green)  
 
Figure 11. An Identification of how PO, and the Routes to PO, Featured in Employees’ Explanations of how 
SIP Participation had an Impact on their Attitudes and Behaviours at Work.   
 
Where employees did perceive such influences from the SIP, Figure 11 is able to show 
whether employees felt the impact worked through one of the routes to PO, or PO itself 
(e.g. E1 shows that the employee felt the SIP influenced both PO and commitment, and 
that the employee felt the impact on commitment worked through this PO).   
 
In response to the research questions, using the data collected and presented in this chapter, 
a summary of the SIP’s impact in Companies 1, 2 and 3 will be presented. Explanation will 
also be provided addressing the feelings and experiences employees experienced at work, 
irrespective of the SIP, and why they did not feel the SIP was able to impact the feelings, 
thoughts and behaviours central to the research questions. This will help to question 
whether there is still reason to believe that PO and the routes are important feelings and 
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experiences to consider, and the potential importance of other feelings and experiences at 
work, when explaining how a SIP can have an impact.   
 
5.9.3 The Impact of the SIP on the Routes to Psychological Ownership  
 
As seen in Figure 11, seven employees felt the SIP satisfied one of the routes to PO at 
work, giving them more control or knowledge. In six of these cases, employees felt that the 
SIP satisfied the knowledge route, and led them to understand more about the company, 
the share price, or its performance. In the remaining case, the voting right (control route) 
was felt to provide additional influence. In all of these cases, employees stated that they 
felt knowledge and control anyway, and that the SIP only added to these experiences in a 
small way.  
 
Experiencing an impact from the SIP on a route did not mean that the employee would feel 
more PO at work. It did not mean that the employee would also perceive there to be an 
influence from the SIP on their attitudes towards the company or the way they behaved at 
work. The findings showed that four employees felt the plan had an impact on a route, but 
did not perceive any other outcome. Likewise, outcomes (PO or an attitude or behaviour) 
from the SIP were evident without there also needing to be an impact on any routes (or any 
feelings of PO). Figure 11 shows that five employees felt the plan had an impact on an 
outcome (PO or an attitude or behaviour), but did not feel the SIP satisfied any of the 
routes. There was no clear and obvious way of explaining employees’ experiences of the 
SIP’s impact in relation to which routes were satisfied by the SIP and those that were not.  
 
However, when referring to Table 10 it is possible to see that the SIP was only felt to have 
an impact on routes that employees believed were already being satisfied at work, by other 
factors that would exist even without the SIP. The SIP appeared only to add to the pre-
existing experience of these routes. It can be concluded with regards to the routes that in 
some employees’ experiences, the SIP made a small contribution, and was not the only 
source of control or knowledge; the routes were already being experienced.     
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Table 10. Routes of PO Employees Believed they Experienced at Work  
 The Control Route The Knowledge Route The Investment Route 
Employee Felt at work* SIP Impact Felt at work* SIP Impact Felt at work* SIP Impact 
E1 No No   No   No 
E2   No   No   No 
E3       No   No 
E4   No   No   No 
E5   No       No 
E6   No       No 
E7   No       No 
E8   No       No 
E9 No No No No   No 
E10   No       No 
E11   No       No 
E12   No   No   No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this route was experienced at work irrespective 
of their participation in the share plan. This route was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in 
some cases employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
 
The Control Route  
 
Employees felt that being a participant in the SIP did not make them want more control or 
influence at work. All but two employees (E1, E 9) felt that they had control and influence 
at work within their jobs “already”, and for this reason, the SIP did not influence their 
desire for more. Unlike the other companies, employees in company 3 also felt that their 
lack of interest in the plan, the long wait before a return could be made; feeling a 
disconnection between themselves and the share price and having a small amount of shares 
were also reasons for the SIP’s limited impact on their desire for more control at work.  
 
All but one employee (E3) felt that the SIP did not provide any control or influence at 
work, or add to what was already being experienced. Despite a number of employees 
understanding the voting right, only one felt this was an additional right that provided 
some influence that he would not have otherwise have had. The remaining employees 
provided reasons why they felt the plan was unable to provide additional control or 
influence; some felt unsure whether they had voting rights as shareholders and some stated 
they did not understood the plan enough to know. In company 2, employees did understand 
that they had a voting right as a SIP participant, but the vote was not felt to allow them to 
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impact change. There was also a belief that employees should be aligned to the goals of the 
company anyway, and therefore seeking to contribute and influence with or without the 
SIP.  
 
Knowledge Route  
 
With the exception of Employee 9, employees felt that they were interested in 
understanding the company, and the performance of the company, and that they sought 
knowledge because of factors other than the SIP. Reasons for being interested related 
mostly to job responsibilities which required knowledge of the company. Overall, six 
employees felt that the SIP contributed to them wanting to seek information and 
understand better the company and its performance. This enhanced interest was financially 
driven, employees were more interested in performance and share price because they 
wanted to know how much money they had made, or were likely to make, and when would 
be the best time to sell their shares.   
 
With regards to knowledge of the share plan and interest in it, in most cases, employees did 
not feel their knowledge and understanding of the SIP was high. Employees believed the 
company was communicating SIP information clearly and that they would need this 
information at some point, but this did not mean they felt they understood the plan very 
well or felt that they needed to. Also, not being confident about their SIP knowledge did 
not deter them from participating. Interest in the SIP appeared low in many of the 
interviews, and employees often referred to the long term nature of employee share 
ownership, the feeling that they cannot do “anything with it”, and that the SIP was easily 
forgotten. It was often viewed as a long term investment and not something that needed to 
be understood “at the moment”, or at least until the employee intended (or was able) to “do 
something with the shares” (e.g. sell them).  
 
Investment of the Self Route  
 
During interviews employees provided little evidence to suggest the plan had led them to 
invest themselves more into the organisation (e.g. more of their skills, ideas, energy, time, 
effort or attention, because of the SIP).   
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Most employees provided responses throughout the interview, relating to the control and 
influence they used at work, how they had created, shaped and produced tasks, projects 
and processes at work – but did not attribute this to being a SIP participant. Employees 
indicated how they were already committed, integrated, feeling task significance, and 
already investing additional time and effort outside of their job specifications. Responses 
suggested that employees were investing themselves, psychologically, to some degree into 
the organisation already.  
 
Employees were asked how the SIP made them feel about the company and their job, what 
participating in the SIP gave them that they did not already have, and what difference it 
made to how they thought, felt and behaved at work. Responses did not provide evidence 
to suggest the plan had added significantly, if at all, to whether they invested their skills, 
ideas, energy, time, effort or attention into the company or any aspect of their jobs.  
 
5.9.4 The Impact of the SIP on Psychological Ownership   
 
It can be concluded with regards to PO, as with the routes to PO that the SIP did not 
provide anything new. Instead, in a few cases it added to PO that what was already felt 
over the company (see Table 11). This impact however, was not felt to be working through 
any routes that had been influenced by the SIP. Instead, the two employees, both from 
company 1 and both given free shares (described as a “token gesture”), felt the SIP 
enhanced their feelings of PO because being given free shares was appreciated, and created 
a feeling of being “more of an employee”, and a greater feeling of being “part of the 
organisation”.  
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Table 11. Feelings of Company and Job Based PO at Work and Incidences Where the SIP Contributed to 
Feelings of PO 
Psychological Ownership 
Employee 
Company Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Company Based PO 
SIP Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based PO 
SIP Impact 
E1     No No 
E2   No   No 
E3       No 
E4   No   No 
E5   No   No 
E6   No   No 
E7   No   No 
E8 No No   No 
E9 No No No No 
E10   No Did not differentiate No 
E11   No Did not differentiate No 
E12 No No No No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that PO was experienced at work irrespective of their 
participation in the share plan. PO was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in some cases 
employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
 
It was more frequently found that the SIP did not add to feelings of PO, and furthermore, 
in the cases where employees did not feel PO at work, the SIP did was not found to 
provide it. It could therefore be argued that the SIP alone may not have been enough to 
create a feeling of ownership.    
 
Psychological Ownership  
 
Ten of the twelve employees stated that the SIP had little or no influence on their feelings 
of PO over the company or their jobs. The reasons employees gave for this can be 
categorised, broadly, into two groups. In both groups responses included some experiences 
that related to feelings of control, and sources of knowledge, that were experienced 
elsewhere in the organisation from sources other than the SIP. This adds support to the 
propositions and findings in the research literature relating to the conditions needed to 
develop feelings of PO, and questions, given that the SIP had little impact on PO, the SIP’s 
ability to provide these routes, or add to routes already experienced.   
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Firstly, employees’ reasons can be explained as a belief that they already felt PO and that 
the causes of this PO (the causes being feelings towards the company) were not related to 
SIP participation, but instead, were already experienced for other reasons. These 
explanations tended to be more frequent in Companies 1 and 2, than in company 3.   
 
Sharing the company ethos and feeling a “common cause”, feeling a sense of responsibility 
and a sense of belonging (all of which could be argued to relate to the investment of the 
self route), having a good understanding of what is happening in the company (the 
knowledge route), and the fact that the company was small, were reasons given in 
company 1 for feeling company based PO. Employees in company 2 tended to feel that 
feelings of responsibility at work, and the feeling of being familiar with colleagues and the 
company as a result of working for the company for, what they felt to be a long period of 
time, were felt to be causes of PO.  
 
Employees felt that feelings of job based PO were caused because they had control and 
influence over the tasks or projects they were working on (the control route), and because 
they felt a sense of responsibility. Employees also referred to their knowledge at work (the 
knowledge route), stating that they felt PO over their jobs because they had more 
knowledge and understanding of the job, and how to do it, compared to colleagues.  
 
The second group of reasons for a lack of impact on PO related to the plan itself. This type 
of response was more frequently stated by employees in company 3. Reasons for the SIP 
not contributing to feelings of company or job based PO often related to the voting right, 
the right of a shareholder in the SIP, specifically, its inability to give the employee an 
influence in the company (the control route), and the small number of shares owned that 
gave the feeling of being a very small shareholder.  
 
Unlike some of the reasons for a lack of impact on the PO routes, employees did not 
attribute the length of time they had to wait for a financial return to a lack of SIP impact on 
PO. Instead, the responses related to the inability of the SIP, and the shares, to give them 
anything that would allow them to make a difference to how they felt, or what they did (or 
could do) at work. PO over the company was felt to be caused by a sense of responsibility, 
belonging, feeling familiar with the company and knowledgeable about it, and in terms of 
PO over the job, by feelings of control and knowledge.    
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5.9.5 The Impact of the SIP on Employee Attitudes and Behaviours at Work  
 
Where the SIP was found to have an impact on employee attitudes and behaviours, the 
reasons related to the money the employee could make, and the cost of leaving. Despite the 
reasons for the SIP’s impact being financially related, employees felt they were no more 
likely work harder or perform better to try to increase the potential financial gains they 
hoped to make, or the share price.   
 
The three employees who neither felt PO at work or that the SIP provided PO, all reported 
an impact of the SIP on commitment, satisfaction or the amount of time they would stay 
employed for the company. This suggests that the SIP did not need to create a feeling of 
PO in order to impact these outcomes. In contrast, there was also an instance where the SIP 
helped satisfy a route and a feeling of PO, but did not have an impact on any attitudes or 
behaviours.   
  
Attitudes and Behaviours: Commitment; Motivation; Job Satisfaction; and Performance  
 
As seen in Table 12 (below), two employees (E1, E9) felt that the plan increased their 
feelings of commitment at work. One employee believed that the SIP’s impact on 
commitment worked through PO (PO that was also caused by the SIP). Another employee 
suggested she was more committed because of financial factors related to the SIP, 
including the tax benefits, the matching rate and the opportunity to save money, which 
suggested a continuance commitment. No employees felt that the SIP made them work 
harder, produce better work or be more motivated, but one employee did feel the plan gave 
them more job satisfaction. This however was also financially related, reflecting the 
employee’s view that the SIP was a great bonus; a great way to make money.  
 
The SIP was felt to be “something for the future”, employees did not see any “benefit at 
the moment”, and felt, in most cases, it provided nothing they did not already have 
(tangible or intangible). Some employees also felt that the plan did not have an impact 
because they did not have enough shares, whilst others stated the SIP was just a way for 
them to save some money, describing it as being very similar to a bank account.  
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Employees were motivated, committed and performing as well as they could for other 
reasons. Some state that this was because they wanted the company to be successful, and 
because they were proud of the company. In some cases, employees said they joined the 
plan because they were committed or because they wanted to demonstrate their belief. 
Responses suggested that the employees’ attitudes and behaviours were already felt to be 
high, and were unaffected by the SIP. It is possible that these employees were already 
performing as well as they could, already committed, motivated and satisfied, and that the 
plan was unable to add to what was already felt. Although the evidence cannot verify this 
in detail, it is possible that these employees were more likely to join the plan, rather than 
experience these attitudes and behaviours because of it.  
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Table 12. The Impact of the SIP in Relation to Employees’ Experiences of the Routes to PO, and PO, at Work 
 
 The Control Route 
The Knowledge 
Route 
The Investment 
Route 
Psychological Ownership 
Retention of 
Staff 
Attitudes and 
Behaviours 
 
Felt at 
work* 
SIP 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
SIP 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
SIP 
Impact 
Company Based 
PO  Felt at work* 
Company Based 
PO  SIP Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based 
PO SIP 
Impact 
SIP Impact SIP Impact 
E1 No No   No   No     No No No Commitment 
E2   No   No   No   No   No   No 
E3       No   No       No No No 
E4   No   No   No   No   No   No 
E5   No       No   No   No No No 
E6   No       No   No   No No No 
E7   No       No   No   No No No 
E8   No       No No No   No   No 
E9 No No No No   No No No No No   Commitment 
E10   No       No   No 
Did not 
differentiate 
No   No 
E11   No       No   No 
Did not 
differentiate 
No No No 
E12   No   No   No No No No No   Job Satisfaction 
 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this (route, feeling of PO, or outcome) was experienced at work irrespective of their participation in the share 
plan.  
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Employee Retention  
 
Six employees felt the plan would retain them longer in the organisation. Employees were 
able to explain why the plan would retain them longer; suggesting they were likely to stay 
because they believed it was possible they would make money. In making this decision, 
employees appeared to be weighing up the financial cost of leaving (continuance 
commitment).  This impact of the SIP was not a sign that employees were more committed 
in the sense that they would feel more emotionally attached, or a greater sense of 
identification, in most cases, employees indicated they felt this irrespective of the SIP. It is 
possible however, that the SIP may have been retaining the more financially orientated 
employees, or encouraging employees to think in this way (i.e. to be financially 
motivated).   
 
For most employees who did not feel the SIP would have an impact on the amount of time 
they would work for the company, it was felt that there were more significant reasons that 
would influence this, such as the location of their job or salary level. Some felt that the 
amount of money they had invested was too small for the SIP to retain them longer. 
Responses suggested the opposite of the reasons given by those that felt the plan would 
retain them longer, i.e., the SIP did not create a continuance commitment.  
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CHAPTER 6: ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES (EMI) FINDINGS   
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will begin by presenting the findings for the three companies operating EMI 
schemes. The results will be presented for company 4, followed by company 5 and 
company 6. To begin, a summary of each company and an overview of the EMI managers’ 
responses will be presented. The EMI managers’ responses will relate to why they believe 
the company operates the plan, and the impact they feel it has had on attitudes and 
behaviours across the company.    
 
Using data collected from each company, findings for each Research Question will be 
presented and summarised. Details of the EMI companies can be found in Table 13, and 
details of the employees interviewed in these companies can be found in Table 14.  
 
Table 13. Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI)   
 EMI Company 4 EMI Company 5 EMI Company 6 
Number of employees at the company 850 22 11 
The company’s annual turnover (£) 14,278, 000 945, 000 791, 000 
Industry 
Care Service System 
Supplies 
Neuroscience 
Research 
Management Consultancy 
Services 
Stand-alone/ group company Is a subsidiary Standalone Standalone 
Ownership and stock exchange listing UK Owned UK Owned UK Owned 
Stock exchange listed AIM AIM Unlisted 
Age of Business    
More than 1 year and up to 5 years (from takeover)    
More than 5 years and up to 10 years     
Plans Offered to Employees    
Save as you earn (Sharesave/SAYE)     
Enterprise management Incentives (EMI)       
Share incentive plan (SIP)    
Other plans offered to all employees    
Date EMI shares were first awarded  2008 2004 2007 
The EMI Scheme    
Total value of EMI options granted in this company (£) 700,000 U U 
% of Workforce in this company that has been granted 
EMI Options 
12% U 82% 
Criteria used to decide which staff are awarded EMI 
options 
Key Employees All Employees All Employees 
Point staff are granted EMI options  
When selected: No 
performance targets 
When they meet 
performance targets 
When they meet 
performance targets 
Average Total Value of EMI Options Granted per 
Employee 
   
£10,000 - £29,999     
£30,000 - £49,999     
Unknown by plan manager       
 
U = Unknown. EMI Manager was unable to provide an answer when asked.   
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Table 14. Interviewees Participating in the EMI 
 
Companies using Enterprise Management 
Incentives (EMI) 
EMI Company 4 
 
EMI Company 5 
 
EMI Company 6 
 
Employee (E) E13 E14 E15 E13 E14 E15 E13 E14 E15 E13 E14 E15 
Gender/ Age/ Number of dependants             
Gender M M F M F M M F M M F M 
Age 58 44 31 42 47 54 31 24 36 30 30 31 
Number of dependants 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Education             
Up to GCSE (or equivalent)              
A-Level (or equivalent)                
Bachelors degree (or equivalent)                
Higher degree (or equivalent)                  
Length of Employment and Work Status             
1 year or less              
More than 1 year and up to 3 years                  
More than 3 years and up to 5 years               
More than 5 years and up to 10 years               
More than 10 years and up to 15 years               
Work status: Full Time (FT) Part Time (PT) F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T 
Length of Participation in the SIP Plan             
1 year or less                   
More than 1 year and up to 3 years                  
More than 3 years and up to 5 years              
Gross Earnings             
£15,000 - £24,999              
£25,000 - £34,999              
£35,000 - £44,999               
£45,000 - £54,999                
£55,000 - £64,999              
£65,000 - £74,999              
Over £75,000                
Approximate total Value of EMI Options 
Employee Currently Holds   
            
£10,001 - £30,000.                 
£30,001 - £50,000.               
More than £50,000.             
Unknown                    
Exercise of EMI Share Options             
Exercised all or some EMI share options             
Exercised no EMI share options (not vested yet)                         
Employee View of EMI Shares in Relation to 
Salary 
            
In lieu of a higher salary              
Supplementary/added bonus                        
 
U = Unknown. Employee was unable to provide an answer when asked.   
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6.2 Company 4  
 
Company 4 is a supplier of technology solutions to the healthcare and commercial markets, 
employing 133 people. The company is an AIM listed, UK owned, and almost 10 years old 
(see Table 13).   
 
The Share plan manager in company 4 described the company as “a software company that 
sells software they have developed themselves, bought in, or acquired”. The company is, 
according to the plan manager, known as a “consolidator” in the industry, stating:  
 
“We acquire companies at a fair old rate...the base company was formed around the 
provision of health care software to clinics, health centres and walk in clinics, and 
since then we have bounced off into other areas related to healthcare and other 
business requirements” (EMI Manager, Company 4).   
 
The employees interviewed in company 4 were employed in of one of the thirty seven 
subsidiaries owned by company 4. The company, in which the employees interviewed once 
belonged, was taken over by company 4 approximately a year prior to the interviews. The 
employees who were interviewed felt, despite the company trading under its original name, 
that they were now part of a newer, larger company.  
 
6.2.1 Company 4: Enterprise Management Incentives  
 
Company 4 operates two share plans, an EMI scheme and an SAYE. The company has 
operated the EMI scheme since 2008. The EMI scheme is limited to key individuals within 
the company, selected by Senior Management. When the subsidiary in which the 
employees interviewed were employed was taken over by company 4, senior management 
decided which individuals were “key individuals” and offered them share options.  
 
The EMI manager stated that, as the company only gives share options to employees 
whom they feel are “special for the company”, if an employee is given options then they 
“know that they are special”. The company has no formal definition of a “key employee”, 
and at the time of interview, the EMI manager stated that Senior Management were in the 
process of discussing whether to allocate share options in the future to “employees that 
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otherwise might leave, who we (Senior Management) would like to stay”, or “to people 
who are working in a key role and work jolly hard”.  
 
Participating in the EMI scheme provides employees with no extra benefits in terms of 
voting rights. Participation provides employees with shares after approximately three 
years, and there are also no performance targets with regards to Share Option allocation.  
At the time of interview, company 4 had approximately 850 employees overall and less 
than 100 option holders in the EMI scheme.  
 
6.2.2 Company 4: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the EMI Scheme  
 
The EMI manager also worked as the Chief Financial Officer in company 4, and described 
her position as:  
 
“I am a main board Director and I get my fingers into all sorts of other things, like 
HR, share plans, legal and secretarial, that kind of thing” (EMI Manager 1).   
 
The success of the scheme was measured, as explained by the EMI manager, by “the 
number of people that leave who we have given EMI options to”. There was no mention 
that the company had introduced the scheme to impact attitudes such as commitment or job 
satisfaction, or improve employee performance.   
 
The manager did however believe that the EMI scheme made employees “feel wanted”:  
 
“... it certainly makes them feel singled out as being important to the company and 
they would not have been given the options unless we felt that they had some 
benefit to offer the company” (EMI Manager 1).   
 
When asked about employees’ job satisfaction and sense of job responsibility, the manager 
appeared confident in stating that she did not think there had been an impact, believing that 
the “EMI scheme does not give enough shares to warrant it”.  However, with regards to 
company performance, the manager felt that the EMI scheme had an indirect impact, 
although did not seem certain, stating:  
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“...because if it enables us to keep people that otherwise might have left then, 
hopefully our performance would be greater than it would otherwise have been, 
but, you can’t measure it, you don’t know” (EMI Manager 1).    
 
The EMI manager appeared most confident when stating that the scheme had an impact on 
the retention of employees in the company. This seemed to be, again, related to the 
financial return that could be made:  
 
“It does have an impact on retention, people do think more than twice before they 
change jobs because they are aware, especially in a company like us, like ours 
where the share price has zoomed up quite quickly, they are aware that they may be 
leaving behind a fair pot of value. It won’t stop them moving if their job is 
completely wrong for them, but it makes them stop to think” (EMI Manager 1).     
 
When asked whether the scheme had met expectations, the EMI manager responded stating 
that it had, and added that she believed this was because employees were more interested 
in company profits than before. When asked whether the EMI manager felt the scheme had 
any other influences on employee attitudes and behaviours at work, the manager’s 
responses suggested that this would depend on the options being converted to shares and 
sold, and whether or not employees were likely a make a financial return.   
 
“Erm, in terms of attitudes and behaviours, our plan is not very old, the first grants 
were only a year ago. So nobody has had a chance to have any options vest, so we 
don’t know” (EMI Manager 1).   
 
Reservations were expressed with regards to the impact of the scheme. The manager did 
not feel that the scheme had made employees want to be more involved at work, or have 
more influence, or that it had been able to provide this, and was unsure that the scheme had 
influenced employees’ feelings of ownership or possession at work. When asked about 
employees’ commitment and motivation, the EMI manager stated that she believed the 
impact was dependant on the number of options held.  
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6.3 Company 4 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
6.3.1 Company 4: Findings for Research Question 1 
  
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, coming to intimately 
know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
6.3.2 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
All employees in company 4 felt that they had some influence in decision making at work. 
Employees did not feel they had influence over board members or the overall company 
strategy, but did feel they had control within the departments they worked in, for example, 
making pricing decisions and negotiating contracts with customers.  
 
Employee 16 was the only employee to state that participating in the EMI scheme may 
have had an impact, albeit small, on the influence he had at work. However, the employee 
was vague and ambiguous when elaborating on how the EMI scheme may have had this 
impact:   
 
“Indirectly maybe, it hasn’t changed anything dramatically no, but I suppose, 
perhaps subtly, peoples attitude, you know, people who know, my Directors, they 
probably know I have got shares, and am part of this thing (The EMI), so possibly 
their attitudes have changed, but yeah, it is nothing I can pin point, no” (Employee 
16).  
 
The remaining employees did not feel the EMI scheme gave them any control or influence 
at work. Employees felt they had this anyway, or that this desire to be involved and 
influence decisions was a result of other things, such as “wanting to climb the career 
ladder”.  
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6.3.3 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Employees did not feel that participating in the EMI scheme led them to want more 
information or want to understand better, anything at work. However, when asked if EMI 
scheme participation had enhanced their understanding of anything at work, Employees 15 
and 16 expressed that, although they believed their knowledge and interest in the company 
was already high, participating in the EMI scheme had led them to understand the 
department they worked in better. When asked for further detail about what it was about 
the EMI that influenced this increased awareness, Employee 15 felt that this impact was 
financially motivated, stating:  
 
“It sounds incredibly shallow, but yeah, I mean, ultimately you are looking at it as 
it is an additional reward, an additional top up to what you get paid, and of course I 
want to pay off my mortgage early, I want to retire early, you know and that all 
contributes to that” (Employee 15).    
 
Employee 16’s answer, to the same question, related to an enhanced feeling of being “part 
of the company” as opposed to Employee 15’s emphasis on financial returns.  
 
“Yes, it (the EMI scheme) does a bit. I mean I do anyway, I mean, just in social 
scenarios when people ask me, you know around dinner tables, to describe my 
company, I find I can describe my department very well, I can describe elements of 
my company. So yeah, because of being part of this scheme I do feel I am part of 
the company rather than just an employee, so yeah. It does instil a bit more interest 
in understanding it” (Employee 16).   
 
The remaining employees did not feel the EMI scheme had an impact on their knowledge 
or understanding of anything related to the company or their job, and felt they paid an 
interest in company performance and “what was going on in the company anyway”.  
 
With regards to the EMI scheme, employees felt that they knew enough about the scheme 
in order to use it. Employee 13 described his knowledge of the EMI scheme as 
“reasonable”, and went on to state:  
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“I don’t actually have to do anything, unless the company is sold, or I retire, or 
there is a third option, if the group as a whole is being sold, or taken over by 
somebody else or, you know, so I know enough and I have got the documents to re-
read later if I need to” (Employee 13).   
 
Other employees also indicated that they did not have to think about the scheme, or do 
anything with it until a certain amount of time had passed, or unless certain events were to 
happen. Employee 14 felt his knowledge of the plan was “not particularly strong”, stating 
this was because the vesting date is three years away. Employee 14 went on to state:  
 
“...I am aware of how many shares I have got, I can look at the share price and 
think, oh, in two years’ time that might generate me this much cash, but in terms of 
the details (of the EMI scheme), I will pick that up again in two years and eleven 
months. I know enough to know why it is there. The only bit that I am not clear on 
at the moment is the mechanics of how it will all happen” (Employee 14).  
 
Other responses included “I know what I need to know” or “I know enough to use it”. 
Employee 15 felt her knowledge of the previous EMI scheme was good and had helped her 
understand the current EMI scheme. All employees acknowledged, when explaining the 
reason for their limited EMI knowledge, that they were required to “hold the shares for 
three years, and can’t do anything with them for three years” and this meant it was not 
something they needed to read about or understand in detail day to day.  
 
The EMI scheme was communicated to only those employees who were invited to 
participate. It was communicated individually and participants were unaware of who else 
in the organisation had been invited to join and how the scheme was being operated in the 
company. Employee 15 stated:  
 
“...it felt then like there was an air of confidentiality about it at the time, and it 
wasn’t something you would come into work and talk to other people about, 
because you didn’t know if they had been asked to participate, and so actually you 
didn’t talk to anyone about it. I suppose I still don’t know if it is still being 
continually rolled out to new members of staff or whether it was something that in 
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isolation in that point in time that they wanted to do or not, I don’t know. So, there 
is a bit of a question mark about it” (Employee 15).  
 
For the employees, the process itself, of being invited to participate, communicated a 
message. Employees viewed this invitation to participate as “a reward for loyalty and hard 
work” and “a sign that the company recognised effort”. The EMI scheme was seen by 
employees as a way for the company to “reward the people that deserve rewarding”. 
Employees felt that the EMI scheme was in place to retain “key” staff and as a way of 
“maintaining morale”. Employee 14 stated:   
 
“...it (the offer to participate in the EMI) was a sign of recognition of effort, from 
the Chief Exec, and the higher level management team, that here is a guy that we 
want to entice, that he does make a difference, yeah, we will try to motivate him to 
stay with the company and not go off and do something else” (Employee 14).  
 
6.3.4 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
Employees’ responses suggested that they were already investing themselves into the 
organisation; they felt they participated in decision making at work (as stated in the 
Control Route), had responsibility over teams, managed large budgets and appeared eager 
to want to help the company succeed. As with the control route, there was little evidence to 
suggest that employees were investing more energy, time, effort, or attention at work, 
because they were participating in the EMI scheme. Given that EMI Options were only 
granted to selected employees, and from the responses provided by the EMI scheme 
manager in an interview, it could be argued that it was because the employees were already 
investing themselves into their jobs and the company, that they were selected, and offered 
the opportunity to participate in the scheme. As the EMI plan manager stated:  
 
“...the employees would not have been given the options unless we felt that they 
had some benefit to offer the company...the company only gives share options to 
employees whom we feel are special for the company” (EMI Manager, company 
4).    
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Neither EMI scheme participation, nor the amount of formal investment employees had in 
the company in the scheme (i.e. the amount of options/shares held by employees), 
appeared to act as a mechanism through which employees invested themselves (e.g. their 
time, energy, attention), or wanted to invest themselves, more, into the company.  
 
Instead, the amount of legal share/options held, in relation to the amount offered to other 
employees, was interpreted (by employees) as being a sign of how the company viewed 
them as an employee in the company, compared with other employees. The amount of 
options granted to the employee in relation to other employees, appeared to be the only 
way interviewees could envisage how the ‘amount’ of shares might change the way they 
felt at work, or how they perceived their relationship with the organisation.  
 
Employees seemed to mirror the company’s approach to the EMI scheme in this respect. 
The scheme was selective, and employees assumed the company compared employees to 
determine those who deserved share options, and those who did not. Participation was 
therefore perceived as an acknowledgement of the employees’ efforts and position in the 
company, in relation to other employees.  
 
However, due to a lack of knowledge about who was in the scheme, or how many options 
they had been offered, employees did not feel the amount of share options would have an 
impact on the way they felt or behaved at work. Employee 13 was an exception, in that he 
was near retirement and believed more shares would change the way he felt at work. 
However, the response suggested that the employee would be more motivated at work 
because of the knowledge that he would not have to stay employed in the company for as 
long as he otherwise might have done.  
 
“I would like more. Yeah it would, if they were to double or treble the amount of 
options that I have got then yes it would. I suppose it would make me even more 
motivated because it would, if they were to double or treble the amount of shares I 
have got then I could certainly retire at the option stage” (Employee 13).   
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6.3.5 Company 4: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
b. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
When employees were asked whether there was anything related to the company or their 
jobs that they felt a sense of ownership over, all four employees stated that they 
experienced feelings of ownership at work. All employees, except Employee 16 (who felt 
company based PO only) described feelings of ownership over both the company and 
aspects of their jobs.  
 
Employees provided a wide range of reasons as to why they felt ownership over the 
company or aspects of their jobs. Whilst employees were able to identify specific aspects, 
such as teams they were responsible for managing, they seemed, when asked, unable to 
differentiate between the causes of ownership feelings of different targets (of ownership). 
Explanations were very general (despite more specific questioning), and referred mostly to 
feeling “part of the company”, (Employee 13, 16) feeling proud to work for the company 
(Employee 13, 15, 16), because they had a senior position they were proud of (Employee 
14, 15), and because they had worked for the company for a long time and helped it grow 
(Employee 14, 15, 16). For example:  
 
“All the time, yeah, it is my team and my company that I work for, I use that a lot, 
my team and, erm, yeah, I suppose you feel ownership because you feel proud of it, 
yeah....I think being part of the senior management team makes me feel like it is 
my team. For me personally, I think that is a big factor. Having a role like this 
allows you some more ownership. You are definitely more committed when you 
are allowed to have ownership, and you’re definitely more productive” (Employee 
15).  
 
In addition, Employees 15 and 16 felt that the size of the company had influenced feelings 
of ownership. These two employees also felt that their feelings of ownership formed when 
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the company was much smaller because in a smaller company everybody knows each other 
and employees “have got the ability to have more of an influence”.  
 
Employee 13 felt that he experienced feelings of ownership because he was satisfied at 
work, and felt due to his experience working in the armed forces, his work ethic and 
attitude to work meant that he believed he was being paid to get a job done, not work from 
nine until five, and for that reason, he believed he felt ownership over the job. Employee 
13 also believed that an employee “should” feel ownership over the company they work 
for (even if they do not participate in an ESO plan).    
 
A “sense of belonging” was felt by Employee 16 to have helped create a feeling of 
ownership at work. Employee 14 referred to the culture of the company as being “close 
knit”, and feeling like a “family company”, as a reason for feeling ownership. Receiving 
information from the Managing Director also helped Employee 14 feel ownership.   
 
Although the EMI scheme was not mentioned by any employees when they were asked to 
explain the causes of ownership feelings, when asked specifically whether participating in 
the EMI scheme had influenced feelings of ownership two employees felt that the scheme 
had a small impact on these feelings at work. Of the two employees, Employee 14 did not 
feel the EMI  scheme had an impact on the routes to PO, whereas, Employee 16 felt that 
participation in the scheme had an impact on both, a feeling of control (control route) and 
levels of knowledge (knowledge route) at work. However, there was no evidence, in either 
case, to suggest from their answers that the impact of the scheme on feelings of possession 
worked through these routes. Employees 14 and 16 stated:  
 
“It probably does to an extent, but for me I guess I had a such a strong feeling of 
ownership in the first place, it was so deep rooted that the share side of things, yes, 
it bolsters that but it didn’t significantly improve it” (Employee 14).  
 
“Erm, yeah, I think it does. Erm, I would like to say that I would have a feeling of it 
anyway, but it does make it more so definitely. Does it lead to a sense of 
ownership, err, yes, it does, it makes it more of a case, it does not change it 
dramatically, I had a sense of belonging (felt by the employee to cause PO) 
anyway, but, it definitely helps yes” (Employee 16).      
191 
 
The remaining two employees already felt ownership at work and did not feel the EMI 
scheme added to this in any way. Employee 13 and 15 stated that if they had not been 
invited to participate in the EMI scheme, or had no shares or options; they would feel and 
behave the same and would still feel ownership at work.   
 
6.3.6 Company 4: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees had few expectations regarding the impact of the scheme on their attitudes or 
behaviours at work. Only Employee 14 expected there to be an impact, which he felt was 
met when the scheme enhanced his motivation at work. Responses suggested that 
participating in the EMI scheme made a difference, in some cases, to motivation and 
commitment at work, a feeling of recognition and a greater feeling that the employee was 
valued and trusted by the company.   
 
When asked what the EMI scheme gave them that they would not have otherwise have 
had, all employees felt that they were already motivated, but this had been enhanced 
slightly by participation in the EMI scheme. None of the employees, when explaining why 
they felt more motivated, described feelings of PO.  
 
Employee 15 felt that he had become more motivated because the scheme had made him 
feel valued more by the company. Other employees referred to the EMI’s impact on their 
motivation to keep working through “difficult times”, driven by the thought that in a 
number of years they may make money from the scheme. However there appeared to be 
little impact on employees’ motivation to work harder to increase this return. Instead, they 
appeared more motivated to tolerate the difficult aspects of their work life, and wait for it.   
 
“Yes, it does definitely, it is something that if you feel your motivation waning you 
can remember that you do have these shares that could lead to some cash, and it 
boosts you. I would like to think it is there anyway, but, erm, yes it does. I would 
say it definitely does” (Employee 16).     
 
192 
 
With the exception of Employee 13, Employees also stated that participating in the plan 
made them feel a greater sense of recognition, and feeling that they were more valued and 
trusted by the company. This was found, not to be a result of enhanced feelings of 
ownership or any other feeling the EMI scheme had influenced, but was instead the result 
of being invited to participate and the employees’ perception of the company’s rationale 
for introducing the EMI scheme. Employee 14 stated:   
 
“I saw that it (the EMI scheme) as way to retain staff, as one reason they (company 
4) did it. That meant that they were also fairly secure with me, they had faith in me 
as an individual. It is the recognition, the realisation that, hey, I am considered, 
erm, one of the team to keep” (Employee 14).   
 
Employee 14 also felt the company trusted him to make the right decision, and an 
enhanced confidence in his own ability, as a result of being offered an opportunity to 
participate in the EMI scheme. The feeling, of being valued as a result of being invited to 
participate was reiterated in other employees’ responses. Feeling valued related to 
Employee 16’s perception of why the company had introduced the scheme. Although, 
unlike Employee 14 who felt it was to retain employees, Employee 16 felt more valued 
because he believed, or hoped, it was rewarding length of service and commitment.  
 
“I suppose, it makes you feel more valued at work for sure, I mean I have been in 
the company for quite a long time, I hope that it is not just for the length of time, 
but it is for my commitment as well” (Employee 16).  
 
Employee 16 also referred to a sense of belonging, a sense of purpose and a feeling of 
stability, stating:  
 
“It gives you a bit of a sense of belonging a bit of a sense of purpose, it does, yeah, 
it does, because I think otherwise if it wasn’t for that, you’re just an employee 
aren’t you. I suppose it gives you that feeling of stability” (Employee 16).  
 
Employees did not feel that the EMI scheme added to their feelings of satisfaction, 
believing satisfaction to be a result of other factors, such as achieving performance targets 
or doing “a good job”. All employees also felt they were already committed and would be 
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without the share plan. However, three employees expressed that participating in the EMI 
scheme added to this but did not indicate that feelings of possession had influenced this 
outcome.  Employee 13 felt more committed because the plan had made him want to work 
harder to increase the share price (although the following section explains that he did not 
feel his performance actually changed). Likewise, Employee 14 also felt more committed 
because of the possibility there could be a financial reward after three years. Employee 16 
felt, as a selected individual invited to participate, more committed to the company due to 
an “expectation” he felt, to help increase the share price.  
 
6.3.7 Company 4: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
Two employees felt that there had been an impact on the way they behaved at work, 
specifically, to help the business grow and perform better. For Employee 15, having a 
“substantial number of share options”, a feeling that what she does in her job role affects 
the share price, and a greater focus on growing the business caused by EMI participation, 
helped cause a change in performance behaviour.  
 
“...it focuses you a little bit on making sure you participate correctly in helping to 
grow the business which helps you to grow the value of your shares, whenever that 
may be, when your able to exercise them, that helps you to enable that growth 
phase, and I think that does focus you a little bit and make you think that OK, there 
is more to this than just the day to day humdrum, it is about growing the business” 
(Employee 15).   
 
Employee 16 also felt there had been a “slight” impact on his performance at work, when 
thinking about the options he holds. As with many other employees, determining whether 
participating in ESO had made a difference to what they thought felt or did at work was 
not easy. Employees 16’s response highlights the ambiguity found in many of the 
interviews.  
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“Again, I would like to think that… yes, performance, yeah. I think so overall, 
there are times when I think about these options I have got, and I think it gives me a 
mental boost, I mean, performance wise, I don’t think that just because I am a 
participant my productivity has shot right up, I don’t see that no. But, perhaps 
slightly. Not enough to say absolutely yes” (Employee 16).  
 
Employee 13 stated, when asked about the impact on motivation and commitment, that 
there had been a small impact as a result of understanding that working harder would help 
increase the share price. However, when asked specifically about performance and whether 
participating in the EMI scheme had changed this, or anything that he “did” at work, 
Employee 13 stated:   
 
“It may do for other people; my performance I would like to think is good anyway. 
The scheme, I don’t think, makes any difference to that. It does not make me more 
committed to working harder, because I work as hard as I can anyway by default” 
(Employee 13).  
 
This may suggest that the EMI’s impact on commitment and motivation, although small, 
was related to his desire to see the share price rise, but in practice, participation had not 
made him work harder to increase the share price.  
 
Three employees felt that they were more likely to stay employed for the company for 
longer because they are participating in the EMI scheme. For one of these employees, the 
money that could be made from the EMI share options was very important, in helping him 
plan for retirement. Describing continuance commitment, Employee 13 stated:   
 
“Well, I don’t actually own the shares yet, but therefore, it makes me feel that I am 
more tied into the company because if I was to go and get a job tomorrow I would 
lose those options, and therefore lose those potential financial benefits” (Employee 
13).   
 
Employee 15 and 16 also felt the scheme would help retain them for longer. They felt they 
would stay employed until they were able to exercise their options, and were less likely to 
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leave before that point. This again demonstrated continuance commitment, as they 
weighed up the financial costs of leaving.  
 
6.4 Company 5  
 
Company 5 is a neuroscience research company, described as a “spin-out” company from a 
UK University. The company employs 22 people, is UK owned, listed on AIM, and is 
approximately 7 years old.   
 
The main business of company 5 involves developing therapeutics for patients suffering 
from diseases of the central nervous system (CNS), neuro-inflammation/inflammation and 
oncology. The company aims to bring novel drugs and innovative new treatments to CNS 
disorders as quickly as possible. The company offers employees one share plan, the EMI 
scheme, and has operated this scheme since 2004.  
 
6.4.1 Company 5: Enterprise Management Incentives 
 
Company 5 operate a three year EMI scheme. Employees join, and at the end of that three 
year scheme they are then granted the equivalent of their salary in share options. For 
example, an employee earning £30,000 per year would be given 30,000 share options, over 
three years. Over the three years they would be allocated 10,000 share options per year, to 
be received after the third year. The number of options granted is dependent on the 
employees’ performance rating in their annual review. The company operates a five point 
system, e.g., if the employee is awarded a 3, they are considered to be meeting 
expectations, and a four would suggest they are exceeding expectations, and a 5 means the 
employee is exceeding expectations consistently. If the employee scored, for example, a 3, 
they would receive 70% of their options for that year, a four would mean they receive at 
least 85%, and if they scored a 5 they would receive 100%. Employees then have three 
years to exercise the shares.  
 
Should the employee leave the company as a result of being made redundant, they are able 
to keep options already granted. If the employee leaves the company voluntarily, they 
would lose the options they have been granted.    
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6.4.2 Company 5: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the EMI  
 
The EMI manager in company 5 was the Finance Director whose job role also required 
him to take responsibility for operational aspects such as HR, issues relating to premises, 
and facilities. The EMI manager was also involved in the management and design of the 
EMI scheme in company 5. Responsibilities included keeping EMI scheme records up to 
date, knowing who has options, making sure that the company has signed certificates for 
employees, and completing paperwork for the HMRC.  
 
The EMI scheme manager stated that the scheme is in place because they (the 
management) believe that it is important for employees to feel “some form of ownership of 
the company” and “(share) options are a good way of doing that”. When asked how the 
manager believed the scheme would lead employees to feel “some form of ownership”, the 
manager referred to the knowledge that a financial return could be made, stating:  
 
“I assume that people know that options mean they have got an interest in the share, 
a share in the company, and so they share in the growth of the company and if the 
company pays dividend and they convert those options into shares, they will also 
receive an income as shareholders. Do people understand that, I am not sure? I 
doubt it, some do, some don’t” (EMI Manager 2).  
 
Them stated that the company uses the scheme to try and “align everyone’s interests so 
that if the company does well, everyone does well out of it”. The EMI manager stated that 
the company had never done any formal research to understand the impact of the scheme, 
and assumed, based on his impression of how interested in the options employees were that 
the scheme has an impact. The manager stated:  
 
“I guess it is just informal evidence as to whether people…whether people feel 
incentivised, whether they stay, and whether, to those who leave, the options are a 
factor. But people seem keen on the options, so I guess it has some impact” (EMI 
Manager 2).   
 
Following further questions about the impact the manager felt the Scheme had on 
employees, the manager stated that he was unsure whether the scheme had an impact.  
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“...it is hard to say, it is hard to know whether the option scheme itself incentivises 
people to work harder, I mean, I think other people work hard and are just 
motivated by doing a good job, or they’re not” (EMI Manager 2).  
 
The manager also suggested that there was a scale, ranging from the lazy to the very 
hardworking, and it was in the middle of the scale where the scheme may have an effect. 
The manager also doubted the impact of the scheme on employee loyalty, stating:  
 
“I think, does it…I don’t know, I don’t necessary think it does have, erm, there are 
people at both ends, the lazy people I don’t think it makes much difference, I don’t 
think it is going to make them work harder, erm, I think it is probably around the 
margins that it has an effect on people. I don’t know if it generally raises loyalty, 
we have had plenty of people leave and forfeit their options, so I suppose in those 
cases it didn’t work” (EMI Manager 2).    
 
The share price was also felt by the manager to influence whether the EMI scheme would 
have an impact, believing that “if employees can see that their options are worth 
something” it can have an impact, but explained the company had not been in a position 
where the share price was high enough to give employees a feeling that they owned 
something that was, financially, “worth something to them”.  
  
6.5 Company 5 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
6.5.1 Company 5: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SIP, EMI and SAYE) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
6.5.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
All employees felt that they had an input in decision making at work, as a result of their 
position in the company or their job responsibilities. For example, Employees 17 and 18 
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felt that because they were senior management, they could have an input in decision 
making in the company.  
 
Employee 19 and 20 did not feel they were senior members of staff, and did not feel they 
had an influence in strategic decision making, or big decisions the company had to make. 
However, these employees felt their jobs gave them opportunities to influence and control 
day to day tasks, such as purchasing equipment, and looking after the health of animals 
which were kept within the company for research purposes.  
 
All employees felt that EMI scheme participation did not give them any control or 
influence at work. Instead, they felt that this came from their job role, and the 
responsibilities they had as an employee. They also felt that they would be motivated to be 
involved in decision making anyway, whether they were participating in the EMI scheme 
or not.  
 
6.5.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Employees reflected on their interest in, and knowledge of, the company and their jobs, 
and concluded that they were interested in understanding the company and following the 
share price. However, employees (with the exception of Employee 19) did not feel that 
being a participant in the EMI scheme made them want to understand the company, their 
jobs or the EMI scheme, any more than they already did.  
 
“Not really, because as I say, I work here not for the share plan, I work here 
because I am interested in the research, I like the research work, and I am paid by 
the salary. The share plan is just an addition, but it does not impact me in this way” 
(Employee 18).  
 
Employees did not feel their knowledge of the share plan was good. This was felt to be 
because the EMI scheme was long term, and employees did not expect to make a financial 
return for a number of years. Some employees felt that they were unlikely to ever make a 
return, as they did not expect the share price to increase enough for them to make any 
money whilst they were employed in the company.  
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“Not very good, but as I said, I joined with my own choice and I regard it as a long 
term plan, and it is a performance related scheme. I just leave it, don’t think about 
it” (Employee 18).      
 
6.5.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
Employees did not feel the EMI scheme led them to invest any more of their energy, time, 
effort, or attention into anything at work, and felt that “other things”, mostly relating to the 
company and their jobs, contributed to them doing this. Conducting research so that 
patients suffering from various illnesses can be helped, the research subject, the size of the 
company, and the flexible working hours, were aspects of work life that they felt helped 
them invest their energy, effort and attention (themselves) into the business.  
 
As mentioned previously, the plan was seen as a long term investment. With regards to the 
scheme’s impact on whether or not employees invested themselves into the business, 
Employee 17 stated:  
 
“...this has been something that, because it is so related to long term, as an 
incentive, and with the current climate, I really haven’t paid much attention to it. It 
is something in the background, if I am in the organisation for as long as is needed 
for the shares to start being worth anything, then it will be an additional bonus, but 
I would never base my efforts on the possibility of share options” (Employee 17).   
 
Two employees indicated that they may feel different about the company if they had a 
greater number of shares, but felt that at the moment, with their current level of shares, 
they did not feel different about the company. Employee 19 did not feel the amount of 
shares would change the way he felt because he did not expect to ever buy them. Employee 
20 responded in a similar way, adding that, when observing others, he did not see any more 
enthusiasm from those employees with higher number of shares.  
 
“ No, not really, and from what you hear from around the company about what the 
shares are worth, you don’t see much enthusiasm from people that have got quite a 
lot of shares, so, no” (Employee 20).     
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Employee 17 further explained that the shares were worth “nothing” and that in order to 
gain anything he would have to stay employed for a number of years.  
 
“Unfortunately I was given them at their highest price of the year, and so it would 
require me to stay for a number of years. They may be of some value, and I think 
that is the critical thing, they may be of some value, but they may not. At the 
moment they are not, they are worth nothing” (Employee 17).    
 
6.5.2 Company 5: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
a. To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
Two employees (Employee 17 and 18) stated that they felt ownership over the company, 
and two employees (Employee 18 and 20) felt ownership over their jobs. Employee 17 
believed she felt a feeling of ownership over the company because she was committed and 
wanted to represent the company as best she could. Motivated by “scientific excitement”, a 
feeling of task significance and responsibility, also led to a “protective” feeling, and a 
feeling of attachment, which she felt contributed to a feeling of ownership over the 
company.  
 
Employee 18 was the only employee to feel ownership at work over both the job and the 
company, and the only employee to feel that participating in the plan had an impact on job 
and company based feelings of ownership. There was no evidence however to state that the 
feelings of ownership had worked through any of the routes. Employee 18 stated:  
 
“In a lesser extent yes, it has. When I think about the work, yes, I also think, “Oh I 
have got some options. The options do contribute a little bit to a sense of ownership 
over my tasks that I do, and (company 5), feeling like, it is my company that I work 
for” (Employee 18).  
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6.5.3 Company 5: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees were able to differentiate clearly between what it meant for them to have 
options as opposed to shares. When asked how participating in the EMI scheme made them 
feel at work, towards the company and their jobs, responses suggested that employees did 
not feel that having options made a difference to how they felt, but having shares might. 
For example, Employee 18 responded to this question making a comparison with share 
ownership, stating that if he bought shares, he would feel a “part owner of the company”. 
Owning something, he felt, would result in a feeling of attachment.  
 
In general, employees also felt that participating in the scheme had not given them 
anything that they did not have before participating. The reasons given for this related, 
mainly, to the feeling that the scheme may not produce a financial return, and that any 
outcome of participating in the scheme, was “out of their hands”. When asked about the 
impact of the scheme or what effect participation had on them, employees nearly always 
answered by considering how much money they may make, as opposed to anything related 
to the way they felt or behaved, or any other non-financial benefits that may accompany 
being an option or shareholder. Employees stated:  
 
“No, the share option plan we have here feels very much out of your hands, there is 
very little you can do with that” (Employee 17).  
 
“Not really, looking at the history of the company’s share options, I couldn’t see 
that it was going to go anywhere anytime soon” (Employee 19).   
 
One employee however, Employee 18, felt that participating in the EMI scheme led to 
more job satisfaction. This, from the extract below, again appeared to refer to the ability of 
the scheme to produce a return (reward).  
  
“Yes, to a certain extent because, err, if the company performs better, it will kind of 
reflect on the reward” (Employee 18).   
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When employees were asked what they thought was needed in order for the EMI scheme 
to change their attitudes at work, most felt unable to make many suggestions. It was felt 
that any impact the scheme may have would be dependent on whether or not the share 
price would rise and lead to a financial return. Furthermore, employees did not feel they 
could influence this.  
 
6.5.4 Company 5: Findings for Research Question 4   
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?   
 
Employees did not feel that participating in the plan had an impact on their behaviours, at 
work, and stated that if they were not participants in the EMI scheme, what they did at 
work would not change. The performance targets that were used to determine the number 
of options allocated were also not felt to influence how employees performed. Employees 
18 and 19 stated:   
 
“I would perform the same, exactly the same because, as I say, my interest in the 
company is my research work, not the plan. Secondly, I think of it as a long term 
plan, so I don’t think about it. What makes me remember it is when I receive the 
annual letter, I think, oh, I still have this plan (laughs)” (Employee 18).  
 
“There are performance targets tied in with it, but because I don’t find that those 
shares will have any value in my lifetime in the company, I would not exercise 
them or take any value from them...am I working any harder to get a higher grade 
because I am going to get some of those options, no” (Employee 19).   
 
Employees were asked what they thought was needed in order for the EMI scheme to 
change their behaviours at work. As with attitudes, most felt unable to make many 
suggestions, stating they felt the share price was unlikely to rise, and that they were 
unlikely ever to purchase the shares.  
 
When asked how they thought participating in the EMI scheme would influence the 
amount of time they would work for the company, all but one employee felt that the 
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scheme had no impact. Employee 18 was the only employee who felt the scheme would 
have an impact, but did not feel the scheme was the main influence in retaining her.  
 
“Err, yes. Yes it will affect this, because the longer time you work for the company, 
the more shares you will be allocated. But, it is not the main factor. The other 
factors are the research work” (Employee 18).    
 
6.6 Company 6  
 
Company 6 is a Management Consultancy; UK owned and employs 11 people. The 
company was formed in 2005 and operates one plan, the EMI scheme. The company 
provides a consultancy service, and states (on its website) to be skilled in “customer 
strategy, organisation and process design, customer metrics and scorecard, statistical 
analysis and modelling and data modelling”.  
 
Company 6 is also “dedicated to helping organisations focus their operations on their 
customers”. The company has, according to its website, consultants who are able to advise 
large and small organisations, adept at tailoring solutions to address the different 
challenges posed by a variety of sectors.              
 
6.6.1 Company 6: Enterprise Management Incentives 
 
The company has been running an EMI scheme for the past two years. The company 
typically grants options once a year to employees, taking non-voting equity, equating to 
two per cent of the business, dividing this up amongst participants in the scheme. The 
amount calculated, and allocated, is based on employees’ individual total salary, bonus for 
the year as a proportion of the total salary, and the bonus awarded across the business that 
year.  
 
The options are non-dividend paying and carry no voting rights.  The founders of the 
company did not want to dilute the control of the business, and instead designed the 
scheme to try and share some of the wealth created by the company. The scheme was set 
up so that employees are able to exercise the options after ten years from the grant, or in 
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the event of an exit, i.e. if the company is sold. If any employee voluntarily leaves the 
business they lose all their options.   
 
6.6.2 Company 6: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the EMI  
 
The EMI scheme manager in company 6 was a Director and founder of the company.  
The manager worked as a Finance Director, and Director of Operations, acting as the point 
of contact for legal matters as well as doing “client facing delivery work as well, from time 
to time”.  
 
The EMI Scheme was introduced following requests from employees, who, according to 
the scheme manager, asked, “I had taken a risk in joining the business; how am I rewarded 
for the risk that I have taken?”  The plan manager explained that employees wanted to 
share in the wealth which they believed they were helping to create in the company. In 
response, the founders, including the scheme manager, explained that this was shared with 
employees via a bonus. Employees however, were interested in how the capital value of 
the business was shared. The plan manager felt that this issue became “quite a major 
distraction for getting on with work, as it was on peoples’ minds”. The founders therefore 
felt they needed to create a vehicle whereby employees were “equitably rewarded for their 
contribution and their length of tenure”.  
 
It was decided that the bonus scheme would remain in place, but that the company would 
also have a scheme to share:  
 
“...any kind of cash windfall from some liquidation event possibly in the future, 
without changing the voting rights or giving away any control of the business” 
(EMI Manager 3).  
 
The plan manager explained, when asked the reasons why the scheme was introduced:  
 
“Ok, for the directors, I will be brutally honest, it was to stop a whole bunch of 
noise that was really starting to detract from, err, people focusing on growing the 
business, because they thought they were not being awarded fairly for a 
contribution they were making” (EMI Manager 3).  
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When the conversation turned to the impact of the scheme, the manager indicated doubts 
with regards to its ability to impact. Referring to the terms of the scheme, he stated:   
 
“I don’t think it gets them out of the bed in the morning to be honest. It is 
something good to offer in principle, although I think materially, given that the 
terms are if you leave the business you leave all your options, erm, I am not sure it 
is of tremendous value to employees, to be honest” (EMI Manager 3).  
 
Appearing more certain, the manager also stated “it does have a retention effect”, and went 
on to state:   
 
“I think it is another straw, if an employee was weighing up whether to leave or not 
leave, erm, it would be a factor to consider, if they had been here for a considerable 
amount of time, if they had built up options in the business, err, they know if they 
left they would forgo all of those options” (EMI Manager 3).  
 
6.7 Company 6 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
6.7.1 Company 6: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SIP, EMI and SAYE) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a target, 
coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
6.7.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
All employees in company 6 felt that within their job roles, they were able to have an input 
in company decision making. When employees were asked about their desire for control 
and influence at work none of the employees felt that participating in the EMI scheme had 
made them feel that they wanted to be more involved at work, or had actually given them 
any more control or influence at work.  
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“Not necessarily, because I don’t think it is front of mind anymore. If the plan had 
been constructed differently, voting rights might have been a bit more of an interest 
but, I don’t think there is any more or less of an interest because of the way the plan 
is constructed” (Employee 21).   
 
“Erm, no I have always had that. It has had very little impact” (Employee 22).   
 
“No, no. No, I think what I am doing I would have done anyway, even if there was 
no option plan” (Employee 23).   
 
6.7.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
It was found that employees did not feel they wanted to understand more about the 
company because they were participating in the EMI scheme. Employees felt that they 
were interested in understanding the company, especially when they felt it was related to 
their jobs, but believed this interest was there anyway, irrespective of EMI participation.  
Employees felt that other things contributed to them being interested in the company and 
knowing more about what was “happening at work”. For example, when asked what the 
cause of this interest was, Employee 21 stated:  
 
“I think the role that I have been able to play, a variety of roles, so, you know, I 
have think I have performed particularly well at motivating teams, getting people 
excited, and starting things up. For me personally, I think it is the, never having 
done it (i.e. a variety of roles) before, being granted the opportunity to do it, and 
being granted, you know, a big degree of freedom to you know to do it as I think is 
right. I tend to get quite a wide remit to do things, so that has been quite, on a 
personal level, exciting for me” (Employee 21).   
 
Employees did not feel that their knowledge of the share plan was good, and stated that the 
communication of information relating to the EMI scheme had reduced since it was 
launched. The lack of communication however was not felt to be the cause of employees’ 
lack of EMI scheme knowledge; rather, employees stated that it was the terms of the plan 
(such as the length of time before options could be exercised) that made it forgettable and 
unimportant to them. Employee 21 stated:  
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“...the communication about the plan has probably been less so over time, but I 
think that might be a response to the fact that no one is overly interested...it is not 
front of mind enough for people, to warrant that (the lack of communication) being 
a management team agenda item to be honest with you” (Employee 21).   
 
When asked what type of impact, if at all, the lack of communication may have had on 
employees, employees responded with suggestions that the EMI scheme is not important 
enough to employees for this to have had a negative impact. Employees stated:  
 
“Erm, not really. I think that the plan is not in front of mind, or that material in 
people’s minds to be honest with you. Erm, I think if it was equity, dividend rights, 
voting rights, I think it would be a bit more in front of mind, and people would be a 
bit more conscious about the valuation of the company and what that means to their 
dividend and it would be a bit more material that way” (Employee 21).   
 
“I think for most people I think they kind of sign it and forget about it and, you 
know, if you ask anyone how many shares have you been granted, I doubt many 
would know. Err, let alone the value of the shares. I would be very surprised if 
anyone could tell you that bit of information” (Employee 23).    
 
6.7.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
Employees found it difficult to be able to say that they invested more of their energy, time, 
effort, or attention in their jobs because they were participants the EMI scheme. For 
example, Employees 22 and 24 stated:  
  
“It is very difficult because, if there is a change, it is pretty slight. I mean at the 
time it was nice to feel part of something, rather than just an employee. So, you do 
feel a little bit more engaged. I can’t really explain much further than that to be 
honest” (Employee 22).  
 
“Erm, it is not a profit share scheme and has no voting rights, so we still feel, I still 
feel less incentivised than if it was, say, a partnership model or a profit share 
model” (Employee 24).    
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With regards to the amount of options and shares employees held in the company, 
Employee 21 acknowledged that at different times he had different amounts of options, but 
believed that because of the way the scheme had been set up, the amount had not led him 
to feel differently at work, or do anything differently. In contrast, Employee 22 did feel 
that having a greater amount would influence the scheme’s impact.     
 
“Probably. If I had a lot more I would care more about it. If it was a situation where 
I could see this is going to be a significant portion of future income, if (a) I owned a 
significantly more of the stock, and (b), I got to execute at a time that suited me 
after a certain period, erm, which I believe is a fairly common thing to happen, then 
yeah, it would impact a great deal” (Employee 22).   
 
6.7.2 Company 6: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working through 
the three routes to PO?  
 
Employees in company 6, with the exception of Employee 21, felt a sense of ownership at 
work over the company, and in one case (Employee 23) aspects of their job. Employee 21 
stated, when asked whether he felt ownership or possession at work:  
 
“Erm, no, I never refer to this as “my” company. Err, I probably refer to it as “the” 
company. So the company I work for. So, the language I use when I introduce what 
I do, and where I work is of that of someone who is a regular employee. So, I work 
for x” (Employee 21).   
 
Although Employee 21 did not feel ownership at work, he did state that he felt ownership 
in his previous place of employment. The reasons provided by Employee 21 as to why he 
felt ownership in one company and not the other, related to the differences between the 
share plans. Referring to the differences, Employee 21 stated:  
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“The way the equity was structured. So, it was, err, a traditional option scheme that 
was dividend paying that would pay every three years, and every year you got 
granted another set basically. Err, and you could see what the value was, you could 
see, you know, your percentage ownership of the company, so it was much more 
material, and err, there was a lot more communication around it actually” 
(Employee 21).   
 
When asked whether he believed the feeling of ownership he experienced in his previous 
employment was related to the share plan, Employee 21 stated “At the previous company, 
yes, absolutely, yes”. When asked how he would have felt had his previous employers not 
had a share plan, Employee 21 stated that he would have felt “just have felt like another 
employee”. Elaborating on why he believed he did not feel a sense of ownership in his 
current employment (in company 6), Employee 21 stated:  
 
“Because the way the instrument has been created…is very different to what I have 
seen elsewhere in the past, such that, there isn’t a genuine grant that means you 
own any of (company 6), and the only time it can ever be realised is on an exit. 
Whereas, in the previous place after three years it would produce a value, and so 
therefore, you know you could, there was something there” (Employee 21).    
 
The remaining employees who felt ownership or possession at work felt that participating 
in the EMI scheme had no impact on what they felt PO over. The reason employees gave 
for this lack of impact was that they did not feel that being granted options gave them 
ownership in anything, and because it could not provide any short term benefits. 
Employees 22 and 23 stated:  
 
“It is not something that benefits me immediately, or even in the short term” 
(Employee 22).  
 
“The share plan has not impacted my sense of ownership related to anything to this 
company because we don’t really own anything, we own options” (Employee 23).  
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6.7.3 Company 6: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees felt that the EMI scheme had little impact on how they felt at work. Responses 
suggested this to be because employees felt they were already “engaged” with the 
company and demonstrating positive attitudes at work. However, there was an exception. 
When exploring the investment route (Section 6.7.1.3) with employees, it emerged that one 
employee (Employee 22), did feel the scheme had a small impact, stating, “You do feel a 
little bit more engaged”. Other employee responses included:   
 
“No. I can’t say that I have experienced any change, but the thing is I have always 
been pretty engaged with the company, you know, I have always enjoyed working 
here and I have always felt that my effort is about growing the business, and it is 
about that group effort to grow the business rather than just my career. So, you 
know, I haven’t felt any more” (Employee 22).  
 
“Err, it makes me feel positive, it makes me feel part of the business. That’s about 
it really” (Employee 24).  
 
Employees were asked what impact they expected participating in the EMI scheme to have 
on their life at work. Where employees felt able to provide a response, responses were 
based mostly around the financial gains that could be made. Employee 21 stated:  
 
“...you know, things like lifestyle changes that you would be able to make, like 
paying off your mortgage, all those kinds of aspects that, you know, I think you 
might look for, would be much more of a realisation, or reality than what they are 
at the moment, because it is literally you are a salaried employee. If ever an exit 
were to happen, which you know, may or may not, that is the only time you benefit 
from it, so, I’m not sure how feasible that would be” (Employee 21).     
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The terms of the plan were also found to limit employees’ expectations, as Employee 23 
stated:  
 
“Because of that ten years thing, my impression was that the company is not going 
to be sold within the ten years, and ten years is a long time so I didn’t expect any 
impact” (Employee 23).  
 
In order to try to elicit any other type of impact from EMI participation, employees were 
asked what participating in the plan had given them that they did not have before 
participating. There was no mention of any impact on attitudes or behaviours, or any 
change in the way the employee felt towards the company or their job. Instead, employees 
stated that EMI participation had only given them the knowledge that they might make 
some money one day, although for some employees, this seemed almost irrelevant to them, 
given that they did not see their long term future being employed company 6.  
 
Employees did not feel that having options gave them ownership, which appeared 
important to them when explaining why the scheme had little impact on the way they felt. 
Employees differentiated clearly, describing themselves, because they had options not 
shares, as being “no more than salaried employees”, as Employee 21 stated:  
 
“How am I any different here to how I was in (another company the interview 
worked for previously), where I had no ownership I was just a salaried employee. 
That is what I am here, so therefore there is no real difference. Most people here, 
their careers have been as salaried employees, so I don’t think they see this as 
materially different to what they are used to, I would argue” (Employee 21). 
 
When employees were asked how the scheme could have an impact on their attitudes at 
work, employees responded with a range of answers relating to the terms of the plan. 
Voting rights, and a shorter time period before being able to make a financial return were 
areas in which employees felt the scheme could be changed to have more of an impact.  
 
“Things like voting rights, and things like I said at the start” (Employee 24).  
 
“It is too long to be really motivational” If there was a more immediate benefit to 
it” (Employee 22).  
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6.7.4 Company 6: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
When the interviews turned from attitudes to behaviours, and employees were asked 
whether participating in the scheme had an impact on what they did at work, it became 
apparent that employees felt there was little impact. When explaining why he felt the 
scheme had little impact on behaviours, Employee 21 explained that the company had 
hired people who would behave and perform well anyway, stating:  
 
“I think the profile of the people that we have recruited here generally wants to do a 
good job, so, for example, when everyone realised that is what the scheme was, did 
any of us work less or were we any less committed to the business, no we weren’t. I 
think that is quite telling in that, almost to the advantage of (the founders) that you 
know, without the scheme we would have behaved this way, with the scheme we 
behave this way, so I think therefore I think they have done a good job in recruiting 
the right type of people” (Employee 21).  
 
Employee 22, 23 and 24 also expressed the view that they performed the same irrespective 
of the scheme, and that the benefit of participating in the scheme was not clear to them, 
stating:  
 
“I always do things outside my job role, but I haven’t done more or less because of 
it. I’m uninspired about it, currently. I don’t really understand the benefit” 
(Employee 22).  
 
“No, it does not change anything of what I would do anyway. You can tell I am not 
a great fan of it? I am not against it but it is not like something that is really 
important to me, so it is difficult to come up with good things about it, because it is 
not really very high on the benefits list for me” (Employee 23).  
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“I can see the benefits, but at the moment they seem so far off and so minimal, that, 
you know, like I say, the whole…it has been quite opaque right from the start and 
felt quite unclear. Nobody talks about it” (Employee 24).  
 
When commenting on what would be needed in order for the EMI scheme to change what 
they did within the company, or their job, employees responded in a similar way to when 
asked what could change to have a greater impact on attitudes. Employees felt the scheme 
could be communicated better so that they could “visualise what the value is (of the 
options)” and know “what this (share options) is worth to me now”.  They also felt the 
scheme was an “underutilised benefit” that was not “understood”. Employees believed the 
length of time employees were required to work for the company before making a return 
was too long, and they needed to make a return earlier. The long wait also led employees 
to state that the EMI scheme would not impact the amount of time they would stay 
employed in the company.   
 
6.8 THE EMI FINDINGS: COMPANIES 4, 5 AND 6  
 
As found in the SIP results, there was no clear and obvious way of explaining employees’ 
experiences of the EMI scheme’s impact in relation to which routes were satisfied by the 
EMI or those that were not. As found with the SIP in the previous chapter, experiencing an 
impact from the EMI on a route did not mean that employees would feel more PO at work, 
or an influence on their attitudes or behaviours. Outcomes (PO or an attitude or behaviour) 
from the EMI scheme (again, as found with the SIP) were also evident without any 
evidence that they occurred via any of the theoretically specified routes to PO (or to any 
feelings of PO).  
 
In a few cases and slightly more frequently than found with SIP participants, the EMI 
scheme added, in a small way to PO (as seen in Figure 12). However, as with the SIP, this 
impact was not felt to be working through the routes to PO and in two of these cases 
(Employee 14 and 18) the employees did not feel there had been any impact from the EMI 
scheme on any of the routes.  
 
The impact of the EMI scheme on outcomes such as motivation, commitment and 
performance was in most cases financially driven. This was particularly the case in 
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instances where the employee believed they would stay employed for longer in the 
company. Unlike the other EMI companies, by selecting a relatively small number of 
employees, the EMI scheme in company 4 appeared to impact the way employees felt, 
with regards to how they believed the company viewed them. With regards to the 
outcomes found in the EMI companies, as with the SIP, the EMI did not need to create a 
feeling of PO in order to have this impact.   
  
6.8.1 EMI Rationale and Impact: The EMI Managers  
 
With the exception of the company 4 plan manager, the EMI managers, like the SIP 
managers, expressed doubts as to whether the scheme had been able to impact employee 
attitudes and behaviours at work. Also, again as found with the SIP managers, they had 
conducted no research to help them understand the impact of the scheme on the 
employees’ attitudes or behaviours in the company.  
 
The EMI manager in company 4 was much more confident than the other EMI managers in 
stating that there had been an impact, and this manager’s responses seemed to reflect 
employees’ responses more closely than other EMI managers. It was believed, by the EMI 
manager in company 4, that the scheme had made employees feel “wanted” (most evident 
in E14, E15 and E16), more interested in the company (found with E15 and E16) and that 
there had been an impact on the amount of time the employee would stay employed for the 
company (as found with E13, E15 and E16).  
 
The company 5 EMI manager stated the scheme was intended to give employees a feeling 
of ownership, but this impact was only reported by one employee in that company (E18). 
The manager in company 5 also felt that employees in the middle of, what he explained as 
a “work effort scale” (the middle being neither those that were most lazy or hardworking), 
may have been influenced most by the scheme. Both the EMI manager in company 4 and 5 
believed that the impact of the EMI scheme was dependant on whether the employee felt 
they would make a financial return. Consequently, because of the low share price, the 
company 5 manager felt that employees in his company would not have developed a 
feeling of ownership or felt they owned something that was financially valuable. 
Conversely, company manager 4 was more positive about the company share price, and 
about the impact of the EMI scheme.  
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In company 6, whilst it was suggested senior employees were more interested in the 
company (which was not found in the company 6 data), the scheme alone was not thought 
to be the main cause. The manager in company 6 also felt there had been a retention 
impact, but again, this was not found in the data.  
 
In company 6, the EMI manager seemed to acknowledge that the scheme did not “get 
employees out of bed in the morning” and that it may not be of “tremendous value to 
employees”. He was much more doubtful than the other scheme managers when 
considering any impact, yet appeared satisfied with the scheme. The manager was satisfied 
with the scheme because it had been put in place without diluting control of the business. 
The company in which there appeared to be least impact (company 6), also appeared to be 
the one in which the management seemed least committed to using the scheme as a way to 
give “ownership” to employees. The management here had introduced the scheme as a way 
of “stopping a whole bunch of noise (requests for a share plan) that was starting to detract 
from growing the business”. The impact of the scheme on attitudes such as commitment, or 
on performance, seemed less of a motivation to the manager and did not appear in his 
explanations for having the scheme.  
 
6.8.2 How EMI Participants Interpret Share Ownership and Assess its Impact  
 
Figure 12 addresses the research questions, displaying employees’ perceptions regarding 
whether participating in the EMI satisfied the “routes to” PO at work, and/or PO towards 
anything within the organisation; and whether employees perceived an influence from the 
EMI on how they felt and behaved at work, as well as the likelihood they would work for 
the company for longer.  
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E = Employee 
Company 4 (Red); company 5 (Blue); company 6 (Green)  
 
Figure 12. An Identification of how PO, and the Routes to PO, Featured in Employees’ Explanations of how 
EMI Participation had an Impact on their Attitudes and Behaviours at Work.   
 
Where employees did perceive such influences from the EMI scheme, Figure 12 shows 
whether employees felt the impact worked through one of the routes to PO, or PO itself. 
However, as with Figure 11 (see the previous SIP Results chapter), Figure 12 does not 
explain why or how the EMI scheme had an impact or whether the impact was a result of 
other feelings or experiences.  
 
6.8.3 The Impact of the EMI on the Routes to Psychological Ownership  
 
As seen in Figure 12, much less frequently than in the SIP interviews, three employees felt 
the EMI scheme satisfied one of the routes to PO at work, giving them more control or 
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knowledge. Like the SIP, the EMI scheme was not found to influence the investment of the 
self route. In three of these cases, employees felt that the SIP satisfied the knowledge route, 
and led them to understand more about the company, the share price, or its performance. In 
one of these cases, the EMI scheme was also felt to provide additional influence at work. 
In all of these cases, as with the SIP, employees stated that they felt knowledge and control 
anyway, and that the EMI scheme only added to these experiences in a small way, if at all.  
 
Experiencing an impact from the EMI scheme on a route did not mean that the employee 
would feel more PO at work, and in only one employee’s experience was the scheme found 
to influence both a route and a feeling of PO. Furthermore, where the EMI was found to 
influence a route, employees did not always perceive there to also be an influence from the 
EMI scheme on their attitudes towards the company or the way they behaved at work. 
Likewise, outcomes (PO or an attitude or behaviour) from the EMI scheme (as with the 
SIP) were evident without there also needing to be an impact on any routes, or any feelings 
of PO. The results for the ESO scheme found that there was no clear and obvious way of 
explaining employees’ experiences of the EMI’s impact in relation to which routes were 
satisfied by the EMI and those that were not.  
 
When referring to Table 15 it is possible to see that the EMI scheme was only felt to have 
an impact on routes that employees believed were already being satisfied at work, by other 
factors that would exist without the EMI scheme. As with the SIP, the EMI appeared only 
to add to the pre-existing experience of these routes. It can be concluded with regards to 
the routes that in some employees’ experiences, the EMI scheme did make a small 
contribution, but was not felt to be the only source of control or knowledge. In these cases 
the routes were already being experienced at work.      
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Table 15. Routes of PO Employees Believed they Experienced at Work  
 
 The Control Route The Knowledge Route The Investment Route 
Employee Felt at work* EMI Impact Felt at work* EMI Impact Felt at work* EMI Impact 
E13   No   No   No 
E14   No   No   No 
E15   No       No 
E16           No 
E17   No   No   No 
E18   No   No   No 
E19   No       No 
E20   No   No   No 
E21   No   No   No 
E22   No   No   No 
E23   No   No   No 
E24   No   No   No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this route was experienced at work irrespective 
of their participation in the share plan. This route was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in 
some cases employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
 
The Control Route  
 
Employees felt that being a participant in the EMI scheme did not make them want more 
control or influence at work and felt that they had control and influence at work within 
their jobs already, as well as a desire to influence.   
 
One employee (E16) did feel that the scheme had an impact on the control and influence he 
had at work. The employee felt that as a participant, he was viewed differently, and that 
other peoples’ attitude towards him, specifically company Directors, was felt to have 
changed because he was in the scheme. This change in attitude towards him, he felt, had 
led to him having more influence at work.    
 
It may not be surprising that few employees felt the scheme had an impact on their control 
or influence at work, as the companies had granted EMI options over non-voting shares. 
Unlike the employees in the SIP or SAYE Companies, there were no voting rights.  
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Knowledge Route  
 
All employees felt that they were interested in understanding the company, and the 
performance of the company, and that they seek knowledge because of factors other than 
the EMI scheme. Having an interest and knowledge of what the company was doing, its 
performance, and reasons for changes in performance, was something employees referred 
to as something that was required of them anyway, as an employee.  
 
Three employees (one of whom, E16, also felt an impact from the EMI on the control 
route) believed that participating in the EMI scheme had influenced their level of 
knowledge or interest in understanding the company (E15, E16) or how the EMI scheme 
worked (E19). The impact was not felt to be significant, as these employees felt they were 
already interested in the company and its performance.  
 
The two employees who felt they were more interested in the company (E15, E16) were 
both from company 4. Reasons for this differed, one related to an enhanced feeling of 
being “part of the company”, and the other emphasised greater interest in potential 
financial returns.  
 
With regards to knowledge of the share plan and interest in it, in most cases employees did 
not feel their knowledge and understanding of the EMI scheme was high (as found with the 
SIP in the previous chapter). In some cases employees did not feel they understood the 
plan very well, or felt that they needed to.  
 
Employees were granted an option to buy shares in the company, and would only be 
required to pay a fixed price if they decided to buy the shares (exercise the option). There 
was no obligation for employees to exercise the options they had been granted if the share 
price did not rise. Employees understood this, and in Companies 5 and 6, employees 
frequently throughout the interviews, expressed that they would be unlikely to exercise. 
This was for different reasons however. In company 5 the price was not expected to rise 
before the employees left the company, and in company 6, the terms of the scheme, i.e. the 
exercise of EMI options only on a sale of the company (or after 10 years), meant that 
employees felt it was long term and that they were unlikely to gain anything financially.  
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Therefore, interest in the EMI was not high, particularly in Companies 5 and 6.  In 
company 4 also, the vesting date was a number of years away, so employees felt happy to 
forget the scheme, knowing that currently they “did not have to do anything” or need to 
have a good knowledge to “use it”. In company 5 the plan was also perceived to be a “long 
term plan”, possibly too long for it to be of any interest to employees. Likewise, in 
company 6, the terms of the scheme meant that it was “forgettable and unimportant” as the 
scheme did not provide employees with a feeling that they would make money from it and 
it did not provide any voting rights.  
 
Investment of the Self Route  
 
During interviews employees provided little evidence to suggest that the plan led them to 
invest more of themselves into the organisation (e.g. to invest more of their skills, ideas, 
energy, time, effort or attention) because of the EMI scheme. They appeared to be doing 
this anyway.  
 
As with the SIP employees, employees in the EMI scheme provided responses throughout 
the interviews, relating to the control and influence they used at work, how they had 
created, shaped and produced tasks, projects and processes at work, and how they were 
already committed, integrated, feeling task significance, and already investing additional 
time and effort outside of their job specifications. Responses suggested that employees 
were investing themselves, psychologically, to some degree into the organisation already, 
and in company 4, where a relatively small number employees were carefully selected to 
participate, there was good reason to believe that employees were selected because they 
were already investing themselves into the company.  
 
A strong theme throughout the interviews was the belief employees had that they would be 
working hard and doing everything they could to perform at their best and represent the 
company well, with or without Share Options in the EMI scheme. To some employees 
(less so in company 4), the idea that the scheme would be able to add to this, given its long 
term nature and the belief that they were unlikely to make a return, appeared almost 
amusing to some employees. The willingness to forget the scheme, and in some cases, 
express disappointment with the scheme (in company 6), appeared to be based almost 
entirely on whether or not the employee felt they would be able to make money from it. In 
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company 4, there did seem to be more confidence, much more than in company 5 or 6, that 
employees could make some money from the scheme. Perhaps it was no coincidence that 
there were more frequent reports of impact in Company 4 than in company 5 or 6, when 
comparing the data.  
 
6.8.4 The Impact of the EMI on Psychological Ownership   
 
Table 16. Feelings of Company and Job Based PO at Work and Incidences where the EMI Contributed to 
Feelings of PO 
 
Psychological Ownership 
Employee 
Company Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Company Based PO 
EMI Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based PO 
EMI Impact 
E13   No   No 
E14         
E15   No   No 
E16     No No 
E17   No No No 
E18         
E19 No No No No 
E20 No No   No 
E21 No No No No 
E22   No No No 
E23   No   No 
E24   No No No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that PO was experienced at work irrespective of 
their participation in the share plan. PO was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in some 
cases employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
 
Psychological Ownership  
 
Table 16 shows that all but two employees stated that they felt ownership at work (job or 
company based PO), for reasons other than the EMI scheme, and these employees felt they 
would experience this even if they were not participating in the scheme. The most frequent 
causes stated by employees to explain why they felt ownership, included feeling “part of 
the company”, (E13, 16) feeling proud to work for the company (E13, 15, 16), because 
they had a senior position they were proud of (E14, 15), because they had worked for the 
company for a long time and helped it grow (E14, 15, 16, 23), due to a culture in the 
222 
 
company that was “close knit”; feeling like a “family company” (E14, 24), because of a 
“sense of belonging” (E16), commitment (E17), because they were motivated by the 
subject they researched (E17), a feeling of task significance (E17), responsibility (E17, 23, 
24), a feeling of attachment (E17), feeling proud to work for the company (E22), and 
because they felt they had the ability to participate in decision making (E22).  
 
All employees appeared, from the data, to feel that the routes to PO were being satisfied at 
work, but not all employees felt PO at work. Some employees also felt an impact of EMI 
on a route, but still felt no impact on PO. Feeling that the routes were satisfied did not 
mean that feelings of PO would automatically follow. Where the EMI scheme did impact a 
route, the presence of PO (already experienced or influenced by the EMI) was also not 
guaranteed to exist. Conversely, some employees experienced an impact from the EMI on 
PO, or already felt PO at work (more commonly over the company rather than their job, or 
aspects of it), but did not experience an impact from the EMI scheme on any routes.  
 
However, it cannot be inferred from this that the EMI scheme does not need to satisfy the 
routes for PO to emerge, only that employees do not necessarily have to feel that the routes 
have been satisfied by the EMI scheme in order for them to feel the EMI scheme 
contributes to feelings of PO. 
 
Although it is difficult to infer that one or more routes must be present for PO, or that the 
EMI must satisfy a feeling of some sort before PO emerges, it was clear from the findings 
that all employees felt the routes of PO were satisfied at work without the EMI scheme. It 
may be that the strength of these feelings, prior to EMI scheme participation, and the 
extent, to which the routes were satisfied (at work and by the Scheme), may help explain 
the disparate findings and the reasons why the scheme was felt to impact in some cases and 
not others.   
 
It can be concluded with regards to PO, as with the routes to PO, that the EMI scheme did 
not provide anything new. Instead, in a few cases it added to the PO that what was already 
felt over the company (E 14, E16 and E18) or the employees’ job (E14 and E18). Two of 
the three employees who felt the EMI scheme had an impact on feelings of PO, did not feel 
that the EMI scheme satisfied any of the routes to PO, and it was clear from responses that 
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the impact was not felt to be working through any of the theoretically specified routes to 
PO.   
 
Three employees, two of whom were from company 4, felt the EMI enhanced their 
feelings of PO but did not feel the impact was “dramatic”. They believed it only added 
slightly to what was already felt. These employees were vague about how or why the 
scheme was able to add to this, and instead, emphasised that the impact was small. With 
regards to job based PO, reasons given for feeling this tended to be because employees 
believed they were able to use their “own” knowledge to do their job, and had a feeling of 
responsibility over an aspect of the job. This was not found to be because of the EMI 
scheme, or to work through any of the routes that had been influenced by the EMI scheme.  
 
As with the SIP, it was more frequently found that the EMI did not add to feelings of PO, 
and furthermore, in the cases where employees did not previously feel PO at work, the 
EMI was not found to provide it. It could therefore be argued that the EMI alone, or the 
granting of share options to employees, was not enough to create a feeling of ownership. 
Nine of the twelve employees stated that the EMI scheme had no influence on their 
feelings of PO, over the company or their jobs. In company 6 the EMI scheme had the least 
impact on PO (and routes to PO) when comparing employees’ responses from the three 
companies. In company 6 the reasons for the scheme not having an impact on PO related to 
the terms of the scheme and the belief that it was unlikely to result in the employee having 
any ownership or any other shorter term benefit.   
 
Similarly, in company 5 the lack of impact from the EMI scheme was attributed to the 
feeling that employees would not make a financial return from the EMI scheme, and also 
the belief that they were more likely to find another job, and lose their options, before the 
EMI scheme was able to provide any benefits.  
 
6.8.5 The Impact of the EMI on Employee Attitudes and Behaviours at Work  
 
Attitudes and Behaviours: Commitment; Motivation; Job Satisfaction; and Performance  
 
It is clear from both Figure 12 and Table 17 (see below) that there were many more 
reported impacts from the EMI in company 4, than in company 5 or 6. It can also be seen 
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that outcomes were experienced without the employee stating the EMI acted through 
anything that had also been influenced by the EMI, such as the routes to PO, or through PO 
itself. From the findings, it can also be concluded that the scheme added to what was 
already there, and was not felt to be the sole cause of any of the reported outcomes.  
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Table 17. The Impact of the EMI in Relation to Employees’ Experiences of the Routes to PO, and PO, at Work 
 
 
The Control 
Route 
The Knowledge 
Route 
The Investment 
Route 
Psychological Ownership 
Retention 
of Staff 
Attitudes and Behaviours 
 
Felt at 
work* 
EMI 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
EMI 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
EMI 
Impact 
Company Based 
PO  Felt at work* 
Company 
Based PO  
EMI Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based 
PO EMI 
Impact 
EMI 
Impact 
EMI Impact 
E13   No   No   No 
  
 
No   No 
  
Motivation; Commitment 
E14   No   No   No 
  
 
  
  
  No 
 
Motivation; Commitment; 
Recognition; Valued; Trusted 
E15   No       No   No   No 
  Motivation; Performance; 
Recognition; Valued; Trusted 
E16   
  
      No 
  
 
  
No No 
  
Motivation; Sense of belonging; 
Sense of purpose; Feeling of 
stability; Commitment; 
Performance; Recognition; 
Valued; Trusted 
E17   No   No   No   No No No No No 
E18   No   No   No   
  
  
    
Job Satisfaction 
E19   No       No No No No No No No 
E20   No   No   No No No 
  
 
No No No 
E21   No   No   No No No No No No No 
E22   No   No   No 
  
 
No No No No Engaged 
E23   No   No   No   No   No No No 
E24   No   No   No   No No No No No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this (route, feeling of PO, or outcome) was experienced at work irrespective of their participation in the share 
plan.  
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In company 4 there were a wide range of outcomes reported. Motivation was reported by 
all employees in this company to have been enhanced (although only slightly) by the EMI 
scheme. Employees also reported an enhanced feeling of commitment (E13, 14, 16), 
recognition (E14, 15), as well as a range of other feelings that related to the relationship the 
employees had with their employer. For example, employees felt more trusted and valued 
(E14, 15, 16), and in some cases a greater sense of purpose, stability and belonging.  
 
In company 4 the reasons given for an increase in motivation were financially orientated. 
Commitment also followed similar reasoning. As well as feeling more committed because 
there may be a financial reward (continuance commitment rather than affective) there was 
also a feeling that being given the options meant there was an element of expectation on 
the employees.  
 
In two cases (both in company 4) the employee felt there had been a small influence from 
the EMI scheme on their performance at work. Reasons for this included having a 
“substantial number of share options”, feeling that they can affect the share price, and 
because they had become more focused on growing the business.  
 
Perhaps reflecting the fact that employees in company 4 had been “secretly” selected to 
participate in a scheme that was intended to make them feel “special”; and a scheme that 
they also felt they had to keep secret, there were also a greater feeling of recognition, sense 
of belonging and belief that they were valued by the company. The company wanted the 
small number of employees selected to feel special, and it appeared that there was an 
enhanced feeling that accompanied the invitation to join, that made employees feel wanted 
by the company. It may be, although it would be difficult to be certain, that this impact on 
the relationship the employees felt they had with their employer, and the belief that the 
scheme would make them money eventually, may have led to the relatively greater number 
of perceived changes that employees reported on their attitudes and behaviours (such as 
commitment, motivation and performance). There were relatively very few outcomes in 
the other companies.   
 
Outside of company 4, only two of the remaining eight employees reported an outcome, 
including a greater sense of satisfaction (E18) and feeling of engagement with the 
company (E22). The reported outcomes were not evenly spread across the twelve 
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employees, which raises the question of why so many employees reported so many 
outcomes from the EMI scheme in company 4, compared to so few in company 5 and 6?  
 
In company 5, employees felt that the EMI scheme did not have an impact on their 
attitudes or behaviours for a range of reasons. Reasons focused mainly, on the inability of 
the scheme to make the employee feel involved in the company, because the employee 
owned “options not shares”. Reasons also focused on the feeling that the employee could 
not gain anything from the scheme in the short term, and that EMI participation was 
something that could be easily forgotten. Other reasons also referred to the employees’ 
feeling that they could influence the share price.  
 
In company 6, the way the scheme had been set up was the main focus in employees’ 
responses when explaining why the scheme had little, or no, impact. Employees did not 
feel different to non-participants (described as “just salaried employees”); they did not feel 
that they had ownership, employees did not feel there was any immediate, or “even short 
term benefit”, and they felt the scheme was “too long term” to be motivational. Employees 
were unsure that they would still be employed in the company in ten years’ time, or when 
the company was eventually sold, so felt unlikely to gain financially from it. It was not felt 
to be important to employees, and they explained that they were “uninspired” by it. 
Employees also explained that they were already engaged, committed, motivated and 
performing as well as the believed they could. For these reasons, in most cases, employees 
did not feel the scheme had an impact on their attitudes or behaviours.  
 
When comparing the impact of the EMI scheme on the amount of time employees felt they 
would stay employed for the company, the disproportionate impact remained consistent. 
Three of the four employees to say that the scheme would help retain them longer were 
employees in company 4, and all indicated that it was the potential financial return that 
they could gain when exercising their options that had influenced them, as they did not 
want to leave and lose this. In company 5 the belief that the share price was unlikely to 
rise, or would take a long time to do so, and that the employees were likely to leave the 
company for their own personal reasons before the share price was at a level that would 
retain them, meant that the EMI scheme was not felt to be something that would retain 
employees. Similarly, the scheme had little impact on the amount of time employees felt 
228 
 
they would work for the company in company 6 because it was viewed as being very long 
term, and therefore unlikely to produce a financial reward.  
 
Table 17 displays a number of patterns in relation to the EMI’s impact on PO. For 
example, where the impact was greatest (company 4) there were also more employees who 
already felt PO, felt the EMI had added to PO and felt the EMI influenced a route. Where 
there was less EMI impact, there were fewer incidences of these patterns. Furthermore, it 
can be observed that the employees who reported the greatest number of outcomes (E16) 
was also the only employee to state the EMI scheme had an impact on two routes, their 
control and knowledge routes at work, and also company based PO.  
 
The two employees (E19, 21) who neither felt PO at work or that the EMI provided PO, 
both also reported no impact on attitudes or behaviours (in contrast to the EMI participants, 
where in similar cases of no PO, an impact of the EMI on commitment, satisfaction or staff 
retention was found). In contrast, there was also an instance where the EMI helped satisfy 
a route (E19), but did not have an impact on any attitudes or behaviours. In three of the six 
cases where an outcome on attitudes or behaviours was stated, the EMI scheme had also 
influenced feelings of PO and in all of these cases where there was an impact on an 
outcome, the employees stated they already felt PO at work, irrespective of the EMI 
scheme.  The scheme was found to supplement pre-existing PO.  
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CHAPTER 7: SAVE AS YOU EARN (SAYE) FINDINGS    
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will begin by presenting the findings for the final three companies, all of 
which offer employees the opportunity to participate in an SAYE plan. The results will be 
presented for company 7, followed by company 8 and company 9. To begin, a summary of 
each company and an overview of the SAYE manager’s responses will be presented. The 
SAYE manager’s responses will relate to why they believe the company operates the plan, 
and the impact they feel it has had on attitudes and behaviours across the company.    
 
Using data collected from each company, (four employee (SAYE participant) interviews 
(five in company 9) and one SAYE manager Interview) findings for each Research 
Question will then be presented and summarised. Details of the SAYE companies can be 
found in Table 18, and details of the employees interviewed in these companies can be 
found in Table 19. Please see below.  
 
Table 18.The Save as You Earn (SAYE) Plan   
 SAYE Company 7 SAYE Company 8 SAYE Company 9 
Number of employees at the company 105,000 75,000 204,200 
The Company’s annual turnover (£) 20,859,000 GBP 9,536,600 GBP -2,323,000 GBP 
Industry Telecommunications Retail Financial Services 
Stand-alone/ group company Has subsidiaries Has subsidiaries Has subsidiaries 
Ownership and Stock Exchange Listing UK Owned UK Owned UK Owned 
Stock exchange listed FTSE All share FTSE All share FTSE All share 
Age of Business    
More than 20 years       
Plans Offered to Employees    
Save as you earn (Sharesave/SAYE)       
Enterprise management incentives (EMI)    
Share incentive plan (SIP)      
Other plans offered to all employees    
Date EMI shares were first awarded  1985 U 1985 
The SAYE Plan     
Date SAYE share options were first granted 1985 U 1985 
% of workforce in this company that has been granted 
SAYE share options 
55% U 79% 
Eligibility criteria when deciding which employees to 
invite to join the SAYE  
None None None 
Contracts Offered to Employees    
3 year contracts only      
3 and 5 year contracts only     
5 year contracts only    
3, 5 and 7 year contracts      
How often employees are  invited to join the SAYE Annually Annually Annually 
 
U: Unknown by Plan Manager  
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Table 19. Interviewees Participating in the SAYE  
 
Companies using the SAYE plan (SAYE) SAYE Company 7 SAYE Company 8 SAYE Company 9 
Employee € E25 E26 E27 E28 E29 E30 E31 E32 E33 E34 E35 E36 E37 
Gender/ Age/ Number of dependants              
Gender M M M M M F F F F F M F M 
Age 42 46 36 43 31 46 50 61 34 37 48 38 43 
Number of dependants 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 3 
Education              
Up to GCSE (or equivalent)                 
A-Level (or equivalent)                  
Bachelors degree (or equivalent)                 
Higher degree (or equivalent)                 
Length of Employment and Work Status              
More than 1 year and up to 3 years               
More than 3 years and up to 5 years              
More than 5 years and up to 10 years                
More than 10 years and up to 15 years                
More than15 years and up to 20 years               
More than 20 years                     
Work status: Full Time (FT) Part Time (PT) F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T F/T 
Length of Participation in the SAYE Plan              
1 year or less               
More than 5 years and up to 10 years                   
More than 10 years and up to 15 years               
More than15 years and up to 20 years                 
More than 20 years                 
Gross Earnings              
£14,999 or less                
£25,000 - £34,999                 
£35,000 - £44,999               
£45,000 - £54,999                
£55,000 - £64,999               
£65,000 - £74,999               
Over £75,000                 
Amount Saved  in Total per Month Across 
all Savings Contracts (£) 
225 225 108 225 15 250 30 150 250 100 250 250 200 
SAYE Contracts Employee Participates in              
3 Year Contract                     
5 Year Contract                     
Options Exercised in the Past Two Years.              
Exercised all of SAYE share options which 
became available 
                 
Exercised some SAYE share options which 
became available 
               
Not exercised any SAYE share options which 
became available 
                  
Not had any SAYE share options become 
available for exercise 
               
Intention to Keep or Sell the Shares              
Keep -         - -     - 
Sell -           - -   - 
A mix of the above -         - -   - 
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Table 19 Continued. 
Experience of Exercising SAYE Share 
Options in Current company 
        
  
  
 
Sold all shares -  - -      - -   - 
Sold some shares -   - -       - -   - 
Not sold any shares -  - -      - -     - 
Employee View of SAYE Shares in Relation 
to Salary 
             
In lieu of a higher salary               
Supplementary/added bonus                         
Both of the above/mixture               
 
7.2 Company 7  
 
Company 7 is a telecommunications company employing over 105,000 people. The 
company is UK owned, listed on the FTSE All Share, and is approximately 26 years old 
(see Table 18). According to its’ website, company 7 operates in more than 170 countries, 
and is one of the world’s leading providers of communications solutions and services.  
 
Company 7’s principal activities include networked IT services, local, national and 
international telecommunications services, and higher value broadband and internet 
products and services. 
 
7.2.1 Company 7: Save as You Earn 
 
The company operates two share plans, the Share Incentive plan (SIP), and the SAYE plan. 
The SAYE plan has been running in company 7 since 1985. At the time of the interview, 
approximately 55% of the workforce in company 7 participate in the SAYE plan, and are 
able to participate in 3 or 5 year contracts.  
 
In order to have voting rights in the SAYE plan, employees have to exercise their SAYE 
share options and become a shareholder. As an option holder employees does not have 
voting rights. 
 
7.2.2 Company 7: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SAYE  
 
The SAYE plan manager in company 7 was employed as “Head of Share Plans and Share 
Registration”. As well as being “instrumental in the communication of the plans”, his role 
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required him to manage the relationship between the company secretariat team and the 
company’s share plan administrators.  
 
According to the SAYE plan manager, the plan was, when it started, “seen as a real plus, 
as an employee benefit”, and “has stayed ever since”. When asked why the company has 
the plan, the plan manager stated:   
 
“I believe it is still regarded as a key employee benefit, erm, although I think part of 
the reason it is still offered is it always has been offered, I think it seems a very 
difficult benefit to reduce at this point in time when there is a lot of pressure on 
other benefits. But it is keenly supported, actively supported by the CEO, but it is 
not something that is evaluated from the point of view of how much productivity or 
how much bang we get for our buck as it were” (SAYE Manager 1).  
 
The plan manager was asked what the company hoped to achieve by having the SAYE 
plan:   
 
“It is partly greater staff satisfaction; there is also more involvement in what the 
staff understand about the City about the shares, share prices and finance in 
general, and, it is regarded as a motivational factor, erm, for employees” (SAYE 
Manager 1). 
 
The plan manager’s responses, when asked why he felt employees participated, focused on 
the financial returns, stating: 
 
“Many people use their participation in plans for a particular event, or just as part 
of their overall financial planning...It is a way of increasing financial wealth” 
(SAYE Manager 1).  
 
It was also believed that the plan had made employees want to understand more about the 
company:    
 
“...people that have got an interest in Sharesave (SAYE ) or an interest in the SIP 
are very keen to understand how decisions that the Finance Director is making 
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about re-investment or dividends is actually going to affect the share price going 
forward and the dividend stream going forward” (SAYE Manager 1).  
 
When asked specific questions relating to different attitudes at work, the plan manager 
believed the plan had made employees who participate more committed at work, 
motivated, that it gave them more job satisfaction, and a greater sense of responsibility. 
Whilst the plan manager was confident in stating there was an impact on these feelings, he 
appeared vague when asked for supporting evidence – how he had come to such a 
conclusion. This was typical of most plan managers interviewed in this study. For example, 
when asked what differences the plan manager had recognised between employees who 
participate and those who don’t, he stated:  
 
“I don’t sufficiently interact with the employees that don’t, to make a proper 
answer to that question I don’t think” (SAYE Manager 1). 
 
Following deeper questioning into how he had come to believe there had been an 
altitudinal impact, the plan manager was asked about the plan’s impact on employees’ 
performance – but seemed reluctant to suggest a positive impact:   
 
“That is a very difficult one, it is very difficult to directly relate share plan 
participation to performance, I think it is part of an overall sort of, an overall 
attitude and culture of giving people the responsibility and allowing them to carry 
on with the work, and seeing the benefit of that in erm, better financial results and 
subject to the market volatility, erm, a better share price, which they benefit from” 
(SAYE Manager 1).  
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7.3 Company 7 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
7.3.1 Company 7: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SAYE and SAYE) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a 
target, coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
7.3.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
All employees felt that they had some influence or control at work within their jobs, but 
felt unable to make decisions relating to the overall company strategy, for example, in 
deciding whether to launch new products or invest in new markets. Participating in the 
SAYE plan was not felt to influence the amount of control or influence employees desired 
at work, and interviewees felt this was something they would desire irrespective of the 
plan. Employee 26 stated:  
 
“Erm, hard question to answer because I have always been involved to the 
maximum that I could anyway, from day one. So, you can’t get any more involved” 
(Employee 26).  
 
Following a recent fall in share price, Employee 25 stated that he realised he had little 
connection between what he did at work and how the company performed – and did not 
believe that SAYE plan participation made any difference to this. Employee 25 stated:    
 
“It (SAYE participation) made me feel that if I do a good job, hopefully the shares 
will perform well. However, that is what I did think, but now I don’t think there is 
any bearing on the share price of what I do. So I could do a spectacularly good job, 
and my Sharesave (SAYE) plans will still be worth nothing. So it really is luck, it 
really is luck, chance, that is what you are doing, you are taking a chance, that 
(company 7) share price will go up. So, I don’t have any influence over that at all” 
(Employee 25).    
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Only Employee 28 felt that the plan provided more control or influence at work. Unlike the 
other employees, Employee 28 felt the right to vote at the company AGM,  was a way in 
which the SAYE plan provided him with a greater voice, stating:  
 
“Erm, yes, shareholders, obviously, can go to the shareholder AGM if you want to 
go and talk if you want to...You have a voice, you’re not just an employee you have 
actually got a stake in the company you have got to a very small extent, an 
influence about what goes on and can say your bit” (Employee 28). 
 
In contrast, when asked whether he felt voting rights gave him more influence or a greater 
input in decision making, Employee 26 responded:  
 
“No...it is irrelevant as to where my votes would go. Because it would have no 
impact. I am under no illusion about that. I was just talking to a company secretary, 
about three quarters of an hour ago about the fact that there are still 1million small 
shareholders in (company 7), which is, as far as I am concerned, shareholders that 
hold less than 1,600 shares. There may be 1.2 million shareholders but the vast 
majority of the shares are held in probably 20 companies or investment vehicles, 
and they decide what will and will not happen” (Employee 26).    
 
7.3.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Two employees felt that participating in the SAYE did not have an impact on their 
knowledge of the company, or desire to understand more. Employee 26 stated:  
 
“No, because I have always been a very nosey person and I have always wanted to 
know how things, whether it be mechanical, how it works, or in an environment 
like this, who does what. I have always wanted to know the ins and outs of thing. 
So whether I held shares or not, it would have been irrelevant, I would still have 
wanted to know” (Employee 26).    
 
Employees 25 and 27 said that participating in the SAYE did have some impact on their 
knowledge of the company, and specifically, their interest in the share price and company 
performance, stating:  
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“I guess the thing I do, I look at the share performance. I don’t go and feel as 
though I want to go and find out about particular areas of the company, because I 
can do that on my day job anyway. But no, I do watch the share price on a regular 
basis, daily, it does not do me any good, but that is kind of one behaviour that I 
think being in the Share save plan does drive. I focus on the performance of the 
price” (Employee 25).   
 
“I kind of think so, because you automatically find yourself following the share 
price more, and I guess the factors that have an impact on the share price going up 
and down” (Employee 27).  
 
Employees felt that the company communicated the SAYE plan very well, and also felt the 
company was highly committed to the SAYE plan. However, when asked how good they 
felt their knowledge of the share plan was, Employees 25 and 27 both provided responses 
suggesting that although they did not know a lot about the plan, it was not a priority and 
they could obtain the information they felt they needed. Employee 25 responded by stating 
that, whilst he may not be sure of how the SAYE works, knowing what he could make 
(financially) was all he was interested in understanding.  
 
7.3.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
There was reason to believe, particularly when employees were asked about the impact of 
the plan on feelings of commitment, motivation and performance, that they already felt 
they were working as hard as they could already, investing themselves, their energy and 
effort, and felt they were, and would be, committed and motivated without the plan. For 
example, Employee 25 was enthusiastic to explain the extra effort he goes to, when off 
duty, to report any vandalism he notices to telecommunication equipment in public places, 
which is owned by company 7. Employee 25 stated that at work, “I take great 
responsibility for what I do”. Other employees also provided evidence that they invested 
themselves at work, motivated by the variety and responsibilities their roles gave them.  
 
The low share price (when joining), the “safety and security of it” and the potential return 
that could be made, were stated as being the most appealing aspects of the SAYE. When 
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asked about why they decided to participate in the SAYE plan, this appeared to be based 
on the opportunity to make money. Employee 26 stated, it was “a purely financially 
orientated decision”. Employee 27 stated:  
 
“I will be honest, I intend to, unless the share price looks like it will continue to 
increase at the end of the three years, I intend to cash my shares and use it probably 
for household improvements at the end of the three years” (Employee 27).   
 
Employee 25 explained that he had seen colleagues take out SAYE plans and make “an 
absolute fortune”, and consequently decided to join the plan. As well as believing that the 
company operated the SAYE plan to give employees an opportunity to make money 
employees felt that the plan was “separate” from what they did at work and from their 
attitudes towards the company. Employee 25’s comment summarises the way employees 
described their approach to ESO:  
 
“It is about how much money I can make out of it” (Employee 25).   
 
7.3.2 Company 7: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
Three of the employees felt that the SAYE plan had not influenced feelings of ownership 
at work, and seemed unsure of how it could. For Employee 25, it was felt that ownership 
feelings were a result of his own “personal and professional integrity” and were a result of 
his belief that he “should come to work to do a professional job”. Commenting on the 
potential relationship between the SAYE plan and feelings of ownership, Employee 25 
stated:  
 
“I am not sure how it would have created a sense of ownership. Well, let’s just 
think, if I had have made a lot of money out of it, would that have made me feel a 
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sense of ownership? Probably not, no, it would probably have just made me feel a 
bit happier, in my personal life. I can’t see a direct link between the performance of 
the share plan and my personal sense of ownership”.  
 
Employee 26 suggested that the SAYE plan had a limited impact on employees’ feelings of 
ownership towards and within company 7 because “...there has never been a mega amount 
of money made by anyone”. Employee 26 believed that in the case of some of the 
company 7 SAYE plans in the past, employees could achieve the same return outside of 
the company (on the open market) and so, it would be difficult to make the SAYE plan feel 
“impressive” to employees.  
 
Employee 28 was the only employee to feel that the SAYE plan influenced feelings of 
ownership at work. When asked if he could elaborate on how the SAYE plan had this 
impact, Employee 28 reiterated that the SAYE plan was not the only contributing factor in 
explaining why he felt ownership. No evidence was provided to infer that feelings of PO 
had worked through anything connected with the SAYE plan. Employee 28 described how, 
existing feelings of responsibility influenced helped create a feeling of ownership, and that 
SAYE participation added to this feeling.  
 
7.3.3 Company 7: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?   
 
In contrast to Employee 25 – who felt strongly that he was unable to influence the share 
price and therefore, the plan could have little impact on what he thought about the 
company or what he did at work, other employees were more positive. Employee 26 for 
example, felt “a slightly more secure feeling” that “there is a lump of money that is there 
for me to grab” in the event that he might be made redundant - something which he 
anticipated happening within the next few years. Employee 27 felt that the SAYE plan 
gave him a feeling of “loyalty to the company and an interest in the share price and 
financial movement of the organisation” that he would not otherwise have had.  
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Employee 27 went on to state that he felt more engaged with the company because of a 
greater interest in the performance of the company following SAYE plan participation. It 
could therefore be inferred that the impact on the feeling of being “more engaged” was 
working through the knowledge route. Employee 27 stated:  
 
Employee 28’s enhanced sense of belonging following SAYE participation was also felt to 
be related to the SAYE plan’s impact on a PO route. This impact was felt to be working 
through the control route:  
 
“...you do feel a sense of belonging, and quite often you do feel like a shareholder 
because... (pause) you have a stake in the company, you have a voice, you’re not 
just an employee you have actually got a stake in the company you have got to a 
very small extent, an influence about what goes on and can say your bit” 
(Employee 28).     
 
When asked more specifically, (providing examples such as commitment and motivation) 
whether the opportunity to participate in an SAYE plan had changed the way employees 
viewed the company, or felt at work, Employees 27 and 28 felt there had been some 
impact, but the remaining employees did not. Employee 27 and 28 both felt the SAYE plan 
made them more motivated at work. Where employees did state an impact from SAYE 
plan participation on their attitudes at work, there was no mention of this working through 
feeling of ownership.  
 
Other employee responses (E25 and E26) suggested that they would feel, for example, 
committed and motivated without the plan. Employee 26 stated:   
 
“It hasn’t (had an impact) because I have not put them in the same basket, I have 
always kept them as separate entities, erm, I have treated the share plan purely as 
an investment opportunity to take part in, or not, as I felt right at the time” 
(Employee 26).  
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7.3.4 Company 7: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
Employees felt that the SAYE plan had no impact on how they performed at work, feeling 
that working hard and performing well was already important to them and driven by other 
factors than SAYE plan participation. However, there was an impact reported by all 
employees with regards to the amount of time they would be likely to stay employed for 
the company. This impact reflected a continuance commitment; responses suggested it was 
the thought of possibly making money from the plan that was likely to keep employees 
employed for longer. Employee 25 stated:  
 
“Yeah, yeah I think it probably could. From (company 7’s) point of view they 
might think it (the SAYE plan) is like golden handcuffs, but that only works if the 
share price is going up, if the share price is going down then it does not work, it is a 
negative actually, the opposite effect, people are less likely to stay because they 
will say there is no point in me staying, my share save is not worth anything I might 
as well just take the cash and go” (Employee 25).   
 
Employee 26 believed that, should he not be made redundant at the end of his contract, 
staying employed in the company would be more of an incentive, as the financial returns 
from the SAYE plan could be help him maintain his standard of living when he did 
eventually leave. Employees 27 and 28 also felt that the SAYE plan would influence the 
amount of time they would stay employed in the company. Employee 27 explained “it has 
a fairly big impact, to be fair”, stating:  
 
“...clearly if you do leave the organisation of your own accord, before then (the end 
of the SAYE plan), then you don’t reap the benefits of the plan, assuming that the 
share price kind of rises over the three or five year period. You don’t get the return 
in which you originally anticipated” (Employee 27).   
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7.4 Company 8  
 
Company 8 is a retail company employing over 75,000 people. The company is UK 
owned, listed on the FTSE All Share and is over 100 years old. According to the company 
website, company 8 is a leading UK retailer, with over 21 million people visiting their 
stores each week. The company sells clothing, home products and foods, sourced from 
around 2,000 suppliers globally. Company 8 has over 600 UK stores, plus an expanding 
international business.  
 
7.4.1 Company 8: Save as You Earn 
 
The company currently (at the time of interview) operates one share plan, the SAYE plan, 
but has also previously operated the Share Incentive plan (SIP). 3 Year contracts are 
offered to employees. In order to have voting rights, employees have to exercise their 
SAYE share options and become a shareholder. As an option holder employees do not 
have voting rights.  
 
7.4.2 Company 8: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SAYE  
 
The SAYE plan manager in company 8 was responsible for managing senior remuneration 
and all employee share schemes in company 8. When asked why the company has the 
SAYE plan, the manager stated:   
 
“I think it is actually fundamental to our benefits package. It enables our employees 
to feel part of the business, and the generation of feelings that comes with that, 
because they then part own the business, but also I think it’s really from a corporate 
social responsibility point of view, it enables our employees to financially plan, and 
plan for a more secure future as well. So I think it has got two answers, I think it 
has got a CSR (corporate social responsibility) arm, and it has also got the added 
benefit of having shareholders who are in the company” (SAYE Manager 2).  
 
When elaborating on the extent to which the plan was intended to impact employee 
attitudes and behaviours, it appeared that the plan manager was assuming that ownership in 
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the company “must act to the good”. This was a strong view, and one that the plan 
manager seemed to refer to as something that went hand in hand with share ownership.  
 
“...I think inevitably, when someone has some ownership in a company, whilst it is 
not measurable and we have never measured it, and we have never tried to measure 
it, I think we have a view that as a stakeholder, inevitably, it must act to the good, 
because why wouldn’t it if you are there and what you receive is not only your 
salary from the company but any future profits as a shareholder, you feel partly, 
more involved...” (SAYE Manager 2). 
 
The statement “why wouldn’t it” reflected the manager’s positive approach to the SAYE 
plan. With regards to the “good” the plan does, (following the statement: “it must act to the 
good”), the manager felt that participation in the plan made employees more interested in 
the company and its performance. Whilst the plan manager stated that this impact was 
“inevitable”, she also said it was difficult to prove.  
 
“...whilst we don’t have absolutely everyone involved in Share Save, we have a 
third of our workforce who are in one scheme or more, and inevitably those people 
talk about the share price, they keep an eye on profits, they keep an eye on what the 
results are, probably to a greater degree than someone who isn’t, but can we prove 
that, can we physically feel it? I think it is very difficult when you’re looking at 
70,000 people” (SAYE Manager 2).   
 
The plan manager made a number of claims and appeared quite certain of the plan’s 
positive impact. It was claimed that when employees make a financial return from the plan 
there is an impact on the work force that is “quite significant and tangible”. When asked 
more specifically about the impact that the plan had, to try and elicit what was “significant 
and tangible,” and how plan participants “view their employer”, the plan manager stated 
that employees were more financially aware, more aware of the financial health of the 
business, “because they have an interest in the share price”.  
 
 
 
 
243 
 
On commitment, the plan manager stated:  
 
“Where you do see the commitment though is where someone goes into the 
scheme, we had it a few years ago, someone goes into the scheme at £1.56, and 
leave at £7, the impact that has on that individual about how they then value their 
employer, and the good will it generates, and then just general, am I happy to come 
to work for this employer, is significant” (SAYE Manager 2).  
 
The plan manager was asked to what extent participation levels act as an indicator of the 
plan’s success.  
 
“...participation rates are hugely important to us in terms of getting a sense of what 
our employees think about it (the SAYE plan), but not just what they think about 
that, but what is going on in their lives economically, because there are other 
factors why people may not join Share Save, and we have got to be mindful of 
those” (SAYE Manager 2).  
 
The plan manager felt that participation “has got to be some sort of indication of how they 
feel about the business”, stating:  
 
“...I think some of it (decision to participate in the SAYE plan) must be about trust, 
because why would you pay over X amount every month, you know, if you didn’t 
trust that that was going to be, you know, either a good investment  or you believe 
that it would be, you would be treated fairly...” (SAYE Manager 2).  
 
The plan manager also felt the plan “has got to be a retention tool, in terms of motivating”, 
but despite being confident of this impact, admitted she did not have a “wizzy way” of 
measuring it.  
 
“I think it is a retention tool, and it has got a couple of years to run and it has got to 
be a retention tool, in terms of motivating, I think, in terms of how we measure it, if 
you can come up with a wizzy way of how we can measure that then fine, you 
know, but do we really measure it in that degree, no, no we don’t. I think it is us 
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knowing, getting a sense of our employees, and getting a general feeling, that it is 
the right thing to do. It does cost us a lot of money, on our P and L charts it cost us 
up to £10 million a year, on Sharesave, so it is not an insignificant amount of 
money” (SAYE Manager 2).    
 
Furthermore, the plan manager felt that employees wanted to understand more about the 
company, because they were participating in the SAYE plan, but was unsure whether 
participation made employees want to be more involved at work, stating “I don’t know...if 
I go an visit a store I don’t know who is in Share Save and who isn’t”. The manager did 
not believe that the SAYE plan gave employees any more control or influence at work.  
 
7.5 Company 8 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
7.5.1 Company 8: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SAYE and SAYE) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a 
target, coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
7.5.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
Employees felt that they were able to have an input in decision making within their job 
roles, but not at a corporate or strategic level. Participating in this SAYE plan did not make 
employees feel that they wanted to be more involved at work. Furthermore, the SAYE plan 
itself was not felt to have given employees more control or influence at work. Employees 
felt that they had influence within their jobs already.  
 
“I think with the job I do, I think I have that anyway. So, I think whether I had the 
shares or not I would do that” (Employee 29).  
 
“No, no. Everybody is treated the same whether you are or you’re not really” 
(Employee 31). 
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“Erm, I just see the share plan as something separate, to your everyday role. It does 
not really affect it one bit to be honest, not in our, working on the floor (area of 
retail department store)” (Employee 32). 
 
When responding to the lack of impact the plan has on her control and influence at work, 
Employee 30 explained why in her experience, there was a separation between work and 
share schemes:  
 
“I have been doing the share plan for 22 years now, and because over the years 
there have been big ups and downs, I always forget that I am in it. I always pretend 
it is not there. Whatever number of shares I have got, I don’t think about them...I 
feel they are just isolated from me. I go there when I need to, but because I know 
that I could lose a fortune in a day, or gain a fortune in a day, depending on what 
happens then I don’t feel, that does not connect with what I do. When I come into 
work, what is my job list, what can I make better there is not a connection with 
that” (Employee 30). 
 
7.5.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Employee 29 and 31 felt that participating in the SAYE plan had an impact on their interest 
in understanding company performance. When elaborating on what it was about being a 
shareholder that gave him an added interest in the company, Employee 29 referred to both 
a feeling that he was “part of” the company, and the potential financial returns of owning 
shares, stating:  
 
“I suppose it comes down to, because you actually own a part of the company. I 
know it is going to be 0.000, whatever percentage, but, you do feel you have a part 
in it and that is why when there is stuff in the news, you follow it more because you 
are a shareholder, and you can see the share price changing, and although the ones I 
got given I have never sold, you do sit there and think, the share price is £6 and 
they gave them to me at £2.80, that would be quite nice” (Employee 29).   
 
Knowledge of the SAYE plan was felt to be very good by the employees, as was the 
communication of the SAYE plan. Employee 29 stated:  
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“I would say I have good knowledge, the reason is probably being in the company 
for a long time, but also because I have had to go through (the process) and cancel, 
close and re-open and join when it comes out again” (Employee 29).   
 
7.5.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
There was little evidence to suggest that employees were investing more energy, time, 
effort, or attention at work, because they were participating in the SAYE plan. Instead, it 
appeared that employees were already investing themselves into their jobs and the 
company, and the SAYE plan was a way for them to make money rather than feel invested, 
or invest themselves more. For example, Employee 29 stated:  
 
“I would always just want to do my very best. Always, erm, my work ethos is to do 
the very best, always, even in times of troubles. I never think, I am going to work a 
bit harder at this because I am a shareholder. I just think I will work as hard as I can 
on this because that is who I am” (Employee 29).  
 
Furthermore, participation in the SAYE plan did not appear to be a way of demonstrating 
to senior colleagues that they were investing themselves into the business or committed to 
the company. It was a financial decision, viewed (particularly by Employee 31 and 32 - the 
least senior and lowest paid employees) as being separate to what they did, or how they 
felt, at work. The plan was, primarily, a way to save money.  
 
Employees did not feel that the amount of share options they owned in the SAYE plan, 
affected the way they felt about the company. Participation was felt to be largely unrelated 
to their life at work, with regards to how they felt or behaved. The SAYE plan appeared to 
be, from employees’ responses, related much more to the opportunity to save money, and 
make money.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
247 
 
7.5.2 Company 8: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as 
working through the three routes to PO?  
 
In company 8, only Employee 29 felt ownership at work over both the company and his 
job. When asked why he believed he felt a sense of ownership at work, Employee 29 
talked about the ownership of the company (but not his job) he felt from the shares he held 
as a consequence of being in the SAYE plan, stating:  
 
“When I have got the plan and I am saving each month and you see the share price 
moving you do sort of think, what are they doing, why is that happening, sort of , 
you obviously read in the papers or see in the news, so definitely (explaining why 
he felt PO over the company)” (Employee 29).   
 
It can be inferred from Employee 29’s response that he felt the influence from the SAYE 
plan was working through the knowledge route, specifically, the company and share price 
knowledge that was also enhanced by SAYE participation. In contrast, the remaining 
employees did not feel ownership over the company, but did feel ownership over aspects 
of their jobs. Employee 30 stated when asked whether the ESO plan influenced her 
feelings of ownership at work, stated:  
 
“Yeah…my job...If I was sitting here with people that work here that understand 
the business, then we would talk about our business. I have just been talking this 
morning about something that I am accountable for, I own it, because in a work 
scenario, I own and take responsibility for and have real pride in doing that” 
(Employee 30).    
 
Unlike Employee 30, Employees 31 and 32 did not feel that the SAYE plan caused, or 
influenced in anyway, their feelings of ownership over the responsibilities they described 
within their jobs.   
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“No, they are two separate things. They are totally separate” (Employee 31).  
 
Overall then, in company 8, feelings of ownership at work that had been influenced by the 
SAYE plan tended to be because the SAYE plan had been able to provide employees with 
some share ownership, rather than options. Explanations referred back to the feeling that 
they did, legally, own part of the company.  
 
7.5.3 Company 8: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees differentiated between share options and the shares, and felt that there was a 
difference in how they felt, depending on which of the two they owned. It was shares, 
rather than options, that were felt to have an impact on the way the employee felt at work, 
as Employee 30 stated:  
 
“I think being a shareholder does give you that connection. The share save scheme 
(SAYE) is a vehicle to getting the shares, but I think having shares does make you 
feel more connected. It is not the plan; it is having shares I think” (Employee 30).  
 
When asked specific questions relating to the impact of the SAYE plan on their attitudes at 
work, Employee 31 and 32 did not feel the plan had any impact on their attitudes. The plan 
was viewed as a saving scheme in these cases, not as something that could, or did, 
influence their day to day life.  
 
However two employees did feel there had been some impact. Employee 29 and 30 stated 
that they felt the SAYE plan had made them feel more committed at work, although, there 
was no evidence from the responses to believe that employees felt that the SAYE plan 
worked through feelings of ownership, or any of the routes.  
 
The impact on commitment appeared, with both Employee 29 and 30, to be a continuance 
commitment, where the employees were weighing up the financial cost of leaving. This 
can be seen in Employee 30’s response:  
249 
 
“There have been occasions over the last 27 years, where I have been, this is about 
the share plan actually, where I have been looking to leave, but knowing that if I 
hung in 12 months, or six months...there have been occasions that it (the SAYE 
plan) has been a reason for me to consider whether I go or not. At the beginning of 
my career, the Sharesave scheme (the SAYE plan) year in year out without fail it 
delivered really good results, and made a lot of money, erm, it was a bit of a, it was 
a hold” (Employee 30).  
 
Employees 29 and 30 stated that they did not feel the SAYE plan had made them feel more 
motivated at work. Employee 30 felt that her pension acted as more of a motivator, 
because she felt, compared to the SAYE plan, it was more “guaranteed”. Furthermore, 
there was no impact found with regards to job satisfaction at work or a greater sense of 
responsibility.  
 
7.5.4 Company 8: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
Employees did not feel that the plan had an impact on their behaviours at work. 
Consequently, there was no evidence from the responses to believe that employees felt the 
SAYE plan worked through feelings of ownership, or any of the routes. For example, 
Employees 29 and 30 stated:  
 
“No, I would say what I do, or how I perform, is how I would be whether I was in 
it or not. I don’t think having it, share plan or shares, makes me work harder, 
because I am paid a salary and I want to do a very good job” (Employee 29).   
 
“I would always just want to do my very best. Always, my work ethos is to do the 
very best, always, even in times of troubles. I never think, I am going to work a bit 
harder at this because I am a shareholder or in the Sharesave (the SAYE plan). I 
just think I will work as hard as I can on this because that is who I am” (Employee 
30).    
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All but one employee (Employee 31) felt that participating in the plan influenced the 
amount of time they would stay employed in the company. Employee 29 appeared to feel 
this more strongly than his colleagues, stating:  
 
“I think it has, I think, I suppose for me it has actually given me more reason to 
stay, I think, (laughs), I would say it has given me more reason to stay because it is 
another benefit and obviously as you build up benefits it makes you think about 
what you are doing, where you are going, and obviously if you decide to leave what 
are you actually going to lose. So I do think it build up that loyalty toward the 
company” (Employee 29).   
 
 
Employee 31 was the only employee to feel that the SAYE plan did not impact the amount 
of time she would stay employed in the company. Whereas Employee 32 stated she had “a 
lot of shares”, and was intending to continue working for the company until the share price 
increased and her shares were sold, Employee 31 did not feel the SAYE plan would impact 
her because she was unable to put “a lot of money into it”.  
 
7.6 Company 9  
 
Company 9 is in “Financial Services”, listed on the FTSE All Share, and over 20 years old. 
Currently the HM Treasury holds a majority controlling share in company 9.  
 
According to the company website, company 9 has been through “an exceptionally 
difficult period”. It is also stated that “the crisis in global financial markets and 
deteriorating economic conditions across the world has weakened many financial services 
organisations”. Company 9, again according to its website, made “bad mistakes” which 
made them vulnerable during the economic crisis.  
 
7.6.1 Company 9: Save as You Earn 
 
The company currently (at the time of interview) operates two share plans, the SAYE plan, 
and the SIP. SAYE share options were first granted in company 9 in 1985. Employees who 
wish to participate are offered 3, 5 and 7 year contracts, and as with company 7 and 8, in 
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order to have voting rights, employees have to exercise their SAYE share options and 
become a shareholder. At the time of the interview, approximately 79% of the workforce 
participated in the SAYE plan.    
 
7.6.2 Company 9: Plan Manager: Reasons for Introducing the SAYE  
 
The SAYE plan manager in company 9 was employed as “Head of Shareholder Services” 
and had two broad responsibilities, to manage share plans, and “the registry side, looking 
after the shareholders”. According to the plan manager, one reason company 9 has the 
SAYE plan is to give employees an opportunity to make money, stating:  
 
“...at its most basic and crude, it is an opportunity for people to make money. Erm, 
you know, depending on the type of plan or the tax free basis etc., and you know, 
let’s face it, that has to be a fundamental part of it, because people would not invest 
if they were losing money” (SAYE Manager 3).  
 
When asked what the company hoped to achieve as a result of offering the plan, the plan 
manager did not believe there were any objectives:   
 
“Yeah, well I think, erm, we don’t have, well, we don’t have stated objectives, that 
said, probably when the plans were launched, well before my time here, I imagine 
that there were, you know, some principles set out as to why we want to introduce 
this. Erm, but I think, why, I think it is again to encourage employee share 
ownership, we see it as a benefit to have employees who are focused on share 
price...” (SAYE Manager 3).  
 
To elicit more information, the plan manager was asked what would determine a 
“successful” share plan in company 9. However, the lack of targets made this difficult to 
answer, and what constitutes a successful share plan remained unclear:  
 
“Again, we don’t have targets, so, erm, we are not saying year on year we want to 
see a 5% increase (in participation) or anything like that. The reason for that, to 
answer your question in a roundabout way, is that we don’t look to push people into 
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the share plans, we don’t even encourage people into the share plans” (SAYE 
Manager 3). 
 
To the specific question, of whether the SAYE plan is operated with the intention of 
influencing employee attitudes or behaviours at work, the plan manager did not see this as 
a formal objective but did feel that SAYE participants who had not made money during the 
share price decline would be more committed to helping the company improve. However, 
he also acknowledged that employees may not feel that they, individually, can impact the 
share price.  
 
The plan manager believed that employees participated in the SAYE plan to make money, 
but believed that currently, SAYE plan participants felt “disenfranchised”, stating:  
 
“I don’t think our employees would say it is a benefit at the moment, it is a cost to 
them.” (SAYE Manager 3).   
 
Due to a fall in share price, the plan manager felt that employees participated in the SAYE 
plan wanted to understand more about the company.  
 
“I think now, because the share price has crashed so spectacularly, now they do 
want to know more about the company. They want to know if they are going to get 
their money back at some point” (SAYE Manager 3).   
 
When asked about the plan’s impact on employees’ performance, the manager was clear 
that the fall in share price was evidence that the plan had not made employees perform 
more effectively. Furthermore, with regard to employees’ attitudes at work, the plan 
manager felt that unless the employee owns shares, they may feel no different to an 
employee, who is not participating in the SAYE plan, stating:  
 
“...it is only when you exercise options and become a shareholder that I think then 
the dynamics change slightly, because then you are interested in the well-being of 
the company more than I am, in that you are obviously monitoring the share price” 
(SAYE Manager 3).  
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7.7 Companyy 9 Findings: Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
7.7.1 Company 9: Findings for Research Question 1  
 
What are employees’ perceptions regarding whether participating in UK ESO plans 
(SAYE, SAYE and SAYE) provides the routes to PO at work (i.e. control over a 
target, coming to intimately know a target and investing the self into a target)?  
 
7.7.1.1 The Control Route: Controlling the Ownership Target  
 
Employees 36 and 37 did not feel they had any influence at work, within their jobs or over 
the company as a whole. Employee 33 did feel she had a small influence at work within the 
area in which she worked, rather than in company decision making, or strategic level 
decisions. Employee 34 felt she had “quite a lot” of influence at work, as did Employee 35, 
who stated:  
 
“Erm, basically people come to us for advice, internally, and we give advice and 
they take that into account in their decision making, and so yes, I think I do have a 
role to play” (Employee 35).    
 
Employees did not feel that participating in the SAYE plan made them want to be more 
involved at work. For example, Employee 35 stated:  
  
“No. I think that comes down to your professionalism and the job that you do. As I 
say, on a day to day basis it would not even cross my mind that I have options or 
shares there” (Employee 35).  
 
Employees did not feel the SAYE plan gave them any additional influence or control at 
work, and in some cases, employees were unsure of whether the SAYE plan could result in 
them having voting rights. Employees 33 and 37 both recognised that as participants in the 
SAYE plan, once they became shareholders they could vote at the company AGM but did 
not feel this gave them any more control or influence. As a significant proportion of 
company 9 had recently been acquired by the UK Government, Employees 33 and 37 did 
not feel their vote would have an influence.  
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“Yes...voting rights, but, my vote now, because the shares are very much diluted, 
the government owns most of them it would not have any impact. I don’t intend to 
vote at AGMs going forward” (Employee 33).  
 
7.7.1.2 The Knowledge Route: Coming to Intimately Know the Target  
 
Employee 33 felt that although she already had a good knowledge of the company and “its 
activities”, being a participant in the SAYE plan made her more interested in 
understanding company performance, stating:  
 
“It certainly makes me more interested in what the profits are and where they are 
coming from” (Employee 33).    
 
The remaining employees did not feel that there had been any such impact, as Employee 
34 stated:  
 
“I follow its performance pretty closely anyway. I don’t think you can particularly 
say it is because of being in the plan” (Employee 34).    
 
Employees felt they would follow the share price because they were interested in the 
business, that there was already lots of information available about what the company was 
doing and participating in the plan did not make them want to know more, or that they 
were working in the areas of the company that gave them all the information that they 
wanted. Employee 37 stated that the company had been through difficult times due to 
economic recession, and that other factors were greater influences on his interest in 
understanding and developing his knowledge about aspects of his work life.  
 
“Having gone through the last two years, erm, I think there is a lot more, a lot of 
other factors that make me want to understand the performance of the company and 
how it is doing and what is going on, rather than the share options. The share 
options, as I say, are worthless at this point in time, right now I should be more 
concentrated on maintaining, or keeping my job” (Employee 37).     
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Employees felt their knowledge was generally, good, reflected in responses such as “good” 
(Employee 33, 35), “reasonable” (Employee 34), “alright” (Employee 36), and “fairly 
decent” (Employee 37). Employees felt that the reason they understood the plan, as well as 
they did, was due to good communications about the SAYE plan by the company.   
 
“The communication is very clear and set out, with worked examples, and it is 
made attractive” (Employee 33).  
 
7.7.1.3 The Investment Route: Investing the Self into the Target 
 
Employees felt that they enjoyed the variety within their jobs, the responsibility it gave 
them and the sense of achievement, and felt they were already investing their ideas, skills, 
time, effort and attention into the company. It was felt that this was required of them, and 
they would do that anyway, irrespective of the plan. Investing energy, effort and attention 
at work was felt to be particularly important at the moment because of the recent decline in 
the company’s fortunes. There was little evidence to suggest that the SAYE plan made 
them invest, or want to invest (in a non-financial sense), themselves any more than they 
felt they were already.  
 
When asked why they decided to participate in the SAYE plan, and invest money into it, 
the motivation to participate was very much financial, and the financial investment into the 
SAYE did not appear to correlate in employees’ minds with the extent to which they 
invested, for example, their time, effort or energy.  
 
The SAYE plan did not appear to be about ownership to employees, and participation did 
not appear to be motivated by the opportunity to feel part of the organisation. Participation 
was not found to relate to employees desire to have more influence at work, or as a way of 
being able, as a SAYE participant or shareholder, to more effectively invest their ideas, 
skills, time, effort and attention into the company in order to have an impact at work. The 
perceived low risk, the opportunity to save money and the potential return that could be 
made were frequently stated reasons for participating. Employee 35 stated:  
 
 
 
256 
 
“It seemed just a very simple and convenient method of saving...If the share price 
goes down you can just take the money out, plus a slight enhancement, so it was no 
worse I would say then putting the money into a savings building society account, 
and you have the opportunity of the share price going up. So, you could make quite 
a good return on it as well, so there was the possibility of a good return but pretty 
much guaranteed a safe return” (Employee 35).   
 
Employees provided similar views with regards to whether the amount of shares, or the 
size of their investment, would affect the way they felt about the company. Employees did 
not feel that having more, shares, options or money invested, would change the way they 
felt or behaved at work, stating that unless they owned a “huge” amount of shares, that 
would give them more control over the company, they would not change the way they 
think, feel or behave at work.  
 
Given that employees did not feel the SAYE plan had an impact on the amount of control 
or influence they had at work, or their performance, it is perhaps not surprising that 
employees found it difficult to state that participating in the plan led them to invest more of 
themselves (e.g. ideas, skills, time, effort and attention) into the company.  
 
7.7.2 Company 9: Findings for Research Question 2  
 
To what extent, and how, do employees feel participating in a UK ESO plan has 
influenced their feelings of PO towards anything within the organisation (e.g. their 
job, organisation, equipment, chair)?  
To the extent that they do perceive such influence, is this seen as working through 
the three routes to PO?  
 
Four of the five employees felt ownership at work over the company, and two of these 
employees also felt ownership over their jobs. Employees’ felt ownership had developed 
because they identified “very strongly with the company” or because they had worked in it 
for a number of years. Feelings of ownership were also felt to have emerged as a result of 
having responsibility, and feeling responsible for, projects and specific duties.  
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With regards to whether participating in the SAYE plan had an impact on feelings of 
ownership at work all but two employees did not feel the plan had this impact. Employee 
37 stated that he had always understood that his role was not “just a job”, stating, “I am 
part of a community”. This employee felt that his sense of ownership would exist with or 
without SAYE plan participation. Employee 36 also felt that her feelings of ownership 
were not related to the SAYE plan, attributing this to her own personality.  
 
However, this was not the case for Employee 34 and 35, who did feel there had been an 
impact from the SAYE plan. There was however, no evidence to suggest that the SAYE 
plan had this impact by working through any of the routes to PO, or any other feeling or 
behaviour also influenced by the SAYE plan.  
 
Employee 35 felt there was a small impact, given that he currently owned a small number 
of options and shares. The amount owned was felt to impact the level in which the SAYE 
plan could affect feelings of ownership.  
 
Employee 34 also felt there had been an impact, and felt that feelings of ownership were 
felt a result of “working here” (in company 9) and being a participant in the SAYE plan.       
In coming to this opinion he provided an example of how this added sense of ownership 
would impact the way he would view decisions made within the company.  
 
“Yes, I think it has. Yes, I think it has. Certainly as a shareholder I would recoil at 
some of the things I think have happened over the years, some of the things that I 
have seen reported I would, in terms of how shareholder money has been spent, or 
particular projects that are being pursued, I might have views as a shareholder 
whether that is appropriate or not” (Employee 34).  
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7.7.3 Company 9: Findings for Research Question 3  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee attitudes?  
 
Employees reported few instances where the SAYE plan had made a difference to their 
attitudes at work. For most employees, the SAYE plan was a “nice benefit”, but not a 
priority. Employees explained that they were more interested in working hard and 
committing to the company in order to keep their jobs during, what was in their view, a 
difficult time for the company. Employee 35 stated:   
 
“For me, the benefit is (company 9) offer lots of additional benefits, so to me it (the 
SAYE plan) is just one part of the overall package...(company 9) offers lots of 
different financial products and insurances, you can pick and choose to suit your 
circumstances. So in so far as, it is part of that overall offering, I think it (the SAYE 
plan) makes (company 9) an attractive place to work. But, my actual participation 
in the plan itself, I don’t think has had any effect whatsoever on how I would view 
the company or act on a day to day basis” (Employee 35).  
 
When asked specifically about whether participating in the SAYE plan had an impact on 
attitudes such as commitment and motivation, findings indicated little impact. With regards 
to a greater feeling of commitment, Employee 33 was the only employee to feel that 
participation did have an impact, stating:  
 
“I hopefully would have been quite committed. I suppose it makes me marginally 
more committed because I have some investment there yes…I care about what 
happens to the company because if the company succeeds then I stand to not only, 
you know, progress my career and enjoy my job, but to make some extra money on 
the side” (Employee 33).  
 
Other employees felt that they were already engaged and committed, and would be without 
the SAYE plan. Similarly, with regards to motivation, Employee 34 felt that he was 
motivated by “other drivers”, rather than the SAYE plan, and Employees 35 and 36 also 
shared this view.  Employee 33 felt that her motivation at work did decline when the share 
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price declined, but was unsure that this, or any change in motivation she had experienced 
at work, was related to the SAYE plan. Employee 37 was motivated to help the company 
share price rise, but this motivation was felt to be driven by the desire to keep his job, 
rather than to increase the value of his shares.  
 
The impact of the SAYE plan on job satisfaction was felt to be “dependent on the share 
price”. Employee 33 and 36 felt that, in the past, there had been a small impact on their job 
satisfaction, but felt at the moment (because of the low share price) this was not the case.  
Employee 36 stated:  
 
“Yeah, well, yeah it must do, because, erm, apart from just now when it is low, it is 
always there at the back of your mind, I know what it could do and I know what it 
could do if it turned around, so it does give me some sense of satisfaction” 
(Employee 36).    
 
Given the limited impact of the SAYE plan, employees instead chose to comment on what 
they felt was needed in order for the SAYE plan to change their attitudes at work. 
Responses related to two main areas, the influence the employee has at work and the 
influence the SAYE plan has on the employee’s life. It was felt that in a large company, 
such as company 9, where employees were believed to feel less influence over the 
company, its performance, and ultimately, the share price; it was harder for a share plan to 
impact employee attitudes. It was felt that in a smaller company, this may be different. 
Employee 36 stated:  
 
“I think it is the size of the company that affects it, I think if you worked for a much 
smaller company that offers these share, where what you did could really, really 
affect it (the return of the SAYE plan, i.e. the share price), and where the 
commitment you give could make a difference, maybe it would give me that 
(impact on attitudes at work)” (Employee 36).  
 
Employees also felt that the SAYE plan would have to “have much more of a direct 
influence on your life”. It was felt that employees would have to feel that, compared to 
what they currently saved financially by using the SAYE plan, they were getting “a greater 
benefit from it that you would not just get if you were buying in the High Street”. For 
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Employee 37, having the job and the salary in company 9 was more important, and had a 
greater impact on his life than the SAYE plan.  
 
7.7.4 Company 9: Findings for Research Question 4  
 
Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important part 
of how UK ESO has an impact on employee behaviours?  
 
The interviews turned from attitudes to behaviours, and employees were asked whether 
participating in the scheme had an impact on what they did at work. However, it became 
apparent that employees felt, as with attitudes, that there had been little impact and that 
they worked as hard as they could irrespective of the SAYE plan.  Employee responses 
included:  
 
“Erm, no, I don’t think so really, erm, (pause for three seconds) just let me think 
about that again. It certainly doesn’t lessen my performance. I push myself quite 
hard anyway, I feel I have to do a good job and I expect I would do that even if I 
wasn’t a shareholder. I think I would have done the overtime and things anyway” 
(Employee 34).   
 
“No, no, I can be very clear on that one. My annual performance rating has a 
greater driver on that, of which my salary is increased and my potential bonus 
award” (Employee 37). 
 
Employee 37 went on to state why he felt the SAYE plan did not impact his performance 
at work, explaining this to be because he felt he had no influence on the company share 
price:  
 
“I have knocked my pan in (worked hard) for 25 years without fail, consistently, I 
have seen the share price rocket and I have seen it plummet, so my activities on a 
day to day basis are too far removed from what happens on the share price. So, I 
would say then, your question was why, what is it that prevents it from being a 
driver, primarily because I get my salary, and I have got more influence on that, I 
have got more influence on my bonus, and so therefore I have got more influence 
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over the things that are important to me outside of work as a consequence of having 
those two key factors” (Employee 37).   
 
When asked how they thought participating in the SAYE plan would influence the amount 
of time they would work for the company, all but one employee felt that the scheme had no 
impact.  Employee 33 was the only employee to feel the SAYE plan would have an impact, 
stating:  
 
“Yes, I would say it has because if I was to leave I would be giving up the option. I 
think the fact that I am tied in to the share plan for five years makes me think that I 
hope I am going to be around for the five years” (Employee 33).     
 
In contrast, other employees did not feel that SAYE plan participation had an impact on the 
amount of time they would stay employed in company 9. Employee 34 did not feel it 
would impact this because having cut down his shareholdings, felt “it is not worth so much 
to me”. Similarly Employee 35 felt the impact was dependant on the number of shares 
held, and since he had few share options, felt there was no impact.   
 
7.8 THE SAYE PLAN FINDINGS: COMPANIES 7, 8 AND 9  
 
This chapter presented findings addressing the four research questions. Again, as found in 
the SIP and EMI results, there was no clear and obvious way of explaining employees’ 
experiences of the SAYE plan’s impact. There were also no obvious patterns with regard 
to which routes were satisfied by the SAYE plan or those that were not. As found with the 
previous share plans, experiencing an impact from the SAYE plan on a route did not mean 
that the employee would feel more PO at work, or an impact on their attitudes or 
behaviours.  
 
The SAYE plan was found to add in a small way to PO (as seen in Figure 13), in five 
employees’ experiences, more frequently than found with the SIP (2) or EMI (3). Again, as 
with the SIP and EMI, this impact was not felt to be working through any routes that had 
been influenced by the SAYE plan, and in three of these cases (Employee 30, 34 and 35) 
the employees did not feel there had been any impact from the SAYE plan on any of the 
routes.  
262 
 
The impact of the SAYE plan on outcomes such as motivation, commitment and 
performance was in most cases financially driven, as employees considered how much 
money they might be able to make from the plan. With regards to the outcomes found in 
the SAYE companies, as with the SIP and EMI, the SAYE plan did not need to create a 
feeling of PO in order to have this impact.   
 
7.8.1 SAYE Rationale and Impact: The SAYE Plan Managers  
 
As found in the SIP and EMI findings, in the SAYE findings managers in company 7 and 9 
had conducted no research to help them understand the impact of the SAYE plan on the 
employees’ attitudes or behaviours at work. In company 8, the plan manager did refer to 
research that had been conducted internally, but was still doubtful, and felt unable to state 
that the plan had an impact on “what employees do at work”.  
 
The plan manager in company 9 expressed most doubts about the impact of the SAYE 
plan. This manager felt that employees participated in the SAYE plan to make money, and 
suspected that due to a sharp decrease in the share price, SAYE plan participants felt 
“disenfranchised”. The manager expressed his belief that employees may not feel that they, 
individually, can impact the share price, and felt that as the share price had recently fallen, 
the SAYE plan had not had an impact on employees’ performance. Furthermore, the plan 
manager in company 9 differentiated between options and shares, stating that unless the 
employee owns shares, they may feel no different to an employee who is not participating 
in the SAYE plan. The manager believed that it is only when the employee exercises their 
options and become a shareholder that the dynamics change, because then, they are more 
interested in the well-being of the company. The manager also expressed doubts regarding 
the plan’s impact on motivation, doubting many employees would think that if they work a 
bit faster, the share price will rise and they will benefit. This was perhaps most reflective of 
the employees responses (although not all the manager’s suspicions were found), compared 
to responses from other managers.  
 
Reasons for having an SAYE plan seemed vague in all three companies. During interviews 
with the plan managers, responses did not specifically relate to any particular type of 
outcome, or impact, and it was not clear what the companies were aiming to achieve by 
having the plan, despite follow up and probing questions. In company 7, “part of the reason 
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it is still offered is it always has been”, in company 8 it was believed that “there was a 
benefit of having shareholders working in the company” (although specific aims relating to 
these benefits remained vague), and in company 9 the manager “did not believe there were 
any objectives”, and stated “we don’t have targets”. More information was obtained from 
the manager in company 7, who stated that in the 1980’s the SAYE plan was “seen as a 
real plus, as an employee benefit”, and “has stayed ever since”. When pressed further, the 
manager believed the plan was in place because it added to employee satisfaction 
(although this was not found in the employee responses), and was regarded as a 
motivational factor (motivation was felt to be influenced by two employees in company 7).  
 
The same can be said for the manager in company 9, who was also able to elaborate when 
asked. The plan was a way “to give employees an opportunity to make money” and “to 
encourage employee share ownership”, because it was believed this would focus 
employees on share price (an impact found in one of the five cases in company 9). Overall, 
plan managers were ambiguous when explaining why they had the plan in place and what 
they aimed to achieve by having it.  
 
Plan managers were more forthcoming when asked about the impact of the SAYE plan. 
For example, in company 7 it was believed employees that participated had a greater 
interest in company performance, were more committed at work, motivated, feel more job 
satisfaction, and a greater sense of responsibility. The company 8 plan manager believed 
that the SAYE plan made employees more interested in the company and its performance 
(found in two cases in company 8), and committed.  
 
7.8.2 How SAYE Participants Interpret Share Ownership and Assess its Impact  
 
Figure 13 addresses the research questions, displaying employees’ perceptions regarding 
whether participating in the SAYE plan satisfied the routes to PO at work, and/or PO 
towards anything within the organisation; and whether employees perceived an influence 
from the SAYE plan on how they felt and behaved at work, as well as the likelihood they 
would work for the company for longer.   
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E = Employee 
Company 7 (Red); company 8 (Blue); company 9 (Green)  
 
Figure 13. An Identification of how PO, and the Routes to PO, Featured in Employees’ Explanations of How 
SAYE Plan Participation had an Impact on their Attitudes and Behaviours at Work.   
 
Where employees did perceive such influences from the SAYE plan, Figure 13 is able to 
show whether they felt the impact worked through one of the routes to PO, or PO itself.  
In response to the research questions, Figure 13 will help question whether there is still 
reason to believe that PO and the routes are important feelings and experiences to consider 
when explaining how an SAYE plan can have an impact.   
 
7.8.3 The Impact of the SAYE Plan on the Routes to Psychological Ownership  
 
As seen in Figure 13, six employees felt the SAYE plan satisfied one of the routes to PO at 
work, giving them more control or knowledge. Like the SIP and the EMI scheme, the 
SAYE plan was not found to influence the investment of the self route. In five of these 
cases, employees felt that the SAYE plan satisfied the knowledge route, and led them to 
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understand more about the company, the share price, or its performance. In one of these 
cases, the SAYE plan was also felt to provide a feeling that the employee had some 
additional influence in the company. In all of these cases, as with the SIP and EMI, 
employees stated that they experienced these routes anyway, and the SAYE plan only 
added to these experiences in a small way.  
 
Experiencing an impact from the SAYE plan on a route did not mean that the employee 
would feel more PO at work, and in only two employees’ experiences was the SAYE plan 
found to influence both a route and a feeling of PO. Furthermore, where the SAYE plan 
was found to influence a route to PO, this did not mean that employees would also 
perceive there to also be impact from the SAYE plan on their attitudes towards the 
company or the way they behaved at work. Likewise, outcomes (PO or an attitude or 
behaviour) found resulting from the SAYE plan (as with the SIP and EMI) were evident 
without there also needing to be an impact on any routes, or any feelings of PO.  
 
Table 20 shows that the SAYE plan was only felt to have an impact on routes that 
employees believed were already being satisfied at work. These were satisfied by factors in 
the company that would exist without the SAYE plan. As with the SIP and EMI, the SAYE 
plan appeared only to add to the pre-existing experience of these routes. It can be 
concluded with regards to the routes that in some employees’ experiences, the SAYE plan 
did have a small impact, but was not felt to be the only source of control or knowledge; the 
routes were already being experienced.      
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Table 20. Routes of PO Employees Believed they Experienced at Work  
 
 The Control Route The Knowledge Route The Investment Route 
Employee Felt at work* SAYE Impact Felt at work* SAYE Impact Felt at work* SAYE Impact 
E25   No       No 
E26   No   No   No 
E27   No       No 
E28       No   No 
E29   No       No 
E30   No   No   No 
E31   No       No 
E32   No   No   No 
E33   No       No 
E34   No   No   No 
E35   No   No   No 
E36 No No   No   No 
E37 No No   No   No 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this route was experienced at work irrespective 
of their participation in the share plan. This route was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in 
some cases employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
 
The Control Route  
 
One employee (E28) did feel that the scheme had an impact on the control and influence he 
had at work, feeling that, although it was very small, the SAYE plan did provide some 
additional opportunity to influence. However, this influence, felt to be from having an 
AGM vote, was not felt to “influence things to a great deal”.  
 
Not all the employees had shares, some held share options. Those with shares, who had an 
AGM vote, did not feel they could have any impact on what the company did or how it did 
it. These employees felt a disconnection with what they did and how the share price 
moved, or felt they already had influence at work and the opportunity to participate in 
decision making (irrespective of whether they were a SAYE participant or shareholder).  
 
Knowledge Route  
 
All employees felt that they were interested in understanding the company, and the 
performance of the company, and that they sought information because of factors other 
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than the SAYE plan. Having an interest and knowledge of what the company was doing, 
its performance, and reasons for changes in performance, was something employees felt 
they were already inspired to seek information about.  
 
Five employees believed that participating in the SAYE plan had influenced their level of 
knowledge or interest in understanding the company, its’ performance, or the share price. 
As with other plans, this impact was not felt to be significant; these employees were 
already interested the company, its performance, and the share price.  
 
It can be seen from the responses that employees who did not feel their knowledge of the 
SAYE plan was good, did not believe that understanding it was a priority, and were 
confident they could obtain the information they felt they needed, when they believed they 
needed it. Knowledge of the SAYE plan was felt to be very good by the remaining 
employees, as was the communication of the SAYE plan.  
 
Investment of the Self Route  
 
As with the EMI and SIP interviews, employees participating in the SAYE plan provided 
little evidence to suggest that the plan led them to invest more of themselves into the 
organisation (e.g. to invest more of their skills, ideas, energy, time, effort or attention). In 
the three companies it appeared from responses that employees were investing themselves 
at work, and were motivated to invest their time, effort and attention by other factors, such 
as the variety and responsibilities their roles gave them, the responsibility it gave them and 
the sense of achievement.  
 
In many cases it was believed that the company operated the SAYE to give employees an 
opportunity to make money. Similarly, the SAYE plan was viewed by employees as a way 
to make money. Participating in the SAYE plan did not appear to relate in employees’ 
minds with the extent to which they invested their time, effort or energy. As found in the 
SIP and EMI responses, employees felt that the plan was separate in their minds, from 
what they did at work and from their attitudes towards the company.  
 
The lack of impact on this route (in this share plan and in others) was perhaps not 
surprising given that employees reported few instances of an impact on their performance. 
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Employees did not feel they worked differently, and stated that they would behave the 
same even if they were not participating in the SAYE plan. This was emphasised heavily in 
company 9, where it was explained that investing energy, effort and attention at work was 
particularly important at the moment because of the recent decline in the company’s 
fortunes.  
 
7.8.4 The Impact of the SAYE Plan on Psychological Ownership   
 
Psychological Ownership  
 
As shown in Table 21, all but two employees stated that they felt ownership at work, for 
reasons other than the SAYE plan. These employees felt that they would experience these 
feelings even if they were not participants, due to other causes. These included feeling 
proud to work for the company (E28, E30), because they had worked for the company for a 
long time (E34, E35), a feeling of task significance (E25, E37), responsibility (E25, E28, 
E30, E34, E36, E37), and because they felt engaged and loyal at work (E27).  
 
Table 21. Feelings of Company and Job Based PO at Work and Incidences Where the SAYE Plan 
Contributed to Feelings of PO  
Psychological Ownership 
Employee 
Company Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Company Based PO 
SAYE Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based PO 
SAYE Impact 
E25   No   No 
E26 No No No No 
E27   No No No 
E28   No     
E29       No 
E30 No No     
E31 No No   No 
E32 No No   No 
E33 No No No No 
E34         
E35     No   
E36   No   No 
E37   No No No 
 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that PO was experienced at work irrespective of their 
participation in the share plan. PO was often felt to be satisfied by other causes at work – in some cases 
employees felt the ESO plan added to this.  
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Feeling that the routes were satisfied did not mean that feelings of PO would automatically 
follow. Where the SAYE plan did impact a route, the presence of PO (already experienced 
or influenced by the SAYE plan) was also not guaranteed to exist. Conversely, some 
employees experienced an impact from the SAYE plan on PO, or already felt PO at work, 
but did not experience an impact from the EMI scheme on any routes.  
 
As found in the previous chapters when observing other share plan data (SIP and EMI 
findings), it cannot be inferred from this that the SAYE plan does not need to satisfy the 
routes for PO to emerge. It can be concluded however that employees do not necessarily 
have to feel that the routes are satisfied by the SAYE plan in order for them to feel the 
SAYE plan contributes to feelings of PO.  
 
As with the SIP and EMI findings, it can be concluded with regards to PO (as with the 
routes to PO) that the SAYE plan did not provide anything new. Instead, in a few cases it 
added to PO already felt over the company (E29, E34, E35) or the employees’ job (E28, 
E30, E34, E35). Three of the five employees who felt the SAYE plan had an impact on 
feelings of PO, did not feel the SAYE plan satisfied any of the routes to PO and it was 
clear from responses that the impact was not felt to be working through any routes.  
 
Five employees felt the SAYE plan enhanced their feelings of PO but did not express this 
as being significant. In one case (E29) this was found to work through the knowledge 
route, specifically, because of the enhanced interest and knowledge the employee had in 
understanding the company and share price.  
 
In the other cases it was difficult for employees to be specific about why the SAYE plan 
had been able to influence their feeling of ownership at work, but they were confident in 
stating that it was because they were participating in the plan. In some cases this was 
affected by the amount of ownership the employee held as a result of being in the SAYE 
plan. There was however, no evidence to suggest that the SAYE plan had this impact by 
working through any of the routes to PO, (as a result of satisfying the control, knowledge 
or investment routes), or any other feeling or behaviour also influenced by the SAYE plan. 
It tended to be more closely related to the “fact” (participation per se) that the employee 
was in the plan.  
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It could be argued that the SAYE plan alone, or saving money in the SAYE plan and 
owning share options, was not enough to create a feeling of ownership. Eight of the 
thirteen employees stated that the SAYE plan had no influence on their feelings of PO. 
Reasons for the SAYE plan not having an impact on PO tended to relate to employees’ 
belief that feelings of ownership were a result of “other things”, the SAYE plan was 
“purely and simply an investment” and because PO was already felt prior to SAYE plan 
participation.  
 
7.8.5 The Impact of the SAYE Plan on Employee Attitudes and Behaviours at Work  
 
Attitudes and Behaviours: Commitment; Motivation; Job Satisfaction; and Performance  
 
In most cases, outcomes were experienced without the employee stating that this worked 
through anything that had also been influenced by the SAYE plan, such as the routes to 
PO, or through PO itself. It can be concluded that more employees interviewed in company 
7 reported an impact from the SAYE plan on their attitudes, behaviours and relationship 
with their employer, than those interviewed in company 8 or 9. 
 
In company 7 there were a wide range of outcomes reported. Employees reported feeling 
“more secure” at work, more “loyal”, “engaged”, committed”, a greater sense of belonging 
and a greater “feeling of responsibility”. As well as these positive outcomes, the only 
negative outcome of the SAYE was also found in company 7. In one case (E25) 
participating in the SAYE plan did not meet the employees’ expectations, and left the 
employee feeling that he “trusted” senior management less, blaming them, in part, for the 
declining performance of the company. The recent decline in share price had made the 
employee feel that whether or not he was a shareholder or option holder, he was unable to 
influence share price performance. This employee also reported no SAYE plan impact on 
his life at work. The outcomes of the SAYE plan can be seen in Table 22 (below).  
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Table 22. The Impact of the SAYE Scheme in Relation to Employees’ Experiences of the Routes to PO, and PO, at Work 
 
 The Control Route 
The Knowledge 
Route 
The Investment 
Route 
Psychological Ownership 
Retention 
of Staff 
Attitudes and 
Behaviours 
 
Felt at 
work* 
SAYE 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
SAYE 
Impact 
Felt at 
work* 
SAYE 
Impact 
Company 
Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Company 
Based PO 
SAYE Impact 
Job Based PO 
Felt at work* 
Job Based PO 
SAYE Impact 
SAYE 
Impact 
SAYE Impact 
E25   No       No   No   No   
(Negative) 
Less trustful of 
management 
E26   No   No   No No No No No   
A more secure 
feeling 
E27   No       No   No No No   
Loyalty to the 
Company 
More engaged 
Commitment 
Motivation 
E28       No   No   No       
A sense of 
belonging. 
A sense of 
responsibility 
Motivation 
E29   No       No       No   Commitment 
E30   No   No   No No No       Commitment 
E31   No       No No No   No No No 
E32   No   No   No No No   No   No 
E33   No       No No No No No   
Commitment 
Engaged. 
E34   No   No   No       
  No No 
E35   No   No   No     No   No No 
E36 No No   No   No   No   No No No 
E37 No No   No   No   No No No No No 
*Felt at work: This indicates whether the employee felt that this (route, feeling of PO, or outcome) was experienced at work irrespective of their participation in the share 
plan.  
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As Table 22 shows, outside of company 7 few employees reported an impact on an 
outcome as a result of SAYE participation. In company 9 in particular, a recent decline in 
share price was felt to be more influential than the SAYE plan in making them more 
interested in working hard and committing to the company, in order to keep their jobs. In 
company 8, employees appeared to differentiate between share options and shares, and felt 
that there was a difference in how they felt, depending on which of the two they owned. 
Being a shareholder (as opposed to saving money in the SAYE plan, and technically being 
an option holder) was felt to have a greater impact. Furthermore, the plan was viewed 
primarily, as a saving scheme in these cases (rather than as a mechanism to own shares), 
and was not felt to be something that could, or did, influence their day to day life. This was 
in contrast to company 7, where employees seemed more optimistic that the company 
share price could rise, and in many of these cases, employees had experience of making 
money from the SAYE plan.  
 
No SAYE participants in any of the companies felt that there had been an impact on their 
performance, explaining that they performed well, and worked hard, without SAYE plan 
participation. With regards to the limited impact, on both attitudes and behaviours, it was 
found that some employees felt that if they do not feel they have an influence over the 
company, its performance, and ultimately, the share price, and if the plan does not have an 
influence on day to day life, then it would be difficult for any share plan to impact the way 
employees felt and behaved at work.  
 
When asked specifically about the amount of time the employees would work for the 
company, eight of the thirteen employees felt that participating in the SAYE plan would 
make them more likely to work for the company for longer. All employees answered based 
on whether they felt they would make money from the SAYE plan, and in some cases (four 
of the five cases in company 9), employees did not feel their holdings were worth very 
much. Where the impact was positive, this was not found to work through the routes to PO, 
or through any feeling of PO. Instead, it seemed the SAYE plan was helping retain those 
employees who felt they could make money.  
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
A review of the research literature led the researcher to develop a loose conceptual 
framework drawn from largely positivist analyses of PO and ESO. This framework was 
then translated into a set of interpretivist research questions which were used to trace 
through with interviewees their experiences of ESO and the impact they felt ESO had. In 
doing this, the researcher explored whether these causal models, derived from positivist 
research, can be observed in the way people explain for themselves their own reactions to 
ESO. In this study, the key focus of the research questions has been to try and understand 
the role that feelings of ownership (PO) may play in employees’ own interpretations of 
ESO. 
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have presented the results of semi-structured interviews in nine 
different companies. During the interviews the researcher explored the perceptions of 37 
employees participating in different types of ESO plan, as well as the views of an ESO 
plan manager in each of these companies. The results chapters presented what interviewees 
believed had happened in different cases – including situations in which ESO was felt to 
have an impact, but also when it was not.  
 
By simplifying the ESO outcomes found and presenting them in table form, it is possible to 
display a basic comparison of ESO’s impact when interviewing employees in the three 
different ESO plans. The table shows where, based on employees’ own interpretations, 
each route was most frequently found to be satisfied by ESO. This table can be seen below.  
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Area s of ESO Impact: as reported 
by employees during interviews 
SIP  
(12 employees 
interviewed) 
EMI  
(12 employees 
interviewed) 
SAYE  
(13 employees 
interviewed) 
From 37 
employee 
interviews 
The control route
4
 1 1 1 3 
The intimate knowledge route
5
 6 3 5 14 
The investment of the self route
6
 0 0 0 0 
Company based PO 2 3 3 8 
Job based PO  0 2 4 6 
Commitment 2 3 4 9 
Motivation 0 4 2 6 
Job satisfaction 1 1 0 2 
Valued 1 3 0 4 
Recognition 0 3 0 3 
Trusted 0 3 0 3 
Sense of belonging 0 1 1 2 
Sense of purpose 0 1 0 1 
Feeling of stability/ security 0 1 1 2 
Engaged 0 1 2 3 
Loyalty 0 0 1 1 
Sense of responsibility 0 0 1 1 
Performance 0 2 0 2 
Time spent employed in company 6 4 8 18 
Less trustful (negative) 0 0 1 1 
 
Table 23. Employees’ Interpretations of ESO’s Impact: A Plan by Plan Comparison  
 
Although the table needs to be interpreted with caution, as it overlooks the detail and 
nuance employees provided in their interview responses, it does highlight a number of 
contrasts that can be made within the findings – which, using employees’ explanations, 
will be further explored in this chapter.  
 
Caution needs to be taken in the interpretation of comparisons from this table. For 
example, the table does not indicate that the SIP (in this study or more generally) has less 
impact than the other plans. Instead, it indicates only that in the experiences of the SIP 
individuals interviewed, and from their own interpretations of how they have felt and 
behaved since participating, the SIP was not felt (in the cases were this was stated) to have 
caused an impact. It also indicates that the findings of this study provide relatively more 
insight into situations in which, for example, the SIP was not felt to have an impact, than 
when it was felt to do so. It may be that the lack of perceived overall impact from the SIP 
compared to the other plans, tells us something about the SIP’s impact, which may or may 
not be representative of something which is happening on a larger scale. However, this 
                                                     
4 The amount of control/influence an employee has over a particular organizational factor  
5 The extent to which the employee intimately knows a particular organizational factor 
6 The extent to which an individual employee invests themselves  into their work/or a particular organizational factor 
275 
 
study has not aimed to produce representative findings and it would be difficult to claim 
these findings as being typical in all (or most) companies with ESO plans.    
 
This chapter will address the research questions, by drawing on employees’ explanations 
(as presented in the findings chapters), to discuss some of the striking differences found 
both within and between plans. The findings from this study will be discussed in the 
context of the research literature, and will be used to consider the extent to which the 
causal mechanisms of ESO and PO, depicted in the research literature, are authentic to the 
experience of the interviewees. The chapter will lead to conclusions of how this study 
contributes to existing theories of ESO’s impact and the current body of knowledge 
available to researchers.  
 
8.2 The Relationship Between ESO and the Routes to PO  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) believed that there were many parts of their model of ESO and PO 
(especially the core – i.e. the relationships between ESO and PO) which were applicable to 
a variety of ESO situations. Different types or forms of ownership, according to Pierce et 
al. (1991) may moderate the relationship between ESO and the degree to which the 
employee develops feelings of PO at work. To explore this proposition, this study has 
focused on the relationship between three different ESO plans operating in the UK, and the 
routes proposed to lead to PO.  
 
As seen in the literature review, it was suggested that an ESO arrangement constructed 
around equity, information, and influence (ownership rights) more or less parallels the 
three routes to PO (see Pierce et al., 2004; Chi and Han., 2008) – and that ESO can 
therefore, based on theory, satisfy the PO routes and lead to feelings of PO at work. 
However, as highlighted in the literature review, little empirical evidence is available that 
helps indicate how and when this is likely to happen.  
 
Theoretical links between ESO and PO detailed in the literature were, in the most part, 
developed based on the US ESOP model and were based on the findings from majority 
owned firms (as opposed to mainstream ESO) in the USA and Canada. The literature 
review showed how the US ESOP differs from UK plans such as the SAYE, SIP or EMI, 
but that at their core, they all potentially lead to employee share (or stock) ownership. It 
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seems plausible that UK plans such as the SAYE, SIP or EMI (mainstream ESO plans) 
may fit into the models presented in the literature (e.g. Pierce et al.’s, 1991 model), 
especially since the three right/routes, according to theory (see Pierce et al., 2003: 95), do 
not all necessarily have to be satisfied by ESO in order for PO to develop. Theoretically it 
makes sense that the principle of share ownership may be enough, irrespective of how that 
ownership is obtained, to provide all or some of the ownership rights to some degree in 
order to satisfy the routes to PO, contribute to feelings of PO, and consequently have an 
impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviours. The following sections of this chapter will 
discuss the findings for the three plans with specific focus on the relationship between ESO 
and the routes to PO. 
 
8.3 What are Employees’ Perceptions Regarding Whether Participating In An ESO 
Plan Satisfies The Three Routes To Po At Work?  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that ESO could provide certain rights, and these rights – 
suggested to mirror the routes to PO - were considered to be important factors in allowing 
ESO to lead to feelings of PO. Many of the employees interviewed owned shares, held 
share options, had voting rights or had been participating in different plans within the 
company for a number of years. Yet few said that participating in the plan or being a 
shareholder gave them more control or had caused them to invest more attention, effort, 
time or energy into what they did at work.  
 
With regards to ESO’s impact on the control route, where this impact was found (in 3 of 
the 37 interviews)
7
, it was only found in cases where employees felt they were already 
experiencing a feeling of control or influence at work, for example, over a certain 
responsibility, team of people or department. ESO was not seen to create feelings of 
control or influence over anything employees did not already experience influence over to 
some degree.  
 
In the three cases where this impact was found, there did not seem to be any obvious trends 
with regards to any one plan, job role or level of seniority. Two of the three employees 
reporting an impact on the control route believed that as a result of being an ESO 
                                                     
7 SIP: E3; EMI: E16; SAYE: E28. 
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participant they had voting rights which, in a small way, gave them more influence. 
However, when questioned further, these employees were unable to elaborate on what they 
felt they had more influence over or what they had been able to influence. One employee 
(E16) provided an alternative explanation, stating that because managers within the 
company knew he was an EMI employee, he was afforded more of a voice and was 
listened to more. However, the employee was again unable to provide examples of when 
and how this had materialised.  
 
Across all plans, the lack of evidence provided in explaining this relationship and 
employees’ emphasis that this was a “small impact” that “would not change things a great 
deal” (E28), gave the researcher a strong overall impression that employees’ interpreted no 
significant impact from ESO on this route. Furthermore, employees also felt that 
participating in the ESO plan did not lead them to desire more control or influence at work. 
 
With regards to the extent to which employees felt they invested themselves into their 
work/or a particular organizational factor (reflected in the energy, time, effort, and 
attention employees felt they invested: See Marx, 1976; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton, 1981), all employees felt that they were already doing this as much as they could, 
and that the ESO plans did not cause any changes. Of all the routes, this seemed to be the 
one in which employees were most confident in concluding there was no impact. As found 
in many other areas of this study, including in the control and knowledge route findings, 
for many employees the ESO plan was, in their minds, felt to be “separate” from what they 
did at work. This was found across all three plans (SAYE, SIP and EMI).  
 
Findings did however uncover some interesting factors which employees felt prevented the 
ESO plan from influencing the amount of energy, time, effort, and attention they invested 
into their jobs and work life. Employees in C1, for example, felt they invested themselves 
into their work because they felt a lot of task significance, wanted an ethical job, and 
because they liked the company’s ethical goals. Likewise, in C5 the biological research 
employees were conducting into illnesses provided task significance, which, rather than 
ESO, was felt to be the primary cause of the investment of the self route. In C2, a company 
which had recently experienced difficult times and came close to being delisted, employees 
felt that by participating in the SIP they were showing their belief in the company’s 
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recovery. Other factors such as the size of the company and flexible working hours were 
also felt to be more effective at influencing this route.   
 
Of all the routes, the area of greatest impact was found to be on the knowledge route, 
where a number of employees (14 of 37) felt that because they were an SAYE, SIP or EMI 
participant they sought more information about the company, its’ performance, and the 
share price. It was also clear that employees who could envisage making some money 
eventually from the plan (particularly employees in C2 and C4), seemed more likely to feel 
that their interest in understanding the company, what the company was doing 
strategically, and the reasons for changes in share price had increased. Employees were 
interested in knowing when the best time to sell shares would be, how much profit the 
company was making and how much money they were likely to make from the ESO plan. 
ESO’s impact on this route seemed to be a result of employees seeking more information 
themselves, rather than being more knowledgeable or interested as a result of being given 
information they were legally entitled to as ESO participants or as a shareholder.  
 
Employees in Tucker et al.’s (1989: 38) study viewed the ESOP as “an aspect of their 
workplace about which they care a great deal”, yet when queried about the specifics of the 
plan, few were knowledgeable (Tucker et al. 1989: 38). Similarly, in this study employees’ 
knowledge and understanding of how the ESO plan worked was not always felt to be good, 
but this did not mean employees wanted to understand more. The feeling employees had, 
that they did not understand ESO, clearly did not stop them participating. Most employees 
stated that they did not feel they needed to understand the ESO plan well because they 
were not intending to sell shares at the moment, and the plan was something to think about 
in the future. Employees stated that they would become interested in the plan when they 
were able to “do something” with their shares/options; when they needed to know how 
much their shares were worth, if they were leaving the company or if there was a change to 
the plan. Employees tended to feel that the long term nature of ESO made the fact that they 
were participating in it easy to forget about. However, despite this lack of ESO knowledge, 
and as in Tucker et al.’s (1989) study, ESO was still able to lead to some (albeit perceived 
as small) changes in attitudes (as seen in later sections of this chapter).  
 
From this study, there is evidence to say that the SAYE, SIP and EMI plans provided some 
of the ownership rights and satisfied some of the routes to PO (as described by Pierce et al. 
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1991), but only in some cases. Furthermore, there was little evidence to infer that one plan 
was more effective at satisfying any particular route than another. It can also be concluded 
that, contrary to O’Driscoll et al.’s (2006) suggestion, when one route was found to be 
satisfied by ESO this was not found to lead to the other routes being satisfied. Overall most 
employees experienced little or no impact on the routes to PO. One question the findings 
therefore raise is why, in a large number of the interviews, the ESO plans being studied 
were not felt to satisfy the routes to PO (particularly the control and investment of the self 
route), as proposed in the literature? (E.g. See Pierce et al. 1991; Pierce et al. 2004a; Chi 
and Han, 2008).  
 
8.3.1 The Routes to PO: ESO’s Impact  
 
Two main explanations of ESO’s lack of impact on the routes can be identified from 
employees’ responses. The first relates to what the employees felt they were already 
experiencing at work, and how they would behave if they were not an ESO participant. 
Employees felt in a lot of cases that the opportunities to influence at work, obtain 
information, seek understanding of what was “going on”, and the energy, effort, time and 
attention they invested, were a result of other factors. For example, with regards to the 
knowledge route, the impact was often described as small. Employees were often quick to 
highlight that other factors at work also influenced the knowledge route, such as for 
example, in C2 the threat of the company being delisted in the previous year. 
 
Where the ESO plan was not felt to have an impact on the control or knowledge route, 
employees stated that they were already involved at high levels, their jobs already required 
them to have a good knowledge of what was “going on”, some autonomy and a certain 
amount of responsibility. Employees also felt they would want to seek knowledge and 
understanding of issues relating to the company and their jobs, and would want to be 
involved and participate in decisions “anyway”. In C9, more so than any of the other 
companies in this study, the share price had taken quite a dramatic fall in the previous few 
years. Following this, employees felt they needed to be interested in what was going on 
within the company (irrespective of SAYE participation) and working hard to keep their 
jobs.  
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The second possible explanation of why ESO was found to have little impact on the routes 
to PO concerned the perception that ESO is predominantly an opportunity to invest and 
make money. It is clear from the findings (and as seen in the following sections) that many 
employees viewed ESO as a mechanism to make financial profit. Employees’ expectations 
of what they wanted to gain from the ESO plan and their attitudes towards it appeared to 
reflect this – and possibly, if consistent with French’s (1987) analysis, limited ESO’s 
impact.   
 
French (1987: 432) argued that “when ownership is treated by employee shareholders as an 
investment, it makes little sense to assume that shareholding invariably increases 
employees' desires for influence”. The present study found that ESO did not inspire 
employees to want more control or influence – and was, in a lot of cases, primarily viewed 
as an opportunity to make money, or in some cases, save money.   
 
French (1987: 432) also claimed that employees would feel content with whatever level of 
PDM they experienced before ESO participation, “as long as the returns on their 
investments are satisfactory”. If dissatisfied, it was suggested that employees would seek 
more opportunities to influence and participate in decisions in order to address the 
inadequate financial returns. However, in contrast to this suggestion and as later sections of 
this chapter explain, in C5 and C6 it was particularly clear that employees felt they were 
unlikely to make money from the plan – yet there was no evidence that these employees, or 
any others, wanted more influence at work or more opportunities to participate in 
decisions.  
 
An obvious way ESO might be felt to satisfy the control route would be through the 
opportunity to vote. However, the ESO plans (in 34 of the 37 employees’ accounts) were 
not believed to have been able to affect the control route – including in cases where ESO 
provided voting rights. There were a number of employees who recognised they had voting 
rights as a shareholder but few viewed this as an opportunity to influence. Employees’ 
reasons for this tended to relate to the feeling that even if they could vote, it would have 
little or no influence – employees did not feel they had control over the financial outcome 
of the plan and attributed this to its lack of impact on this route.  
 
281 
 
Similar barriers appeared to prevent the knowledge route from being satisfied. For 
example, in C5 and C6, where no impact at all was reported for this route, there was a lot 
of disillusionment felt with the EMI plan – which seemed to invoke more responses 
relating to why the EMI plan had not, and would be unlikely to have, such an impact. 
Typical responses from employees were that the EMI plan was unlikely to provide a 
financial return; that the length of time to wait before being able to exercise shares was too 
long; they felt they could not influence the share price; and there was a feeling that the 
company’s share price was unlikely to rise.  
 
The lack of impact on the routes may be a result of the plans being unable (or not being 
perceived to) provide the characteristics of ownership (equity, information and influence). 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that the employees interviewed did not expect to have 
these rights when participating in the plans in this study – employees did not desire more 
control as ESO participants, did not feel they needed any additional information about the 
company and expressed their preference to sell shares if they could, rather than become 
shareholders.  
 
As seen in later sections, despite many theoretical suggestions in the research literature 
(e.g. Pierce et al. 1991; 2001; 2003; Pierce et al. 2004a; Mayhew et al. 2007) these (small) 
changes on the PO routes, as a result of ESO, did not seem to translate into feelings of PO, 
or changes in employees’ performance.  
 
8.4 To what extent and how, do employees feel participating in an ESO plan 
influenced their feelings of PO at work?  
 
Pierce et al. (1991) proposed that the operationalisation of ESO, an objectively defined 
state, through high levels of equity possession, information sharing, and influence is (by 
working through the routes to PO) positively and causally related to PO. According to 
Pierce et al. (1991: 127), the extent to which ESO satisfies the routes to PO is likely to 
influence the degree to which the psychological state of ownership is created. However, it 
is unclear from the research literature the extent to which the ESO plan needs to provide 
these rights, or whether one route is more important (or has stronger effects) than another, 
in order to cause or contribute to PO at work.   
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Studies in the research literature have found that PO can emerge without ESO, suggesting 
that the routes can be satisfied elsewhere in the organization (e.g. Chi and Han, 2008; 
O’Driscoll et al. 2006). This raises the question of whether ESO needs to provide all of 
these rights, in order for it to satisfy the routes, influence employees’ feelings of PO and 
lead to changes in attitudes and behaviours at work.  
 
Overall, a greater number of employees felt that ESO had no impact on their feelings of 
PO (27 employees), compared with those who did (10 employees). All plans were found to 
have some impact on PO in some cases. In cases where the ESO plan had an impact on 
feelings of PO, few employees were able to provide detailed explanations of how ESO had 
led to such a state of mind; and the changes in feelings of PO were typically described as 
being “slight” or “small”. There was little evidence (from any of the plans) to suggest 
(contrary to the literature) that ESO’s impact on PO worked through any of the routes to 
PO. Only one employee (E29) felt able to state that there was some impact on his feelings 
of ownership over the company as a whole, and that his enhanced interest in understanding 
why the share price was changing led to a feeling of PO. In this case there was some 
evidence that the influence from the SAYE Plan was working through the knowledge 
route.  
 
Although the three routes can be seen in employees’ explanations of why they felt PO, not 
all employees who felt PO at work (irrespective of ESO’s impact) believed that all three 
routes were satisfied at work (by ESO or any anything else)
8
. The data therefore supports 
the suggestions made in the literature that PO can develop without all three routes being 
satisfied at work (see Pierce et al. 2003: 95; VandeWalle et al. 1995; Van Dyne et al. 
2004).   
 
Pierce et al. (2003: 96) acknowledged that it was not clear whether some routes are more 
effective at generating PO than others, but speculated that “the routes of control and the 
investment of the self in the target have the potential to be most effective”. Pierce et al. 
(2004) also suggested that if the control route is not addressed, PO may not be influenced 
by ESO. However, the findings in this study offer little support for the need for ESO to 
                                                     
8 SIP: E1, SAYE: E36, E37.  
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satisfy any routes at all. In six employees’ experience, ESO affected feelings of PO without 
affecting any of the routes.  
 
Furthermore, when examining the relationship found between ESO and PO, it can be 
concluded that the findings cast some doubt on Pierce et al.’s (2004) statement that the 
effects of ownership may not be realised when management creates an equity based 
ownership arrangement without also addressing the information and influence dimensions 
of ownership
9
. Clearly, there were a number of cases where employees did not feel that 
ESO satisfied the control or knowledge route, but still felt ESO had an impact on PO.  
 
It has been acknowledged in the research literature that the target of ownership may 
develop for a wide range of things, both intangible and tangible. Pierce et al. (2003:94) 
stated that whilst “there have been many attempts to identify the targets to which 
individuals become psychologically tied” there does not appear to be a “theory of 
ownership targets.” Currently, there is no generally accepted classification scheme 
regarding what employees feel possession over. Employees in this study did not find it 
easy to differentiate between ownership targets, and often were unable to be any more 
specific than to say they felt ownership over the company as a whole, or their job. In some 
cases employees were able to elaborate and identify certain projects, responsibilities, 
teams, or achievements, but few were able to be so specific.  
 
In line with theoretical suggestions in the research literature (Pierce et al. 1991), it may be 
that ESO’s inability to have any major impact on the routes to PO may be one barrier 
preventing ESO influencing feelings of PO. The major purpose of O’Driscoll et al.’s 
(2006) study was to explore the possibility that PO (of the job and the organisation) can 
function as an intervening variable between work environment conditions and employee 
attitudes and behaviours. Like Pierce et al. (2004b), O’Driscoll et al. (2006) proposed that 
in an unstructured work environment, the employee will develop a closer and more 
intimate association with the job and the organisation – resulting in PO. This was 
explained to occur because there is less structure telling the employee when and how to 
perform. The data shows that the majority of employees provided evidence that the 
                                                     
9 Pierce et al. (1991), in their discussion of ESO, hypothesized that the psychological state of ownership was more likely 
to be created when the ESO arrangement is designed and operated such that it reinforced the full complement of 
ownership rights and meets ownership expectations.    
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organisations in which they worked provided them with autonomy, some freedom to make 
decisions and an opportunity to have some influence at work - at least within their 
department or area of work. The lack of impact on PO from ESO may reflect the 
possibility that in these companies, the low levels of work environment structure (as 
suggested by Pierce et al. 2004b, and O’Driscoll et al. 2006) were satisfying one or more 
of the routes – or at least contributing to the development of PO in some way. The data 
supports the possibility that other factors, such as these, were influencing the process 
leading to PO – in effect, replacing ESO in Pierce et al.’s (1991) model of ESO.   
 
As seen in the findings chapters, employees themselves provided a number of alternative 
explanations as to why ESO had not affected the three routes. Following the work of 
French (1987) and Hammer and Stern (1980), Pierce et al. (1991) proposed in his model 
that the degree to which employees approach employee ownership with primarily an 
investment expectation (seeing ownership from an instrumental perspective) will weaken 
the relationship between formal and psychological ownership. There is however, little 
empirical research available to indicate whether a financial orientation to ESO can restrict 
ESO’s impact on PO, or other attitudes or behaviours at work. 
 
In support of the propositions made by French (1987), Hammer and Stern (1980) and 
Pierce et al. (1991), the findings in this study provided evidence that in some cases, 
employees’ financial interest in ESO may have acted as a barrier preventing ESO from 
influencing feelings of PO. A number of employees felt for example, that the small number 
of shares they held prevented the SIP from having an impact on feelings of PO, and that 
their share options were not worth enough to have an impact. Others felt that the long wait 
before being able to exercise their options meant the plan did not create or add to feelings 
of PO. The long wait was felt to prevent this impact because in these situations, employees 
believed they were unlikely to have any ownership that would be converted into a financial 
return.  
 
In a number of cases where there was not felt to be an impact on PO, employees also stated 
that, prior to ESO participation; they were already experiencing a feeling of PO at work. 
This finding highlights something so far overlooked in the ESO/PO literature - the 
importance of understanding employees’ feelings of PO prior to ESO participation, and the 
possibility that ESO’s impact may be limited by the impact of ‘other things’ on the 
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development and satisfaction of routes to PO. As seen in the following sections, 
employees’ feelings prior to, and irrespective of, ESO were also used to explain why ESO 
did not have any significant impact on existing attitudes and behaviours.  
 
8.5 Do employees feel that the creation of a psychology of ownership is an important 
part of how ESO has an impact on their attitudes and behaviours?  
 
8.5.1 PO and Commitment  
 
As chapter 3 shows, overall the research literature does not suggest with any certainty the 
factors (a large number have been proposed with mixed findings) which moderate the 
relationships between ESO and outcomes such as commitment, motivation or performance. 
Whilst the routes to PO have been proposed repeatedly in the literature, PO is context 
specific (Mayhew et al. 2007) and exactly how and when different routes need to be 
satisfied in order for PO to develop and lead to positive changes has only been explored 
empirically in part. Many parts of the models presented in Pierce et al.’s published work 
are yet to be explored. This study aimed to contribute insights into how ESO may or may 
not (as suggested in the research literature) relate to PO and have an impact on employees 
at work.  
 
In 2007, Sengupta, et al. recognised that a majority of studies report a positive impact of 
ESO on participants commitment levels (e.g. Long, 1978; Pendleton, 2001; Pendleton et 
al., 1998; Long, 1980; Buchko, 1992; Tucker et al., 1989; Brandes et al. 2003) – and as in 
these studies, support was found for an impact on commitment in this study. Although an 
impact was found, this was found only in nine cases (from 37)
10
.  
 
The commitment described by almost all employees (except one) resembled Mayhew et al. 
(2007) and Allen and Meyer's (1990) 8-item measure of continuance commitment. In this 
type of commitment, employees make an assessment of the cost associated with leaving 
the organisation. This is in contrast to affective commitment (found in E1), characterized 
by positive feelings of identification with, attachment to, and involvement in, the 
organization (as reflected in VandeWalle et al. 1995 and Meyer and Allen’s, 1984 affective 
commitment scales). The opportunity to save money, favourable ESO terms (e.g. matching 
                                                     
10 SIP: E1, E9; EMI: E13, E14, E16; SAYE: E27, E29, E30, E33. 
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rate in the SIP, and free shares, expectations that they would be employed long enough to 
exercise the options and make some money), tax savings, the belief that the plan could 
produce a financial return, and the fact that they had put their own money into the plan, 
were cited as explanations of how ESO had an impact on continuance commitment. In 
general, the feeling was that the plan had made these employees more committed because 
they believed they might make money.  
 
Contrary to Pierce et al.’s (1991) model of ESO (and other theories of PO e.g. Van Dyne et 
al. 2004; O’ Driscoll et al. 2006; Mayhew et al. 2007) employees in almost all cases did 
not attribute attitudinal impact (including commitment) from the ESO plan to feelings of 
PO at work. In only one case (E1) ESO’s impact on commitment (in this case an affective 
commitment) and feeling that she was more valued at work, was felt to have worked 
through another ESO impact, company based PO.  Furthermore, contrary to predictions in 
the literature and as found with ESO’s impact on the routes to PO, and on PO, ESO’s 
impact (as seen in later sections) was not found to convert into behaviours – it did not 
accompany any change for example, in how hard employees felt they worked, or in 
perceptions of changes in their own performance. 
 
8.5.2 PO, Motivation and Satisfaction  
 
Employee motivation has not been tested as an outcome of PO in any known empirical 
study of PO defined by possession, and has been theorised in few PO studies. As well as 
suggesting that ESO would lead to greater job satisfaction, Pierce et al. (1991) also 
suggested the simple perception of gains and losses associated with the employees’ current 
or future equity, as well as their influence and informational rights, may have a 
motivational effect. Six employees felt there was an impact on their feelings of motivation 
at work
11
 and only two employees felt more job satisfaction, as a result of participating in 
an ESO plan
12
.  
 
With regard to satisfaction, VandeWalle et al. (1995) found that that overall satisfaction 
and PO for the organization had a moderately strong, positive relationship, and Van Dyne 
et al. (2004) also found a positive relationship between PO for the organization and job 
                                                     
11 EMI: E13, E14, E15, E16; SAYE: E27, E28.  
12 SIP: E12; SAYE: E18. 
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satisfaction. Since only two employees felt greater levels of satisfaction, and both did not 
relate this to PO, it is difficult to conclude that this study offers a lot of support for findings 
in the literature relating to ESO’s impact on employee satisfaction.  
 
Where satisfaction was felt to be influenced by ESO, this resembled extrinsic job 
satisfaction (see Locke, 1976; Odom et al. 1990). Satisfaction in these cases derived from 
the rewards given to the individual (in the form of share options) by the organisation. 
Furthermore, rather than acting as a motivation to perform better, the motivational impact 
from ESO was reflected in an enhanced desire to be employed within the company. In all 
of these cases (where an outcome was found on feelings of motivation or satisfaction) 
employees indicated that the impact was caused by the possibility that they might be able 
to make a financial return, and it was this that caused them to want to be at work, want to 
be employed in this company or feel satisfied with the possibility of financial gain.  
 
Employees’ financial orientation and the impact this was found to have on continuance 
commitment, motivation and extrinsic satisfaction, reflects some of the findings in the 
research literature. Dewe et al. (1988: 19) for example, found that if the scheme turns out 
to be financially rewarding, “these conditions seem to offer a greater potential for more 
widespread attitudinal change to follow”. Of Klein’s (1987) three models of ESO, the 
findings also relate most closely to the extrinsic model – the theory that ownership leads to 
attitudinal and behavioural change because it is financially rewarding. However, in 
contrast to Klein’s study, rather than the ESO plan being financially rewarding, it was 
employees’ expectations that it would be, which led to an impact. Furthermore, this was 
also felt to restrict ESO’s impact - employees who did not feel an impact from ESO (on 
commitment, satisfaction or motivation at work) often felt that they could not make a 
financial return (due to the terms of the plan or the feeling that the share price would not 
rise) or felt they did not have enough shares or options for the plan to have an impact. 
Given the importance employees attributed to the financial return, the potential importance 
of the size of the employees’ ownership share may also be of importance. Klein (1987) for 
example, found that the size of the company contribution to an ESOP was significantly 
positively related to employee ESOP satisfaction and organizational commitment and 
significantly negatively related to turnover intention. This reflects a number of employee 
responses which suggested that for ESO to have a greater impact (on attitudes and the 
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amount of time they would stay employed in the company – see later sections of this 
chapter), they would have to have a lot more shares.  
 
Klein’s (1987) intrinsic satisfaction model suggests that ownership per se is sufficient to 
bring about attitudinal and behavioural change. Klein (1987) and Buchko (1992) concluded 
that the intrinsic model of ESO is of limited use in explaining ownership - attitude 
relationships. Whilst this model played little part in employees’ explanations, what can be 
seen in the findings is an impact from what appears to be the gesture of offering employees 
the opportunity to participate in an ESO plan. This seemed most strong in C1, where 
employees interpreted the offer of shares to be an acknowledgement of the ethical passion 
they shared with the company. Similar findings can be seen in C4, where employees were 
unexpectedly selected and given share options– and consequently made to feel valued and 
important to the company. Rather than ESO per se (Klein’s intrinsic satisfaction model), 
the offer to participate in ESO; being given free shares or options and the message 
interpreted by this gesture, may help explain how ESO can have a variety of effects (e.g. 
feeling valued, trusted, sense of purpose, belonging, recognition). This does not appear to 
have been considered in any depth in studies of ESO’s impact. It was stated by Kuvaas 
(2003) that a lack of support for direct effects of ESO does not exclude the possibility that 
ownership may generate more favourable attitudes toward the company, over and beyond 
what the instrumental and extrinsic effects can account for. Whilst Kuvaas does not refer to 
this finding specifically, it may be that considering how employees perceive the 
opportunity to participate in ESO (sometimes perceived as a gesture or a gift from the 
company) is one way to explain ESO’s effects without relying on the instrumental and 
extrinsic models of ESO.  
 
8.5.3 Retaining Employees  
 
If the impact in a lot of these cases was about making a financial return, it would make 
some sense that this may translate into an impact on the amount of time employees felt 
they would stay employed in the company. This appeared to be the case, about half of the 
employees interviewed (spread across all three plans) felt that the ESO plan would 
influence the amount of time they would stay employed in the company.  
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In C1, even where employees seemed less motivated by money and more motivated by the 
ethical goals of the company, two employees felt that, in a small way, participating in the 
SIP might influence the amount of time they would stay employed – stating that if they 
were to leave, they might miss out on a financial return. In this company however, other 
factors such as the location of the job, company ethics, and salary were considered to be 
more important in retaining them. In other companies, which were perhaps more 
financially driven, employees expressed more strongly that tax savings, the opportunity to 
attain more shares, not wanting to lose share options, and the chance to make money from 
ESO, would cause them to stay in the company longer than they might otherwise had done.  
 
There were employees who did not feel any impact on this. E31, for example, had put 
small amounts of money into the ESO plan and therefore felt it was not enough to impact 
the amount of time they would stay employed in the company. Other employees who 
experienced little impact (particularly those in C2, C5 and C9) felt their shareholdings 
were not worth very much, and doubted the share price would increase enough to give 
them a significant return. Other factors such as the employees’ pension or mortgage were 
considered to be greater determinants of how long they remained employed in the 
company. In C6, if the terms of the plan were different and employees did not have to wait 
ten years, or for the company to be sold, before they could make a financial return, they 
felt the plan might have been able to influence them to stay employed longer. As it was, in 
most cases where there was little impact on retention, employees expected to leave before 
there was any chance of making money.  
 
As mentioned previously, employees’ interest in making money and expectations of 
whether they were likely to, seemed to be a strong determinant of whether ESO was felt to 
have had any impact. The nature of ESO’s impact (an impact was mostly found where 
ESO was felt to be able to provide the employee with some profit) mirrored the nature of 
employees’ attitudes towards ESO – they were both financial in nature. For example, 
continuance commitment was found much more often than affective commitment and 
employees appeared keen to stay in the company because ESO could provide financial 
returns, rather than because of any enhanced emotional attachment or feeling of ownership. 
This study has highlighted some contextual factors, potentially important in explaining 
how ESO has an impact. For example, what the employee expects from ESO and whether 
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they feel these expectations can be met, and their financial orientation to ESO, appear to be 
important considerations.  
 
8.5.4 Employee Performance 
 
In this study, there were very few cases found (2 of the 37 employees) where employees 
felt that the plan had influenced their performance at work, including cases were attitudes 
had been affected. C4, as well as being the company that produced the greatest number, 
and widest variety of ESO outcomes, was also the only company in which employees felt 
an impact on performance. Here, the impact of being selected and made to feel special 
because they had been offered the chance to participate seemed to have a much wider 
range of outcomes than in other employees’ experiences in other companies. These 
employees (E15; E16) felt there had been a “slight impact” on their performance, 
explaining that they felt the EMI plan had focused them a little bit more on making sure 
they participated in a way that helped the business grow – although this acknowledgement 
of a link between employees’ effort at work and the financial returns that could be made, 
was rare. The thought of one day being able to exercise their share options and make 
money was attributed as a cause of their own perceived changes in performance. 
Participating in ESO made these employees feel they should focus on trying to grow the 
business.  
 
Conversely, in other companies reasons for the limited impact on performance related to 
employees’ doubt that they would make money; and the outcome of ESO (the eventual 
value of their shares/options) was perceived to be “out of their hands”. In the short term, 
employees felt they “could not get anything out of it now” financially, and so being an 
ESO participant did not (in their view) affect what they did at work.  
 
As with attitudinal impact, for some employees (particularly in C6) there was a belief that 
the company had employed people who would perform the best they could anyway, and 
many also felt that their behaviours were a result of other factors at work. Employees felt 
they had more influence on their salaries, bonuses, and annual performance ratings, all of 
which influenced them to work hard. When talking about their attitudes and behaviours, 
the impression given from employees’ descriptions of how they viewed ESO could be 
compared to how one might feel if given a lottery ticket. Many employees’ responses 
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during interviews gave strong impressions that they felt that until it needed to be checked it 
could be forgotten about; they had no influence over the outcome; it was nice to have but 
the possibility of winning did not change dramatically what they thought, felt, or did; and it 
was a “good thing”, because they might win. The possibility that their commitment, 
motivation or performance at work would be influenced because they were saving money 
each month in the SAYE, waiting until share options could be exercised, or waiting until 
the share price rose high enough to be able to sell shares and receive a sum of money, 
seemed (from the responses given and the impression many of the employees gave the 
interviewer) an unlikely link.  
 
The findings offer little support for Pierce et al.’s (2004a) model, which suggests that 
ownership affects organisation based self-esteem, which in turn influences the individual's 
performance motivation, with a subsequent impact upon performance (i.e. including both 
in role and extra role behaviours). Likewise, Buchko’s (1992) assessment that, “overall, the 
data (ESO research literature) seem to suggest that ESO may be a useful mechanism for 
improving organization performance and increasing competitiveness”, is also unsupported 
from the findings in this study.  
 
The findings for performance reflect more closely a conclusion drawn by Kaarsemaker et 
al. (2010), where it was stated that although the consensus is ESO has positive effects on 
performance (especially productivity), these outcomes are often small and/or statistically 
insignificant. Consistent with Kaarsemaker et al. (2010) this study has found that in the 
cases explored, it is not possible to conclude with any degree of certainty that participating 
in ESO plans improves employees’ performance at work – at least, not in the cases 
explored.  
 
Even where individual and group performance targets were associated with ESO, 
employees did not feel an impact on their performance. For example, in C5 due to the low 
share price and doubt that it would rise, they did not feel they could ever make a return 
financially. In C1, where there were also performance conditions attached to the amount of 
free shares employees received, there was also no perceived impact on performance. 
Employees were purposely recruited for their passion for social change, and felt that their 
passion would drive their performance irrespective of whether they received shares for 
doing so. So in this case, employees felt the plan was rewarding them for what they already 
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had, rather than incentivising them to want to achieve the company’s ethical goals. Given 
that these employees were more interested in working for an ethical company than making 
lots of money, it makes sense that the plan had little impact on their desire to perform well.   
 
The findings here are in contrast to a number of studies in the research literature, including 
Jones and Kato (1995), who found in their Japanese study that the introduction of an ESOP 
led to a 4-5-percent increase in productivity. In another study, Blasi et al. (1996) found that 
with regards to profitability, productivity, and compensation, where differences were found 
between ESO and non-ESO companies, they are favourable to companies with ESO, 
especially among companies of small size. In 2002, Sesil et al. found that the adoption and 
maintenance of broad based stock option plans is associated with greater value added per 
employee.  
 
However, not all studies report positive findings – a number produce findings indicating 
little impact on performance – reflecting what was found in this study. For example, Meng 
et al.’s (2010) Chinese study found, after examining a variety of performance measures, 
little difference in performance between ESOP firms and non- ESOP firms. The findings in 
the present study suggested that there was often a weak connection between perceptions of 
individual effort and reward (the “1/N problem”). Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) observed 
from the literature that if “n” employees share together some return rights, then the 
magnitude of the returns is determined, in part, by the effort exercised by each of these n 
individuals. The cost of effort is borne by each individual who exercises it, whereas the 
returns to that effort are shared with all other n - 1 employees. Therefore, an employee will 
receive a l/n share in employee return rights without making any effort beyond the 
minimum enforceable effort level. Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) suggested that if the cost of 
an individual’s effort exceeds his or her share in the additional returns induced by that 
effort, then the incentive effect of a share in returns on motivation to work will be nil. This 
may be a possible explanation as to why not all studies in this area report positive results of 
ESO on performance, and may be an explanation for why in this study most employees did 
not feel ESO had an impact on performance.  
 
Another explanation of the impact ESO is sometimes reported to have on performance, can 
be drawn from the findings of this study.  It was found in the present study that there was a 
much greater impact on the amount of time employees felt they would stay employed in 
293 
 
the company, than on their performance. It may be that in studies where a performance 
impact has been found, this is due in part to ESO’s influence on employees increased 
incentive to stay. This in turn, might help the firm economise on hiring/firing costs and 
protect valuable investments in specific human capital (Sengupta et al. 2008). This, as 
suggested by Sengupta et al. (2008), would describe a “golden handcuffs” explanation of 
the positive share ownership/performance relationship. Another possibility that may also 
help explain the contrasting findings is that in some of the studies, workplaces with higher 
performance were more likely to introduce ESO schemes.  
 
Finally, it is frequently stated in the research literature that ESO is more likely to have an 
impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviours when combined with a feeling of influence 
or the opportunity to participate in decision making at work. Kruse (1984) for example, 
after studying two ESOP firms concluded that “ownership must accompany changes in 
other work-related variables, including participation, if the ESOP is to be effective in 
changing attitudes”. Long (1982) also suggested that employee PDM may be a key factor 
in realizing positive effects from ESO and preventing negative consequences from arising. 
However, overall this study offers more support for the proposition put forward by French 
(1987). French (1987: 427) stated “employee owners may view themselves as investors 
who, by coincidence, own shares in the company they work for. Their expectations may be 
limited to a return on the investment, rather than greater control”. This assessment reflects 
the attitude many employees in this study had towards ESO, it was about making money - 
the shares just happened to be in the company they worked for.  
 
Furthermore, the findings in this study did not reflect Klein’s (1987) instrumental 
satisfaction model – which suggests that ownership brings about attitudinal and 
behavioural change by facilitating participation in decision-making. This is again, in 
contrast to many past studies that studied the instrumental models and found positive 
results (Long 1978b, 1981; Klein 1987; Kruse 1984; Bucko 1992). The contrasting 
findings can perhaps be explained as these studies were based mostly in firms where 
companies had been purchased by employees (majority ESO) – and the right to influence, 
control and participate in decisions was perhaps more pertinent to employees than in 
companies with mainstream ESO. Research literature on non-majority owned companies 
supports the proposition that the instrumental model is not needed to explain ESO’s impact 
(e.g. Bakan et al. 2004). Tucker et al.’s (1989) study for example found that employees’ 
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commitment to the organisation and job satisfaction were higher after ESOP 
implementation, yet, perceived worker influence levels did not change – thereby 
suggesting, as did the present study, the possibility that ownership can change employees’ 
evaluations of their jobs and companies without changing employees’ influence over them.  
 
When considering the relationships employees interpreted between ESO’s impact on 
attitudes and behaviours and the routes to PO, and PO itself, it is clear that in the majority 
of cases, employees did not perceive there to be a relationship, or perceived a small impact. 
McHugh et al. (2004) suggested, with reference to Pierce et al.’s (1991) routes to PO, that 
different experiences of the routes to PO would impact the attitudes and behaviours of 
employee-owners, which would in turn, ultimately impact firm performance. The findings 
in the present study do not disprove this assertion, but do show that ESO in these cases 
struggled to provide employees with experiences of the routes.  
 
The findings also suggest that, contrary to many of the models of ESO and PO found in the 
literature review, ESO (examples in all three plans) can be felt to cause an impact (on the 
ways employees think, feel and behave at work) even when employees feel no PO at work 
(before or after ESO participation). ESO can also be found to have an impact in cases 
where employees report they feel PO, but do not feel ESO has affected these feelings of 
PO. An alternative possibility to explain these findings is that employees may not 
recognise, or may find it difficult to identify and explain, when ESO’s impact is working 
through a route or a feeling of PO.  
 
Furthermore, this study has shown, by taking a qualitative semi-structured interviewing 
approach, that when respondents are asked to assess the impact of ownership on their own 
attitudes, positive findings do not always follow. In the research literature (as pointed out 
by Pendleton, 2001) studies that have followed this approach (asking respondents to assess 
the impact of ownership on their own attitudes), usually using quantitative surveys, have 
tended to produce relatively more positive findings than studies that have obtained views 
of managers, or tested before and after ESO is implemented. When reflecting on ESO’s 
impact in response to open interview questions, with the opportunity to explain and 
elaborate, employees in this study tended to credit ESO with much less impact than some 
areas of research literature might suggest they would.  
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8.5.5 A Model of ESO’s Impact   
 
In summary, it has been found that employees’ responses during interviews gave strong 
impressions that they felt that, until it (their options/shares) needed to be checked it could 
be forgotten about; they had no influence over the outcome; it was nice to have but the 
possibility of making money did not change to any great extent what they thought, felt or 
did at work; and ESO was a “good thing” - because there was a chance of a financial 
return. It has also been found that whilst PO did not play a part in employees’ explanations 
of how ESO had an impact, other factors did. 
 
Overall, three main themes can be identified from employees’ responses, which appeared 
to have some influence on whether or not the share plan was felt to have an impact. 
Drawing on the findings and discussion, Figure 14 displays the three main factors which 
help explain ESO’s impact (and lack of) in the cases explored in this study. These factors 
are labelled as the “Financial Route”, “ESO as a: Gesture/Gift/Message” and employees’ 
“Feelings and Behaviours Prior to ESO Participation”. Findings have shown that (in a 
variety of ways) employees’ experience of these factors helped and/or hindered ESO’s 
impact.  
 
As seen in the findings chapters and in Table 23 (page 274), a wide variety of findings 
were reported across the three plans, relating to the factors displayed in Figure 14. The 
findings in C4 (EMI) and C7 (SAYE) were particularly varied and larger in number than in 
other companies. In contrast, employees in C1, C2, C3 (SIP), and C5, C6 (EMI) reported 
very little impact with regards to their attitudes and behaviours at work. Comparing the 
outcomes found in C4 (where most impact was found) and C6 (where least impact was 
found) offers an interesting contrast and helps demonstrate the role that the factors in 
Figure 14 play in explaining ESO’s impact in this study. 
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Figure 14. Factors Found to Influence ESO’s Capacity to Affect how Employees Think, Feel and Behave at 
Work 
 
In C4, findings showed strong evidence that the opportunity to participate in ESO 
communicated a message to employees (‘ESO as a Gift/ Gesture/Message’, Figure 14). C4 
was the only company in this study in which employees were selected to participate with, 
according to the plan manager, the aim of being made to feel they were “key” employees 
who were important to the company’s future. Understanding this, and why the offer of 
share options had been made, led (according to employees) to a wide range of outcomes. 
Employees in C4 were also interested in ESO as a mechanism to make money (Financial 
Route, Figure 14). They were optimistic about the share price and believed, following a 
recent rise, and that they would make money from the plan. Employees did not feel they 
had to wait “too long”, as they were only required to keep the options for a minimum of 
three years - to avoid tax when selling.  
 
In contrast, employees in C6 had very different experiences of ESO. They had to wait ten 
years before they could exercise their options, or for the company to be sold (if that 
occurred sooner), and did not think they would make any money from the plan (Financial 
Route, Figure 14). These employees felt they were unlikely to become shareholders 
because of the long wait to exercise the options and could see no benefit of having the plan 
at all. Employees wanted to be rewarded financially by the company they were helping to 
grow, and (despite at first expecting ESO to provide this) were now in a position where 
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they felt the plan was unlikely to provide this. The remaining part of this chapter will 
summarise the factors presented in the model.   
 
8.5.6 Financial Route 
 
Employees’ interest in making money played a large part in employees’ explanations of 
ESO’s impact. The intention to make money and the belief that money could be made, 
resulted in outcomes such as continuance commitment and the belief that the employee 
would stay employed longer in the company – with the intention to wait and make money 
from ESO. This interest in making money appeared to dominate the nature of employees’ 
expectations of ESO – and the impact it was felt to have. For example, one of the most 
frequent influences ESO was found to have was on the knowledge route. ESO seemed to 
have its greatest impact on employees’ understanding of company performance and 
interest in share price movement – inspiring them to monitor and gauge whether they 
might make money.  
 
The findings suggest that it is not a financial orientation alone that helps cause or restrict 
ESO’s impact. For example, when a financial orientation is combined with a feeling that 
money cannot be made from the plan, it seems that it is then that employees feel PO, or 
other types of attitudinal outcomes cannot be affected by ESO. In the findings it can be 
seen that there tended to be more impact from ESO amongst employees who felt they were 
likely to make money from the ESO plan (e.g. in C4, C7, C8) and less impact where 
employees felt they were unlikely to make money (e.g. C2, C3, C6, C9).   
 
8.5.7 Feelings and Behaviours Prior to ESO Participation  
 
Furthermore, a lot of the ESO outcomes featured in the academic literature were already 
felt to be experienced by employees at work. Models of ESO in the research literature 
which depict an impact from ESO working through PO were also limited by what 
employees felt they already experienced. In Figure 14, this factor was found to be the 
biggest barrier preventing PO from developing.   
 
ESO plans appeared to be only able to add, in a small way, to what was already felt. It 
seemed that share plans were not as influential in influencing outcomes such as affective 
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commitment, the motivation to work harder or extra voice/role behaviours, as other factors 
at work. Employees made reference on many occasions to what they “already” felt. During 
the interviews, the interviewer often felt that other things had got there first – that, even if 
ESO could affect these attitudes and behaviours, other things could too, and were already 
doing so. Often ESO was forgettable, and employees could not see how it could affect their 
day to day life at work – which created a feeling during interviews that ESO was very 
much in the background of employees’ minds. This factor was perhaps most clearly seen in 
C9, where employees were most fearful of job loss. Employees were working hard and 
demonstrating positive attitudes as they wanted to keep their jobs – and felt that a lot of the 
attitudes and behaviours discussed during interviews should be demonstrated by employees 
irrespective of whether or not they participate in ESO.  
 
8.5.8 ESO as a: Gesture/Gift/Message  
 
Finally, this factor perhaps reflects most closely Pierce et al.’s (2004a) assertion that 
having an ESO plan in the employing organisation sends signals to the employee about 
their value and importance to the organisation. As this message becomes integrated into the 
employees’ self-beliefs, Pierce et al. (2004a) suggest that employees with ownership will 
come to believe that they are significant, worthy, and valuable to the organisation. 
However, unlike in Pierce et al.’s (2004b) assertions, this impact was felt to lead from ESO 
participation without any mention of, or need for, PO.  
 
A range of outcomes were found where employees felt more trusted, valued, a greater 
sense of belonging, recognition, feeling of stability and purpose. Instead of a greater sense 
of PO, these outcomes were found to relate to the employees’ interpretation of what it 
meant to be given the opportunity to participate in ESO. The offer to participate (described 
in the model as a gift or gesture – reflecting employees’ descriptions of how they felt about 
the company’s decision to provide an ESO plan) in ESO by the companies, was seen to 
communicate a message of some sort (representing the views of the company as a whole or 
how the company wanted employees to feel). The way in which employees were given the 
opportunity to participate in ESO led in some cases to employees to feeling differently 
about the company, and about themselves as employees within the company.   
 
299 
 
In some situations ESO represented something quite meaningful to employees. This was 
not necessarily related to the prospect of making money. Instead, ESO was sometimes 
interpreted as being a sign that the company valued employees, wanted them to feel part of 
the company, or that the employees were important to the company. It was also interpreted 
in some cases as an acknowledgement for hard work, and an indication of how the 
company wanted employees to feel. This, it appeared, enhanced ESO’s capacity to impact 
how employees felt at work.  
 
When this route was satisfied, it was found to result in a wide range of outcomes – 
compared to cases where it was not satisfied. Where this route was satisfied, it also seems 
likely from the data that employees’ expectations had been exceeded here. For example, in 
one case (C4) employees did not expect there to be an ESO plan and had no idea that they 
had been selected to participate (after being privately informed) and offered share options. 
This is in contrast to cases where employees had a strong financial orientation and did not 
expect to make money – resulting in little ESO impact. As suggested in the findings in 
Long (1980) and French (1987), this may be an indication that employees’ expectations 
have some role to play in explaining ESO’s impact.   
 
8.5.9 In Contrast to the View outside Academic Research Literature  
 
When asked about the impact they felt the ESO plans in their employing companies had, 
plan managers tended to be very ambiguous and unsure of what the researcher might find. 
Whilst many of the managers provided answers, relating to changes they believed the plan 
may have had, it often appeared to be guess work – and not something they appeared to 
have given a lot of thought to. When giving answers, managers tended to infer from 
participation rates what employees might think about the company - and assumed 
participation to be a sign of positive attitudes towards the company. Reasons for having an 
ESO plan also seemed vague in some companies – particularly the large companies that 
had been operating the plans for many years. “Part of the reason it is still offered is it 
always has been”, one manager stated. Another stated “we don’t have targets”.  
 
Some responses were found to reflect the findings more than others – although this tended 
to be in the cases were there was either a lot of impact (e.g. C4) or very little (e.g. C6). One 
manager’s comments reflected the ‘Financial Route’ in Figure 14, stating they doubted 
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there was much impact because employees owned small amounts of shares that were of 
low value. Another manager doubted that the scheme alone would be the main cause of 
any impact, reflecting the ‘Feeling and Behaviours Prior to ESO Participation’ factor in 
Figure 14. Some managers were very sceptical of the plan’s impact. During one interview 
it was stated that the scheme did not “get employees out of bed in the morning” and in 
another the manager suspected that due to a sharp decrease in the share price, SAYE plan 
participants felt “disenfranchised” at work. Interestingly, plan managers assumed that the 
impact of ESO was dependant on whether the employee would make a financial return, 
and appeared to predict what impact the plan would have on employees based on which 
way the share price was moving.  
 
It was also found that the overwhelmingly positive assessments of ESO often heard in the 
media and in industry reports, were not reflected in the findings of this study. For example, 
whereas Rt Hon David Cameron (2006) stated that ESO creates a common bond between 
employees and aligns them with the interests of the company, this study found that many 
employees already felt aligned with the company and felt that the plan had little impact on 
how hard they worked or how they felt as employees. Likewise, Lord Newby’s (2010) 
comments suggesting that share schemes can incentivise employees, was not found to any 
great extent. Furthermore, in contrast to a report by an independent consultancy (Oxera, 
2007) ESO in the present study was not found to encourage employees to work more 
productively. Recent conclusions by Computershare (2009), that an employee who is a 
member of a company share plan works harder than one who is not, were also not reflected 
in this study. The question therefore arises of whether these findings are representative of 
ESO’s impact on a larger scale, and how (particularly if they are) the perception of ESO 
being a great way of boosting employees’ commitment, motivation and performance 
persists? It may be that something else, typical in companies implementing ESO plans 
leads to positive changes in the ways employees think, feel and behave at work – and the 
positive assessments heard and seen in the media are picking up the effects of those. The 
findings of this study may or may not be representative of what happens on a larger scale – 
something this study did not set out to establish – but nevertheless, the research literature 
does not provide overwhelming support one way or another of whether ESO plan is a good 
investment for a company to make – and this study does not suggest that ESO’s impact in 
the cases explored was felt by employees to be significant. However, the impact found in 
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this study, whilst not significant in a lot of employees’ views, does show that ESO can, in 
some circumstances, have a small but positive impact.  
 
8.6 The limitations of this Research  
 
This chapter is concluded with a statement of the limitations of this study, overall 
conclusions and potential areas for future research - in order to further enhance the existing 
knowledge of the relationship between ESO and employees’ attitudes and behaviours.  
 
As explained in chapter 4, there are a number of potential methodological limitations in 
this study. Misinterpretation may occur in both the researcher’s analysis of data and in the 
interviewees’ explanations, and as well as ‘seeing what they want to see’, interviewees 
may not be able to identify the relationships between feelings they report. Likewise, the 
researcher may not identify the links, meanings and explanations in employees’ responses, 
which the employee has intended to communicate.   
 
Given the relatively small number of participants involved in this study, it is easily argued 
that the findings and the subsequent conclusions may not be representative of the 
experiences of employees who participate in SAYE, SIP or EMI plans. For example, while 
the findings reveal no cases where routes to PO were not being satisfied by other factors at 
work, or where ESO was felt by employees to provide all three routes, there may have 
been ESO participants in those companies who had experienced this– and the impact of 
ESO in those cases may have been very different. In which case, the conclusions of the 
study may have been different.  
 
The Methodology (chapter 4) has also addressed a number of issues relating to 
generalisability. There is for example, some criticism that qualitative research findings rely 
too much on the researcher’s often unsystematic views about what is significant and 
important (Bryman, 2004: 284). Furthermore, there are criticisms that qualitative research 
can be difficult to replicate. Bryman (2004: 284) states that it is almost impossible to 
conduct a true replication, since there are hardly any standard procedures to be followed. 
The investigator is the main instrument of data collection and so what is heard and what 
the researcher decides to concentrate on is very much a product of their predilections. 
Whilst these limitations may be potentially true of this study, chapter 4 has addressed how 
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the researcher has made effort to protect against limitations relating to causality and 
generalisability.  
 
8.7 Conclusions  
 
The findings of this study were reported in chapters 5, 6 and 7 and discussed in chapter 8 
by comparing the findings for the three plans and relevant studies reported in the literature. 
In this section of the chapter, the main contributions will be summarised. The implications 
of the findings and recommendations for future policy development will then be explored.  
 
In summary, this study set out to explore the role of Psychological Ownership (PO) in 
employees’ interpretations of the differences participating in ESO plans makes to the ways 
they think, feel and behave at work. As seen in the chapter 3, the construct PO appears to 
have been given more than one conceptual definition in the ESO literature. In most cases 
the inconsistencies with regards to the conceptual definition of PO are not acknowledged 
in the literature and many studies that do refer to PO, talk of PO generally, describing it 
simply as a general psychological recognition of ownership. This study has offered 
clarification of what PO is and how it has been defined inconsistently in the ESO research 
literature. In exploring this concept in the context of ESO, the study has taken a rarely used 
approach in the ESO research literature, and by using semi structured interviews, explored 
how employees explain for themselves their experiences and report what they feel is 
important to them in explaining ESO’s impact.  
 
The study found that PO played little or no part in employees’ explanations of how any of 
the share plans had an impact. Furthermore, the study found that many of the attitudes and 
behaviours in the academic literature associated with ESO’s impact (such as affective 
commitment, motivation, satisfaction and behaviours relating to performance) were not 
found in the majority of employees’ explanations of ESO’s impact.  
 
However, in some cases ESO did have an impact. In some cases, as shown in Figure 14, 
the impact seemed to relate closely to employees’ financial expectations and the extent to 
which they felt the plan was likely to provide a financial return. In other cases, outcomes 
were also found to have emerged as a result of employees’ own interpretations of what it 
meant to be given the opportunity to participate. In general, ESO’s impact appeared to 
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reflect, in most cases, how employees felt as employees within the company, how they 
perceived their relationship with the people employing them, their intentions to seek 
knowledge about the company and their intentions to stay employed longer in the 
company. Attitudes generally were not found to convert into behaviours, and in almost all 
cases, employees did not feel the plan had any impact on their performance at work.  
 
With regards to ESO’s impact via PO, which was at the centre of this study, it can be 
inferred from the findings that the types of impact proposed in the research literature (e.g. 
affective commitment, motivation, performance) were, in the vast majority of cases, not 
found. This however, is consistent with Pierce et al. (1991) who suggested that the more 
financially motivated the employee is, the less attitudinal impact can be expected. 
Although ESO was found to add to feelings in some cases, this was not perceived by 
employees to be significant.   
 
Literature suggests that (to have an impact) ESO does not have to provide all of the 
ownership rights (equity, influence, information) or to satisfy all the routes to PO. It was 
found however, that ESO had very little to do with ownership in the minds of employees, 
and was much more about money. Employees’ approach to ESO and expectations of it, 
suggested that ESO was not about ownership. ESO was not seen as being a mechanism for 
employees to have, or feel ownership over the company.  
 
In almost all cases the routes were felt by employees to have been satisfied at work by 
other factors, and ESO was only able to add to some of these experiences in a small way. It 
appeared that, ‘other things got there first’; other factors seemed to satisfy PO routes 
before, or possibly better than, ESO. In theory PO makes sense. But in the cases featured in 
this study, it seemed that the routes were satisfied elsewhere and ESO was not attributed as 
being a significant cause of, or contributing factor, to feelings of PO. It may be that the 
models set out by Pierce et al. (1991); Pierce et al. (2001); Pierce et al. (2003); Pierce et al. 
(2004a), and Chi and Han (2008) are more likely to play out in practice in situations where 
ESO is introduced into environments where employees are not already experiencing the 
routes to PO or feeling any PO at all (a situation which might be difficult to find). It may 
also be that these models are more likely to be reflected in employees’ accounts, in 
situations where ESO is perceived to be primarily a way of having ownership in the 
company.    
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Models of PO and ESO in the research literature rarely take into account the possibility 
that the processes surrounding PO’s cause and effect may already exist in the work 
environment as a result of other factors. Theoretically it appears to make sense that ESO 
could satisfy some or all of the routes, and that PO could emerge from ESO participation 
and lead to other effects. But in this study, the process of PO appeared to exist and was 
already being satisfied by other factors. ESO could only enhance some feelings within this 
process, in a small way.  
 
In summary this study has demonstrated originality by exploring relationships between 
ESO and PO, and specifically a definition of PO based on feelings of possession – which 
has received growing attention – but rarely been tested. The PO literature has been 
theorised, but not empirically explored in any great depth before – especially in the context 
of employee ownership. Furthermore, empirical work exploring these concepts and 
relationships has not been conducted in the UK, and no known study has explored the 
impact, or compared the impact, of the SAYE, SIP and EMI mainstream plans. Studies that 
have explored ESO and PO, have been based mostly in the US, China or Taiwan.  
 
Methodologically, this study has added to knowledge in a way that has rarely been done 
before in the ESO literature – by taking an interpretivist approach and conducting 
qualitative semi-structured interviews to obtain rich, detailed interpretations. In doing this, 
this study has responded to suggestions made by Kaarsemaker et al. (2010), Sengupta et al. 
(2010), Knyght et al. (2010) and Poutsma et al. (2006) to compare the attitudinal effects of 
different types of employee ownership, avoid the manipulation of large, readily available 
data sets, and to provide insights into the causal processes surrounding ESO.  
 
Finally, the results of this study raise the question of why the widespread view that ESO 
has a wide range of broad and significant effects on employees’ persists. In addition to 
other studies that have questioned, or inferred some doubt about ESO’s impact (e.g. 
Sengupta et al. 2007; Park et al. 2004; Meng et al. 2010; Sengupta et al. 2010; Keef, 1998; 
Kruse, 1984; Bakan et al. 2004), the findings in this study indicate that the majority of 
people interviewed from the nine companies, do not interpret a big or significant impact 
from ESO. Furthermore, it appears from this study that PO was already being experienced 
in a lot of cases, and ESO was only able to add to the positive attitudes and behaviours 
employees experienced. If, as literature suggests, PO can lead to such outcomes, the 
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question emerges of whether companies would be better advised to concentrate on 
developing feelings of psychological ownership, rather than providing actual, legal, share 
ownership. The costs and benefits of this may be an area for future research. As well as 
highlighting a possible mismatch between the commonly held view of ESO, the 
assumptions and guesses made by ESO managers, and the interpretations of employees, 
this study has raised the question of whether ESO achieves what it is often intended (and 
often believed) to achieve. The following section of this chapter will address possible areas 
for future research.  
 
8.8 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Based on the findings in this study, it may be interesting for future studies to explore 
further the knowledge route. Of all the routes, the area of greatest impact was found to be 
on employees’ interest in seeking more information about the company, its’ performance, 
and the share price. ESO’s impact on this route seemed to be a result of employees seeking 
more information themselves, rather than being more knowledgeable or interested as a 
result of being given information they were legally entitled to as ESO participants or as 
shareholders. Given that this was one of the most frequently found outcomes from ESO, it 
may be interesting to explore in greater depth the implications of this impact. This may 
lead to further insights into possible consequences of this impact for companies, and how 
ESO can act, possibly, as a mechanism to educate.  
 
Future research might also question and explore whether these findings are typical when 
talking to employees in larger numbers of companies, and whether ESO plans should (in 
order to maximise the types of impact found in this study) be designed, and companies 
encouraged, to achieve a balance between the factors presented in Figure 14. This study 
would suggest that paying specific attention to how ESO could be used as a way of 
communicating a message about what the company stands for, and how important 
employees are to the company – whilst giving a clear indication of how employees can 
make money from the plan (in a way that meets their expectations), helped lead to some 
positive attitudinal changes. The factors in Figure 14, particularly the message ESO can 
communicate to employees – and the associated effects, are underexplored in the ESO 
literature. Further exploration, possibly in combination with a study of the various 
innovative ways companies are increasingly using (text messaging, games, CD’s etc.) to 
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inform and alert employees to ESO, might help companies consider potential implications 
of the ways employees interpret ESO.   
 
It may be that the models set out by Pierce et al. (1991); Pierce et al. (2001); Pierce et al. 
(2003); Pierce et al. (2004a), and Chi and Han (2008) are more likely to play out in 
practice in situations where ESO is introduced into environments where employees are not 
already experiencing the routes to PO or feeling any PO at all (a situation which might be 
difficult to find). It may also be that these models are more likely to be reflected in 
employees’ accounts in situations where ESO is perceived by employees to be primarily a 
way of having ownership in the company. Situations such as these are areas where further 
research could be conducted to explore further the details of when and how the causal 
models in research literature may play out in practice.  
 
About half of the employees interviewed felt that the ESO plan would influence the 
amount of time they would stay employed in the company.  More detailed, focused 
research into this impact may also uncover who these employees are – and whether in fact 
the companies operating ESO plans are retaining the employees they would most like to 
retain. It may also be of interest to policy makers to know whether this impact on the 
amount of time employees intend to stay employed in the company has any economic 
benefit– perhaps through companies’ cost savings or the wider implications this may have 
on the labour market and employees’ disposable income.  
 
Few employees said that participating in the plan or being a shareholder gave them more 
control or had caused them to invest more attention, effort, time or energy into what they 
did at work.  Furthermore, the findings in this study offer little support for the need for 
ESO to satisfy any routes at all – in some cases ESO affected feelings of PO without 
affecting any of the routes. With regards to PO, future research might explore situations in 
which, prior to ESO implementation employees are experiencing low levels of the three 
routes to PO. It may be that in these circumstances, ESO has very different outcomes.    
 
Consistent with Kaarsemaker et al. (2010) this study has found that in the cases explored, it 
is not possible to conclude with any degree of certainty that participating in ESO plans 
improves employees’ performance at work – at least, not in the cases explored. The impact 
of ESO on company performance appears to be of great interest to policy makers and to 
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those advocating the use of ESO. This study has not supported the proposition that 
employees feel their performance has changed because they are participating in ESO, or 
because they own share options or shares in the company. However, it may be that the 
impact ESO was found to have in this study – largely on employees’ interest in 
understanding the company, the time they intend to stay employed and feelings such as 
recognition, trust and being valued at work - have multiplier effects employees find 
difficult to identify.  
 
Finally, the findings in this study, particularly relating to employees’ assessments of ESO’s 
impact on performance, may be of interest to policy makers. Based on HMRC figures (as 
of June 2010) ifs Proshare report (2011b) on their website that in the UK, there are 
currently 800 approved Sharesave schemes in operation costing the government £170m in 
tax and NIC relief; over 10,000 companies operating EMIs costing the government £240m 
in tax relief; and currently 890 Share Incentive Plans in place costing the Government 
£320m in tax relief's. Given this expenditure, it seems logical – especially given the results 
of this study and the mixed evidence in the research literature, that ESO should be 
reconsidered. Evidence from interviews with the ESO plan managers suggests that, not 
only are the objectives of ESO quite blurred in these companies, what constitutes a 
successful ESO plan, and how the performance of one is measured, were not questions all 
plan mangers could answer. Future research might therefore explore what companies want 
ESO plans to achieve, on what basis governments continue to invest, and how this is 
justified.  
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Comparison of Psychological Ownership with Commitment, Identification and Internalisation. 
 
  
 
Pierce et al. (2001: 306)  
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Appendix 2: ESO Participant Interview Questions  
 
ESO Participant Interview Questions  
To Explore Research Question 1:  
1. How long have you worked for the company?  
 
2. Could you tell me a little bit about your job role at (name of company) and how that has 
changed during your time here? 
 
3. What do you like most about your job?  
 
4. What do you least like about your job?   
 
5. What employee share ownership plans do you participate in at (name of company)?  
a. Did the plan play a role in your decision to work for this company?      
 
6. How long have you been using the plans here at (name of company)?  
 
7. What made you decide to participate in this ESO plan?  
a. What were the most appealing things about the plan to you?  
 
8. At the time, did you have choices of different plans you could use?   
a. What was it about this plan that persuaded you to choose it, rather than the others 
available?   
b. How has your participation in share plans changed during your time in the company?  
 
9. What impact did you “expect” participating in the plan to have on your life at work?  
a. Did you have any other expectations about the plan?  
b. Have your expectations been met during your time working in this company?  
i. If not, what has not been met?  
c. How does that make you feel?  
i. About the company?  
ii. About your job?  
 
10. What has participating in the plan given you that you did not have before participating?  
a. Can you provide examples of any advantages?    
b. Can you explain how this makes you feel?  
i. About the company?  
ii. About your job?  
 
c. Can you provide examples of any disadvantages?   
d. Can you explain how this makes you feel?  
i. About the company?  
ii. About your job?  
 
11. Have there been any consequences of participating in the plan that you did not anticipate?  
 
12. Why does the company offer the plan, do you think? 
a. How would you describe the company’s commitment to the plan?   
b. How would you describe the company’s communication of the share plan to you?  
c. How has the communication of the plan changed during your time here?    
d. In your view, how effective do you feel the communication of the plan is?  
i. How does this make you feel?  
1. About the company?   
2. About your job?  
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ii. How good do you think your knowledge of the share plan is?  
1. What are the reasons for this?  
 
I would now like to ask some questions about how you feel about the company.  
 
To Explore Research Question 2:  
 
13. How do you think participating in the ESO plan has changed your feelings towards:  
a. the company?  
i. Has that changed over the years?  
b. your job?   
i. Has that changed over the years?  
 
14. How does “owning” shares/options in the company make you feel?  
 
15. Have you found that you want to understand more about the company since participating in 
this ESO plan?   
a. Could you identify specifically what the ESO plan has led you to understand more 
about? 
b. Why do you think the ESO plan has had this impact?   
 
16. In your job role to what extent would you say you have an input in company decision 
making?  
a. Would you be able to explain the extent to which you feel you have an input? 
 
17. Has participating in this ESO plan made you feel that you want to be more involved at work 
now?  (control or influence at work)  
a. Why do you think participating in this ESO plan has made you feel that?  
b. Do you feel that owning shares in this company has given you a greater say in 
decision making?  
i. If yes, please provide an example of how?  
 
18. Do you feel that the “amount” of shares you “own” affects the way you feel about the 
company?  
a. How?  
b. At different times you may have owned different amounts of shares. Have you found 
you have felt differently about the company at different times?  
 
19. Do you invest in other companies outside of (name of company employed in)?  
 
20. If you were to invest in another company, how would you describe the way you would feel 
about that company as a shareholder, compared to this one – which you own shares in, and 
work for?  
 
DM: I want to use an example of a football fan that supports a football team. They do not 
own the football club, but sometimes refer to the club as “their” team, or “us”. They appear 
to “feel” some ownership or possession over it.   
  
The following statements demonstrate feelings of possession or ownership for a company:   
 This is “MY” organisation  
 This organisation is “OUR” company  
 
21. Could you tell me about anything related to the company that you work in that you feel a 
sense of ownership over?  
a. Do you feel a sense of ownership over anything related to your job?  
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22. Why do you think you feel a sense of ownership over these things?  
a. Or, why do you think you do not feel a sense of ownership over anything?  
 
23. Has participating in the plan had an impact on what you feel is “yours”, or “ours”? Or, how 
do you think ESO could have created a sense of ownership?  
a. How?   
i. DM: try to probe whether ESO has created new feelings of PO, or developed 
existing feelings of PO, and how.      
  
24. Do you think the size of the company affects feelings of ownership or possession at work?  
a. How?  
 
I would like to ask some further questions about how you feel and how you think about the 
company and your job. After these questions I will then ask some questions about work 
behaviour, for example your performance.  
 
To Explore Research Question 3:  
 
25. What has been the impact of participating in the plan on your attitudes at work? (I will pause 
and leave this as an open question)  
 
a. Why do you think the plan has had this impact?  
 
26. Prompts (if used, all four will be stated):  
i. E.g. do you feel more committed because you participate in the plan?  
1. Why?  
ii. E.g. do you feel more motivated at work because participate in the plan? 
1. Why?  
iii. E.g. do you feel more job satisfaction because you participate in the plan? 
1. Why?  
iv. E.g. do you feel a greater sense of responsibility at work because you 
participate in the plan?  
1. Why?  
 
v. (DM: also listen for “company based self esteem”) 
vi. (DM: also listen for “feelings of identification with the company”)       
 
b. Could you give an example of how your attitudes have changed?  
 
1. DM: How do you they think “participating in the ESO plan” has 
changed your attitudes?  
2. DM: Identify and probe the links with the ESO plan, and/or any PO.  
3. DM: listen if it is because they are more motivated to work because 
of ESO/PO.  
4. DM: listen if it is because they feel they are more “integrated” into 
the company because of ESO/PO.  
(Potential follow up questions)  
 
27. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change your attitudes at work?  
a. Why do you think these things are important?  
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DM: I would like to ask you about your view regarding “employees” generally in this 
company:  
 
b. Has participation in the ESO plan been successful in changing employee attitudes 
across the company?  
c. What could make participation in the ESO plan more successful in changing 
employee attitudes across the company?  
 
28. Do you think there is a difference between employees who participate in ESO plans and those 
who don’t, in their attitudes towards the company?  
i. (Or, if all are in it) Have you recognised any differences in how it has had an 
impact on different employees?  
b. How?  
 
I would now like to ask about your work behaviour.  
 
To Explore Research Question 4:  
 
29. What has been the impact of participating in the plan on “what you do” at work?    
 
a. Why do you think the plan has had this impact?  
 
i. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on your 
performance?   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
ii. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on whether you do 
extra work? (extra role behaviour)   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
iii. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on whether or not 
you achieve everything in your job role?   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
 
b. Could you give examples of how participating in the plan has changed what you do at 
work? 
  
i. DM: How do you they think “participating in the ESO plan” has changed 
your behaviours?  
ii. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of integration into the ownership experience because of ESO/PO.   
iii. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of company based self esteem because of ESO/PO.   
iv. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of motivation because of ESO/PO. 
(Potential follow up questions)  
 
30. How do you think participating in the plan influences the amount of time you will work for 
this company?    
 
31. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change what you do within the 
company, or your job?  
a. Why do you think these things are important?  
 
DM: I would like to ask you about your view regarding “employees” generally in this company:  
 
b. Has participation in the ESO plan been successful in changing what employees do at 
work? (if the employee feels it has had some impact)  
313 
 
c. Do you think there is anything else that you have not mentioned that could make 
participation in ESO more successful in changing other employees work behaviour?    
 
Final Questions  
 
32. How has the recent economic climate had an impact on your participation in the share plan?   
a. How has it affected the way you feel as a shareholder? 
i. Why do you think this is?   
33. Do you think the recent economic climate has affected your attitudes or behaviours at work?  
 
34. What are the 2 best things about participating in the plan?  
 
35. What are the 2 worst things about participating in the plan?   
 
36. Is there anything else about the plan you would like to tell me?  
 
37. Finally, why did you volunteer to participate in this interview?  
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Appendix 3: ESO Plan Manager Interview Questions   
 
To Explore Research Question 1:  
 
1. Could you tell me a little bit about your job role at (name of company)? 
a. Has your job role changed during your time here? 
 
2. Do you have any involvement in the management or design of the plan in the company? (E.g.  
Making decisions about the granting of options)  
a. If yes, please briefly state your main role/duties:  
 
3. Why does the company offer this plan to employees? 
a. (e.g.) 
 Supplementary In lieu (instead of) 
 To help with recruitment of key employees 
 To help with the retention of key employees 
 Cash flow problems 
 Offered to enhance salaries 
 To improve staff motivation  
 Advisor suggested it  
 Tax advantage (to whom?)  
b. What did the company hope to achieve as result of offering the plan?  
 How?  
 Has it achieved this?  
 
c. To what extent was the plan introduced with the aim of changing employee’s 
attitudes and behaviours at work? 
 
4. Would you say that ESO options are/were used in your company mainly as a supplement to 
salary or in lieu of a higher salary?  
a. (e.g.)  
 Supplementary (additional) 
 In lieu (instead of) 
 A mix of both for all employees 
 A supplement to salary for some employees, in lieu of a higher salary for 
others 
 None of these 
 Don’t know  
 
5. How would you describe your commitment to the plan?   
a. The management of the plan in the company?  
b. The promotion of the plan in the company?  
 
c. Could you give an example of how you think the company has shown its commitment 
to the plan, to employees?   
 
6. How would you describe the company’s communication of the share plan?  
a. What impact does the communication have on employees?   
 
7. Why do you think employees participate in this ESO plan?  
 
8. What impact did you expect this ESO plan to have on the employees?  
a. Did you have any other expectations?  
b. Have your expectations been met?  
i. If not, what has not been met?  
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9. Have there been any consequences that you did not anticipate?  
 
To Explore Research Question 2:  
 
10. Do you think that participating in the plan has changed employees in any way?  
a. How?  
 
11. How do you think participating in the plan makes employees feel?  
 
12. Have you found that employees want to understand more about anything related to the 
company since participating in this ESO plan?   
a. What do you think the ESO plan led employees to understand more about? 
b. Why do you think the ESO plan has had this impact?   
c. Do you think this is important in order for ESO to be successful?  
i. Why?  
 
13. Do you think that participating in this ESO plan has made employees feel that they want to be 
more involved at work now?  (control or influence at work)  
a. Why do you think participating in this ESO plan has made them feel that?  
b. Do you feel that owning shares in this company gives employees a greater say in 
decision making?  
c. Are the employees who participate more involved at work now?  
i. If yes, please provide an example of how?  
d. Do you think this is important in order for ESO to be successful?  
i. Why?  
 
14. Do you think the “amount” of shares an employee “owns” affect the way employees feel 
about the company?  
a. How?  
b. At different times different employees may have owned different amounts of shares. 
Have you noticed any difference in employees’ attitudes and/or behaviours when they 
own different amounts of shares?  
 
DM: I want to use an example of a football fan that supports a football team. They do not own 
the football club, but sometimes refer to the club as “their” team, or “us”. They appear to “feel” 
some ownership or possession over it.   
  
The following statements demonstrate feelings of possession or ownership for a company, for 
example:   
 This is “MY” organisation  
 This organisation is “OUR” company  
 
15. Could you tell me about anything related to the company that you think employees feel 
ownership over?  
 
a. Would you be able to provide an example?  
 
16. Why do you think they feel ownership over these things?  
 
17. Has participating in the plan had an impact on what employees feel is “theirs”, or collectively, 
or what they may refer to as “ours”, within the company?  
a. How?   
i. DM: try to probe whether ESO has created new feelings of PO, or developed 
existing feelings of PO, and how.      
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18. How do you think the size of the company affects feelings of ownership or possession at 
work?  
a. How?  
b. Do you notice a difference between employees that have more control or influence 
within their jobs?   
 
I would like to ask some questions about how employees that participate in the plan feel about 
the company and their job. After these questions I will then ask some questions about what 
employees that participate in the plan do at work, for example their performance.  
 
To Explore Research Question 3:  
 
19. What do you think has been the impact of participating in the ESO plan on employee attitudes 
at work? (I will pause and leave this as an open question)  
 
c. Why do you think the plan has had this impact?  
 
20. Prompts (if used, all four will be stated):  
i. E.g. do they feel more committed because they participate in the plan?  
1. Why?  
ii. E.g. do they feel more motivated at work because they participate in the plan? 
1. Why?  
iii. E.g. do they feel more job satisfaction because they participate in the plan? 
1. Why?  
iv. E.g. do they feel a greater sense of responsibility at work because they 
participate in the plan? 
1. Why?  
 
v. (DM: also listen for “company based self esteem”) 
vi. (DM: also listen for “feelings of identification with the company”)       
 
1. DM: How do you they think “participating in the ESO plan” has 
changed employee attitudes?  
2. DM: Identify and probe the links with the ESO plan, and/or any PO.  
3. DM: listen if it is because they are more motivated to work because 
of ESO/PO.  
4. DM: listen if it is because they feel they are more “integrated” into 
the company because of ESO/PO.  
(Potential follow up questions)  
 
b. Could you give an example of how employee attitudes have changed?  
 
21. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change employee attitudes at work?     
 
a. What do you think has made ESO successful in changing employee attitudes? (if the 
employer feels it has had some impact)  
b. What could make ESO more successful in changing employee attitudes?  
 
22. Do you think there is a difference between employees who participate in ESO plans and those 
who don’t, in their attitudes towards the company?  
a. How?  
 
To Explore Research Question 4:  
 
23. What has been the impact of participating in the plan on “what employees do” at work?    
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a. Why do you think the plan has had this impact?  
 
b. Prompts (if used, all four will be stated): The following could be suggested as types of 
behaviour:   
 
i. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on employees 
performance?   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
ii. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on whether 
employees do extra work? (extra role behaviour)   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
iii. E.g. what has been the impact of participating in the plan on whether or not 
employees achieve everything in your job role?   
1. Why has it had this impact?  
 
i. DM: How do you they think “participating in the ESO plan” has changed 
their behaviours?  
ii. DM: Listen to whether the employer interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of integration into the ownership experience because of ESO/PO.   
iii. DM: Listen to whether the employer interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of company based self esteem because of ESO/PO.   
iv. DM: Listen to whether the employer interprets these changes to be through a 
feeling of motivation because of ESO/PO. 
(Potential follow up questions)  
 
c. Could you give examples of how the ESO plan has changed what employees do at 
work? 
  
24. How do you think participating in the plan influences the amount of time employees work for 
this company?    
 
25. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change what employees do within 
the company, or their job?   
a. Why do you think these things are important?  
 
b. What do you think has made ESO successful in changing what employees do at 
work? (if the employer feels it has had some impact)  
c. What could make ESO more successful in changing what employees do at work?  
 
Final Questions  
 
26. How has the recent economic climate had an impact on employee participation in the share 
plan?   
a. How has it affected the way they feel as a shareholder? 
i. Why do you think this is?   
27. Do you think the recent economic climate has affected employee attitudes or behaviours at 
work?  
 
28. Is there anything else about the plan you would like to tell me?  
 
29. What are the 2 best things about the ESO plan?  
 
30. What are the 2 worst things about the ESO plan?   
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Appendix 4: An Example of the EMI Questionnaire Given to Interviewees Participating in 
EMI Schemes Prior to Interview.   
 
Employee Share Ownership Research interview: Short Questionnaire (EMI) 
 
Purpose of questionnaire:  
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether employee share ownership has an impact 
on employee attitudes and behaviours (e.g. commitment, satisfaction, motivation, 
performance etc.) and if so, how. The study is focused specifically on the impact of the UK 
plans Save as you Earn (SAYE), Share Incentive Plan (SIP) and Enterprise Management 
Incentives (EMI). 
 
This questionnaire is provided to employees that are participating in interviews.  
 
How anonymity is protected: 
This is an anonymous questionnaire. For more information about confidentiality please see 
the Participant Information Sheet.  
 
Please do not include your name or the name(s) of your colleagues anywhere on the 
questionnaire. 
 
Informed consent:  
Participation in this project is voluntary. Completion of the questionnaire indicates your 
consent to participate in this research. The research has ethical clearance from 
Loughborough University. 
 
Your Details  
 
1. Name of Company _____ 
 
2. Gender  
□  Male    □  Female  
 
3. Age _____ 
 
4. Number of dependants _____  
 
5. Education  
□  Up to GCSE (or equivalent)  
□  A-Level (or equivalent)  
□  Bachelors degree (or equivalent)  
□  Higher degree (or equivalent) 
 
6. How long have you worked for this 
company?   
□  1 year or less  
□  More than 1 year and up to 3 years  
□  More than 3 years and up to 5 years  
□  More than 5 years and up to 10 years  
□  More than10 years and up to 15 years 
□  More than 15 years and up to 20 years 
□  More than 20 years   
 
 
7. Work status 
□  Employed full time (30+ hours pw)  
□  Employed part time (<30 hours pw) 
 
8. How long have you been participating 
in the EMI in this company? _____ 
□  1 year or less  
□  More than 1 year and up to 3 years 
□  More than 3 years and up to 5 years  
□  More than 5 years and up to 10 years  
 
 
 
 
9. What are your total earnings per 
annum before deductions?  
 
□  £14,999 or less  
□  £15,000 - £24,999 
□  £25,000 - £34,999 
□  £35,000 - £44,999 
□  £45,000 - £54,999 
□  £55,000 - £64,999 
□  £65,000 - £74,999 
□  Over £75,000
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EMI Participation   
 
10. What is the approximate total value of EMI options that you currently hold?  
 
□ Less than £500  
□ £500-£1,000  
□£1,001-£10,000  
□ £10,001-£30,000  
□ £30,001-£50,000  
□ More than £50,000 
 
11. Are you able to exercise your EMI options at any time, or are there personal or 
company performance conditions and / or vesting period attached to them?  
 
(Vesting period means the earliest date on which an option can be exercised) 
 
□ There is a vesting period attached to some or all of my options 
□ Yes, I am able to exercise all my options at any time 
□ There are both performance conditions and a vesting period attached to some or  
     all of my options 
□ There are performance conditions attached to some or all of my options 
□ Other (Please State) _______________________________________________  
 
12. Have you exercised any of your EMI share options? By exercised we mean, 
have you purchased any of the shares over which EMI options were granted?  
 
□ I have exercised all of my EMI share options  
□ I have exercised some of my EMI share options 
□ No, I have not exercised any of my EMI share options even though some or all of 
them have vested (Go to question 16) 
□ No, as none of my EMI options have vested yet (Go to question 16) 
□ Other (Please State) 
________________________________________________ 
 
13. And have you sold any of the shares you obtained after exercising any of your 
EMI share options?  
 
□ Yes, sold all my shares 
□ Yes, sold some of my shares 
□ No, not sold any of my shares (Go to question 16) 
 
 
14. How long after obtaining those shares did you decide to sell them? (If you sold 
any of the shares you obtained after exercising any of your EMI share options)   
 
□ Immediately on exercise 
□ Within 1 month 
□ Between 1 and 3 months later 
□ Between 3 and 6 months later              
    □ Over 6 months but less than a           
    year later 
    □ Over a year later    
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15. Thinking again about the last shares you sold, why did you decide to sell 
them when you did? (If you sold any of the shares you obtained after 
exercising any of your EMI share options)    
  
□ The shares had reached a good price 
□ I was planning on leaving the company 
□  I needed the money to invest in other shares, investments, savings or 
pension 
□  I needed the money for another purpose  
□  The company was sold/listed  
□  Other (Please state)_____________________________________________ 
 
 
Offer of EMI share options   
 
16. How do you view EMI share options in relation to your salary? 
 
□  In lieu of a higher salary 
□  Supplementary/added bonus  
□ Both of the above/mixture   
□  Other (Please state)_____________________________________________ 
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Appendix 5: E-mail Letter some ESO Administrators Agreed to Forward Electronically to 
ESO Plan Managers (or employees involved in the management of ESO within the 
company they worked for).                                                                                     
 
Dear Employee Share Plan Manager,  
 
RE: Employee Share Ownership Research at Loughborough University 
 
My name is David McConville and I am currently undertaking Ph.D. research at 
Loughborough University, sponsored by ifs Proshare. My research is concerned with how 
employee share ownership has an impact on employee attitudes and behaviours (e.g. 
commitment, satisfaction, motivation, performance etc.). The study is focused on the 
impact of the UK plans SAYE, SIP and EMI.  
 
Following a discussion about this project, (Name of Administrator) kindly agreed to 
forward this e-mail to you because you operate one (or more) of those plans.   
 
Over the next few months I will be collecting data, and am currently looking to identify 
companies in the UK who would like to be involved in the project.  
 
I would like to invite your company to take part.  
 
 The study will be an opportunity for you to obtain a summary of findings regarding 
the impact of your plan, as I would be happy to provide you with a summary of the 
information collected from your employees.  
 This could provide you with an insight into the benefits of the share plan(s) in your 
company, and ways in which these benefits could be increased further.  
 
To be involved in this Research:  
 
If you would like to consider participating in this project, please e-mail me using the 
address below, and I will contact you to discuss this further. Alternatively, you can contact 
me at Loughborough University using the telephone number below.  
 
E-mail: (Researchers’ e-mail address)   
 
Telephone: (Researchers’ telephone number)   
 
I look forward to hearing from you.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
David McConville 
 
Doctoral Researcher 
The Business School 
Loughborough University 
Ashby Road 
Loughborough 
LE11 3TU 
(Researchers’ telephone and e-mail contact details).   
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Appendix 6: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee Share Ownership Research at Loughborough University  
Participant Information Sheet 
 
David McConville 
The Business School 
Loughborough University 
Ashby Road 
Loughborough 
LE11 3TU 
UK 
d.c.mcconville@lboro.ac.uk 
John Arnold 
The Business School 
Loughborough University 
Ashby Road 
Loughborough 
LE11 3TU 
UK 
J.M.Arnold@lboro.ac.uk 
Alison Smith 
The Business School 
Loughborough University 
Ashby Road 
Loughborough 
LE11 3TU 
UK 
A.J.Smith2@lboro.ac.uk  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether employee share ownership has an 
impact on employee attitudes and behaviours (e.g. commitment, satisfaction, motivation, 
performance etc.) and if so, how. The study is focused specifically on the impact of the UK 
plans SAYE, SIP and EMI. It is intended that one outcome of the study will be an insight 
into the benefits of the share plan(s).   
 
Who is doing this research and why? 
 
As part of his doctoral research, David McConville will be the main investigator, 
supervised by Professor John Arnold and Alison Smith at Loughborough University. The 
study is sponsored by ifs Proshare (a not-for-profit membership organisation that provides 
a voice for the Employee Share Ownership (ESO) industry), BT and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
 
Once I take part, can I change my mind? 
 
Yes.  After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have, we will 
ask you to complete an Informed Consent Form. However if at any time, before, during or 
after the sessions you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the main 
investigator. You can withdraw at any time, for any reason and you will not be asked to 
explain your reasons for withdrawing. 
 
Will I be required to attend any sessions and where will these be? 
 
As part of the study, questionnaires and interviews will be conducted. You will be visited at 
your place of work after an appointment has been arranged.  
 
How long will it take? 
 
Each interview is expected to last around 1 hour. You do not need to do anything before 
completing the questionnaire or interview, and you do not need to bring anything with you.  
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What will I be asked to do? 
 
For the interview, you will be asked some questions about participating in an employee 
share ownership plan. Before the interview you will be asked for some details about which 
plan(s) you participate in and some personal details such as your age, job title etc in a 
short questionnaire.   
 
With your consent, the interview will be audio recorded. This will then be transcribed by 
the main researcher so that the transcript can be analysed. The audio recording will be 
deleted once transcribed. Your name will not be included in any audio recording and only 
the main researcher will listen to this, to transcribe the interview.  
 
What personal information will be required from me? 
 
You will be asked for some details about your age, education, work status, how long you 
have worked for the company and your total earnings per annum. However, you will not 
have to answer any questions you do not want to answer.   
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information you provide, including personal data, will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers. The information will be stored 
with the researchers at Loughborough University, and only they (David McConville, John 
Arnold and Alison Smith) will have access to it.  
 
Any data used in reports, publications or presentations will be anonymous, non-
attributable and you will not be identifiable. Reports, publications and presentations will 
include a doctoral thesis and reports for sponsors of the research (ifs Proshare, BT and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
 
To maintain participant confidentiality you will not be asked for your name during the 
interview. The research has ethical clearance from Loughborough University.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
As part of a doctoral study, they may be included in a Ph.D. thesis as well as other 
publications resulting from/preceding this. The doctoral research is due to be completed in 
2011. Reports of the study will also be provided to sponsors of the study, who may 
disseminate the findings more widely. All data you provide will remain anonymous and 
non-attributable. Each company that participates will receive a summary of findings from 
their company. You will not be identifiable in this report.  
 
I have some more questions who should I contact? 
 
The main investigator: David McConville. (Researchers’ e-mail address)  
 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted? 
 
Loughborough University has a policy relating to Research Misconduct and Whistle 
Blowing which is available online at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.  
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Appendix 7: Pilot Interview Questions  
 
To Explore Research Question 1:  
 
1. What made you decide to participate in this ESO plan?  
a. What were the most appealing things about the plan to you?  
b. What was it about this plan that persuaded you to choose it, rather than the others 
available?   
2. Why does the company offer the plan, do you think? 
a. How would you describe the management’s commitment to the plan?   
b. Did the plan play a role in your decision to work for this company?      
3. What has participating in the plan given you that you did not have before participating?  
a. Can you provide examples of any advantages?    
b. Can you provide examples of any disadvantages?   
 
4. What impact did you expect participating in the plan to have on your life at work?  
a. Did you have any other expectations?  
b. Have your expectations been met?  
i. If not, what has not been met?  
5. Have there been any consequences that you did not anticipate?  
 
To Explore Research Question 2:  
 
6. How do you think participating in the ESO plan has changed your feelings towards 
anything related to the company?   
7. How does “owning” shares in the company make you feel?  
8. Have you found that you want to understand more about the company since participating in 
this ESO plan?   
a. What has the ESO plan led you to understand more about? 
b. Why do you think the ESO plan has had this impact?   
9. Has participating in this ESO plan made you feel that you want to be more involved at 
work now?  (control or influence at work)  
a. Why do you think participating in this ESO plan has made you feel that?  
b. Are you more involved at work now?  
i. If yes, please provide an example of how?  
10. Do you feel that the “amount” of shares you “own” affects the way you feel about the 
company?  
a. How?  
 
DM: I want to use an example of a football fan that supports a football team. They do not 
own the football club, but sometimes refer to the club as “their” team, or “us”. As they invest 
their time, follow the team and care about its progress, they appear to “feel” some ownership 
or possession over it.   
  
The following statements demonstrate feelings of possession for a company, for example:   
 This is “MY” organisation  
 This organisation is “OUR” company  
 I feel a very high degree of personal “ownership” for this organisation  
 
11. Could you tell me about anything related to the company that you work in that you feel a 
sense of ownership over?  
a. Do you feel a sense of ownership over anything related to your job?  
 
12. Why do you think you feel a sense of ownership over these things?  
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13. Has “owning shares” in this ESO plan had an impact on what you feel is “yours”, or “ours” 
within the company?  
a. How?   
i. DM: try to probe whether ESO has created new feelings of PO, or 
developed existing feelings of PO, and how.      
  
I would like to ask some questions about your attitudes and your behaviours (i.e. what you do at 
work).  
 
To Explore Research Question 3:  
 
14. What has been the impact of participating in the plan on your attitudes at work?  
a. For example:   
i. E.g. do you feel more committed?  
ii. E.g. do you feel more motivated at work?  
iii. E.g. do you feel more job satisfaction?   
iv. E.g. do you feel a greater sense of responsibility at work?  
1. DM: also listen for “company based self esteem” 
2. DM: also listen for “feelings of identification with the company”      
b. Could you give an example of how your attitudes have changed?  
 
15. What is it about participating in the plan that has changed your attitudes?  
1. DM: Identify and probe the links with the ESO plan, and/or any 
PO.  
2. DM: listen if it is because they are more motivated to work 
because of ESO/PO.  
3. DM: listen if it is because they feel they are more “integrated” 
into the company because of ESO/PO.  
 
16. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change your attitudes at work?     
 
DM: I would like to ask you about your view regarding “employees” generally in this 
company:  
a. What do you think has made participation in ESO successful in changing employee 
attitudes? (if the employee feels it has had some impact)  
b. What could make participation in ESO more successful in changing employee 
attitudes?  
 
To Explore Research Question 4:  
 
17. What has been the impact of participating in the plan on “what you do” at work?    
a. DM: The following could be suggested as types of behaviour:   
i. E.g. what has been the impact on whether you do extra work? (extra role 
behaviour)   
ii. E.g. what has been the impact on whether or not you achieve everything in 
your job role?   
iii. E.g. what has been the impact on your performance?   
b. Could you give examples of how participating in the plan has changed what you do 
at work? 
  
18. What is it about participating in the plan that has changed “what you do” at work?  
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i. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be 
through a feeling of integration into the ownership experience because of 
ESO/PO.   
ii. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be 
through a feeling of company based self esteem because of ESO/PO.   
iii. DM: Listen to whether the employee interprets these changes to be 
through a feeling of motivation because of ESO/PO. 
 
19. What do you think is needed in order for this ESO plan to change what you do within the 
company, or your job?   
 
DM: I would like to ask you about your view regarding “employees” generally in this 
company:  
a. What do you think has made participation in ESO successful in changing what 
employees do at work? (if the employee feels it has had some impact)  
b. What could make participation in ESO more successful in changing what 
employees do at work?  
 
Final Questions  
 
20. Is there anything else about the plan you would like to tell me?  
21. What are the 2 best things about participating in the plan?  
22. What are the 2 worst things about participating in the plan?   
23. Finally, why did you volunteer to participate in this interview?  
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Appendix 8: Contact Summary Sheet  
 
Contact Summary Sheet   
 
Company:  Interviewee:  ESO plan:  Date:            
 
What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact? 
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Appendix 9: Codes for Analysis: Developed from ESO and PO Literature and Research Questions   
 
 
EXPECTATIONS   
 
EX - OWN Expectations of having “Ownership” in the 
company  
Ownership Expectations, what was expected from “ownership” (about the meaning of ownership) / Equity 
Expectations: Specific expectations relating to equity/shares  
EX – ESO Expectations of participating in the “Plan”  What was expected from the “plan” other than INFL, INFO, EQU.  
EX – ESO - INFL Influence Expectations Specific expectations relating to” influence” participation would give them  
EX – ESO - INFO Information Expectations Specific expectations relating to” information” participation would give them  
EX – ESO - EQU Investment expectation    Employees approach employee ownership with primarily an investment expectation    
EX – MET or UNMET Expectation related to ESO met   
 
ESO RIGHTS 
 
R - ESO A “right” the employee feels the plan gives 
them (privileges)   
 
R – EQU A “right” the employee feels the plan gives 
them (privileges): Equity in/ Shares of the 
owned object (company). 
Reference to owning or having equity or shares as part of share plan participation. “The right to possession of 
some share of the owned object's physical being and/or financial value”.  
R – INFLU A “right” the employee feels the plan gives 
them (privileges): Influence  
The right to exercise influence (control) over an object (or the owned object)  
R - INFO A “right” the employee feels the plan gives 
them (privileges): Information 
The right to information about the status of that which is owned. 
 
PARTICIPATION IN ESO (EQUITY) RIGHT/ROUTE 1 
 
AMOUNT Participation in ESO  Reference to amount of shares or amount (financially) of participation in ESO. Level of participation can be 
seen in the indicators collected from each respondent 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION (INFORMATION) RIGHT/ROUTE 2 
 
KNOW - ESO Knowledge of the plan  
KNOW – COMPANY  Employee intimately knows a particular organizational factor 
INFO Reference made to information 
provided by the company about the 
company or their job (not necessarily 
because of the plan from the employees 
view)  
Information about the company or their job, that does not exist/get communicated because of plan 
participation / Employees’ access to business information / The extent to which employees can access 
business information: (e.g. sales volumes and market share; the cost of labour; financial performance; 
investment strategies; mergers and acquisitions; and plant closures or relocations).  
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INFLUENCE AND CONTROL (INFLUENCE) RIGHT/ROUTE 3 
 
PDM  Participation in decision-
making or Influence/ 
Experienced control over the 
work environment (not 
necessarily because of the plan 
from the employees view) or 
Job design autonomy/ Job 
autonomy.  
E.g. The extent to which employees can influence decisions (e.g. changes in work flow, the altering of work 
procedures, the design of job content, managing job rotation, setting working hours, establishing work rules).  
 changes in work flow 
 the altering of work procedures  
 the design of job content 
 managing job rotation 
 setting working hours 
 establishing work rules  
E.g.  
 “How much control do you have over the variety of methods you use in completing your work?”  
 “How much control do you have over how your work is evaluated?”  
 “How much control do you have over the sources of information you need to do your job?” 
“How much can you control the physical conditions of your work station (e.g., lighting, temperature)?” 
 
Autonomy: E.g. “The job gives the employee the chance to use their personal initiative and judgment in carrying out 
the work.”  
 
SHAPED  Something the employee created, shaped, or produced. 
WS work environment structure  
WS - H High levels of work 
environment structure 
Structural aspects of the context, such as laws, norms, rules, and hierarchy. Technology, autonomy, and participative 
decision making.    
WS – L  Low levels of work environment structure 
 
 
FEELINGS TOWARDS THE ESO PLAN, THE COMPANY OR WORK ROOTS 
 
ASS - ESO Feels associated with ESO plan     
MEAN Experienced meaningfulness of work E.g.  useful, serious or important to the employee 
ATTACHED  
 
Feeling attached to something within 
the organization/ their job  
E.g. come to feel at home   
 
Rudmin and Berry (1987) noted that “ownership is linguistically an opaque concept,” that its meaning is 
difficult to grasp outside of an intra-individual view: “After all, a stolen apple doesn’t look any different from 
any other” (Snare, 1972, p. 200).  
 
They suggested that “attachment” provides part of the meaning of ownership and that attachment breeds 
familiarity and knowledge. Thus, psychological ownership reflects an intimate relationship or a psychological 
proximity of the owner to the owned.  
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Citing Horwicz (1878), Rudmin and Berry noted that we tend to prefer our own possessions to others, even 
others of a similar kind (see Beggan, 1992; Nuttin, 1987), because “we know them better, realize them more 
intimately, feel them more deeply” (translation from James, 1890, p. 326).  
EFF 
ROOT 1 
Individual employee invests himself or 
herself into the potential target of 
ownership/ Efficacy and Effectance: 
“The effectance motive, that is, the 
individual’s desire to interact 
effectively with his or her 
environment”. 
 
The investment of an individual’s energy, ideas, skills, time, effort, and attention into objects.  
 
Effectance:  “The ultimate meaning of ownership is the fusing of the target of ownership with the self”  
“the motivation for possession stems from the individual’s need for effectance and the ability to produce 
desired outcomes in the environment”  
  
“Possession may be one manifestation of effectance motivation in that a central feature of possession is the 
ability to affect and control the object in whatever way one wishes”.  
 
“The effectance motive, that is, the individual’s desire to interact effectively with his or her environment”. 
 
“Exploration of, and the ability to control, one’s environment gives rise to feelings of efficacy and pleasure, 
which stem from “being the cause” and having altered the environment through one’s control actions”.  
SELF  
ROOT 2 
 
Self identity: “Thus, it is through our 
interaction with our possessions, 
coupled with reflection on their 
meaning, that “our sense of identity, our 
self definition, are established, 
maintained, reproduced and 
transformed” (Dittmar, 1992, p. 86)”.  
 
 
 
It is through the interactive process with one’s possessions that they provide space, comfort, autonomy, 
pleasure, and opportunity that facilitate the development and cultivation of one’s identity (Kron, 1983; 
Saunders, 1990), in that they are symbols of self (Cooper, 1976). 
 
E.g. Possessions play an important role in the process of self-understanding and self-identity because of the 
meaning and the importance ascribed to them by society (McCracken, 1986; Mead, 1934).   
 
As pleasure and comfort are found in one’s interactions with objects, the socially shared meaning ascribed to 
those objects is internalized and becomes part of one’s self-identity (McCracken, 1986). “Personal 
possessions,” according to Dittmar (1992), “come to objectify aspects of self-definition” (p. 85).  
 
Thus, it is through our interaction with our possessions, coupled with reflection on their meaning, that “our 
sense of identity, our self definition, are established, maintained, reproduced and transformed” (Dittmar, 1992, 
p. 86).  
HOME 
ROOT 3  
Having a place/ experienced as home: 
“Those possessions in which an 
individual finds a strong sense of 
identification that come to be regarded 
as home”.  
 
E.g. Psychologically, possessions that come to be experienced as home are those in which the individual has, 
in all likelihood, made a considerable emotional investment (Porteous, 1976). It might be suggested, therefore, 
that it is those possessions in which an individual finds a strong sense of identification that come to be 
regarded as home.   
 
Dreyfus (1991) noted that when we inhabit something, that something is no longer an object for us; instead, it 
becomes a part of us.  
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Helping to fulfil their territorial needs. Porteous (1976) too argued that the home is important because it 
provides the individual with both physical and psychic security.  
ASS Feels associated with something   
FAM  Feeling familiar with something   
 
ALLOCATION AND PROCEDURE OF ESO JUSTICE / ESO MAN COMMT.  
 
DISJUS 
 
Employees’ perceived distributive 
justice  
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the organizational allocation of resources (Folger and 
Cropanzano, 1998; Witt, Kacmar, and Andrews, 2001). Employees make distributive justice judgments when 
receiving financial rewards (e.g. salary or bonuses from profit-sharing plans) in exchange for the work they 
have done, which in-turn influence their attitudes towards the organization (Ambrose and Arnaud, 2005; 
Feather, 1999).   
E.g. in my organization I am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I have put in.  
PROJUS 
  
Employees’ perceived procedural 
justice  
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the procedure used to make decisions (Folger and 
Cropanzano, 1998; Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza, 1995). Employees perceive aspects related to 
procedural justice when they experience opportunities to influence decisions, to express their voices, or to 
possess accurate information used for making decisions (Price, Lavelle, Henley, Cocchiara, and Buchanan, 
2006; Thibaut andWalker, 1975).  
E.g. I am able to express my views and feelings during procedures used to make decisions in my organization.  
MANCOM Management Commitment  The degree to which employee ownership is both a central part of management's philosophy and its human 
resource strategy and is integral to the organization's culture and identity  
 
PARTICIPATION IN ESO LEGITIMACY 
 
OWNLEG A sense of ownership legitimacy (may be related to a 
sense of legitimacy to share in EQU, INFO and 
INFLU)   
This will relate to what employees’ definition of ownership legitimacy is, that which is right and proper; 
(French and Raven, 1959) or reasonable and acceptable.  This may relate to their expectations.  
OWNLEG/EQU A sense of legitimacy to share in the equity That it is right, proper, reasonable and acceptable to share in the equity (have shares in the company or a share 
of financial returns).   
OWNLEG/INFO A sense of legitimacy to have access to 
organizational information 
That it is right, proper, reasonable and acceptable to have access to organizational information.  
OWNLEG/INFLU A sense of legitimacy to exercise influence  That it is right, proper, reasonable and acceptable to exercise influence.  
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP  
 
PO 
 
Psychological Ownership  This is MY organisation  
 I sense that this organisation is OUR company  
 I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this organisation  
 I sense that this is MY company  
 This is OUR company  
 Most of the people that work for this organisation feel as though they own the company  
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PO - ORG Organization-based psychological ownership Feelings of ownership or possession of the organization  
PO - JOB Psychological ownership of the job  Feelings of ownership or possession of the job  
PO -  Target Attribute / Factor or target employee may feel 
PO towards  
Details of the target of ownership  
NOPO No feeling of PO towards organisation or anything in 
it, or related to it  
Something “owned” or not “owned” (in this case possibly the shares or share options) that the employee does 
not feel PO over. 
 
INTEGRATION INTO THE ORGANIZATION (ZEAL, IDENTIFCATION, RESPONSIBILITY) AND OBSE INTEGRATION  
 
INTEG 
  
Integration of the employee-owner into the 
ownership experience (May be indicated by Z, CI, 
RESP).  
 E.g. This integration or psychological bonding, an emotional state, manifests itself in the development of 
such attitudes as organizational commitment and the belief that there is a common interest that links 
management and the employee owners.  
 
Webb (1912: 138), in her discussion of employee ownership, suggested that ownership creates a sense of 
"shared responsibility." She argued that ownership operates by creating a "common interest" and together this 
common interest and the sense of responsibility stimulates a "zeal and careful working."  
 
Whyte (1978) argued that through employee ownership a joint-payoff [responsibility] relationship is created 
and through this process the individual becomes integrated into the organization.  
Z Zeal Great enthusiasm or eagerness for the organization or job  
ORG-IDENT 
 
A common interest or a feeling of organizational 
identification  
E.g. The belief that there is a common interest that links management and the employee owners (RE: the 
organization's goals and values).; to feel that you are similar to someone or something in some way. May be 
seen where the employee seems to (internalize) accept or absorb an idea, opinion, belief, etc of the 
organization.  
ESO - RESP A “responsibility” the employee feels the  plan gives 
them   
 
RESP A feeling of responsibility for work and 
organizational outcomes   
Feeling that something is their job or duty to deal with. E.g. may relate to stewardship, citizenship behaviour, 
personal sacrifice, risk. E.g. They may feel they have a “deeper responsibility” than those who do not feel 
ownership.  
OBSE Organization based self esteem  Extent to which employees believe that they are valuable, worthwhile, effectual members of their employing 
organizations. E.g.  
 I count around here  
 I am taken seriously around here 
 I am important around here 
 I am trusted around here 
 There is faith in me around here 
 I can make a difference around here 
 I am valuable around here 
 I am helpful around here 
 I am efficient around here 
 I am co-operative around here 
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ATTITUDES  
 
SAT - E Extrinsic satisfaction  Job satisfaction is defined as the extent to which a worker feels positively or negatively about his or her job 
(Locke, 1976; Odom, Boxx, and Dunn, 1990). It can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, such as extrinsic, 
intrinsic or general satisfaction.  
 
Extrinsic satisfaction is derived from the rewards given to an individual by the organization, peers, or 
superiors that can include, compensation, job security.  
SAT - I Intrinsic satisfaction  Likewise, intrinsic satisfaction refers to actually performing the work and experiencing feelings of 
accomplishment and self-actualization, e.g., career opportunity, advancement.  
SAT General satisfaction Lastly, the general satisfaction refers to an aggregation of satisfaction with various job facets or an 
aggregation of a few measures of general satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Levin and Stokes, 1989). 
SAT - JOB Job satisfaction  “I am extremely satisfied with my job” 
ORG – COM   
 
Organizational commitment 
 E.g. I am proud to tell others that I am a part of 
this organization  
 I really care about the state of this organization  
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AFFEC - COM 
 
Affective organizational commitment. 
 
Commitment characterized by positive feelings of 
identification with, attachment to, and involvement 
in, the work organization. E.g. "This organization has 
a great deal of personal meaning for me" 
 
 
 
CON - COM 
 
 
Continuance commitment  
 
An assessment of cost associated with leaving the 
organisation. i.e. low perceived alternatives and high 
personal sacrifice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
335 
 
 
MOTIVATION  
 
MOT Employee motivation  Defined by: e.g. MOT/WA; MOT/CIT; MOT/PERF  
MOT - WORK Work attendance motivation A motivation to attend work  
MOT - CIT Motivation to engage in acts of good 
organizational citizenship  
 
MOT - PERF Performance motivation  A motivation to perform well  
 
BEHAVIOURS 
 
WORK Work attendance   
PERF  Employee Performance
13,14  E.g.  
 quantity of work  
 quality of work  
 relationships with others  
 initiative  
reliability    
CIT Organizational citizenship/ Extra role behaviour Discretionary work behaviours that contribute to organizational well-being, but are not part of formal job 
expectations.  
Actions not required formally as part of job.  
E.g. helping co-workers, volunteering for special tasks, orienting new employees. Actions that contribute to 
the smooth functioning of the company but are not required formally 
CIT - HELP Employee helping behaviour. E.g. "This particular subordinate helps others in this organization learn about the work").  
CIT – VOICE  Voice extra-role behaviour. Speaks up, communicates, keeps informed etc. (Mayhew et al. 2007) Voice Extra Role Behaviour.  
INRO In role behaviour  Formal requirements of job.  
NEG Deviance behaviours, defined as voluntary 
behaviours that violate group norms and threaten the 
well-being of the group or its members.  
 
Dysfunctional effects  
E.g. Failing to delegate authority and share information; impeding the implementation of participative 
management, teamwork, and cooperation; engaging in sabotage or other deviant behaviors; and feeling 
frustration, stress, and alienation, as well as physical and psychological health effects. 
SACRIF Personal sacrifices  
 
 
                                                     
13
 Quarrey and Rosen (1997) note that there are virtually no performance effects associated with equity unless the equity stake in the organization is accompanied by 
employee participation in organizational decision making.  
14
 Pierce et al. (2004) stated that in many organizational settings, the ability of the individual to affect in-role performance is limited, as a consequence the performance 
effects stemming from objective and psychological ownership may be most pronounced in the area of extra-role performance behaviour. 
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CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATION  
 
CH Organizational Change   
CH - S Self-initiated Change  
CH – I Imposed change  
CH - E Evolutionary change Involving a gradual process of change and development  
CH - R Revolutionary change  
CH - A Additive change  
CH  - PRO Promotion of change   
CH  - RES Resistance to change  
TR Technology routinization Reliance on technology  
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Appendix 10: Informed Consent Form  
 
 
 
 
 
Employee Share Ownership Research at Loughborough University 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that this 
study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have been 
approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage for any reason, 
and that I will not be required to explain my reasons for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and will be 
kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory 
obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is judged that 
confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.  
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
                               Date 
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